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Midweek Review

Fresh look at CFA, ect., finalised by UNP

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Jon Westburg the then Norwegian Ambassador in Colombo, shaking hands with Ranil Wickramasinghe after signing the CFA on Feb. 22, 2002.

Ranil declares US energy deal illegal

By Shamindra Ferdinando

UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, over the last weekend, declared the much disputed Framework Agreement (FA) with the US Company New Fortress Energy illegal.

 National List MP Wickremesinghe, who had served as the Prime Minister on several occasions emphasised: “any agreement that violated the country’s laws is illegal. This agreement has violated the laws of the country. Therefore, it is illegal.

Raising a privilege issue in Parliament the day after Basil Rajapaksa, in his capacity as the Finance Minister, delivered the Budget for 2022, Wickremesinghe explained that the FA violated the Provisions of the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act and its Standing Orders.

 The UNP Leader urged Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to declare that the FA had violated the powers, privileges and immunity of Parliament.

Lawmaker Wickremesinghe’s declaration should be examined taking into consideration his conduct as the Premier during the 2001-2004 and 2015-2019 periods.

Did Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as the Premier, follow the advice he gave the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) in respect of the FA with the company listed in the NASDAQ? Did Wickremesinghe consult Parliament or the Cabinet of Ministers before finalising contentious agreements, like the CFA that he signed with the LTTE, in total secrecy, or the treacherous motion moved against one’s own country in Geneva? Wickremesinghe, during his premiership never bothered, to consult Parliament or discuss the issues at hand with relevant stakeholders.

Perhaps, Wickremesinghe felt that his party can exploit the growing crisis over the FA with the US enterprise. Having being reduced to just one National List slot in the Parliament, following the 2020 parliamentary election, the beleaguered UNP leader will simply do anything to gain some political mileage. Wickremesinghe’s stand on this matter should be examined against the backdrop of a section of the government, led by three Cabinet Ministers, namely Vasudeva Nanayakkara, Wimal Weerawansa and Udaya Gammanpila, declaring the deal inimical to the country.

Let me discuss the Norway, arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Feb 21, 2002. The then Premier disregarded Parliament. The UNP leader didn’t bother to properly consult the armed forces top brass. Their concerns weren’t heeded. Instead, Norway prepared the CFA, taking into consideration the LTTE’s concerns. The one-sided agreement facilitated the LTTE’s despicable project. The LTTE swiftly moved into armed forces held areas, where the group violated the CFA at will. In fact, the CFA facilitated the despicable terror project.

Wickremesinghe gave the go ahead for the 99-year-lease on the strategic Hambantota harbour in 2017 under controversial circumstances. Did Wickremesinghe consult Parliament before co-sponsoring an accountability resolution at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) or entering into ‘Comprehensive Partnership’ agreement with Japan, both in Oct 2015?

Former ministers, Mahinda Samarasinghe (now Sri Lanka’s Ambassador in Washington), Dayasiri Jayasekera (State Minister) and Sarath Fonseka (MP) in response to queries raised by the writer acknowledged that the Cabinet never formally approved co-sponsorship of the Geneva resolution. Wickremesinghe never contradicted what his ministers’ said.

It would be pertinent to mention that on the eve of the CFA, the Navy and the Sea Tigers fought two battles off Mullaithivu. The Sea Tigers triggered the battle by engaging two Fast Attack Craft (FACs) off Chalai. The Navy had to call in Katunayake-based jets in support of the units under attack off the northern coast. The UNP never considered the real threat posed by the LTTE. In fact, the top leadership slept as the LTTE flexed its muscles. The rapid build-up of firepower, within range of the strategic Trincomalee harbour, threatened to overwhelm the armed forces. The LTTE went to the extent of assassinating the then Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on the night of August 12, 2005 at his heavily fortified Bullers Lane residence.

UNP strategy

 The UNP never took the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga into confidence. She was never properly briefed nor her consent obtained before Wickremesinghe signed the CFA. On behalf of the LTTE, the late Velupillai Prabhakaran signed the document prepared in Oslo. Prof. G.L. Peiris, the then top minister in Wickremesinghe’s administration, declared President Kumaratunga skipped Cabinet on two consecutive sittings just before the signing of the CFA therefore she couldn’t receive briefing as regards the provisions of the CFA. Wickremesinghe secured Cabinet approval on Feb. 20, 2002. However, Presidential Spokesman the late Janadasa Peiris, declared the President didn’t attend the Cabinet meet on Feb 20 as she was told that nothing significant was going to take place (Kept away ‘as nothing important was to be discussed’-The Island, March 1, 2002).

Prof. Peiris led the government peace negotiating team, whereas the late Anton Balasingham, a British national of Sri Lankan origin, managed the LTTE team. The talks collapsed in April 2003 after six rounds, at overseas venues, as the LTTE abruptly quit the negotiating table as part of its overall strategy as it launched an unprecedented initiative to build up a formidable political base.

In line with that strategy, a coalition of Tamil political parties, called Tamil National Alliance (TNA) recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. The TNA remained committed to the LTTE’s separatist project until the very end.

Now that MP Wickremesinghe has declared that the New Fortress Energy deal violated the Provisions of the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act and its Standing Orders, wouldn’t it be interesting to examine how Wickremesinghe finalised the CFA.

Dr. John Gooneratne, who had been with the government Peace Secretariat, from its inception in January 2002 to May 2006, explained serious shortcomings in the CFA over a year after the conclusion of the conflict in May 2009. Appearing before the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) on Sept. 15, 2010, Dr. Gooneratne revealed that four key matters, proposed by the government, weren’t included in the CFA. (A) There had been no reference to the requirement to use the CFA to pave the way for talks to find a negotiated settlement. (B) Specific reference to the prohibition of unlawful importation of arms, ammunition and equipment was not included. (C) Although the LTTE was allowed to engage in ‘political work’ in government controlled areas, other political parties weren’t given access to areas under the LTTE control (D) Forcible conscription of personnel to the LTTE’s fighting cadre was also not added to the list of prohibited activities.

Dr. Gooneratne, a veteran career diplomat, faulted the then UNP government as well as the Norwegians for being hasty in their approach. Dr. Gooneratne said: “What lessons can we learn from this experience? Firstly, negotiating on such security and military matters should have been a more inclusive format than by just the party in power. Secondly, in negotiating documents such as the CFA, thoroughness should be the standard, and not just the speed.”

One-time Norwegian peace envoy to the Sri Lankan peace process, Erik Solheim claimed that he drafted the CFA, signed by Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran. Solheim said so in an interview with Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, one of the beneficiaries of the Norwegian project (Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons – Volume II edited by Dr. Rupesinghe – first published in February 2006).

Asked by Dr. Rupesinghe to explain the circumstances under which the CFA came into being, Solheim said that having had extensive discussions with LTTE theoretician, Anton Balasingham as well as ministers, G. L. Peiris (SLPP Chairman and Foreign Minister) and Milinda Moragoda (Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in New Delhi), he drafted a new proposal. That process had taken about two months. Prof. Peiris nor former Minister Moragoda had ever questioned Solheim’s assertions.

Need for proper negotiating mechanism

 During the yahapalana administration (2015-2019) the US negotiated ACSA (Access and Cross Servicing Agreement), SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Compact with Sri Lanka. Did Wickremesinghe and then President Maithripala Sirisena consult Parliament, or the Cabinet of Ministers, regarding the three agreements?

 President Sirisena, in his capacity as the Defence Minister authorised the ACSA. The President had the tacit support of the UNP. The government never disclosed the finalisation of the ACSA until the writer raised the issue with President Sirisena at a media briefing held at the President’s House. Having repeatedly vowed not to allow the UNP to enter into agreements with the US, at the expense of the country’s national security, President Sirisena had no option but to admit his role in authorising ACSA.

The SLFP leader, now a member of the SLPP parliamentary group, quietly allowed the finalisation of the ACSA in early August 2017. The ACSA, first signed by the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, during Mahinda Rajapakas’s first tenure as the President, received Sirisena’s approval, though he subsequently vowed any agreement, inimical to Sri Lanka, wouldn’t be allowed as long as he enjoyed executive powers. This declaration was made at a meeting with editors of national newspapers and senior representatives of both the print and electronic media. When the writer sought a clarification regarding the ACSA, Sirisena acknowledged the finalisation of the agreement, in the first week of August 2017. The UNP never found fault with Sirisena for giving the go ahead for the ACSA finalisation. As far as the yahapalana policy, vis-à-vis the US, both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe took one stand though sometimes, Sirisena tried to distance himself from Wickremesinghe’s Geneva policy.

When Sri Lanka entered into ACSA way back in 2007, the first Rajapaksa administration didn’t bother to consult the government parliamentary group or Parliament.

Talks on SOFA were suspended later. But the possibility of the US taking it up can never be ruled out whereas Sri Lanka abandoned the MCC project on the recommendations made by the Gunaruwan Committee.

Lanka-Singapore trade agreement

 Controversy surrounds the circumstances in which the yahapalana administration entered into the Sri Lanka – Singapore Free Trade Agreement (SLSFTA) on Jan. 23 2018. The agreement was brought into operation with effect from 1 May 2018. Sirisena who had been present at the signing of the agreement in Colombo, declared in Dec of the same year that it was rushed without proper consent of stakeholders. Sirisena said so after receiving a report prepared by retired economics Professor W.D. Lakshman, who studied the agreement. The UNP and the SLFP should be ashamed of the way they handled trade negotiations with Singapore where disgraced Central Bank Governor Arjuna Mahendran secured refuge in early 2018. Professor Lakshman succeeded Mahendran’s successor Dr. Indrajith Coomaraswamy soon after the 2019 presidential poll. Did the yahapalana leaders consult cabinet of ministers or Parliament as regards SLSFTA?

 UNP MP Wickremesinghe owes the country an explanation as to how SLSFTA came into being. Did MP Wickremesinghe follow the advice he recently gave the SLPP in respect of the New Fortress Energy deal?

Successive governments have been utterly irresponsible in finalising key agreements with foreign governments. There cannot be a better example than the deal on the Hambantota port. One-time Ports and Shipping Minister Arjuna Ranatunga recently discussed the failure on the part of the country to adopt a common stand in matters of national importance. Ranatunga said so when the writer sought his opinion on the controversy over the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill enacted in last Oct and the 99-year leasing of the Hambantota port to the Chinese.

Ranatunga compared the handing over of the Hambantota port to China, in July 2017, with the Colombo Port City project to be managed in terms of the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act.

The former lawmaker said that he gave up the Ports and Shipping Ministry as he didn’t want to endorse the disputed agreement under any circumstances.

Ranatunga contested the Gampaha district, on the UNP ticket, at the last general election, but couldn’t win like all other party candidates, barring for a solitary National List seat, which Wickremesinghe grabbed though it should have rightfully gone to John Amaratunga, who was on top of the party’s National List or at least to one of those National List nominees.

 Ranatunga pointed out that the Port City Project, too, had been under the purview of the ports and shipping ministry. But the yahapalana administration, following consultations with him, brought the Port City project under the then Megapolis Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka’s purview.

Ranatunga was replaced as Ports and Shipping Minister by SLFP Vice President and Kalutara District MP Mahinda Samarasinghe.

The former World Cup winning national cricket captain emphasised that he gave up the ministry after the yahapalana government rejected a proposal prepared in consultation with the ministry and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). It was discarded by those bent on pursuing an agenda inimical to Sri Lanka, he charged.

The then SLFPer Samarasinghe finalised the agreement on July 29, 2017.

Former minister Ranatunga said that he was quite surprised by the rejection of his proposal as he presented a sensible solution which addressed concerns of both countries. Ranatunga said that he didn’t want to remain as the Ports and Shipping Minister at any cost.

Acknowledging some support provided by the then Cabinet colleague Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakse PC, as he struggled to thwart a plan inimical to the country, Ranatunga claimed that the Joint Opposition (SLPP now) backed the deal on the Hambantota port. Ranatunga pointed out that some tend to conveniently forget both the Hambantota and Port City projects were initiated during the previous Rajapaksa administration.

The Hambantota port project was initiated in 2007 at the height of the war, whereas the Port City got underway in late 2014.

Appreciating the investments made by China in Sri Lanka, over a period of time, Ranatunga stressed that the country couldn’t afford to enter into agreements detrimental to its interests. The former minister urged lawmakers, both opposed to the project as well as those backing, it to be cautious in their approach.

 Noting that the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) had been among those who petitioned the Supreme Court against the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill, Ranatunga said that the handling of the Hambantota port agreement revealed how the country was being manipulated. “In spite of the Hambantota port coming under the purview of the Ports and Shipping Ministry, it didn’t really have a say. That is the undeniable truth,” Ranatunga said.

The former MP questioned the rationale in reclaiming land adjacent to the Galle Face Green at such a huge cost as the project could have been set up in some other suitable location.

Ranatunga said that he was not aware of the current status of the cases filed against the Hambantota port. Among those who filed cases was the then MP Vavudeva Nanayakkara. However, none of the 19 petitioners who moved the Supreme Court against the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill, including BASL, conveniently failed to figure in the legal challenge thrown against the Hambantota port deal.

Ranatunga said due to the failure on the part of Parliament to take remedial measures the country seemed to be repeating mistakes. The former minister regretted the overall failure to address contentious issues, such as major foreign investment which might threaten the country’s stability. The government and the main Opposition should bear the responsibility for both Hambantota and Port City projects as they proceeded with both.



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Midweek Review

At the edge of a world war

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In September 1939, as Europe descended once more into catastrophe, E. H. Carr published The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Twenty years had separated the two great wars—twenty years to reflect, to reconstruct, to restrain. Yet reflection proved fragile. Carr wrote with unsentimental clarity: once the enemy is crushed, the “thereafter” rarely arrives. The illusion that power can come first and morality will follow is as dangerous as the belief that morality alone can command power. Between those illusions, nations lose themselves.

His warning hovers over the present war in Iran.

The “thereafter” has long haunted American interventions—after Afghanistan, after Iraq, after Libya. The enemy can be dismantled with precision; the aftermath resists precision. Iran is not a small theater. It is a civilization-state with a geography three times larger than Iraq. At its southern edge lies the Strait of Hormuz, narrow in width yet immense in consequence. Geography does not argue; it compels.

Long before Carr, in the quiet anxiety of the eighteenth century, James Madison, principal architect of the Constitution, warned that war was the “true nurse of executive aggrandizement.” War concentrates authority in the name of urgency. Madison insisted that the power to declare war must rest with Congress, not the president—so that deliberation might restrain impulse. Republics persuade themselves that emergency powers are temporary. History rarely agrees.

Then, at 2:30 a.m., the abstraction becomes decision.

Donald Trump declares war on Iran. The announcement crosses continents before markets open in Asia. Within twenty-four hours, Ali Khamenei, who ruled for thirty-seven years, is killed. The President calls him one of history’s most evil figures and presents his death as an opening for the Iranian people.

In exile, Reza Pahlavi hails the moment as liberation. In less than forty-eight hours, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps collapses under overwhelming air power. A regime that endured decades falls swiftly. Military efficiency appears absolute. Yet efficiency does not resolve legitimacy.

The joint strike with Israel is framed as necessary and pre-emptive. Retaliation follows across the Gulf. The architecture of energy trade becomes fragile. Shipping routes are recalculated. Markets respond before diplomacy finds its language.

It is measured in the price of petrol in Colombo. In the bus fare in Karachi. In the rising cost of cooking gas in Dhaka. It is heard in the anxious voice of a migrant worker in Doha calling home to Kandy, asking whether contracts will be renewed, whether flights will continue, whether wages will be delayed. It is calculated in foreign reserves already strained, in currencies that tremble at rumor, in budgets forced to choose between subsidy and solvency.

Zaara was the breadwinner of her house in Sri Lanka. Her husband had been unemployed for years. At last, he secured an opportunity to travel to Israel as a foreign worker—like many Sri Lankans who depend on employment in the Middle East. It was to be their turning point: a small house repaired, debts reduced, dignity restored.

Now she lowers her eyes when she speaks. For Zaara, geopolitics is not theory. It is fear measured in distance—between a construction site abroad and a village waiting at home.

The war in Iran has shattered calculations that once felt practical. Nations like Sri Lanka now require strategic foresight to navigate unfolding realities. Reactive responses—whether to natural disasters or external shocks like this conflict—can cripple economies far faster than gradual pressures. Disruptions to energy imports, migrant remittances, and foreign reserves show how distant wars ripple into daily lives.

War among great powers is debated in think tanks. Its consequences are lived in markets—and in quiet kitchens where uncertainty sits heavier than hunger.

The conflict does not unfold in isolation. It enters the strategic calculus of China and Russia, both attentive to precedent. Power projected beyond the Western hemisphere reshapes perceptions in the Eastern theater. Iran’s transformation intersects directly with broader alignments. In 2021, Beijing and Tehran signed a twenty-five-year strategic agreement. By 2025, China was purchasing the majority of Iran’s exported oil at discounted rates. Energy underwrote strategy. That continuity has been disrupted. Yet strategic relationships do not vanish; they adjust.

In Winds of Change, my new book, I reproduce Nicholas Spykman’s 1944 two-theater confrontation map—Europe and the Pacific during the Second World War. Spykman distinguished maritime power from amphibian projection. Control of the Rimland determined balance. Then, the United States fought across two vast theaters. Today, Europe remains unsettled through Ukraine, the Pacific simmers over Taiwan and the South China Sea, Latin America remains sensitive, and the Middle East has been abruptly transformed. The architecture of multi-theater tension reappears.

At this juncture, the reflections of Marwan Bishara acquire weight. America’s ultimate power, he argues, resides in deterrence, not in the habitual use of force. Power, especially when shared, stabilizes. Force, when used with disregard for international law, breeds instability and humiliation. Arrogance creates enemies and narrows judgment. It is no surprise that many Americans themselves believe the United States should not act alone.

America’s strength does not rest solely in its military reach. Its economy constitutes roughly one-third of global output and generates close to 40 percent of the world’s research and development. Structural power—economic, technological, institutional—has historically underwritten deterrence. When force becomes the primary instrument, influence risks becoming coercion.

The United States now confronts simultaneous pressures across continents. The Second World War demonstrated the capacity to sustain multi-theater engagement; the post-9/11 wars revealed the exhaustion that follows prolonged intervention. Iran, larger and geopolitically deeper, presents a scale that cannot be resolved by air power alone.

Carr’s “thereafter” waits patiently. Military victory may be swift; political reconstruction is slow. Bishara reminds us that deterrence sustains stability, while force risks unraveling it.

At the edge of a potential world war, the decisive question is not who strikes first, but who restrains longest.

History watches. And in places far from the battlefield, mothers wait for phone calls that may not come.

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera is a Senior Research Fellow at the Millennium Project, Washington, D.C., and the author of Winds of Change: Geopolitics at the Crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, published by World Scientific

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Midweek Review

Live Coals Burst Aflame

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Live coals of decades-long hate,

Are bursting into all-consuming flames,

In lands where ‘Black Gold’ is abundant,

And it’s a matter to be thought about,

If humans anywhere would be safe now,

Unless these enmities dying hard,

With roots in imperialist exploits,

And identity-based, tribal violence,

Are set aside and laid finally to rest,

By an enthronement of the principle,

Of the Equal Dignity of Humans.

By Lynn Ockersz

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Midweek Review

Saga of the arrest of retired intelligence chief

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Retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay’s recent arrest attracted internatiattention. His long-expected arrest took place ahead of the seventh anniversary of the bombings. Multiple blasts claimed the lives of nearly 280 people, including 45 foreigners. State-owned international news television network, based in Paris, France 24, declared that arrest was made on the basis of information provided by a whistleblower. The French channel was referring to Hanzeer Azad Moulana, who earlier sought political asylum in the West and one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan aka Pilleyan. May be the fiction he wove against Pilleyan and others may have been to strengthen his asylum claim there. Moulana is on record as having told the British Channel 4 that Sallay allowed the attack to proceed with the intention of influencing the 2019 presidential election. The French news agency quoted an investigating officer as having said: “He was arrested for conspiracy and aiding and abetting the Easter Sunday attacks. He has been in touch with people involved in the attacks, even recently.”

****

Suresh Sallay of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) received the wrath of Yahapalana Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, in 2016, over the reportage of what the media called the Chavakachcheri explosives detection made on March 30, 2016. Premier Wickremesinghe found fault with Sallay for the coverage, particularly in The Island. Police arrested ex-LTTE child combatant Edward Julian, alias Ramesh, after the detection of one suicide jacket, four claymore mines, three parcels containing about 12 kilos of explosives, to battery packs and several rounds of 9mm ammunition, from his house, situated at Vallakulam Pillaiyar Kovil Street. Chavakachcheri police made the detection, thanks to information provided by the second wife of Ramesh. Investigations revealed that the deadly cache had been brought by Ramesh from Mannar (Detection of LTTE suicide jacket, mines jolts government: Fleeing Tiger apprehended at checkpoint, The Island, March 31, 2016).

The then Jaffna Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake, told the writer that a thorough inquiry was required to ascertain the apprehended LTTE cadre’s intention. The Chavakachcheri detection received the DMI’s attention. The country’s premier intelligence organisation meticulously dealt with the issue against the backdrop of an alleged aborted bid to revive the LTTE in April 2014. Of those who had been involved in the fresh terror project, three were killed in the Nedunkerny jungles. There hadn’t been any other incidents since the Nedunkerny skirmish, until the Chavakachcheri detection.

Piqued by the media coverage of the Chavakachcheri detection, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration tried to silence the genuine Opposition. As the SLFP had, contrary to the expectations of those who voted for the party at the August 2015 parliamentary elections, formed a treacherous coalition with the UNP, the Joint Opposition (JO) spearheaded the parliamentary opposition.

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) questioned former External Affairs Minister and top JO spokesman, Prof. G.L. Peiris, over a statement made by him regarding the Chavakachcheri detection. The former law professor questioned the legality of the CID’s move against the backdrop of police declining to furnish him a certified copy of the then acting IGP S.M. Wickremesinghe’s directive that he be summoned to record a statement as regards the Chavakachcheri lethal detection.

One-time LTTE propagandist Velayutham Dayanidhi, a.k.a. Daya Master, raised with President Maithripala Sirisena the spate of arrests made by law enforcement authorities, in the wake of the Chavakachcheri detection. Daya Master took advantage of a meeting called by Sirisena, on 28 April, 2016, at the President’s House, with the proprietors of media organisations and journalists, to raise the issue. The writer having been among the journalists present on that occasion, inquired from the ex-LETTer whom he represented there. Daya Master had been there on behalf of DAN TV, Tamil language satellite TV, based in Jaffna. Among those who had been detained was Subramaniam Sivakaran, at that time Youth Wing leader of the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), the main constituent of the now defunct Tamil National Alliance. In addition to Sivakaran, the police apprehended several hardcore ex-LTTE cadres (LTTE revival bid confirmed: TNA youth leader arrested, The Island April 20, 2016).

Ranil hits out at media

Subsequent inquiries revealed the role played by Sivakaran in some of those wanted in connection with the Chavakachcheri detection taking refuge in India. When the writer sought an explanation from the then TNA lawmaker, M.A. Sumanthiran, regarding Sivakaran’s arrest, the lawyer disowned the Youth Wing leader. Sumanthiran emphasised that the party suspended Sivakumaran and Northern Provincial Council member Ananthi Sasitharan for publicly condemning the TNA’s decision to endorse Maithripala Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential election (Chava explosives: Key suspects flee to India, The Island, May 2, 2016).

Premier Wickremesinghe went ballistic on May 30, 2016. Addressing the 20th anniversary event of the Sri Lanka Muslim Media Forum, at the Sports Ministry auditorium, the UNP leader castigated the DMI. Alleging that the DMI had been pursuing an agenda meant to undermine the Yahapalana administration, Wickremesinghe, in order to make his bogus claim look genuine, repeatedly named the writer as part of that plot. Only Wickremesinghe knows the identity of the idiot who influenced him to make such unsubstantiated allegations. The top UNPer went on to allege that The Island, and its sister paper Divaina, were working overtime to bring back Dutugemunu, a reference to war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa. A few days later, sleuths from the Colombo Crime Detection Bureau (CCD) visited The Island editorial to question the writer where lengthy statements were recorded. The police were acting on the instructions of the then Premier, who earlier publicly threatened to send police to question the writer.

In response to police queries about Sallay passing information to the media regarding the Chavakachcheri detection and subsequent related articles, the writer pointed out that the reportage was based on response of the then ASP Ruwan Gunasekera, AAL and Sumanthiran, as had been reported.

Wickremesinghe alleged, at the Muslim media event, that a section of the media manipulated coverage of certain incidents, ahead of the May Day celebrations.

In early May 2016 Wickremesinghe disclosed that he received assurances from the police, and the DMI, that as the LTTE had been wiped out the group couldn’t stage a comeback. The declaration was made at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKIIRIS) on 3 May 2016. Wickremesinghe said that he sought clarifications from the police and the DMI in the wake of the reportage of the Chavakachcheri detection and related developments (PM: LTTE threat no longer exists, The Island, May 5, 2016).

The LTTE couldn’t stage a comeback as a result of measures taken by the then government. It would be a grave mistake, on our part, to believe that the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity automatically influenced them to give up arms. The successful rehabilitation project, that had been undertaken by the Rajapaksa government and continued by successive governments, ensured that those who once took up arms weren’t interested in returning to the same deadly path.

In spite of the TNA and others shedding crocodile tears for the defeated Tigers, while making a desperate effort to mobilise public opinion against the government, the public never wanted the violence to return. Some interested parties propagated the lie that regardless of the crushing defeat suffered in the hands of the military, the LTTE could resume guerilla-type operations, paving the way for a new conflict. But by the end of 2014, and in the run-up to the presidential election in January following year, the situation seemed under control, especially with Western countries not wanting to upset things here with a pliant administration in the immediate horizon. Soon after the presidential election, the government targeted the armed forces. Remember Sumanthiran’s declaration that the ITAK Youth Wing leader Sivakaran had been opposed to the TNA backing Sirisena at the presidential poll.

The US-led accountability resolution had been co-sponsored by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo to appease the TNA and Tamil Diaspora. The Oct. 01, 2016, resolution delivered a knockout blow to the war-winning armed forces. The UNP pursued an agenda severely inimical to national interests. It would be pertinent to mention that those who now represent the main Opposition, Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), were part of the treacherous UNP.

Suresh moved to Malaysia

The Yahapalana leadership resented Sallay’s work. They wanted him out of the country at a time a new threat was emerging. The government attacked the then Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, PC, who warned of the emerging threat from foreign-manipulated local Islamic fanatics on 11 Nov. 2016, in Parliament. Rajapakshe didn’t mince his words when he underscored the threat posed by some Sri Lanka Muslim families taking refuge in Syria where ISIS was running the show. The then government, of which he was part o,f ridiculed their own Justice Minister. Both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe feared action against extremism may cause erosion of Muslim support. By then Sallay, who had been investigating the deadly plot, was out of the country. The Yahapalana government believed that the best way to deal with Sallay was to grant him a diplomatic posting. Sally ended up in Malaysia, a country where the DMI played a significant role in the repatriation of Kumaran Pathmanathan, alias KP, after his arrest there.

Having served the military for over three cadres, Sallay retired in 2024 in the rank of Major General. Against the backdrop of his recent arrest, in connection with the ongoing investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, The Island felt the need to examine the circumstances Sallay ended up in Malaysia at the time. Now, remanded in terms of the Prevention of terrorism Act (PTA), he is being accused of directing the Easter Sunday operation from Malaysia.

Pivithuru Hela Urumaya leader and former Minister Udaya Gammanpila has alleged that Sallay was apprehended in a bid to divert attention away from the deepening coal scam. Having campaigned on an anti-corruption platformm in the run up to the previous presidential election, in September 2024, the Parliament election, in November of the same year, and local government polls last year, the incumbent dispensation is struggling to cope up with massive corruption issues, particularly the coal scam, which has not only implicated the Energy Minister but the entire Cabinet of Ministers as well.

The crux of the matter is whether Sallay actually met would-be suicide bombers, in February 2018, in an estate, in the Puttalam district, as alleged by the UK’s Channel 4 television, like the BBC is, quite famous for doing hatchet jobs for the West. This is the primary issue at hand. Did Sallay clandestinely leave Malaysia to meet suicide bombers in the presence of Hanzeer Azad Moulana, one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, aka Pilleyan, former LTTE member?

The British channel raised this issue with Sallay, in 2023, at the time he served as Director, State Intelligence (SIS). Sallay is on record as having told Channel 4 Television that he was not in Sri Lanka the whole of 2018 as he was in Malaysia serving in the Sri Lankan Embassy there as Minister Counsellor.

Therefore, the accusation that he met several members of the National Thowheeth Jamaath (NTJ), including Mohamed Hashim Mohamed Zahran, in Karadipuval, Puttalam, in Feb. 2018, was baseless, he has said.

The intelligence officer has asked the British television station to verify his claim with the Malaysian authorities.

Responding to another query, Sallay had told Channel 4 that on April 21, 2019, the day of the Easter Sunday blasts, he was in India, where he was accommodated at the National Defence College (NDC). That could be verified with the Indian authorities, Sallay has said, strongly denying Channel 4’s claim that he contacted one of Pilleyan’s cadres, over, the phone and directed him to pick a person outside Hotel Taj Samudra.

According to Sallay, during his entire assignment in Malaysia, from Dec. 2016 to Dec. 2018, he had been to Colombo only once, for one week, in Dec. 2017, to assist in an official inquiry.

Having returned to Colombo, Sallay had left for NDC, in late Dec. 2018, and returned only after the conclusion of the course, in November 2019.

Sallay has said so in response to questions posed by Ben de Pear, founder, Basement Films, tasked with producing a film for Channel 4 on the Easter Sunday bombings.

The producer has offered Sallay an opportunity to address the issues in terms of Broadcasting Code while inquiring into fresh evidence regarding the officer’s alleged involvement in the Easter Sunday conspiracy.

The producer sought Sallay’s response, in August 2023, in the wake of political upheaval following the ouster of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, elected at the November 2019 presidential election.

At the time, the Yahapalana government granted a diplomatic appointment to Sallay, he had been head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). After the 2019 presidential election, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa named him the Head of SIS.

The Basement Films has posed several questions to Sallay on the basis of accusations made by Hanzeer Azad Moulana.

In response to the film producer’s query regarding Sallay’s alleged secret meeting with six NTJ cadres who blasted themselves a year later, Sallay has questioned the very basis of the so called new evidence as he was not even in the country during the period the clandestine meeting is alleged to have taken place.

Contradictory stands

Following Sajith Premadasa’s anticipated defeat at the 2019 presidential election, Harin Fernando accused the Catholic Church of facilitating Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory. Fernando, who is also on record as having disclosed that his father knew of the impending Easter Sunday attacks, pointed finger at the Archbishop of Colombo, Rt. Rev Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, for ensuring Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory.

Former President Maithripala Sirisena, as well as JVP frontliner Dr. Nalinda Jayathissa, accused India of masterminding the Easter Sunday bombings. Then there were claims of Sara Jasmin, wife of Katuwapitiya suicide bomber Mohammed Hastun, being an Indian agent who was secretly removed after the Army assaulted extremists’ hideout at Sainthamaruthu in the East. What really had happened to Sara Jasmin who, some believe, is key to the Easter Sunday puzzle.

Then there was huge controversy over the arrest of Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah over his alleged links with the Easter Sunday bombers. Hizbullah, who had been arrested in April 2020, served as lawyer to the extremely wealthy spice trader Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim’s family that had been deeply involved in the Easter Sunday plot. Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been on the JVP’s National List at the 2015 parliamentary elections. The lawyer received bail after two years. Two of the spice trader’s sons launched suicide attacks, whereas his daughter-in-law triggered a suicide blast when police raided their Dematagoda mansion, several hours after the Easter Sunday blasts.

Investigations also revealed that the suicide vests had been assembled at a factory owned by the family and the project was funded by them. It would be pertinent to mention that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government never really bothered to conduct a comprehensive investigation to identify the Easter Sunday terror project. Perhaps, their biggest failure had been to act on the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) recommendations. Instead, President Rajapaksa appointed a six-member committee, headed by his elder brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the recommendations, probably in a foolish attempt to improve estranged relations with the influential Muslim community. That move caused irreparable damage and influenced the Church to initiate a campaign against the government. The Catholic Church played quite a significant role in the India- and US-backed 2022 Aragalaya that forced President Rajapaksa to flee the country.

Interested parties exploited the deterioration of the national economy, leading to unprecedented declaration of the bankruptcy of the country in April 2022, to mobilie public anger that was used to achieve political change.

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