By Kusum Wijetilleke

Desperation has been a central theme for much of Sri Lanka’s citizenry long before the pandemic. Although it may seem far removed from the present multitude of issues, the Yahapalana/Mahinda Rajapaksa Constitutional crisis of 2018 set in motion a series of events that have contributed significantly to the current tragicomedy of the Sri Lankan State. At the time the ‘Unity’ Government of President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was struggling along, the economy was in a state of inertia, having recorded a GDP growth of just 3.1 percent in 2017, the lowest in over 15 years. For the sake of balance, there were notable accomplishments under Yahapalanaya that deserve mention: Independent commissions, increased exports to the EU, successive primary account surpluses and 1990 Suwa Seriya, to name a few entries on the credit side. The debit side entries only continued to grow, beginning with the infamous CBSL bond scam and the close association of the then PM to those involved. The public outcry over this major scandal, from a coalition promising ‘good governance’, was only compounded by the Hambantota lease agreement with China Merchants Port company.

Complexities arising from the 19^th Amendment, especially regarding the powers of the Executive Presidency and the devolution of powers to the provinces, sparked claims from the Opposition that PM Wickremesinghe was steering Sri Lanka into a future federal state. The Ranilist faction, with hindsight, lost that battle in the court of public opinion. The co-sponsorship of the UNHRC Resolution of 2015 (30/1) and its explicit mention of “foreign judges… and investigators” was another major contributor to tensions that led to the eventual disunity at the heart of Yahapalanaya. The alleged and as yet unconfirmed assassination plot regarding President Sirisena cleared a path that led through the Easter bombing to the current presidency and policy paradigm of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the Pohottuwa.

Seasons of missed opportunities

The December-January season is critical to the Sri Lankan economy; the boost to local consumption from the season as well as the influx of tourists and remittances represent a windfall that sustains the operations of many businesses for much of the year. In December 2018, there were major disruptions to tourism and hospitality industries arising from travel advisories issued by major tourist origin countries, based on fears of political violence. Sri Lanka’s forex reserves reduced, the Rupee depreciated further and investors sold off treasury bills, all of which contributed to a ratings downgrade and a 3.7 percent drop in industrial activity during that period. The Governments of Japan and the US temporarily froze some $1 billion worth of development aid.

This season of missed opportunity would replay and extend itself in 2019 and beyond. The Yahapalanaya rupture and resulting security failures led to the Easter attacks and ultimately, to an election defined by national security. The context matters; Yahapalanaya, especially with the benefit of hindsight, was clearly an act of desperation. Some three decades of war against a terrorist organisation failed to spawn a meaningful National or ‘Unity’ Government, yet voters were desperate enough to hope that this coalition might be fruitful. The Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election was also a sign of desperation. The wave of anti-Rajapaksa sentiment that brought in Yahapalanaya dissipated and the public was sold a grand promise of a Lee Kwan Yew-esque administrative juggernaut with fresh ideas, powered by professionals promoted through a meritocracy. These notions seem almost delirious considering what has transpired.

As the President carries on, seemingly unwilling or incapable of making any of the very obvious policy ‘u-turns’ that might help ease the suffering, voters are beginning to feel that familiar tinge of desperation. Against this backdrop, the main Opposition, SJB has been accused of not meeting the moment with requisite energy and fortitude, leading to question marks over its position. There has been a media tilt towards alternatives with the National People’s Power coalition (Jathika Jana Balawegaya) and its leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) showing increased energy and organisation.

The JVP-led NPP recently released a manifesto of sorts entitled “Rapid Response to Overcome Current Challenges”; the voting public eagerly anticipated a set of policy alternatives, desperate for some semblance of a strategy to set Sri Lanka on a sustainable path to recovery. AKD’s strength has always been his clear, precise and colourful articulation of the corruption and excesses of government. It might be forgotten to history that the JVP was once a political ‘king-maker’ of sorts, propping up, for example, the UPFA Government of 2004 and the Mahinda Rajapaksa candidacy of 2005. The opening lines of the NPP manifesto alludes to the “misguided economic and social policies pursued by various governments…” of the past, of course this must necessarily include the JVP and many of its present leadership including AKD, who was cabinet minister in the mid-2000s. This argument is also used against the SJB leader Sajith Premadasa due to his seniority in the UNP during its brief periods in power. The crucial difference is that Premadasa, while senior, was certainly outside the UNP establishment of that time, unlike AKD, who was very much a leading figure in the JVP’s support for the UPFA.

Bullet points firing blanks

Political history aside, the NPP must be judged on the merits of its ideas and what proposals it can bring to the table. In discussing the economy, the manifesto makes an immediate critique of the open economic policy of 1977, specifically its “prioritisation of personal gain over social responsibility”. The heading of this section reads “A Thriving economy instead of a Dependent Economy” which then leads to obvious questions.

Given the interdependent and interconnected nature of global economies, given the limited size, scope and production capabilities of Sri Lankan industry and Sri Lanka’s inherent dependence on exports, how does Sri Lanka become self-reliant? Further, if the open economy has been destructive, what form does the alternative take? There are severe efficiency gaps in Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sectors, compounded by strong labour laws and regulations; just some of the reasons the worlds manufacturing conveyor belts are concentrated in specific countries. Does the NPP intend on enhancing manufacturing efficiencies, do they intend on relaxing labour laws, if not how do they intend on reducing the cost of Sri Lankan manufacturing? In fact, the NPP makes the point that “neo-liberalism” has failed to prioritise production and was instead focused on financialisation. This critique fails to realise that Sri Lanka benefits from “neo-liberal” trade policies, in fact Sri Lanka’s exports and consequently its economy depends on open markets and free-trade throughout the world. It must be said that the NPP is hardly alone in making a confused critique of neoliberalism and free trade, yet it points to the fundamental challenge facing the JVP led coalition; the need to balance its Marxist-Leninist roots with the challenge of positioning Sri Lanka in a global market. Turning away from the global market cannot be an option for Sri Lanka.

The Rapid Response Manifesto continues with a section titled “Our Approach” which advocates a “value-added economic approach”, with a number of Bullet points, that once again lacks any specifics with the only clue being to “gradually discourage the importation of goods that can be produced locally”. Here the NPP takes a popular route to production and industry but misses the key factor of cost. There are undoubtedly products that are imported which can be produced locally, the question is at what price. There are reasons why Sri Lankan businesses prefer to import raw materials for the production process rather than source locally and these include: cost, quality and supply chain efficiency.

Any plan to shift production locally must consider these key attributes of production; unfortunately, the NPP manifesto makes no such considerations.

The Bullet points continue with a call to “generate more foreign exchange by joining the global supply chain”. This supply chain is part of the aforementioned and much maligned global open-market and a direct result of globalisation, something the NPP rejects as a precursor to “financialisation”.

In discussing how to tackle Sri Lanka’s rising Government debt, the manifesto further states that more detailed measures will be released in the future with some basic measures being mooted for the time being. These include some sort of punitive action for members of previous administrations, a ‘formal’ five-year plan, working ‘diplomatically’ with creditors for debt restructuring and a mechanism to enhance contributions from migrant workers.

Presidency or Westminster?

These are wasted bullet points given that the country is facing both liquidity and solvency challenges. There is no critique of IMF programmes, no roadmap to restructuring and few plans to increase Government revenue. The very least one might have expected from a coalition with Socialist origins was a broad proposal for income redistribution through an overhaul of the SLPP regime’s tax cuts. As Sri Lanka now has some of this region’s lowest corporate tax rates, it represents an open goal for any political manifesto, one that the NPP seems to have missed completely. Rapid Response, despite the title, does offer some longer-term benchmarks on vital investments on healthcare and education, calling for annual minimum expenditures of five and six percent of GDP respectively.

AKD and the JVP have long been critical of the Executive Presidency; the NPP manifesto reiterates the need for a cabinet accountable to parliament and not to the President. It goes further in calling for the President to be elected by Parliament instead of by the people. This is perhaps where the political rubber meets the road when it comes to Sri Lanka’s unique electoral dynamics. Colombo’s liberal vote base seemed to support similar notions judging by their votes for Yahapalanaya and its purported Westminster model. The Executive Presidency is viewed by the liberal elites as a poisoned chalice, while rural voters in the Sinhala-Buddhist heartland believe this seat and its occupant to be a guarantor against minority rule through globalist proxy.

The NPP gets credit for articulating its position unambiguously; the question remains as to whether the Westminster gambit will be digestible to an electoral base that firmly rejected this parliamentary model in the 2019 election. This brings us back to the aforementioned inertia of the Yahapalanaya regime with its competing power centres and contradictory rhetoric, compounded by an inability to even issue a simple gazette. Sri Lankans will notice that little has changed with the current Pohottuwa administration, Consequently, Executive President or not, the inertia has come full circle.

The NPP’s stance on the Executive Presidency will perhaps force the hand of the main Opposition party in one direction or another. The SJB has political-brand name recognition; few in Colombo perhaps appreciate the strength of the Premadasa name in rural Sri Lanka. On the other hand the SJB also possesses other personalities that have won the trust of the electorate to varying degrees; MPs Harin Fernando, Dr. Harsha De Silva, Eran Wickramaratne and Champika Ranawaka to name a few. These MPs have all carved out their own niches in the wider electorate, consequently, the SJB ‘Team’ might bring its own set of advantages. Whether the core of the SJB believes steadfastly in the Westminster model or whether they utilise the innate ‘brand-name’ might well depend on which election the administration calls first. However, from an ideological standpoint, the SJB must clearly define its path, now that the pretender to the oppositional throne has made its stance clear.

Opportunistic vanguardism

Rapid Response, overall, represents a missed opportunity for the NPP to provide an actual roadmap to economic sustainability and political stability; to be perceived as a real alternative for the electorate. The manifesto seems confused about where it wants to take Sri Lanka’s economy and its people and this is somewhat emblematic of the Marxist-Leninist Communist JVP.

The ideological confusion may seem pedantic but it is hugely informative of why there always seems to be so little convergence of leftist movements and why they are so prone to circular firing squads. Lenin himself is a much-debated figure in history, especially among scholars of Socialism. Prof. Noam Chomsky has written extensively about Leninism and in particular its allegiances with Stalinism noting that for many ‘mainstream’ Marxists of that era, Lenin was a right wing deviation of the socialist movement.

Two of the more famous Marxist intellectuals, Rosa Luxemburg and Anton Pannekoek have referred to what they view as Lenin’s ‘opportunistic vanguardism’. Chomsky notes that Lenin’s writing changed character around 1917; the notion that the radical intelligentsia were going to exploit popular movements to seize control of the state and then organise the populace into the kind of society that they chose. Considering the very core of socialism: Workers’ control over the means of production, this deviation by Lenin seems completely inconsistent. The original Marxists or what Chomsky refers to as ‘left Marxists’ such as Luxemburg and Pannekoek were notably aghast at the moves made by Lenin following the October 1917 revolution, something Chomsky refers to as a ‘coup’ rather than a revolution. One of Lenin’s first actions after seizing power was to destroy the Factory Councils developed by the Soviets, weakening worker control over production: The very antithesis of socialism. As per Chomsky: “Lenin reconstructed the Tsarist systems of oppression” moving away from the libertarian-socialist origins of Luxemburg and Pannekoek.

The JVP led NPP would do well to better understand what Lenin believed, right up to his death; that a socialist state would not be possible in Russia and was instead a holding action for the “real revolution”, which as per traditional Marxist theory would occur in the most advanced industrial capitalist state, which at the time would have been Germany.

The Rapid Response manifesto does little to suggest that the JVP/NPP represents a vanguard intelligentsia of any creed, offering nothing of substance as an alternative in these most desperate of times.

(Email: kusumw@gmail.com, Twitter: @kusumw)