Features
Hambantota oil refinery – From fairy tale to reality?

by Gomi Senadhira
“It is easier to fool people than convince them they have been fooled”– Mark Twain
The signing of US $3.7 billion deal to construct a “state-of-the-art oil refinery” oil refinery, with a capacity of 200,000 barrels, in Hambantota with Chinese state-run oil giant Sinopec during President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD)’s state visit to China, is indeed an important achievement. This is significant because successive governments had tried but failed to attract such a large investment into petroleum refining in Sri Lanka. However, it is appropriate to ask will it become a reality or is it another false promise, a fairy tale? After all, we have been fooled before with “fairy tales” about an oil refinery in Hambantota. Hence, we need to be cautious. Particularly because the most recent attempt to build an oil refinery began as a badly-choreographed farce and ended as a tragedy.
To understand why I am saying so, let’s start with the most recent attempt to build an oil refinery in Hambantota.
Largest Investment under the SLSFTA
In July 2018 the former Minister of Development Strategies and International Trade Malik Samarawickrama announced, during the Parliamentary Debate on the Sri Lanka-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (SLSFTA) that “…. Already, thanks to this FTA, in just the past two-and-a-half months since the agreement came into effect we have received a proposal from Singapore for investment amounting to $ 14.8 billion in an oil refinery for export of petroleum products…. In principle approval has already been granted by the BOI and the investors are awaiting the release of land and environmental approvals to commence the project.”
US $3.85 billion investment by Singapore’s Silver Park International
Eight months after the statement by Minister Samarawickrama in the parliament, on 19th March 2019, Deputy Minister Nalin Bandara and technical advisor to the Ministry, Mangala Yapa, announced at a press conference that the construction of US $3.85 billion oil refinery in the Mirijjawila Export Processing Zone in Hambantota will begin shortly by a Singapore-based Silver Park International (Pte) Ltd with Oman’s Oil and Gas Ministry. The project was a joint venture between Silver Park International, with 70 percent stake in the company, and the Ministry of Oil and Gas of Sultanate of Oman, with 30 percent shares. The investment was billed as Sri Lanka’s largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), ever. The oil refinery with the capacity to refine 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day, was expected to generate additional US $7 billion of exports per annum when it becomes fully operational in 2023, by exporting a minimum of 9 million metric tons of petroleum products per year.
Within twenty-four hours of the announcement by the Sri Lankan government on the joint venture, officials of Oman’s Oil and Gas Ministry denied being part of a $3.85 billion plan to build an oil refinery in Sri Lanka. According to a report filed by Reuters, addressing a news conference in Muscat, Salim al-Aufi, undersecretary of Oman’s Ministry of Oil and Gas, stated “No one on this side of the panel is aware of this investment in Sri Lanka …. It came as news to me; I don’t know who is signing the cheque for $3.8 billion.” In addition to that, Sri Lankan and Indian media started to question the credentials of the Singaporean investor.
Despite the Omani government’s denial and the media exposure of questionable credentials of the Singaporean Investor, Sri Lanka’s Board of Investments (BOI) decided to go ahead with the “project for a joint venture of Singapore company and Oman.” And on March 24, 2019, the foundation stone for the petroleum refinery was ceremoniously laid by the Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at the Mirijjawila Export Processing Zone with the attendance of Omani Minister of Oil and Gas Mohammed bin Hamad Al Rumhy, a number of ministers including Sajith Premadasa and several local parliamentarians.
US $20 billion investment by Singaporean company Sugih Energy International
After that, in October 2019, Sri Lankan newspapers as well as international news websites reported, quoting minister Malik Samarawickrama and Finance Minister Mangala Samaraweera that “The Sri Lankan government has given its approval to the Singaporean company Sugih Energy International (SEI) to build a $20 billion refinery at the port (of Hambantota). The project’s value exceeds the total of all foreign direct investment in Sri Lanka over the past forty year.” Mr. Samarawickrama also stated “”The company will invest in two phases. In the first phase, they have committed an investment of $14.8 billion for the refinery, and further $4 to $5 billion for petrochemical and other projects.”
Fairy Tales to Sell the FTA
Unfortunately, or fortunately, none of these multibillion-dollar investments from Singapore due to the FTA ever saw the light of day. These and almost all other investments from Singapore “thanks to this FTA,” turned out to be “fairy tales” narrated by the government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe to sell the Sri Lanka-Singapore FTA, to the parliament and the people of Sri Lanka. Though the “Silver Park” refinery was to become fully operational by 2023, it didn’t even progress beyond the foundation stone by then. The project by “Sugih Energy International Pte Ltd” couldn’t even reach that milestone. In August 2023 the Cabinet of Ministers approved two proposals presented by President Ranil Wickremesinghe in his capacity as the Minister of Investment Promotion to cancel the agreements with these two “Singapore based investors,” Silver Park International and “Sugih Energy International Pte Ltd”, due to their failure in implementing the projects!
BOI’s Failure to exercise Due diligence on these “largest Foreign Direct Investments”
It is difficult to understand as to why the BOI failed so miserably, to exercise DUE DILIGENCE on these “largest Foreign Direct Investments” in Sri Lanka. Due diligence on an investor by BOI is essential to understand the potential risks of the investment and to make informed decisions about whether to allow an investment in or not. More importantly, it is necessary to comply with Anti-Money Laundering regulations and to prevent financial crime. At the very least, the BOI should have ascertained if the investor is a Politically Exposed Person (PEP) and what the sources of the investor’s funds were? If the BOI had undertaken even a cursory appraisal of these two companies, like a simple google search, they would have discovered enough red flags on these two investors.
However, it is necessary to state that it is difficult to find much information on Sugih Energy International through a simple google search. Only news reports on this company are on its “US $20 billion investment in an Oil refinery in Hambantota.” Then there is a reference to a company, based on data from Panama Papers, named Sugih Energy International registered in the British Virgin Islands (which is well-known for its offshore companies) with links to Singapore, in the “Offshore Leaks Database,”. There is also a reference to a Sugih Energy International in the Singapore Business Directory. However, this company had changed its name to AETURNUM ENERGY INTERNATIONAL PTE. LTD. On 10 August 2024. On the same day it had changed its Entity Status from “Live Company” to “In Liquidation – Compulsory Winding Up (Insolvency).”
In contrast, it is possible to get a substantial amount of information on Silver Park International (Pte) Ltd through a simple google search. For example; the registered address of Silver Park International (Pte) Ltd, which is 18, Roberts Lane, #03-01 Singapore, shows the building in Singapore’s Little India where this company is located. #03-01 could be a room number within that building. More interestingly, it reveals the names of nearly a hundred other companies which have 18, Roberts Lane, #03-01 Singapore (218297), as their registered address. This includes an entity specialising in setting up shell companies. Can a shell company located at a shared address, invest US$3.85 billion in Sri Lanka? A cursory appraisal would have also revealed that most of the directors of Silver Park International (Pte) Ltd were Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and information on the investigations carried out by India’s Enforcement Directorate on these individuals.
Investigation by India’ s Enforcement Directorate (ED)
Though Sri Lankan authorities failed to carry out due diligence, after an explosive report by ‘The Hindu’ newspaper on ‘single largest foreign investment’ in Sri Lanka by a Singapore based investment company with links to an Indian politician’s family, the authorities across the Palk Strait started to investigate the Indian directors of Silver Park International (Pte) Ltd, namely, Mr S.Jagathrakshakan, a DMK Member of Indian Parliament and former union minister of state for information and Broadcasting, and his family members for their involvement money laundering activities. This was reported widely in the Indian media. And according to these reports in August 2024, Mr. Jagathrakshakan and his family members were fined ₹908 crore ( Sri Lankan Rupees 31 billion) for violation of India’s Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) and the charges were related to “….an investment of ₹42 crore in a shell company, Silver Park International Pte Ltd, incorporated in Singapore in 2017, and an investment of ₹9 crore (Sri Lankan Rupees 308million) in a Sri Lankan company.”
US$ 4.5 billion Oil Refinery by Sinopec
Though the government scrapped these controversial agreements with Silver Park International and “Sugih Energy International Pte Ltd” in August 2023, these agreements with controversial shell companies seriously damaged Sri Lanka’s image as an investment destination. Law-abiding countries do not permit investments, particularly such large investments, without doing a reasonable appraisal of the investors and the sources of the investor’s funds.
After scrapping the agreements with the controversial shell companies in November 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers approved awarding a contract to China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) to build a petroleum refinery in Hambantota. It was also announced that the refinery is expected to attract an investment of at least $4.5 billion. However, since then no tangible progress has been reported on this project.
US$ 3.7 billion oil refinery by Sinopec
Now, we have the MOU signed between Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Power and Energy and China’s Sinopec Corporation to build US$ 3.7 billion oil refinery, capable of producing 200,000 barrels of oil per day. Though this was signed during President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s four-day state visit to China, given the history of this project it is still appropriate to ask will it become a reality this time around or will it be another false promise, a fairy tale?
Conclusion
Given the high-profile manner in which this MOU was signed we can be optimistic about the success of the project. After all, Sinopec is one of the biggest petroleum companies in the world and with a revenue of $429.7billion in 2023, is the fifth on Fortune Global 500 list. We cannot even think about comparing it with shell companies like Silver Park International or Sugih Energy International.
Finally, however, there is one unanswered question about the amount of the investment. The cost of this project appears to have substantially reduced since it was first mooted in November 2023; from US$4.5 billion to US$3.7 billion. Will the Ministry of Power and Energy explain the reasons for this change?
(The writer, a former public servant and a diplomat, can be reached at )
Features
RIDDHI-MA:

A new Era of Dance in Sri Lanka
Kapila Palihawadana, an internationally renowned dancer and choreographer staged his new dance production, Riddhi-Ma, on 28 March 2025 at the Elphinstone theatre, which was filled with Sri Lankan theatregoers, foreign diplomats and students of dance. Kapila appeared on stage with his charismatic persona signifying the performance to be unravelled on stage. I was anxiously waiting to see nATANDA dancers. He briefly introduced the narrative and the thematic background to the production to be witnessed. According to him, Kapila has been inspired by the Sri Lankan southern traditional dance (Low Country) and the mythologies related to Riddhi Yâgaya (Riddi Ritual) and the black magic to produce a ‘contemporary ballet’.
Riddhi Yâgaya also known as Rata Yakuma is one of the elaborative exorcism rituals performed in the southern dance tradition in Sri Lanka. It is particularly performed in Matara and Bentara areas where this ritual is performed in order to curb the barrenness and the expectation of fertility for young women (Fargnoli & Seneviratne 2021). Kapila’s contemporary ballet production had intermingled both character, Riddi Bisaw (Princes Riddhi) and the story of Kalu Kumaraya (Black Prince), who possesses young women and caught in the evil gaze (yaksa disti) while cursing upon them to be ill (De Munck, 1990).
Kapila weaves a tapestry of ritual dance elements with the ballet movements to create visually stunning images on stage. Over one and a half hours of duration, Kapila’s dancers mesmerized the audience through their virtuosic bodily competencies in Western ballet, Sri Lankan dance, especially the symbolic elements of low country dance and the spontaneity of movements. It is human bodily virtuosity and the rhythmic structures, which galvanised our senses throughout the performance. From very low phases of bodily movements to high speed acceleration, Kapila managed to visualise the human body as an elevated sublimity.
Contemporary Ballet

Figure 2 – (L) Umesha Kapilarathna performs en pointe, and (R) Narmada Nekethani performs with Jeewaka Randeepa, Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, Maradana, 28th March 2025. Source:
Malshan Witharana
The dance production Riddhi-Ma was choreographed in several segments accompanied by a flow of various music arrangements and sound elements within which the dance narrative was laid through. In other words, Kapila as a choreographer, overcomes the modernist deadlock in his contemporary dance work that the majority of Sri Lankan dance choreographers have very often succumbed to. These images of bodies of female dancers commensurate the narrative of women’s fate and her vulnerability in being possessed by the Black Demon and how she overcomes and emancipates from the oppression. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have showcased their ability to use the bodies not much as an object which is trained to perform a particular tradition but to present bodily fluidity which can be transformed into any form. Kapila’s performers possess formlessness, fluid fragility through which they break and overcome their bodily regimentations.
It was such a highly sophisticated ‘contemporary ballet’ performed at a Sri Lankan theatre with utmost rigour and precision. Bodies of all male and female dancers were highly trained and refined through classical ballet and contemporary dance. In addition, they demonstrated their abilities in performing other forms of dance. Their bodies were trained to achieve skilful execution of complex ballet movements, especially key elements of traditional ballet namely, improvisation, partnering, interpretation and off-balance and the local dance repertoires. Yet, these key ballet elements are not necessarily a part of contemporary ballet training (Marttinen, 2016). However, it is important for the dance students to learn these key elements of traditional ballet and use them in the contemporary dance settings. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have achieved such vigour and somatic precision through assiduous practice of the body to create the magic on stage.
Pas de deux
Among others, a particular dance sequence attracted my attention the most. In the traditional ballet lexicon, it is a ‘pas de deux’ which is performed by the ‘same race male and female dancers,’ which can be called ‘a duet’. As Lutts argues, ‘Many contemporary choreographers are challenging social structures and norms within ballet by messing with the structure of the pas de deux (Lutts, 2019). Pas de Deux is a dance typically done by male and female dancers. In this case, Kapila has selected a male and a female dancer whose gender hierarchies appeared to be diminished through the choreographic work. In the traditional pas de deux, the male appears as the backdrop of the female dancer or the main anchorage of the female body, where the female body is presented with the support of the male body. Kapila has consciously been able to change this hierarchical division between the traditional ballet and the contemporary dance by presenting the female dominance in the act of dance.
The sequence was choreographed around a powerful depiction of the possession of the Gara Yakâ over a young woman, whose vulnerability and the powerful resurrection from the possession was performed by two young dancers. The female dancer, a ballerina, was in a leotard and a tight while wearing a pair of pointe shoes (toe shoes). Pointe shoes help the dancers to swirl on one spot (fouettés), on the pointed toes of one leg, which is the indication of the ballet dancer’s ability to perform en pointe (The Kennedy Centre 2020).
The stunning imagery was created throughout this sequence by the female and the male dancers intertwining their flexible bodies upon each other, throwing their bodies vertically and horizontally while maintaining balance and imbalance together. The ballerina’s right leg is bent and her toes are directed towards the floor while performing the en pointe with her ankle. Throughout the sequence she holds the Gara Yakâ mask while performing with the partner.
The male dancer behind the ballerina maintains a posture while depicting low country hand gestures combining and blurring the boundaries between Sri Lankan dance and the Western ballet (see figure 3). In this sequence, the male dancer maintains the balance of the body while lifting the female dancer’s body in the air signifying some classical elements of ballet.
Haptic sense

Figure 3: Narmada Nekathani performs with the Gara Yaka mask while indicating her right leg as en pointe. Male dancer, Jeewaka Randeepa’s hand gestures signify the low country pose. Riddhi-Ma, Dance Theatre at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025. Source: Malshan Witharana.
One significant element of this contemporary ballet production is the costume design. The selection of colour palette, containing black, red and while combining with other corresponding colours and also the costumes which break the traditional rules and norms are compelling. I have discussed in a recent publication how clothes connect with the performer’s body and operate as an embodied haptic perception to connect with the spectators (Liyanage, 2025). In this production, the costumes operate in two different ways: First it signifies sculpted bodies creating an embodied, empathic experience.
Secondly, designs of costumes work as a mode of three dimensional haptic sense. Kapila gives his dancers fully covered clothing, while they generate classical ballet and Sinhalese ritual dance movements. The covered bodies create another dimension to clothing over bodies. In doing so, Kapila attempts to create sculpted bodies on stage by blurring the boundaries of gender oriented clothing and its usage in Sri Lankan dance.
Sri Lankan female body on stage, particularly in dance has been presented as an object of male desire. I have elsewhere cited that the lâsya or the feminine gestures of the dance repertoire has been the marker of the quality of dance against the tândava tradition (Liyanage, 2025). The theatregoers visit the theatre to appreciate the lâsya bodies of female dancers and if the dancer meets this threshold, then she becomes the versatile dancer. Kandyan dancers such as Vajira and Chithrasena’s dance works are explored and analysed with this lâsya and tândava criteria. Vajira for instance becomes the icon of the lâsya in the Kandyan tradition. It is not my intention here to further discuss the discourse of lâsya and tândava here.
But Kapila’s contemporary ballet overcomes this duality of male-female aesthetic categorization of lâsya and tândava which has been a historical categorization of dance bodies in Sri Lanka (Sanjeewa 2021).

Figure 4: Riddhi-Ma’s costumes creates sculpted bodies combining the performer and the audience through empathic projection. Dancers, Sithija Sithimina and Senuri Nimsara appear in Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025, Source, Malshan Witharana.
Conclusion
Dance imagination in the Sri Lankan creative industry exploits the female body as an object. The colonial mind set of the dance body as a histrionic, gendered, exotic and aesthetic object is still embedded in the majority of dance productions produced in the current cultural industry. Moreover, dance is still understood as a ‘language’ similar to music where the narratives are shared in symbolic movements. Yet, Kapila has shown us that dance exists beyond language or lingual structures where it creates humans to experience alternative existence and expression. In this sense, dance is intrinsically a mode of ‘being’, a kinaesthetic connection where its phenomenality operates beyond the rationality of our daily life.
At this juncture, Kapila and his dance ensemble have marked a significant milestone by eradicating the archetypical and stereotypes in Sri Lankan dance. Kapila’s intervention with Riddi Ma is way ahead of our contemporary reality of Sri Lankan dance which will undoubtedly lead to a new era of dance theatre in Sri Lanka.
References
De Munck, V. C. (1990). Choosing metaphor. A case study of Sri Lankan exorcism. Anthropos, 317-328. Fargnoli, A., & Seneviratne, D. (2021). Exploring Rata Yakuma: Weaving dance/movement therapy and a
Sri Lankan healing ritual. Creative Arts in Education and Therapy (CAET), 230-244.
Liyanage, S. 2025. “Arts and Culture in the Post-War Sri Lanka: Body as Protest in Post-Political Aragalaya (Porattam).” In Reflections on the Continuing Crises of Post-War Sri Lanka, edited by Gamini Keerawella and Amal Jayawardane, 245–78. Colombo: Institute for International Studies (IIS) Sri Lanka.
Lutts, A. (2019). Storytelling in Contemporary Ballet.
Samarasinghe, S. G. (1977). A Methodology for the Collection of the Sinhala Ritual. Asian Folklore Studies, 105-130.
Sanjeewa, W. (2021). Historical Perspective of Gender Typed Participation in the Performing Arts in Sri Lanka During the Pre-Colonial, The Colonial Era, and the Post-Colonial Eras. International Journal of Social Science And Human Research, 4(5), 989-997.
The Kennedy Centre. 2020. “Pointe Shoes Dancing on the Tips of the Toes.” Kennedy-Center.org. 2020 https://www.kennedy-center.org/education/resources-for-educators/classroom-resources/media- and-interactives/media/dance/pointe-shoes/..
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama for proofreading this article.
About the author:
Saumya Liyanage (PhD) is a film and theatre actor and professor in drama and theatre, currently working at the Department of Theatre Ballet and Modern Dance, Faculty of Dance and Drama, University of the Visual and Performing Arts (UVPA), Colombo. He is the former Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and is currently holding the director position of the Social Reconciliation Centre, UVPA Colombo.
Features
Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part II

Chinese Naval Entry and End of Post-War Unipolarity
The ascendancy of China as an emerging superpower is one of the most striking shifts in the global distribution of economic and political power in the 21st century. With its strategic rise, China has assumed a more proactive diplomatic and economic role in the Indian Ocean, signalling its emergence as a global superpower. This new leadership role is exemplified by initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.
In 2025, in terms of Navy fleet strength, China became the world’s largest Navy, with a fleet of 754 ships, thanks to its ambitious naval modernisation programme. In May 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further strengthened its capabilities by commissioning the Fujian, its latest aircraft carrier. Equipped with an advanced electromagnetic catapult system, the Fujian can launch larger and heavier aircraft, marking a significant upgrade over its predecessors.
Driven by export-led growth, China sought to reinvest its trade surplus, redefining the Indian Ocean region not just as a market but as a key hub for infrastructure investment. Notably, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf transit to the Straits of Malacca before reaching its industrial centres. These factors underscore the Indian Ocean’s critical role in China’s economic and naval strategic trajectories.
China’s port construction projects along the Indian Ocean littoral, often associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplify its deepening geopolitical and economic engagement in the region. These initiatives encompass multipurpose berth development, deep-sea port construction, and supporting infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing maritime connectivity and trade. Key projects include the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, a strategic asset for China’s access to the Arabian Sea; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which became a focal point of debt diplomacy concerns; the Payra deep-sea port in Bangladesh; as well as port and road infrastructure development in Myanmar’s Yunnan and Kyaukphyu regions and Cambodia’s Koh Kong.
While these projects were promoted as avenues for economic growth and regional connectivity, they also triggered geopolitical tensions and domestic opposition in several host countries. Concerns over excessive debt burdens, lack of transparency, and potential dual-use (civilian and military) implications of port facilities led to scrutiny from both local and external stakeholders, including India and Western powers. As a result, some projects faced significant pushback, delays, and, in certain cases, suspension or cancellation. This opposition underscores the complex interplay between economic cooperation, strategic interests, and sovereignty concerns in China’s Indian Ocean engagements.
China’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has fundamentally altered the region’s strategic landscape, signalling the end of early post-Cold War unipolarity. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiatives, China has entrenched itself economically, financing. Diplomatically, Beijing has deepened its engagement with littoral states through bilateral agreements, security partnerships, and regional forums, challenging traditional Western and Indian influence.
China’s expanding naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, including its military base in Djibouti, and growing security cooperation with regional states, mark the end of unchallenged US dominance in the region. The Indian Ocean is now a contested space, where China’s presence compels strategic recalibrations by India, the United States, and other regional actors. The evolving security landscape in the Indian Ocean—marked by intensifying competition, shifting alliances, and the rise of a multipolar order—has significant implications for Sri Lanka’s geopolitical future.
India views China’s growing economic, political, and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region as a key strategic challenge. In response, India has pursued a range of strategic, political, and economic measures to counterbalance Chinese influence, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka through infrastructure investment, defense partnerships, and diplomatic engagements.
Other Extra-Regional powers
Japan and Australia have emerged as significant players in the post-Cold War strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean. During the early phases of the Cold War, Australia played a crucial role in Western ‘Collective Security Alliances’ (ANZUS and (SEATO). However, its direct engagement in Indian Ocean security remained limited, primarily supporting the British Royal Navy under Commonwealth obligations. Japan, meanwhile, refrained from deploying naval forces in the region after World War II, adhering to its pacifist constitution and post-war security policies. In recent decades, shifting strategic conditions have prompted both Japan and Australia to reassess their roles in the Indian Ocean, leading to greater defence cooperation and a more proactive regional presence.
In the post-Cold War era, Australia has progressively expanded its naval engagements in the Indian Ocean, driven by concerns over maritime security, protection of trade routes, and China’s growing influence. Through initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and deeper defence partnerships with India and the United States, Australia has bolstered its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Recalibration of Japan’s approach
Japan, too, has recalibrated its approach to Indian Ocean security in response to geopolitical shifts. Recognising the Indian Ocean’s critical importance for its energy security and trade, Japan has strengthened its naval presence through port visits, joint exercises, and maritime security cooperation. The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) has taken on a more active role in anti-piracy operations, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and strategic partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral states. This shift aligns with Japan’s broader strategy of contributing to regional stability while balancing its constitutional constraints on military force projection.
Japan’s proactive role in the Indian Ocean region is evident in its diplomatic and defence engagements. In January 2019, Japan sent its Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Katsutoshi Kawano, to the Raisina Dialogue, a high-profile geopolitical conference in India. Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, identifies China’s growing assertiveness as its greatest strategic challenge and underscores the need to deepen bilateral ties and multilateral defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It also emphasises the importance of securing stable access to sea-lanes, through which more than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass. In recent years, Japan has expanded its port investment portfolio across the Indian Ocean, with major projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In 2021, Japan participated for the first time in CARAT-Sri Lanka (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), a bilateral naval exercise. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force returned for the exercise in January 2023, held at Trincomalee Port and Mullikulam Base.
Japan’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean have been most evident in its involvement in port infrastructure development projects. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are key countries where early Chinese-led port construction faced setbacks. Unlike India, which carries historical and political complexities in its relations with these countries, Japan is better positioned to compete with China. In December 2021, a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility in Trincomalee, complementing the already well-established Tokyo Cement factory. When the Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans in mid-2022 to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port—inviting expressions of interest from investors to utilise port facilities and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land—Trincomalee regained strategic attention.
The Colombo Dockyard, in collaboration with Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, has established a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee, marking a significant development in Japan’s engagement with Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. This initiative aligns with Japan’s broader strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal, a region of critical economic and security importance. A key Japanese concern appears to be limiting China’s ability to establish a permanent presence in Trincomalee. This initiative underscores the broader strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Trincomalee, with its deep-water harbour, has long been regarded as a critical maritime asset. Japan’s involvement reflects its efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement with Sri Lanka amid growing regional competition. The challenge before Sri Lanka is how to navigate this strategic contest while maximising its national interests.
Other Regional Powers
In analyzing the evolving naval security architecture of the post-Cold War Indian Ocean, particular attention should be given to the naval developments of regional powers such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In 2012, Pakistan established the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) to strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). The creation of the NSFC suggests a shift toward sea-based deterrence, complementing Pakistan’s broader military strategy. In December 2012, Pakistan conducted a series of cruise missile tests from naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. Given India’s expanding maritime capabilities, which Pakistan views as a significant threat, the Pakistan Navy may consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships as part of its evolving deterrence strategy. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy cannot overlook this development.
Indonesia also emerged as a significant player in the evolving naval security landscape of the Indian Ocean. In 2010, it launched a military modernisation programme aimed at achieving a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF) by 2024. As part of this initiative, Indonesia sought to build a modern Navy with 247 surface vessels and 12 submarines. One of the primary challenges faced by the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is piracy. To enhance maritime security, Indonesia and Singapore signed the SURPIC Cooperation Arrangement in Bantam in May 2005, enabling real-time sea surveillance in the Singapore Strait for more effective naval patrols. In 2017, Indonesia introduced the Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) and subsequently incorporated blue economy strategies into its national development agenda, reinforcing its maritime vision. According to projections from the Global Firepower Index, published in 2025, the Indonesian Navy is ranked fourth in global ranking and second in Asia in terms of Navy fleet strength (Global Firepower, 2025).
In October 2012, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) announced plans to build a second Scorpène simulator training facility at its base in Kota Kinabalu, in addition to submarine base in Sepanggar, Sabah, constructed in 2002. To enhance its naval capabilities, the RMN planned to procure 18 Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) for maritime surveillance and six Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) between 2019 and 2023. Malaysia and China finalised their first major defence deal during Prime Minister Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in November 2016. During this visit, Malaysia’s Defence Ministry signed a contract to procure LMS from China, as reported by The Guardian. Despite this agreement, Malaysia continues to maintain amicable relations with both China and India, as does Indonesia.
The increasing presence of major naval powers, the rise of regional stakeholders, and the growing significance of trade routes and maritime security have transformed the Indian Ocean into a central pivot of both regional and global politics, with Sri Lanka positioned at its heart. (To be Continued)
by Gamini Keerawella
Features
More excitement for Andrea Marr…

Sri Lankan Andrea Marr, now based in Australia, is in the spotlight again. She says she has teamed up with a fantastic bunch of Sri Lankan musicians, in Melbourne, and the band is called IntoGroove.
“The band has been going strong for many years and I have been a fan of this outfit for quite a few years; just love these guys, authentic R&B and funk.”
Although Andrea has her original blues band, The McNaMarr Project, and they do have a busy schedule, she went on to say that “when the opportunity came up to join these guys, I simply couldn’t refuse … they are too good.”
IntoGroove is Jude Nicholas (lead vocals), Peter Menezes (bass), Keith Pereira (drums), Blaise De Silva (keyboards) and and Steve Wright (guitar).

Andrea Marr: Powerhouse of the blues
“These guys are a fantastic band and I really want everyone to hear them.”
Andrea is a very talented artiste with many achievements to her credit, and a vocal coach, as well.
In fact, she did her second vocal coaching session at Australian Songwriters Conference early this year.
Her first student showcase for this year took place last Sunday, in Melbourne, and it brought into the spotlight the wonderful acts she has moulded, as teacher and mentor.
What makes Andrea extra special is that she has years of teaching experience and is able to do group vocal coaching for all styles, levels and genres.
In January, this year, she performed at the exclusive ‘Women In Blues’ showcase at Alfred’s On Beale Street (rock venue with live entertainment), in Memphis, in the USA, during the International Blues Challenge when bands from all over the world converge on Memphis for the ‘Olympics of the Blues.’

The McNaMarr Project with Andrea and Lindsay Marr in the
vocal spotlight
This was her fourth performance in the home of the blues; she has represented Australian Blues three times and, on this occasion, she went as ambassador for Blues Music Victoria, and The Melbourne Blues Appreciation Society’s ‘Women In Blues’ Coordinator.
Andrea was inducted into the Blues Music Victoria Hall of Fame in 2022 and released her 10th album which hit #1 on the Australian Blues Charts.
Known as ‘the pint-sized powerhouse of the blues’ for her high energy, soulful, original music, Andrea is also a huge fan of the late Elvis Presley and has checked out Graceland, in Memphis, Tennessee, USA, many times.
In Melbourne, the singer also plays a major role in helping Animal Rescue organisations find homes for abandoned cats.
Andrea Marr’s wish, at the moment, is that the Lankan audience, in Melbourne, would get behind this band, IntoGroove. They are world class, she added.
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