Midweek Review
Focus on early stage of ‘unwinnable’ Eelam conflict over a decade after Nandikadal confrontation
Let us set the record straight, officially

Sarath Weerasekera
Retired Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera recently declared that in his capacity as Chairman of the Sectoral Oversight Committee on National Security he would present to President Ranil Wickremesinghe a comprehensive report on how the war was conducted.
The recent US denial of a visa to Adm. Weerasekera underlines the need to take tangible measures to safeguard the interests of serving and ex-military personnel, especially when being unfairly targeted by foreign entities with ulterior motives, like wanting to break up Sri Lanka in pursuit of their agendas.
The announcement was made at a media briefing held at the Presidential Media Centre (PMC). Sri Lanka needs to prepare an all-inclusive dossier on the war. Regardless of some retired/serving officers sharing their experience by way of books and social media, successive governments failed to compile a complete book on the conflict that didn’t belong to any service, a particular regiment or an individual.
The efforts made by individual officers to share their experience should be encouraged but the responsibility of the government is to produce an official record taking into consideration all factors.
It would be pertinent to mention that Sri Lanka is the only country on earth to betray her war-winning armed forces. The Geneva betrayal on 01 October, 2015, underscored the treachery on the part of the then shameless Yahapalana administration. Let there be a genuine effort to restore the pride of our armed forces who saved the country from anarchy in 1971, 1987-1990 and from separatist LTTE terrorism.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Daredevil Armoured Corps officer Ranjan Wijedasa, 52, shared his battlefield experiences in Mihidan Nowu Minisa ( The man who did not get buried) launched in September this year, 15 years after the combined security forces brought the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to a successful end. Sri Lanka proved that what had been termed an unwinnable war here and abroad could be won. The LTTE caught up in a multi-pronged offensive that involved several Divisions and Task Forces in the East and then Vanni theatre, lasting just two years and months.
The recent Hamas attack on Israel that involved groups of heavily armed men invading the Jewish state from the air, sea and ground while thousands of missiles fired from Gaza caused unprecedented death and destruction underscored Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE though the circumstances cannot be compared. The Hamas offensive is a grim reminder how lapses on the part of the political-military setup could cause catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. Judging by international reportage of the latest Israel-Gaza war, there cannot be any dispute regarding the assertion that the Jewish state never expected Hamas to undertake such a large-scale offensive. In that background, let me discuss the Eelam war experienced by an officer who had served the Army at a time eradication of terrorism seemed impossible.
Thrice wounded Wijedasa, now a Brigadier, serving the National Defence College as the Senior Directing Staff, had to quit active service following the amputation of his left hand below the elbow in Aug., 1997 due to injuries suffered during offensive action at Puliyankulam. The young tank officer, in spite of being married to Ruchirani Siriwardena in May 1997, gladly joined the largest ever ground offensive Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) conducted before Eelam War IV (Aug 2006-May 2009). But, Jayasikurui meant to restore the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula had been nothing but a disaster that sent shockwaves through the then political establishment. That offensive should be examined against the backdrop of subsequent LTTE counter-offensive that at one-time threatened even Vavuniya, a strategically important town situated north of Anuradhapura.
Wijedasa had been on the staff of the then Director, Operations Brigadier Udaya Perera during Eelam War IV. One-time Sri Lanka Deputy High Commissioner in Malaysia (2009-2011) Perera, who retired in 2017, is on the US list of war criminals. That categorization has been made in Dec. 2021. Sri Lanka never made a genuine effort to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, thereby facilitating the despicable Western agenda. It would be pertinent to mention that the treacherous UNP-SLFP Yahapalana administration shamelessly betrayed the war-winning military by sponsoring an accountability resolution against one’s own country because that impossible victory was attained against the LTTE by their political rival and to please the West, in early Oct. 2015 by co-sponsoring a US-led move, one of the world’s worst human rights offenders.
Let us get back to Wijedasa’s account of his fighting experience with the Armoured Corps (1991-1997) after having joined the Army in January 1990, several weeks before India pulled out her forces from the then temporarily-merged Northern and Eastern Province. The Eelam War II erupted in the second week of June 1990 while Wijedasa was undergoing training at the Diyatalawa Military Academy. Slain President Ranasinghe Premadasa allowed an LTTE build-up during a 14-month long ‘honeymoon’ with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran that paved the way for the group to exploit the ground situation. Their experience in fighting the Indian Army had been an added advantage against isolated detachments along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road north of Vavuniya. The Army lost Thandikulam –Elephant Pass stretch within weeks after the resumption of hostilities in the second week of June 1990. The Army Commander ended up with egg on his face. Sandhurst trained Hamilton Wanasinghe was his name (Aug. 1988-Nov. 1991). Jayasikurui was meant to regain the MSR at any cost.
Devastating losses at Puliyankulam
- Brig. Ranjan Wijedasa addressing a gathering at Rock House Armoured Corps camp, Mattakkuliya, at the launch of his memoirs (pics courtesy MoD)
At the time Wijedasa suddenly received orders to take over the command of ‘Alpha’ squadron assigned for the Jayasikurui offensive, he was preparing to leave Vavuniya to receive an appointment at the Directorate of Personnel, Army headquarters. Without referring to the Divisions that had been involved in the disastrous bids to capture fiercely defended Puliyankulam, the author described the effort made by the Armoured Corps to bring the town under its control after assaults spearheaded by the infantry failed. The operation involved the 53 Division. It included elite formations with vast experience in fighting in both eastern and northern theatres but couldn’t overcome fierce resistance offered by the enemy or thwart a series of counter attacks which paralyzed fighting Divisions.
The author recalled the devastating outcome of the battle between the Armoured Corps and LTTE units armed with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and the effective use of monster landmines capable of immobilizing a 40-tonne Main Battle Tank (MBT). Of the 48 tanks that had been assigned for the task, only three were able to penetrate enemy defences and reach Puliyankulam town. Each tank had been accompanied by three Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) but accurate RPG attacks on one of the AFVs and the author’s T-55 MBT forced the Armoured Corps to retreat. In hindsight, the Army, at that time, lacked sufficient fighting battalions to conduct large scale offensive operations and the strategy- opening a front with the objective of restoring the MSR seemed reckless at a time the enemy could move within the vast Vanni region without hindrance.
Within 24 hours after suffering injuries, Wijedasa had been transferred from the battlefield to Vavuniya in a Bell 212, then from there to Anuradhapura in Y12 fixed wing aircraft before being airlifted to the National Hospital, Colombo.
Jayasikurui launched in May, 1997 was meant to restore overland MSR to the Jaffna peninsula as the government found it extremely difficult to maintain the sea supply route from Trincomalee to Kankesanthurai. Perhaps, author Wijedasa should have dealt with the loss of MSR soon after the LTTE resumed hostilities in the second week of June 1990. Isolated detachments along the MSR north of Vavuniya were either destroyed or vacated by the Army in quick succession as President Premadasa quickly lost control of the war, having conspired with the LTTE to oust the Indian Army.
Regardless of heavy losses, the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces pressed ahead with Jayasikurui. Finally, Kumaratunga called off the offensive in early Dec. 1998 after the Army acknowledged it couldn’t sustain the offensive any longer. Maj. Gen. Asoka Jayawardena, in his capacity as the Overall Operations Commander (OOC) commanded Jayasikurui. Instead, in a bid to divert public attention from the debacle, troops were deployed to capture Oddusuddan and annex the areas covering Mankulam, Oddusuddan and Nedunkerni in the Vanni east. That, too, ended with disastrous consequences. That offensive was called Rivi Bala.
By the time Mrs. Kumaratunga won a second term at the Dec. 1999 presidential election, the LTTE had the upper hand in the northern theatre of operations. The election was conducted following a series of severe battlefield defeats leading to the worst single ever debacle suffered by the Army in April 2000. The LTTE defeated the 54 Division plus troops deployed at Elephant Pass sector that encompassed Iyakachchi and Vettilaikerni on the Mullaitivu coast. Eventually, the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s Army restored overland MSR in January 2009 following major battlefield success both west and east of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road.
The reportage was subjected to military censorship. The military resorted to harsh censorship to prevent the public from knowing the actual situation. Devastating losses suffered by Armoured Corps were not allowed to be reported in the print media at a time television didn’t cover the conflict and social media never heard of. The losses suffered by the Armoured Corps remained unreported until Brig. Wijedasa went public
The LTTE allowed Rivi Bala troops to advance. Prabhakaran refrained from resisting the latest offensive that involved the 53 and 55 Divisions and some elements of the 56 Division that had been previously involved in Operation Jayasikuru, to bring back Oddusuddan under government control, situated north of Nedunkerni, as it shifted focus of offensive action to east of the A9 road. The LTTE didn’t resist as troops secured Oddusuddan, situated 14 km north of Nedunkerni.
This writer had the opportunity to visit the new frontlines at Nedunkerni-Oddusuddan on Oct. 6, 1998, along with a group of journalists when Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte visited the area. Having participated at a Hindu religious ceremony at Oddusuddan, Minister Ratwatte in camouflaged battle dress was about to get into a Russian built BTR 80 armoured personnel carrier when the LTTE fired four rounds of mortars at the group. At the time of the incident, the visiting group of journalists was about two kilometers south of the scene of the attack. My senior colleague from our sister paper Divaina Sirimevan Kasthuriarachchi was among the group. The group was being moved to Oddusuddan in locally built armoured personnel carriers when the LTTE fired mortars. The convoy stopped in the middle of the road leading to Oddusuddan when the SLA fired artillery in response to the LTTE attack. The group was stuck there for more than an hour. Although Minister Ratwatte, Army chief, Lt. Gen. Daluwatte, SLN Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, Air Force Commander, Air Vice Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody and Wanni Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Lionel Balagalle miraculously escaped, the LTTE attack claimed the lives of four SLA personnel, while 42 received injuries. Three bodyguards of Minister Ratwatte were among the wounded (Anuruddha and service chiefs in narrow escape––The Island Dec. 7, 1998).
A proud father’s advice
Ranjan’s father had served the Army and retired in the rank of Captain. Having studied at Isipathana College, Colombo, where he attended the primary, Ranjan and his three brothers – one elder to him and two younger – the family moved to Mahena, a village near Warakapola, after the retirement of Captain W.A. Wijedasa in 1979. The Brigadier’s narrative of their simple way of life and the boys’ escapades captured the readers’ interest. References were made to the retired officer being recalled in 1983 in the wake of July riots following the killing of 13 soldiers at Thinnaveli, Jaffna, and the emergence of the second JVP insurrection. The enjoyable time Ranjan and his elder brother had at Minneriya Infantry Training Centre and the opportunity granted to the boys to engage in exercises meant for soldiers perhaps influenced their decision to join the Army.
At the time, Ranjan had been chosen for the prestigious Diyatalawa Military Academy, his elder brother Manjula was there. The author’s description of nearly two yearlong training there made good reading but nothing could have been as important as advice he received from his father on the day he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of 33 Intake of SLMA. His brother, now retired after serving the military for nearly 20 years, too, had served the Armoured Corps though the two brothers were not assigned to the same unit during the conflict.
The author quoted his father as having told him that there were various funds in the Army. “Never touch those funds. If you need money, give me a call. Don’t smear insignia with faeces by stealing money.” Unfortunately, such high morals seemed to have made no impact on the overall public service, including the armed forces if allegations traded in Parliament and outside are true. The country is in dire straits due to waste, corruption, irregularities and mismanagement. With both the private and public sectors badly affected, the armed forces and police, too, deteriorated since the conclusion of the conflict in May 2009. Corruption takes a heavy toll on post-war bankrupt Sri Lanka with the economy in such a precarious state with many complaining the difficulties were worse than the time of conflict.
Fifteen years after the end of the conflict, the government is in the process of gradually reducing the Army’s strength to 135,000 by the end of next year and 100,000 by 2030. At the time a soldier shot Velupillai Prabhakaran through the head on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon on the morning of May 19, 2009, the Army strength stood at approximately 205,000. The gradual reduction commenced during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure as the President. By the time, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was forced out of office, the Army strength was down to approximately 168,000. The continuing economic crisis has compelled the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government to go ahead with further downsizing of the Army and by next year the strength is expected to be down to 135,000 and 100,000 six years later.
It would be pertinent to mention that the war couldn’t have been won if not for President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s approval of Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s call for a larger Army. From some 116,000 officers and men, while the Army was fighting on multiple fronts over a period of three years, the strength was increased to 205,000, a tremendous achievement in an environment of instability, uncertainty and political turmoil.
Brig. Wijedasa paid a glowing tribute to Field Marshal Fonseka while recalling the Sinha Regiment hero’s declaration that he wouldn’t leave the war unfinished. Fonseka gave that assurance at a time the LTTE remained a formidable fighting force with conventional fighting capacity in land, sea and even in air with a rudimentary air force, which was used to bomb Colombo on at least two occasions.
DK visits Pooneryn
Brigadier Wijedasa disclosed a hitherto unheard visit by the then Northern Commander Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa to isolated Pooneryn-Nagathevanthurai military base at an early stage in the author’s career. Pooneryn-Nagathevabthurai had been perhaps one of the most difficult bases to serve during the war and was the scene of one of the fiercest attacks carried out by the LTTE on the Vanni east. The Army lost hundreds of men. Kobbekaduwa, also of the Armoured Corps during the visit to Pooneryn had declared that MBTs could operate anywhere in the Pooneryn sector whereas the author dared to disagree with the deployment of such heavy equipment in boggy conditions. Kobbekaduwa seemed to have been offended by the junior officer’s suggestion and ordered the author to prepare a MBT to move from Pooneryn to Kalmunai Point a distance of about 20 kms towards the Jaffna lagoon. Wijedasa recalled how he accompanied by Lt. Colonel Chitral Punchihewa, the Commanding Officer of the infantry deployed therein left Pooneryn atop T-55 MBT and after covering a distance of about 10 km was unexpectedly bogged down. The only other MBT that had been deployed at Pooneyn was called in to pull the bogged down T- 55. The rescuer, too, had got bogged down at the same location where those assigned for the two MBTs had to remain there for three weeks until a tank recovery vehicle was brought in from Mullaithivu by ship to Trincomalee and then overland to Pooneryn to pull the T 55s.
Regardless of orders issued by the Northern Commander in this regard, other officers senior to Wijedasa at that time had found fault with him for the fiasco. However, Lt. Col. Punchihewa had taken the responsibility for the incident thereby saved Wijedasa from being tainted. Wijedasa recollected Punchihewa’s sacrifice with love and gratitude while revealing the death of his savior in a landmine blast that ripped apart his Land rover speeding towards Kalmunai Point. What is really poignant in Punchihewa’s death is that the Lt. Col. had stopped on his way to Kalmunai Point after seeing Wijedasa at the helipad with another officer and inquired what they were doing in the hot sun. The incident underscored the senior officer’s humanitarian qualities amidst a brutal war.
Brigadier Wijedasa’s memoirs is a must read for those really interested in the conflict and how the military absorbed the youth. It would be the responsibility of the top brass to ensure the young officers and men learn from the past as it were. Wijedasa’s memoirs Mihidan Nowu Minisa can be purchased from Design Waves Private Ltd. Tel 011 2150 100 (www.designwaves.lk)
Midweek Review
At the edge of a world war
In September 1939, as Europe descended once more into catastrophe, E. H. Carr published The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Twenty years had separated the two great wars—twenty years to reflect, to reconstruct, to restrain. Yet reflection proved fragile. Carr wrote with unsentimental clarity: once the enemy is crushed, the “thereafter” rarely arrives. The illusion that power can come first and morality will follow is as dangerous as the belief that morality alone can command power. Between those illusions, nations lose themselves.
His warning hovers over the present war in Iran.
The “thereafter” has long haunted American interventions—after Afghanistan, after Iraq, after Libya. The enemy can be dismantled with precision; the aftermath resists precision. Iran is not a small theater. It is a civilization-state with a geography three times larger than Iraq. At its southern edge lies the Strait of Hormuz, narrow in width yet immense in consequence. Geography does not argue; it compels.
Long before Carr, in the quiet anxiety of the eighteenth century, James Madison, principal architect of the Constitution, warned that war was the “true nurse of executive aggrandizement.” War concentrates authority in the name of urgency. Madison insisted that the power to declare war must rest with Congress, not the president—so that deliberation might restrain impulse. Republics persuade themselves that emergency powers are temporary. History rarely agrees.
Then, at 2:30 a.m., the abstraction becomes decision.
Donald Trump declares war on Iran. The announcement crosses continents before markets open in Asia. Within twenty-four hours, Ali Khamenei, who ruled for thirty-seven years, is killed. The President calls him one of history’s most evil figures and presents his death as an opening for the Iranian people.
In exile, Reza Pahlavi hails the moment as liberation. In less than forty-eight hours, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps collapses under overwhelming air power. A regime that endured decades falls swiftly. Military efficiency appears absolute. Yet efficiency does not resolve legitimacy.
The joint strike with Israel is framed as necessary and pre-emptive. Retaliation follows across the Gulf. The architecture of energy trade becomes fragile. Shipping routes are recalculated. Markets respond before diplomacy finds its language.
It is measured in the price of petrol in Colombo. In the bus fare in Karachi. In the rising cost of cooking gas in Dhaka. It is heard in the anxious voice of a migrant worker in Doha calling home to Kandy, asking whether contracts will be renewed, whether flights will continue, whether wages will be delayed. It is calculated in foreign reserves already strained, in currencies that tremble at rumor, in budgets forced to choose between subsidy and solvency.
Zaara was the breadwinner of her house in Sri Lanka. Her husband had been unemployed for years. At last, he secured an opportunity to travel to Israel as a foreign worker—like many Sri Lankans who depend on employment in the Middle East. It was to be their turning point: a small house repaired, debts reduced, dignity restored.
Now she lowers her eyes when she speaks. For Zaara, geopolitics is not theory. It is fear measured in distance—between a construction site abroad and a village waiting at home.
The war in Iran has shattered calculations that once felt practical. Nations like Sri Lanka now require strategic foresight to navigate unfolding realities. Reactive responses—whether to natural disasters or external shocks like this conflict—can cripple economies far faster than gradual pressures. Disruptions to energy imports, migrant remittances, and foreign reserves show how distant wars ripple into daily lives.
War among great powers is debated in think tanks. Its consequences are lived in markets—and in quiet kitchens where uncertainty sits heavier than hunger.
The conflict does not unfold in isolation. It enters the strategic calculus of China and Russia, both attentive to precedent. Power projected beyond the Western hemisphere reshapes perceptions in the Eastern theater. Iran’s transformation intersects directly with broader alignments. In 2021, Beijing and Tehran signed a twenty-five-year strategic agreement. By 2025, China was purchasing the majority of Iran’s exported oil at discounted rates. Energy underwrote strategy. That continuity has been disrupted. Yet strategic relationships do not vanish; they adjust.
In Winds of Change, my new book, I reproduce Nicholas Spykman’s 1944 two-theater confrontation map—Europe and the Pacific during the Second World War. Spykman distinguished maritime power from amphibian projection. Control of the Rimland determined balance. Then, the United States fought across two vast theaters. Today, Europe remains unsettled through Ukraine, the Pacific simmers over Taiwan and the South China Sea, Latin America remains sensitive, and the Middle East has been abruptly transformed. The architecture of multi-theater tension reappears.
At this juncture, the reflections of Marwan Bishara acquire weight. America’s ultimate power, he argues, resides in deterrence, not in the habitual use of force. Power, especially when shared, stabilizes. Force, when used with disregard for international law, breeds instability and humiliation. Arrogance creates enemies and narrows judgment. It is no surprise that many Americans themselves believe the United States should not act alone.
America’s strength does not rest solely in its military reach. Its economy constitutes roughly one-third of global output and generates close to 40 percent of the world’s research and development. Structural power—economic, technological, institutional—has historically underwritten deterrence. When force becomes the primary instrument, influence risks becoming coercion.
The United States now confronts simultaneous pressures across continents. The Second World War demonstrated the capacity to sustain multi-theater engagement; the post-9/11 wars revealed the exhaustion that follows prolonged intervention. Iran, larger and geopolitically deeper, presents a scale that cannot be resolved by air power alone.
Carr’s “thereafter” waits patiently. Military victory may be swift; political reconstruction is slow. Bishara reminds us that deterrence sustains stability, while force risks unraveling it.
At the edge of a potential world war, the decisive question is not who strikes first, but who restrains longest.
History watches. And in places far from the battlefield, mothers wait for phone calls that may not come.
Asanga Abeyagoonasekera is a Senior Research Fellow at the Millennium Project, Washington, D.C., and the author of Winds of Change: Geopolitics at the Crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, published by World Scientific
Midweek Review
Live Coals Burst Aflame
Live coals of decades-long hate,
Are bursting into all-consuming flames,
In lands where ‘Black Gold’ is abundant,
And it’s a matter to be thought about,
If humans anywhere would be safe now,
Unless these enmities dying hard,
With roots in imperialist exploits,
And identity-based, tribal violence,
Are set aside and laid finally to rest,
By an enthronement of the principle,
Of the Equal Dignity of Humans.
By Lynn Ockersz
Midweek Review
Saga of the arrest of retired intelligence chief
Retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay’s recent arrest attracted internatiattention. His long-expected arrest took place ahead of the seventh anniversary of the bombings. Multiple blasts claimed the lives of nearly 280 people, including 45 foreigners. State-owned international news television network, based in Paris, France 24, declared that arrest was made on the basis of information provided by a whistleblower. The French channel was referring to Hanzeer Azad Moulana, who earlier sought political asylum in the West and one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan aka Pilleyan. May be the fiction he wove against Pilleyan and others may have been to strengthen his asylum claim there. Moulana is on record as having told the British Channel 4 that Sallay allowed the attack to proceed with the intention of influencing the 2019 presidential election. The French news agency quoted an investigating officer as having said: “He was arrested for conspiracy and aiding and abetting the Easter Sunday attacks. He has been in touch with people involved in the attacks, even recently.”
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Suresh Sallay of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) received the wrath of Yahapalana Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, in 2016, over the reportage of what the media called the Chavakachcheri explosives detection made on March 30, 2016. Premier Wickremesinghe found fault with Sallay for the coverage, particularly in The Island. Police arrested ex-LTTE child combatant Edward Julian, alias Ramesh, after the detection of one suicide jacket, four claymore mines, three parcels containing about 12 kilos of explosives, to battery packs and several rounds of 9mm ammunition, from his house, situated at Vallakulam Pillaiyar Kovil Street. Chavakachcheri police made the detection, thanks to information provided by the second wife of Ramesh. Investigations revealed that the deadly cache had been brought by Ramesh from Mannar (Detection of LTTE suicide jacket, mines jolts government: Fleeing Tiger apprehended at checkpoint, The Island, March 31, 2016).
The then Jaffna Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake, told the writer that a thorough inquiry was required to ascertain the apprehended LTTE cadre’s intention. The Chavakachcheri detection received the DMI’s attention. The country’s premier intelligence organisation meticulously dealt with the issue against the backdrop of an alleged aborted bid to revive the LTTE in April 2014. Of those who had been involved in the fresh terror project, three were killed in the Nedunkerny jungles. There hadn’t been any other incidents since the Nedunkerny skirmish, until the Chavakachcheri detection.
Piqued by the media coverage of the Chavakachcheri detection, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration tried to silence the genuine Opposition. As the SLFP had, contrary to the expectations of those who voted for the party at the August 2015 parliamentary elections, formed a treacherous coalition with the UNP, the Joint Opposition (JO) spearheaded the parliamentary opposition.
The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) questioned former External Affairs Minister and top JO spokesman, Prof. G.L. Peiris, over a statement made by him regarding the Chavakachcheri detection. The former law professor questioned the legality of the CID’s move against the backdrop of police declining to furnish him a certified copy of the then acting IGP S.M. Wickremesinghe’s directive that he be summoned to record a statement as regards the Chavakachcheri lethal detection.
One-time LTTE propagandist Velayutham Dayanidhi, a.k.a. Daya Master, raised with President Maithripala Sirisena the spate of arrests made by law enforcement authorities, in the wake of the Chavakachcheri detection. Daya Master took advantage of a meeting called by Sirisena, on 28 April, 2016, at the President’s House, with the proprietors of media organisations and journalists, to raise the issue. The writer having been among the journalists present on that occasion, inquired from the ex-LETTer whom he represented there. Daya Master had been there on behalf of DAN TV, Tamil language satellite TV, based in Jaffna. Among those who had been detained was Subramaniam Sivakaran, at that time Youth Wing leader of the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), the main constituent of the now defunct Tamil National Alliance. In addition to Sivakaran, the police apprehended several hardcore ex-LTTE cadres (LTTE revival bid confirmed: TNA youth leader arrested, The Island April 20, 2016).
Ranil hits out at media
Subsequent inquiries revealed the role played by Sivakaran in some of those wanted in connection with the Chavakachcheri detection taking refuge in India. When the writer sought an explanation from the then TNA lawmaker, M.A. Sumanthiran, regarding Sivakaran’s arrest, the lawyer disowned the Youth Wing leader. Sumanthiran emphasised that the party suspended Sivakumaran and Northern Provincial Council member Ananthi Sasitharan for publicly condemning the TNA’s decision to endorse Maithripala Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential election (Chava explosives: Key suspects flee to India, The Island, May 2, 2016).
Premier Wickremesinghe went ballistic on May 30, 2016. Addressing the 20th anniversary event of the Sri Lanka Muslim Media Forum, at the Sports Ministry auditorium, the UNP leader castigated the DMI. Alleging that the DMI had been pursuing an agenda meant to undermine the Yahapalana administration, Wickremesinghe, in order to make his bogus claim look genuine, repeatedly named the writer as part of that plot. Only Wickremesinghe knows the identity of the idiot who influenced him to make such unsubstantiated allegations. The top UNPer went on to allege that The Island, and its sister paper Divaina, were working overtime to bring back Dutugemunu, a reference to war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa. A few days later, sleuths from the Colombo Crime Detection Bureau (CCD) visited The Island editorial to question the writer where lengthy statements were recorded. The police were acting on the instructions of the then Premier, who earlier publicly threatened to send police to question the writer.
In response to police queries about Sallay passing information to the media regarding the Chavakachcheri detection and subsequent related articles, the writer pointed out that the reportage was based on response of the then ASP Ruwan Gunasekera, AAL and Sumanthiran, as had been reported.
Wickremesinghe alleged, at the Muslim media event, that a section of the media manipulated coverage of certain incidents, ahead of the May Day celebrations.
In early May 2016 Wickremesinghe disclosed that he received assurances from the police, and the DMI, that as the LTTE had been wiped out the group couldn’t stage a comeback. The declaration was made at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKIIRIS) on 3 May 2016. Wickremesinghe said that he sought clarifications from the police and the DMI in the wake of the reportage of the Chavakachcheri detection and related developments (PM: LTTE threat no longer exists, The Island, May 5, 2016).
The LTTE couldn’t stage a comeback as a result of measures taken by the then government. It would be a grave mistake, on our part, to believe that the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity automatically influenced them to give up arms. The successful rehabilitation project, that had been undertaken by the Rajapaksa government and continued by successive governments, ensured that those who once took up arms weren’t interested in returning to the same deadly path.
In spite of the TNA and others shedding crocodile tears for the defeated Tigers, while making a desperate effort to mobilise public opinion against the government, the public never wanted the violence to return. Some interested parties propagated the lie that regardless of the crushing defeat suffered in the hands of the military, the LTTE could resume guerilla-type operations, paving the way for a new conflict. But by the end of 2014, and in the run-up to the presidential election in January following year, the situation seemed under control, especially with Western countries not wanting to upset things here with a pliant administration in the immediate horizon. Soon after the presidential election, the government targeted the armed forces. Remember Sumanthiran’s declaration that the ITAK Youth Wing leader Sivakaran had been opposed to the TNA backing Sirisena at the presidential poll.
The US-led accountability resolution had been co-sponsored by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo to appease the TNA and Tamil Diaspora. The Oct. 01, 2016, resolution delivered a knockout blow to the war-winning armed forces. The UNP pursued an agenda severely inimical to national interests. It would be pertinent to mention that those who now represent the main Opposition, Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), were part of the treacherous UNP.
Suresh moved to Malaysia
The Yahapalana leadership resented Sallay’s work. They wanted him out of the country at a time a new threat was emerging. The government attacked the then Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, PC, who warned of the emerging threat from foreign-manipulated local Islamic fanatics on 11 Nov. 2016, in Parliament. Rajapakshe didn’t mince his words when he underscored the threat posed by some Sri Lanka Muslim families taking refuge in Syria where ISIS was running the show. The then government, of which he was part o,f ridiculed their own Justice Minister. Both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe feared action against extremism may cause erosion of Muslim support. By then Sallay, who had been investigating the deadly plot, was out of the country. The Yahapalana government believed that the best way to deal with Sallay was to grant him a diplomatic posting. Sally ended up in Malaysia, a country where the DMI played a significant role in the repatriation of Kumaran Pathmanathan, alias KP, after his arrest there.
Having served the military for over three cadres, Sallay retired in 2024 in the rank of Major General. Against the backdrop of his recent arrest, in connection with the ongoing investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, The Island felt the need to examine the circumstances Sallay ended up in Malaysia at the time. Now, remanded in terms of the Prevention of terrorism Act (PTA), he is being accused of directing the Easter Sunday operation from Malaysia.
Pivithuru Hela Urumaya leader and former Minister Udaya Gammanpila has alleged that Sallay was apprehended in a bid to divert attention away from the deepening coal scam. Having campaigned on an anti-corruption platformm in the run up to the previous presidential election, in September 2024, the Parliament election, in November of the same year, and local government polls last year, the incumbent dispensation is struggling to cope up with massive corruption issues, particularly the coal scam, which has not only implicated the Energy Minister but the entire Cabinet of Ministers as well.
The crux of the matter is whether Sallay actually met would-be suicide bombers, in February 2018, in an estate, in the Puttalam district, as alleged by the UK’s Channel 4 television, like the BBC is, quite famous for doing hatchet jobs for the West. This is the primary issue at hand. Did Sallay clandestinely leave Malaysia to meet suicide bombers in the presence of Hanzeer Azad Moulana, one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, aka Pilleyan, former LTTE member?
The British channel raised this issue with Sallay, in 2023, at the time he served as Director, State Intelligence (SIS). Sallay is on record as having told Channel 4 Television that he was not in Sri Lanka the whole of 2018 as he was in Malaysia serving in the Sri Lankan Embassy there as Minister Counsellor.
Therefore, the accusation that he met several members of the National Thowheeth Jamaath (NTJ), including Mohamed Hashim Mohamed Zahran, in Karadipuval, Puttalam, in Feb. 2018, was baseless, he has said.
The intelligence officer has asked the British television station to verify his claim with the Malaysian authorities.
Responding to another query, Sallay had told Channel 4 that on April 21, 2019, the day of the Easter Sunday blasts, he was in India, where he was accommodated at the National Defence College (NDC). That could be verified with the Indian authorities, Sallay has said, strongly denying Channel 4’s claim that he contacted one of Pilleyan’s cadres, over, the phone and directed him to pick a person outside Hotel Taj Samudra.
According to Sallay, during his entire assignment in Malaysia, from Dec. 2016 to Dec. 2018, he had been to Colombo only once, for one week, in Dec. 2017, to assist in an official inquiry.
Having returned to Colombo, Sallay had left for NDC, in late Dec. 2018, and returned only after the conclusion of the course, in November 2019.
Sallay has said so in response to questions posed by Ben de Pear, founder, Basement Films, tasked with producing a film for Channel 4 on the Easter Sunday bombings.
The producer has offered Sallay an opportunity to address the issues in terms of Broadcasting Code while inquiring into fresh evidence regarding the officer’s alleged involvement in the Easter Sunday conspiracy.
The producer sought Sallay’s response, in August 2023, in the wake of political upheaval following the ouster of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, elected at the November 2019 presidential election.
At the time, the Yahapalana government granted a diplomatic appointment to Sallay, he had been head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). After the 2019 presidential election, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa named him the Head of SIS.
The Basement Films has posed several questions to Sallay on the basis of accusations made by Hanzeer Azad Moulana.
In response to the film producer’s query regarding Sallay’s alleged secret meeting with six NTJ cadres who blasted themselves a year later, Sallay has questioned the very basis of the so called new evidence as he was not even in the country during the period the clandestine meeting is alleged to have taken place.
Contradictory stands
Following Sajith Premadasa’s anticipated defeat at the 2019 presidential election, Harin Fernando accused the Catholic Church of facilitating Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory. Fernando, who is also on record as having disclosed that his father knew of the impending Easter Sunday attacks, pointed finger at the Archbishop of Colombo, Rt. Rev Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, for ensuring Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory.
Former President Maithripala Sirisena, as well as JVP frontliner Dr. Nalinda Jayathissa, accused India of masterminding the Easter Sunday bombings. Then there were claims of Sara Jasmin, wife of Katuwapitiya suicide bomber Mohammed Hastun, being an Indian agent who was secretly removed after the Army assaulted extremists’ hideout at Sainthamaruthu in the East. What really had happened to Sara Jasmin who, some believe, is key to the Easter Sunday puzzle.
Then there was huge controversy over the arrest of Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah over his alleged links with the Easter Sunday bombers. Hizbullah, who had been arrested in April 2020, served as lawyer to the extremely wealthy spice trader Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim’s family that had been deeply involved in the Easter Sunday plot. Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been on the JVP’s National List at the 2015 parliamentary elections. The lawyer received bail after two years. Two of the spice trader’s sons launched suicide attacks, whereas his daughter-in-law triggered a suicide blast when police raided their Dematagoda mansion, several hours after the Easter Sunday blasts.
Investigations also revealed that the suicide vests had been assembled at a factory owned by the family and the project was funded by them. It would be pertinent to mention that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government never really bothered to conduct a comprehensive investigation to identify the Easter Sunday terror project. Perhaps, their biggest failure had been to act on the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) recommendations. Instead, President Rajapaksa appointed a six-member committee, headed by his elder brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the recommendations, probably in a foolish attempt to improve estranged relations with the influential Muslim community. That move caused irreparable damage and influenced the Church to initiate a campaign against the government. The Catholic Church played quite a significant role in the India- and US-backed 2022 Aragalaya that forced President Rajapaksa to flee the country.
Interested parties exploited the deterioration of the national economy, leading to unprecedented declaration of the bankruptcy of the country in April 2022, to mobilie public anger that was used to achieve political change.
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