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Don’t betray  baiyas who voted you into power for lack of better alternative: a helpful warning to NPP – II

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Mahinda

By Rohana R. Wasala

(Continued from Friday February 7, 2025)

Since the JVP/NPP’s arbitrary decision to curtail former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s security and have him relocated to less expensive accommodation is now being legally challenged through an FR petition lodged with the Supreme Court in Colombo, nothing more needs to be said here about it. What I am doing here instead is to express a personal opinion for what it is worth, about something that is of utmost national importance. The interests of the country (nation) matter more than those of individual politicians or political parties. That is why inclusive nationalism (not ethnonationalism or racism) is vital at this juncture.

It is an open secret now that almost all our leaders, with a few honourable exceptions, are being led by the nose by foreign powers (at loggerheads with each other, pursuing their own respective national interests) as Sri Lanka is located in a geostrategically sensitive point in the Indo-Pacific Ocean. Our response to the inevitable aggression that we have no choice but to face should not be politicised within the country. As a patriotic senior Sri Lankan living outside Sri Lanka with absolutely no stake in its current affairs or future prospects, I earnestly request all the MPs and the President with due respect to ponder on the useful implications of what I have just stated. It is their responsibility to look after the people/country (raja dhamma paja rakkha) (the ruler’s duty is to protect the people) through wise statecraft at home and suave diplomacy abroad.

To return to my subject, the question why probably the NPP is going after Mahinda Rajapaksa, though not a mystery, remains to be considered. I hope that this will not be misconstrued as propaganda for Mahinda Rajapaksa who, I believe, is politically ‘out of combat’ because of his advanced age, and should now be in quiet retirement. His significance, though, as the foremost champion of nationalist politics, has not diminished yet. Out of the five living past Presidents, Mahinda Rajapaksa, when in power, was recognised as the most authentic face of Sri Lankan nationhood. He cut an imposing figure on the world stage. In accordance with usual diplomatic protocols, top level foreign state visitors still regularly pay him courtesy calls. Foreign ambassadors in Sri Lanka have formal goodwill meetings with him occasionally. As he wrote in an X post, he had a meeting with Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha on February 5, 2025.

I never hero-worshipped Mahinda Rajapaksa. Quite a number of my articles that I wrote as a nonprofessional newspaper columnist, especially those written over the past 18 years (2007-2025) and published in The Island and elsewhere, bear testimony to this. I have criticised Mahinda Rajapaksa more than I have praised him. I always offered constructive criticism of his politics, both when he was in power and when he was in the Opposition.

My criticism of Mahinda Rajapaksa was basically focused on three areas: what I saw as his family-bandyism or nepotism (giving his own sons, siblings and other kith and kin priority in his public/political life, often to the disadvantage of more deserving others), his harmful, unnecessarily secretive approach to wooing the support of the minorities while taking the loyalty of the Sinhalese Buddhist majority, his main support base, for granted, and his lenient treatment of some of his closest associates who were up to no good. This made me describe him once as ‘a flawed diamond’ (a borrowed metaphor that surfaced from the depths of my ancient literary memory). More recently though, I found myself using such pejorative adjectives as ‘ruinous’ and ‘rascally’ in reference to the Rajapaksas, for squandering, as I believe, the benefits that accrued to the nation from the heroic victory of 2009 over separatist terrorism. That it was a national victory that would not have materialised but for the invaluable contributions of the Rajapaksas is a different matter.

The barefaced geopolitical meddling that intensified after the end of terrorism in 2009, seriously undermining the stability of unitary Sri Lanka, according to my understanding, was greatly facilitated by the three blunders mentioned above that MR could have avoided had he had enough foresight to keep in check his ego-propelled dynastic ambitions. It looked as if his concern for the youth of the country didn’t go beyond his own sons and nephews. He never wanted to allow someone outside his family to succeed him. Had he at least made Maithripala Sirisena Premier (instead of the late D. M. Jayaratne, even then a doddering old man) in 2010, the disastrous upset of 2015 would not have come about so easily (though engineered from outside).

The baiyas, who are ready to forget and forgive their old champion for services done, will not take kindly to the NPP for harassing him. If there are plausible allegations of financial or other crimes against him and his family, let them be investigated and let them face the full force of the law. But mere unsubstantiated allegations should not be bruited about as political propaganda against them. This is what I emphasised in a column, under the title “Prosecute, but don’t persecute,” published in The Island on May 28, 2015 (that is, almost 10 years ago). Who might want him persecuted? His political opponents and those who are baying for Mahinda Rajapaksa’s and his brother GR’s blood for defeating separatist terrorism, who seem to be allies now.

Let’s now turn to his would-be nemesis Anura Kumara Dissanayake. At the last presidential election held on September 21, 2024, as the leader of the National People’s Power (NPP) alliance, popularly known as the Malimawa, Anura Kumara Dissanayake was declared winner after obtaining just over 42% of the total votes cast across the country. He beat his nearest rival Sajith Premadasa, leader of the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB), who was supported by only about 33% of the national electorate. But the important thing is that there was little for AKD to crow about in this victory. Had it not been for the split between Sajith Premadasa and his former boss Ranil Wickremasinghe the leader of the almost defunct United National Party (UNP) that he left to form the SJB, Anura Kumara Dissanayake would hardly have become President. (I have criticised both Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa, too, while admiring some of their personal attributes, as I did in ‘A role for Sajith and UNP ginger group’ published in The Island/August 28, 2019).

Let’s also remember the fact that AKD’s presidential win on September 21, 2024 and the Malimawa’s seemingly impressive performance at the subsequent parliamentary election held on November 14, 2024 were heavily qualified by certain factors that render both successful outcomes (i.e., Malimawa’s presidential and electoral victories) seem accidental, i.e., they are not truly representative of the significant asymmetries of public opinion between regions and communities, for it is probable that the different racial and religious communities that voted for the Malimawa expect different things from the NPP government in return. The Malimawa win seemed almost an electoral aberration.

The wild promises made by the JVP/NPP for getting elected were probably nonchalantly exaggerated due to their unstated private assumption that they were not going to face the hazard of being required to deliver on those promises, as they never expected to win with such a massive majority. For example, what did the Malimawa promise the voters in the North and East, who are predominantly Tamil-speaking ethnic Tamils and Muslims respectively, not forgetting the Sinhalese minority living with them, to win their collective support? Were these promises identical with what the ‘Malimawas’ pledged before the ethnically mixed population in the rest of the country where the Sinhala speakers form the overwhelming majority? Did the Malimawa politicians work to bring about a uniform and consensual awareness of their principal electoral platform of fighting endemic corruption among politicians and bureaucrats, and what they have erroneously identified as ‘the atrocious legacy of the past 76 years’ (alleged wrong policies and corrupt practices of politicians in power in the post-independence period to date)? Do these ‘Malimawans’ believe that their approach to the first and their specific conception of the second are being accepted and embraced by the average citizens in every part of the country with equal conviction and enthusiasm? (To be concluded)



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An opportunity to move from promises to results

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The local government elections, long delayed and much anticipated, are shaping up to be a landmark political event. These elections were originally due in 2023, but were postponed by the previous government of President Ranil Wickremesinghe. The government of the day even defied a Supreme Court ruling mandating that elections be held without delay. They may have feared a defeat would erode that government’s already weak legitimacy, with the president having assumed office through a parliamentary vote rather than a direct electoral mandate following the mass protests that forced the previous president and his government to resign. The outcome of the local government elections that are taking place at present will be especially important to the NPP government as it is being accused by its critics of non-delivery of election promises.

Examples cited are failure to bring opposition leaders accused of large scale corruption and impunity to book, failure to bring a halt to corruption in government departments where corruption is known to be deep rooted, failure to find the culprits behind the Easter bombing and failure to repeal draconian laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In the former war zones of the north and east, there is also a feeling that the government is dragging its feet on resolving the problem of missing persons, those imprisoned without trial for long periods and return of land taken over by the military. But more recently, a new issue has entered the scene, with the government stating that a total of nearly 6000 acres of land in the northern province will be declared as state land if no claims regarding private ownership are received within three months.

The declaration on land to be taken over in three months is seen as an unsympathetic action by the government with an unrealistic time frame when the land in question has been held for over 30 years under military occupation and to which people had no access. Further the unclaimed land to be designated as “state land” raises questions about the motive of the circular. It has undermined the government’s election campaign in the North and East. High-level visits by the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet ministers to these regions during a local government campaign were unprecedented. This outreach has signalled both political intent and strategic calculation as a win here would confirm the government’s cross-ethnic appeal by offering a credible vision of inclusive development and reconciliation. It also aims to show the international community that Sri Lanka’s unity is not merely imposed from above but affirmed democratically from below.

Economic Incentives

In the North and East, the government faces resistance from Tamil nationalist parties. Many of these parties have taken a hardline position, urging voters not to support the ruling coalition under any circumstances. In some cases, they have gone so far as to encourage tactical voting for rival Tamil parties to block any ruling party gains. These parties argue that the government has failed to deliver on key issues, such as justice for missing persons, return of military-occupied land, release of long-term Tamil prisoners, and protection against Buddhist encroachment on historically Tamil and Muslim lands. They make the point that, while economic development is important, it cannot substitute for genuine political autonomy and self-determination. The failure of the government to resolve a land issue in the north, where a Buddhist temple has been put up on private land has been highlighted as reflecting the government’s deference to majority ethnic sentiment.

The problem for the Tamil political parties is that these same parties are themselves fractured, divided by personal rivalries and an inability to form a united front. They continue to base their appeal on Tamil nationalism, without offering concrete proposals for governance or development. This lack of unity and positive agenda may open the door for the ruling party to present itself as a credible alternative, particularly to younger and economically disenfranchised voters. Generational shifts are also at play. A younger electorate, less interested in the narratives of the past, may be more open to evaluating candidates based on performance, transparency, and opportunity—criteria that favour the ruling party’s approach. Its mayoral candidate for Jaffna is a highly regarded and young university academic with a planning background who has presented a five year plan for the development of Jaffna.

There is also a pragmatic calculation that voters may make, that electing ruling party candidates to local councils could result in greater access to state funds and faster infrastructure development. President Dissanayake has already stated that government support for local bodies will depend on their transparency and efficiency, an implicit suggestion that opposition-led councils may face greater scrutiny and funding delays. The president’s remarks that the government will find it more difficult to pass funds to local government authorities that are under opposition control has been heavily criticized by opposition parties as an unfair election ploy. But it would also cause voters to think twice before voting for the opposition.

Broader Vision

The government’s Marxist-oriented political ideology would tend to see reconciliation in terms of structural equity and economic justice. It will also not be focused on ethno-religious identity which is to be seen in its advocacy for a unified state where all citizens are treated equally. If the government wins in the North and East, it will strengthen its case that its approach to reconciliation grounded in equity rather than ethnicity has received a democratic endorsement. But this will not negate the need to address issues like land restitution and transitional justice issues of dealing with the past violations of human rights and truth-seeking, accountability, and reparations in regard to them. A victory would allow the government to act with greater confidence on these fronts, including possibly holding the long-postponed provincial council elections.

As the government is facing international pressure especially from India but also from the Western countries to hold the long postponed provincial council elections, a government victory at the local government elections may speed up the provincial council elections. The provincial councils were once seen as the pathway to greater autonomy; their restoration could help assuage Tamil concerns, especially if paired with initiating a broader dialogue on power-sharing mechanisms that do not rely solely on the 13th Amendment framework. The government will wish to capitalize on the winning momentum of the present. Past governments have either lacked the will, the legitimacy, or the coordination across government tiers to push through meaningful change.

Obtaining the good will of the international community, especially those countries with which Sri Lanka does a lot of economic trade and obtains aid, India and the EU being prominent amongst these, could make holding the provincial council elections without further delay a political imperative. If the government is successful at those elections as well, it will have control of all three tiers of government which would give it an unprecedented opportunity to use its 2/3 majority in parliament to change the laws and constitution to remake the country and deliver the system change that the people elected it to bring about. A strong performance will reaffirm the government’s mandate and enable it to move from promises to results, which it will need to do soon as mandates need to be worked at to be long lasting.

by Jehan Perera

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From Tank 590 to Tech Hub: Reunited Vietnam’s 50-Year Journey

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The fall of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City – HCM) on 30 April 1975 marked the end of Vietnam’s decades-long struggle for liberation—first against French colonialism, then U.S. imperialism. Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh, formed in 1941, fought Japanese occupiers and later defeated France at Dien Bien Phu (1954). The Geneva Accords temporarily split Vietnam, with U.S.-backed South Vietnam blocking reunification elections and reigniting conflict.

The National Liberation Front (NLF) led resistance in the South, using guerrilla tactics and civilian support to counter superior U.S. firepower. North Vietnam sustained the fight via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, despite heavy U.S. bombing. The costly 1968 Tet Offensive exposed U.S. vulnerabilities and shifted public opinion.

Of even more import, the Vietnam meat-grinder drained the U.S. military machine of weapons, ammunition and morale. By 1973, relentless resistance forced U.S. withdrawal. In March 1975, the Vietnamese People’s Army started operations in support of the NLF. The U.S.-backed forces collapsed, and by 30 April the Vietnamese forces forced their way into Saigon.

At 11 am, Soviet-made T-54 tank no. 843 of company commander Bui Quang Than rammed into a gatepost of the presidential palace (now Reunification Palace). The company political commissar, Vu Dang Toan, following close behind in his Chinese-made T-59 tank, no. 390, crashed through the gate and up to the palace. It seems fitting that the tanks which made this historic entry came from Vietnam’s principal backers.

Bui Quang Than bounded from his tank and raced onto the palace rooftop to hoist the NLF flag. Meanwhile, Vu Dang Toan escorted the last president of the U.S.-backed regime, Duong Van Minh, to a radio station to announce the surrender of his forces. This surrender meant the liberation not only of Saigon but also of the entire South, the reunification of the country, and a triumph of perseverance—a united, independent nation free from foreign domination after a 10,000-day war.

Celebrations

On 30 April 2025, Vietnam celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Liberation of the South and National Reunification. HCM sprouted hundreds of thousands of national flags and red hammer-and-sickle banners, complemented by hoardings embellished with reminders of the occasion – most of them featuring tank 590 crashing the gate.

Thousands of people camped on the streets from the morning of 29 April, hoping to secure good spots to watch the parade. Enthusiasm, especially of young people, expressed itself by the wide use of national flag t-shirts, ao dais (traditional long shirts over trousers), conical hats, and facial stickers. This passion may reflect increasing prosperity in this once impoverished land.

The end of the war found Vietnam one of the poorest countries in the world, with a low per capita income and widespread poverty. Its economy struggled due to a combination of factors, including wartime devastation, a lack of foreign investment and heavy reliance on subsistence agriculture, particularly rice farming, which limited its potential for growth. Western sanctions meant Vietnam relied heavily on the Soviet Union and its socialist allies for foreign trade and assistance.

The Vietnamese government launched Five-Year Plans in agriculture and industry to recover from the war and build a socialist nation. While encouraging family and collective economies, it restrained the capitalist economy. Despite these efforts, the economy remained underdeveloped, dominated by small-scale production, low labour productivity, and a lack of modern technology. Inflexible central planning, inept bureaucratic processes and corruption within the system led to inefficiencies, chronic shortages of goods, and limited economic growth. As a result, Vietnam’s economy faced stagnation and severe hyperinflation.

These mounting challenges prompted the Communist Party of Vietnam to introduce Đổi Mới (Renovation) reforms in 1986. These aimed to transition from a centrally planned economy to a “socialist-oriented market economy” to address inefficiencies and stimulate growth, encouraging private ownership, economic deregulation, and foreign investment.

Transformation

Đổi Mới marked a historic turning point, unleashing rapid growth in agricultural output, industrial expansion, and foreign direct investment. Early reforms shifted agriculture from collective to household-based production, encouraged private enterprise, and attracted foreign investment. In the 2000s, Vietnam became a top exporter of textiles, electronics, and rice, shifting towards high-tech manufacturing (inviting Samsung and Intel factories). By the 2020s, it emerged as a global manufacturing hub, the future focus including the digital economy, green energy, and artificial intelligence.

In less than four decades, Vietnam transformed from a poor, agrarian nation into one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, though structural reforms are still needed for sustainable development. Growth has remained steady, at 5-8% per year.

Vietnam’s reforms lifted millions out of poverty, created a dynamic export-driven economy, and improved education, healthcare, and infrastructure. This has manifested itself in reducing extreme poverty from 70% to 1%, increasing literacy to 96%, life expectancy from 63 to 74 years, and rural electrification from less than 50% to 99.9%. Industrialisation drove urbanisation, which doubled from 20% in 1986 to 40% now.

This change displayed itself during the celebrations in HCM, amid skyscrapers, highways and the underground metro system. Everybody dressed well, and smartphones could be seen everywhere – penetration has reached three-fourths of the population. Thousands turned out on motorbikes and scooters (including indigenous electric scooters) – two-wheeler ownership is over 70%, the highest rate per capita in ASEAN. Traffic jams of mostly new cars emphasised the growth of the middle class.

At the same time, street food vendors and makeshift pavement bistro owners joined sellers of patriotic hats, flags and other paraphernalia to make a killing from the revellers. This reflects the continuance of the informal sector– currently representing 30% of the economy.

The Vietnamese government channelled tax income from booming sectors into underdeveloped regions, investing in rural infrastructure and social welfare to balance growth and mitigate urban-rural inequality during rapid economic expansion. Nevertheless, this economic transformation came with unequal benefits, exacerbating income inequality and persistent gender gaps in wages and opportunities. Sustaining growth requires tackling corruption, upgrading workforce skills, and balancing development with inequality.

NLF flag

Tank 390 courtesy Bao Hai Duong

The parade itself, meticulously carried out (having been rehearsed over three days), featured cultural pageants and military displays and drew admiration. Of special note, the inclusion of foreign military contingents from China, Laos, and Cambodia for the first time signalled greater regional solidarity, acknowledging their historical support while maintaining a balanced foreign policy approach.

Veteran, war-era foreign journalists noted another interesting fact: the re-emergence of the NLF flag. Comprising red and blue stripes with a central red star, this flag had never been prominent at the ten-year anniversary celebrations. The journalists questioned its sudden reappearance. It may be to give strength to the idea of the victory being one of the South itself, part of a drive to increase unity between North and South.

Before reunification in 1975, North and South Vietnam embodied starkly contrasting economic and social models. The North operated under a centrally planned socialist system, with collectivised farms and state-run industries. It emphasised egalitarianism, mass education, and universal healthcare while actively preserving traditional Vietnamese culture. The South, by contrast, maintained a market-oriented economy heavily reliant on agricultural exports (rice and rubber) and foreign aid. A wealthy elite dominated politics and commerce, while Western—particularly American—cultural influence grew pervasive during the war years.

Following reunification under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1976), the government moved swiftly to integrate the two regions. In 1978, it introduced a unified national currency (the đồng, VND), merging the North’s and South’s financial systems into a single, state-controlled framework. The unification of monetary policy symbolised the broader ideological project: to erase colonial and capitalist legacies.

Unity and solidarity

However, the economic disparities and cultural divides between regions persist, though less pronounced than before. The South, particularly HCM, remains Vietnam’s economic powerhouse, with a stronger private sector and international trade connections. The North, including Hanoi, has a more government-driven economy. Southerners tend to have a more entrepreneurial mindset, while Northerners are often seen as more traditional and rule-bound. Conversely, individuals from the North occupy more key government positions.

Studies suggest that people in the South exhibit lower trust in the government compared to those in the North. HCM tends to have stronger support for Western countries like the United States, while Hanoi has historically maintained closer ties with China. People in HCM tend to use the old “Saigon” city name.

Consequently, the 50th anniversary celebrations saw a focus on reconciliation and unity, reflecting a shift in perspective towards peace and friendship, as well as accompanying patriotism with international solidarity.

The exuberant crowds, modern infrastructure, and thriving consumer economy showcased the transformative impact of Đổi Mới—yet lingering regional disparities, informal labour challenges, and unequal gains remind the nation that sustained progress demands inclusive reforms. The symbolic return of the NLF flag and the emphasis on unity underscored a nuanced reconciliation between North and South, honouring shared struggle while navigating enduring differences.

As Vietnam strides forward as a rising Asian economy, it balances its socialist legacy with global ambition, forging a path where prosperity and patriotism converge. The anniversary was not just a celebration of the past but a reflection on the complexities of Vietnam’s ongoing evolution.

(Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute. He is a convenor of the Asia Progress Forum, which can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com.)

By Vinod Moonesinghe

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Hectic season for Rohitha and Rohan and JAYASRI

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Rohitha and Rohan: Doing it in London … for kidney patients in Sri Lanka

The Sri Lanka music scene is certainly a happening place for quite a few of our artistes, based abroad, who are regularly seen in action in our part of the world. And they certainly do a great job, keeping local music lovers entertained.

Rohitha and Rohan, the JAYASRI twins, who are based in Vienna, Austria, are in town, doing the needful, and the twosome has turned out to be crowd-pullers.

Says Rohitha: Our season here in Sri Lanka, and summer in the south hemisphere (with JAYASRI) started in October last year, with many shows around the island, and tours to Australia, Japan, Dubai, Doha, the UK, and Canada. We will be staying in the island till end of May and then back to Austria for the summer season in Europe.”

Rohitha mentioned their UK visit as very special.

The JAYASRI twins Rohan and Rohitha

“We were there for the Dayada Charity event, organised by The Sri Lankan Kidney Foundation UK, to help kidney patients in Sri Lanka, along with Yohani, and the band Flashback. It was a ‘sold out’ concert in Leicester.

“When we got back to Sri Lanka, we joined the SL Kidney Foundation to handover the financial and medical help to the Base Hospital Girandurukotte.

“It was, indeed, a great feeling to be a part of this very worthy cause.”

Rohitha and Rohan also did a trip to Canada to join JAYASRI, with the group Marians, for performances in Toronto and Vancouver. Both concerts were ‘sold out’ events.

They were in the Maldives, too, last Saturday (03).

Alpha Blondy:
In action, in
Colombo, on
19th July!

JAYASRI, the full band tour to Lanka, is scheduled to take place later this year, with Rohitha adding “May be ‘Another legendary Rock meets Reggae Concert’….”

The band’s summer schedule also includes dates in Dubai and Europe, in September to Australia and New Zealand, and in October to South Korea and Japan.

Rohitha also enthusiastically referred to reggae legend Alpha Blondy, who is scheduled to perform in Sri Lanka on 19th July at the Air Force grounds in Colombo.

“We opened for this reggae legend at the Austria Reggae Mountain Festival, in Austria. His performance was out of this world and Sri Lankan reggae fans should not miss his show in Colombo.”

Alpha Blondy is among the world’s most popular reggae artistes, with a reggae beat that has a distinctive African cast.

Calling himself an African Rasta, Blondy creates Jah-centred anthems promoting morality, love, peace, and social consciousness.

With a range that moves from sensitivity to rage over injustice, much of Blondy’s music empathises with the impoverished and those on society’s fringe.

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