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Midweek Review

Does SF’s unexpected move portend confrontation?

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Sarath Fonseka

During a violent protest campaign to oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa last year, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka threw his weight behind the project. Fonseka was the only parliamentarian allowed to address large crowds as they gathered near the President’s House on the morning of 09 July, 2022. The Field Marshal didn’t mince his words when he urged the military not to crack down on violent public protests, obviously staged by outside forces with financial and other resources, to oust the then government. Overwhelmed by the massive gathering, the Army quietly abandoned the President’s House, paving the way for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s succession, on whose orders the military then swiftly cleared the President’s House, Presidential Secretariat and other government buildings. Now Sarath Fonseka wants to take on the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government. The People’s Revolution is meant to inspire a countrywide protest campaign. But the task seems difficult in the absence of an environment conducive for such a project without the clandestine backing of outside elements.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, MP, recently declared his intention to chart a new political course amidst continuing turmoil in the Opposition. The war-winning Army Chief, 72, on 11 August, launched a campaign of his own, at the expense of the main Opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), as further differences emerged in the breakaway UNP faction. How could Gampaha District SJB lawmaker Fonseka, the current Chairman of the party, initiate a protest campaign, dubbed ‘People’s Revolution,’ targeting waste, corruption, irregularities and mismanagement?

The Sinha Regiment veteran declared that the national economy couldn’t be restored, under any circumstances, unless the utterly corrupt governance system was done away with.

The protest, held outside Viharamahadevi Park, drew a mixed crowd. The deployment of a sizable police contingent, backed by anti-riot squads and water cannons, was meant as a warning sign not to test the government’s will. The writer quite comfortably felt that the protesting group didn’t have the intention of blocking the road, or marching on any government building. Some displayed placards demanding proper implementation of the ‘Aswesuma’ social security scheme, leave EPF and ETF out of the debt-restructuring process, and media freedom.

The former Yahapalana minister Fonseka seemed alone in that crowd in the absence of any other known face. The SJB Chairman appeared to have lost faith in his own party, struggling to counter President Ranil Wickremesinghe. Regardless of his own party being reduced to just one National List slot (Wajira Abeywardena) at the last parliamentary election, Wickremesinghe has managed to consolidate his position in Parliament.

MP Fonseka’s move should be examined taking into consideration the presidential election due next year. Would parliamentarian Fonseka consider himself as a candidate at the next presidential election? Having served as Regional Development, as well as Minister of Wildlife and Sustainable Development, during the Yahapalana administration (January 2015-November 2019), is he really interested in another go at the presidency. Or will it be used as a bargaining chip to join the increasingly confident possible UNP-SLPP future government. Remember the old adage there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies in politics. Garadihewa, as his name denotes, is from a true warrior stock, and, with a sixth sense in battle, he no doubt proved his mettle by leading the fight to defeat the world’s most ruthless terror outfit against the advice of all pundits, and carried out the war even after the Tigers nearly killed him in his own den with a suicide bomber, who inflicted life threatening injuries on him.

In our humble opinion, may be Fonseka should have quit when he was far ahead with an almost unblemished record as a General. Now this once true lion, having jumped headlong into the political cesspit, is no longer fighting brave tigers, but many more two legged hyenas, jackals and whatnot.

Similarly, see what has happened to our erstwhile cunning comrades in the JVP, FSP and their trade union cabal. Remember they were ready to lay down their lives for the country, but are now more like kittens as if on cue from Uncle Sam, despite New Delhi and Washington clearly running roughshod over us. Even Comrade Kumar Gunaratnam seems to be enjoying the best of both worlds in Australia and Sri Lanka. We should not also forget the NGO quislings, who clearly know on which side their bread is buttered.

The protest at Viharamahadevi Park gravely underscored the war veteran’s dissatisfaction at the way the SJB is addressing the burning issues. The brief but fiery speech delivered there meant that he didn’t have faith in the top management of the party. It would be pertinent to mention that in the run-up to the last presidential election, in 2019, Fonseka, on numerous occasions, declared that he was prepared to contest that election if Ranil Wickremesinghe was not in the race. Then Speaker Karu Jayasuriya, too, indicated his desire and was chosen by a group of academics as the best challenger to SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa. But MP Fonseka’s overtures were ignored. Maybe Fonseka felt he could contest the presidential poll.

Gardihewa Sarath Chandralal Fonseka contested the January 2010 presidential election as the common candidate. Having spearheaded the Army-led all-out offensive to defeat Tiger terrorism, during a three-year-long campaign, backed by the Navy and Air Force, Fonseka declared his intention to contest the first national level election, after Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE, in May 2009. Fonseka had the backing of a US-led coalition that consisted of the UNP, TNA, JVP and the SLMC. There hadn’t been a previous instance of the UNP and JVP forming a political alliance. In their haste to bring the Rajapaksa presidency to an end, they quite conveniently forgot that their partner, the TNA, served the separatist LTTE agenda until the very end. They disregarded how the TNA recognized the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people in 2001 and set the stage for the final showdown, eight years later.

But, Sri Lanka’s greatest ever Army Commander couldn’t deprive Mahinda Rajapaksa of a second consecutive term. Rajapaksa polled 1.8 mn votes more than Fonseka, though the latter comfortably secured all the predominantly Tamil speaking districts, including Digamadulla, thanks to the TNA’s support. The SLMC also played a crucial role in the East on his behalf.

The then General Fonseka’s performance in the Northern and Eastern electoral districts proved beyond any doubt that unsubstantiated war crimes accusations, propagated by interested parties, didn’t hold water.

SJB’s woes

MP Fonseka seems to have distanced himself from the SJB, struggling to cope up with defections and its failure to reach consensus on a common strategy. The elevation of Ranil Wickremesinghe as the President, in July last year, to complete the remainder of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s five-year term, has undermined not only the SJB but the SLPP that elected him.

Wickremesinghe lured SJB MPs Manusha Nanayakkara (Galle district) and Harin Fernando (National List) to accept Cabinet portfolios in May 2022. They switched sides immediately after Wickremesinghe accepted the premiership from President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In spite of their treachery, the government couldn’t entice other members of the SJB parliamentary group. Nanayakkara and Fernando, having repeatedly accused Gotabaya Rajapaksa of being the direct beneficiary of the April 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, joined his government without qualms. In the wake of Gotabaya Rajapaksa being forced to flee the country, due to a well-organized violent campaign to oust him, with massive protests, while law enforcers merely stood by idly, in July 2020, Nanayakkara and Fernando joined Wickremesinghe’s Cabinet.

MP Fonseka has declared his intention to contemplate a different path in the wake of two more elected on the SJB ticket, namely Kumara Welgama (Kalutara district) and Patali Champila Ranawaka (Colombo district) seeking to chart their own courses. Welgama and Ranawaka launched the Nawa Lanka Nidahas Pakshaya and the United Republican Front in 2020 and May this year, respectively.

The SJB won 54 seats, including seven National List slots, at the parliamentary election. Even before the SJB settled down, as the main Opposition party, one of its NL members, first time entrant to Parliament, Diana Gamage, switched her allegiance to the SLPP. Diana Gamage didn’t even bother to hide her contempt for the top SJB leadership when she declared her support to the controversial 20th Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in late October 2020. She simply dismissed the SJB’s decision to vote against that Amendment, meant to further strengthen the executive, as irrelevant. Further deterioration of the SJB parliamentary group can be disastrous as Wickremesinghe steps up pressure on the breakaway faction, ahead of the presidential election.

Fonseka switched allegiance to Sajith Premadasa immediately after the UNP split that followed SP’s heavy defeat at the presidential election. Fonseka contested the last general election on the SJB ticket, amidst simmering controversy over the circumstances under which the then Election Commission allowed the Ape Jathika Peramuna to be named as Samagi Jana Balawegaya in 2020. Diana Gamage’s husband, Senaka de Silva formerly of the Army, had been a one-time influential member of General Fonseka’s staff when he contested the 2010 presidential poll. The cashiered junior Army officer had been the leader of Ape Jathika Peramuna at the time the breakaway UNP faction, under Sajith Premadasa’s leadership, negotiated for the taking over of that party. In the wake of MP Diana Gamage voting for the 20th Amendment, a major issue erupted after the SJB demanded an explanation from her as to why she voted for Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s amendment, regardless of the party decision to move against it. Diana Gamage threatened to take back the party. The bone of contention is whether Diana Gamage could have taken things for granted just because her husband gave up his party for the benefit of Sajith Premadasa’s group.

SP declares his prez candidature

In May this year, the SJB hurriedly named its leader, Sajith Premadasa, as its presidential candidate. The party announced the decision on May 16, following a meeting of its decision-making Working Committee. The announcement was made in the wake of speculation that President Wickremesinghe contemplated introducing a simple amendment to pave the way for presidential election. Declaring that there was no one they could have faith in, except party leader Sajith Premadasa, former UNP MP Sujeewa Senasinghe proposed their leader as the presidential candidate. One-time State Minister and SJB Gampaha District MP Harshana Rajakaruna made a joint proposal in this regard that received the unanimous approval of the Working Committee. A one-page statement, issued by the SJB soon after the meeting, said that MPs S.M. Marikkar and Chamindra Wijesiri, Rehan Jaywickrema and President’s Counsel Upul Jayasuriya and several others appreciated the Working Committee decision.

Did the SJB at least unofficially consult other political parties, which contested under its symbol at the last parliamentary poll, before the announcement on the 2024 presidential candidate was made? The SJB cannot afford to ignore efforts made by the SLMC and the Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA) to pave the way for a consensus between the SJB and President Wickremesinghe. The SLMC and three political parties, represented in the TPA, contested the last general election on the SJB ticket, therefore the main Opposition party should be mindful of the interests of its constituents. Its failure to address the concerns of partners, as well as individual members, can be quite catastrophic ahead of the next presidential election.

President Wickremesinghe stands to gain by the SJB’s shoddy approach to the next presidential election, followed by parliamentary polls. Undeterred by being reduced to just one seat in the 225-member Parliament, the UNP leader seemed quite convinced of his chances at the next presidential election with the backing of a section of the SLPP parliamentary group. A debilitating SLPP split is now almost certain with Power and Energy Minister Kanchana Wijesekera openly declaring his support for the UNP leader. The Matara district parliamentarian is on record as having said that the majority of the SLPP parliamentary group supported President Wickremesinghe’s candidature. Lawmaker Wijesekera has repeatedly declared that though the UNP and the SLPP currently carried out meetings separately, a tie-up between the SLPP and President Wickremesinghe is inevitable.

If Wijesekera is proved right, the main contenders at the next presidential election would be UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and the former UNP Deputy Leader Sajith Premadasa. If that happened, the electors would face the challenging task of choosing one as essentially the two leaders’ economic strategies won’t clash. Would Wickremesinghe’s current policies be acceptable to the SLPP? Perhaps the UNP leader is not looking at a formal agreement with the SLPP but a consensus with a sizable breakaway group ready for its chances with the UNP leader. Whatever the bombastic declarations made by Wickremesinghe’s depleted group, the UNP hadn’t been able to engineer crossovers from the SJB as intended. Over a year after receiving the presidency, Wickremesinghe hadn’t been able to win over a single SJB MP. Manusha Nanayakkara and Harin Fernando switched allegiance to the government at a time Gotabaya Rajapaksa served as the President. Facts are stubborn. In fact, the President totally depends on the SLPP for his survival in Parliament. Their relations are in deepening crisis due to the inordinate delay on the part of the President to accommodate SLPP nominees in his Cabinet. That particular SLPP request has been on the backburner for over 11 months. That is the truth.

With the JVP-led Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB) certain to field a candidate of its own, the rebel SLPP group (Prof. G.L. Peiris-DA [Dallas Alahapperuma] led 12-member group) plus Uttara Lanka Sabhagaya, too, would be compelled to contest, thereby causing further setback to the Opposition effort. The decision-makers will have to examine two key issues: (1) can there be an understanding among the GL Peiris-DA led group and Uttara Lanka Sabhagaya? And (2) is there a likelihood of an alliance involving the SJB, SLPP rebels, including Uththara Lanka Sabhagaya?

Tough times

Having lost badly to Mahinda Rajapaksa at the 2010 presidential election, Fonseka sought to contest the general election on the UNP ticket on his terms. Wickremesinghe however swiftly rejected Fonseka’s move. That prompted Fonseka to contest the election, under the JVP-led Democratic National Alliance (DNA) ticket. It was nothing but an odd marriage of convenience. The DNA managed to secure seven seats. The DNA parliamentary group consisted of Sarath Fonseka, Arjuna Ranatunga (no longer in active politics), Tiran Alles (National List/the incumbent Public Security Minister) and four JVPers, including incumbent leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The subsequent arrest of Fonseka and denial of his parliamentary seat under questionable circumstances prompted the war hero to form the Democratic Party aka DP. That party suffered a catastrophic setback in its debut at the 2015 general election with its leader Sarath Fonseka failing to get elected from Colombo. The DP couldn’t poll 30,000 votes countrywide. Fonseka’s party couldn’t at least secure a National List seat and was relegated to history. However, Yahapalana Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe rescued the former Army Chief by accommodating him on his National List. Fonseka was brought into Parliament on the UNP National List, in early 2016, and accommodated in the Cabinet of Ministers, though Wickremesinghe simply ignored calls to appoint him the Law and Order Minister.

Could Fonseka have averted the 2019 Easter Sunday attack if he was tasked with the Law and Order Ministry? At the time of the Easter Sunday suicide attacks, Ranjith Madduma Bandara served as the Law and Order Minister. Fonseka suffered due to his running disputes with the then President Maithripala Sirisena who strongly opposed giving that particular portfolio to the wartime Army Chief under any circumstances. They failed to iron out differences though Sarath Fonseka was granted the Field Marshal’s rank during Sirisena’s tenure as the President. Sirisena owed a public apology for his failure to award the same to Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda and Air Marshal Roshan Goonatilleke.

The 2019 presidential poll campaign saw UNP candidate Sajith Premadasa declaring Fonseka as the Defence Minister, if he ended up victorious.



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Midweek Review

A look back at now mostly forgotten Eelam war in the aftermath of Kashmir massacre

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LTTE directed two claymore mines at an overcrowded SLTB bus, at Kebithigollewa, on June 15, 2006. The blasts claimed the lives of 68 civilians. Seventeen years after the war, some interested parties sought to muddy the waters by falsely claiming the Karuna faction triggered the Kebithigollewa blasts at the behest of President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre, Pakistan offered to cooperate in what it called a neutral investigation. But India never regretted the
catastrophic results of its intervention in Sri Lanka that led to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army
from NE, Sri Lanka

In a telephone call to Indian Premier Narendra Modi, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake condemned the massacre of 26 civilians – 25 Indians and one Nepali – at Pahalgam, in the Indian controlled Kashmir, on April 22.

President Dissanayake expressed his condolences and reaffirmed, what the President’s Media Division (PMD) called, Sri Lanka’s unwavering solidarity and brotherhood with the people of India.

Having described the massacre as a terrorist attack, New Delhi found fault with Pakistan for the incident. Pakistan was accused of backing a previously unknown group, identified as Kashmir Resistance.

The Indian media have quoted Indian security agencies as having said that Kashmir Resistance is a front for Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen fighting Indian rule in Kashmir. Pakistan says it only provides moral and diplomatic support.

Pakistan has denied its involvement in the Pahalgam attack. A section of the Indian media, and some experts, have compared the Pahalgam attack with the coordinated raids carried out by Hamas on southern Israel, in early October 2023.

President Dissanayake called Premier Modi on the afternoon of April 25, three days after the Pahalgam attack. The PMD quoted Dissanayake as having reiterated Sri Lanka’s firm stance against terrorism in all its forms, regardless of where it occurred in the world, in a 15-minute call.

Modi cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia as India took a series of measures against Pakistan. Indian actions included suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) governing water sharing of six rivers in the Indus basin between the two countries. The agreement that had been finalised way back in 1960 survived three major wars in 1965, 1971 and 1999.

One-time Pentagon official Michael Rubin, having likened the Pahalgam attack to a targeted strike on civilians, has urged India to adopt an Israel-style retaliation, targeting Pakistan, but not realising that both are nuclear armed.

Soon after the Hamas raid some interested parties compared Sri Lanka’s war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the ongoing Israel war on Gaza.

The latest incident in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and Gaza genocide, cannot be compared under any circumstances. Therefore, suggestions that India adopt Israel-style retaliation against Pakistan do not hold water. Also, Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE that was brought to a successful conclusion in May 2009 cannot be compared with the conflict Israel is involved in.

Sri Lanka can easily relate to the victims of the Pahalgam attack as a victim of separatist terrorism that bled the country for nearly 30 years. India, however, never bothered to express regret over causing terrorism here.

Indian-sponsored terror projects brought Sri Lanka to its knees before President JRJ made an attempt to eradicate the LTTE in May-June 1987. JRJ resorted to ‘Operation Liberation’ after Indian mediated talks failed to end the conflict. Having forced Sri Lanka to call off the largest-ever ground offensive undertaken at that time with the hope of routing the LTTE in Vadamarachchi, the home turf of Velupillai Prabhakaran, followed by India deploying its Mi 17s on July 24, 1987, to rescue the Tiger Supremo, his wife, two children and several of his close associates – just five days before the signing of the so-called Indo-Lanka peace accord, virtually at Indian gun point.

First phase of Eelam war

During the onset of the conflict here, the LTTE routinely carried out raids on predominantly Sinhala villages where civilians were butchered. That had been part of its strategy approved by ‘controllers’ based across the Palk Straits. That had been a volatile period in the run-up to the July 29, 1987, accord. Although India established half a dozen terrorist groups here, the LTTE had been unquestionably the most violent and the dominant group. To New Delhi’s humiliation all such groups supported by it were wiped out by the marauding Tigers.

Those who compared the LTTE with Hamas, or any other group, conveniently forget that the Sri Lankan group caused significant losses to its creator. India lost over 1,300 officers and men, while nearly 3,000 others suffered injuries during the Indian deployment here (July 1987-March 1990).

The world turned a blind eye to what was going on in Sri Lanka in the ’80s. The war launched by India in the early ’80s against Sri Lanka lasted till the signing of the peace accord. That can be broadly identified as phase one of the conflict (1983 July – 1987 July). That first phase can be safely described as an Indian proxy war aimed at creating an environment conducive for the deployment of the Indian Army.

Having compelled President JRJ to accept deployment of the Indian Army in the northern and eastern regions in terms of the “peace accord”, New Delhi sought to consolidate its hold here by disarming all groups, except the one it had handpicked to run the North-East Provincial Council. The Indian Army oversaw the first Provincial Council election held on Nov. 19, 1988, to elect members to the NE council. The whole exercise was meant to ensure the installation of the Varatharaja Perumal led-EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Forint) administration therein.

The second phase (1987 July – 1990 March) saw a war between the Indian Army and the LTTE. During this period, the Indian Army supervised two national elections – presidential on Dec. 19, 1988, and parliamentary on Feb. 15, 1989, that were won by Ranasinghe Premadasa and the UNP.

During that period, the UNP battled the JVP terror campaign and the South bled. The JVP that resorted to unbridled violence against the Indo-Lanka accord, at that time, has ended-up signing several agreements, including one on defence cooperation, recently, and the country is yet to get details of these secret agreements.

Raid on the Maldives

The second phase of the Eelam conflict ended when India pulled out its Army from NE Sri Lanka in March 1990. The sea-borne raid that had been carried out by Indian-trained PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) targeting Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, in Nov. 1988, is perhaps a significant development during the second phase of the conflict, though it was never examined in the right context.

No one – not even the Maldives – found fault with India for exporting terrorism to the island nation. India received accolades for swift air borne intervention to neutralise the PLOTE group. The Indian Navy sank a vessel commandeered by a section of the PLOTE raiders in a bid to escape back to Sri Lanka. The truth is that PLOTE, that had been trained by India to destabilise Sri Lanka, ended-up taking up a lucrative private assignment to overthrow President Gayoom’s administration.

India never regretted the Maldivian incident. It would be pertinent to mention that two boat loads of PLOTE cadres had quietly left Sri Lanka at a time the Indian Navy was responsible for monitoring in and out sea movements.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre, Pakistan offered to cooperate in what it called a neutral investigation. But India never regretted the catastrophic results of its intervention in Sri Lanka that led to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army from NE, Sri Lanka.

Resumption of hostilities by the LTTE in June 1990 can be considered as the beginning of the third phase of the conflict. Having battled the Indian Army and gained valuable battle experience, the LTTE, following a 14-month honeymoon with President Ranasinghe Premadasa, resumed hostilities. Within weeks the LTTE gained the upper hand in the northern theatre of operations.

In spite of India banning the LTTE, after the May 1991 assassination of Gandhi, the group continued to grow with the funds pouring in from the West over the years. Regardless of losing Jaffna in 1995, the LTTE consolidated its position, both in the Vanni and the East, to such an extent their victory seemed inevitable.

But resolute political leadership given by Mahinda Rajapaksa ensured that Sri Lanka turned the tables on the LTTE within weeks after the LTTE appeared to be making significant progress at the beginning. Within two years and 10 months (2006 August – 2009 May) the armed forces brought the LTTE to its knees, and the rest is history. As we have said in our earlier columns that victory was soon soured. Spearheaded by Sarath Fonseka, the type of General that a country gets in about once in a thousand years, ended in enmity within, for the simple reason this super hero wanted to collect all the trophies won by many braves.

Post-war developments

Sri Lanka’s war has been mentioned on many occasions in relation to various conflicts/situations. We have observed many distorted/inaccurate attempts to compare Sri Lanka’s war against LTTE with other conflicts/situations.

Unparalleled Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, triggered a spate of comments on Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. Respected expert on terrorism experienced in Sri Lanka, M.R. Narayan Swamy, discussed the similarities of Sri Lanka’s conflict and the ongoing Israel-Gaza war. New Delhi-based Swamy, who had served UNI and AFP during his decades’ long career, discussed the issues at hand while acknowledging no two situations were absolutely comparable. Swamy currently serves as the Executive Director of IANS (Indo-Asian News Service).

‘How’s Hamas’ attack similar to that of LTTE?’ and ‘Hamas’ offensive on Israel may bring it closer to LTTE’s fate,’ dealt with the issues involved. Let me reproduce Swamy’s comment: “Oct. 7 could be a turning point for Hamas similar to what happened to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka in 2006. Let me explain. Similar to Hamas, the LTTE grew significantly over time eventually gaining control of a significant portion of Sri Lanka’s land and coast. The LTTE was even more formidable than Hamas. It had a strong army, growing air force and a deadly naval presence. Unlike Hamas, the LTTE successfully assassinated high ranking political figures in Sri Lanka and India. Notably, the LTTE achieved this without direct support from any country while Hamas received military and financial backing from Iran and some other states. The LTTE became too sure of their victories overtime. They thought they could never be beaten and that starting a war would always make them stronger. But in 2006 when they began Eelam War 1V their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran couldn’t have foreseen that within three years he and his prominent group would be defeated. Prabhakaran believed gathering tens of thousands of Tamils during the last stages of war would protect them and Sri Lanka wouldn’t unleash missiles and rockets. Colombo proved him wrong. They were hit. By asking the people not to flee Gaza, despite Israeli warnings, Hamas is taking a similar line. Punishing all Palestinians for Hamas’ actions is unjust, just like punishing all Tamils for LTTE’s actions was wrong. The LTTE claimed to fight for Tamils without consulting them and Hamas claimed to represent Palestinians without seeking the approval for the Oct.7 strike. Well, two situations are not absolutely comparable. We can be clear that Hamas is facing a situation similar to what the LTTE faced, shortly before its end. Will Hamas meet a similar fate as the LTTE? Only time will answer that question.” The above was said soon after the Oct. 2023 Hamas attack.

Swamy quite conveniently refrained from mentioning India’s direct role in setting up one of the deadliest terror projects in the world here in the ’80s.

Former Editor of The Hindu, Malini Parthasarathy, who also had served as Chairperson of The Hindu Group, released a list of politicians assassinated by the LTTE, as she hit back hard at those who raged against the comparison of the Hamas to the LTTE. The list included two Jaffna District MPs, Arumugam Murugesu Alalasundaram and Visvanathan Dharmalingam, assassinated in early Sept. 1985. Slain Visvanathan Dharmalingam’s son, Dharmalingam Siddharthan, who represents the Vanni electoral district on the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), is on record as having said that the two MPs were abducted and killed by TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation.) gunmen. The list posted by Parthasarathy included PLOTE leader Uma Maheswaran, assassinated in Colombo in July 1989. The LTTE hadn’t been involved in that killing either. Maheswaran is believed to have been killed by his onetime associates, perhaps over the abortive PLOTE raid on the Maldives in Nov, 1988. India never bothered at least to acknowledge that the Maldives raid was carried out by men trained by India to destabilise Sri Lanka. There is no doubt that Maheswasran’s killers, too, were known to the Indian intelligence at that time.

Before rushing into conclusions regarding Hamas and the LTTE, perhaps a proper examination of the circumstances they emerged is necessary. The two situations – fourth phase of the Eelam conflict and the latest Hamas strike on Israel and the devastating counter attack – cannot be compared under any circumstances. Efforts to compare the two issues is more like comparing apples and oranges, though mutually Tamils and Sinhalese have so many commonalities having intermingled throughout history like the Arabs and Jews.

It is no doubt Jews are a people that suffered persecution throughout known history under Assyrians, Babylonians to Romans and so forth. Such persecution includes expulsion of Jews from England in 1290 and from Spain 1492. So what Hitler and the Germans did was to take the historic process to another extreme.

Yet to blame the Palestinians and treat them like animals and to simply butcher them for the latest uprising by Hamas for all the humiliations and suffering they have been going through non-stop since Naqba in1948, from the time of the creation of Israel is to allow the creators of the problem, including the UK, the USA and United Nations to wash all their sins on the true other victims of this conflict, the Palestinians.

It would be pertinent to mention that Israel, in spite of having one of the world’s best fighting armed forces with 100 percent backing from the West, cannot totally eradicate Hamas the way Sri Lanka dealt with the LTTE. Mind you we did not drop 2000 pound bombs supplied by the US on hapless Tamil civilians to commit genocide as is happening in Palestine in the hands of the Israelis.

The circumstances under which the LTTE launched a large-scale offensive in Aug. 2006 and its objectives had been very much different from that of Hamas. The LTTE really believed that it could have defeated the Sri Lankan military in the North by cutting off the sea supply route from Trincomalee to Kankesanthurai and simultaneously overrunning the Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil forward defence line (FDL). The total collapse of the FDL could have allowed the LTTE to eradicate isolated fighting formations trapped north of the FDL. But, in the case of the Gaza war, the Hamas strike was meant to provoke Israel to unleash a massive unbridled counter attack that caused maximum losses on the civilians. As Hamas expected the Israeli counter attack has triggered massive protests in the West against their leaders. They have been accused of encouraging violence against Palestine. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other US allies are under heavy pressure from Muslims and other horrified communities’ world over to take a stand against the US.

But in spite of growing protests, Israel has sustained the offensive action not only against Gaza but Lebanon, Yemen and Iran.

Instead of being grateful to those who risked their lives to bring the LTTE terror to an end, various interested parties are still on an agenda to harm the armed forces reputation.

The treacherous Yahapalana government went to the extent of sponsoring an accountability resolution against its own armed forces at the Geneva-based UNHRC in Oct. 2015. That was the level of their treachery.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

The Broken Promise of the Lankan Cinema:

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Asoka & Swarna’s Thrilling-Melodrama – Part III

 “‘Dr. Ranee Sridharan,’ you say. ‘Nice to see you again.’

The woman in the white sari places a thumb in her ledger book, adjusts her spectacles and smiles up at you. ‘You may call me Ranee. Helping you is what I am assigned to do,’ she says. ‘You have seven moons. And you have already waisted one.’” 

The Seven Moons of Maali Almeida 

by Shehan Karunatilaka (London: Sort of Books, 2022. p84) 

(Continued from yesterday)

Rukmani’s Stardom & Acting Opportunity

Rukmani Devi is still remembered for her incomparable singing voice and her studio photograph by Ralex Ranasinghe with its hint of Film Noir mystery and seduction, and for the role of Blanch Dubois she played in Dhamma Jagoda’s Vesmuhunu, an adaptation of Tennessee Williams’ A Streetcar Named Desire. This is a role she shared on alternate nights with Irangani Serasinghe in the late 60s or early 70s. (See my Island Essays, 2024, p114) She was immensely happy to be able to act in a modern western classic directed by a visionary theatre director like Dhamma Jagoda and it was to his credit that he chose to give her that role when all acting roles had dried up for her. I observed those rehearsals held at Harrold Peiris’ open garage.

I, too, am happy that Swarna has had a chance to perform again in her 70s. The question is, how exactly has she used that very rare opportunity to act in a film that has doubled its production cost within two months, and now showing in private screenings in multiplexes in Australia with English subtitles, with ambitions to be shown on Netflix and Amazon Prime. These outlets also now fund films and make challenging mini-series. Rani has clearly been produced and marketed with this global distribution in mind. How does this important fact affect Swarna’s style of acting and the aesthetics of Asoka’s script, are the questions I wish to explore in the final section of this piece.

A Sensational-Thrilling Political & Family Melodrama

‘Melodrama’ is a popular genre with a history that goes back to 19th century theatre in the west and with the advent of film, Hollywood took it up as it offered a key set of thrilling devices known as ‘Attractions’, for structuring and developing a popular genre cinema. The word ‘Melodrama’ is a compound of the Greek word for music ‘melos’ and drama as an action, with the connotation of a highly orchestrated set of actions. The orchestration (not only with sound but also the speed and rhythm of editing, dramatic expressive lighting, ‘histrionic’ acting, etc.,) always reaches toward thrilling climaxes and at times exaggerated display of emotions. The plots are sensational, propelled by coincidences and written to reach climaxes and dramatic reversals of fortune, and sudden revelations. Hollywood was famous for its happy endings with resolution of the dramatised conflicts, while Hindi melodramas and Lankan copies often ended sadly.

In the history of cinema there are highly sophisticated melodramas within Hollywood, classical Hindi cinema and also in European art cinema. Rainer Werner Fassbinder was one of the German directors who developed a modern ‘Brechtian-Melodrama’ of extraordinary political and aesthetic power in the 70s. And of course, there are very poorly conceived melodramas too like many of the Sinhala films which were copies of Indian prototypes. Melodramatic devices inflect the different genres of Hollywood, for example the Gangster Film, the Western and created durable genre types in character, e.g. the Gangster, the Lonesome Cowboy and Indians; all national stereotypes, one embodying the underbelly of American capitalism, an anti-hero and the other the American hero actualising The American Dream. ‘The Indian,’ merely the collateral damage of this phantasy!

When the stories were centred on women the genre classification was ‘Women’s Melodrama’ as it dealt with interpersonal relations, conflicts, and sadness centred on the home primarily. Feminist film theory has developed a vast archive of scholarship on the melodramatic genre, cross-culturally, with a special focus on Hollywood and Hindi cinema decades prior to the formation we now call Bollywood, made with transnational capital and global reach. It was assumed that the audience for the family melodramas was female and that as women, we enjoy crying at the cinema, hence the condescending name ‘The Weepies’. I cut my scholarly/critical teeth studying these much-maligned melodramatic films for my doctorate, which I had enjoyed while growing up in a long-ago Ceylon.

Asoka’s Melodramatic Turn

 

Asoka in Alborada, but more so in Rani has made melodramatic films with his own ‘self-expressive’ variations on the structure, with an ‘Art Cinema’ gloss. He has said that Rani is more like Alborada and unlike his previous films made during the civil war. This is quite obvious. Though the advertising tag line for Alborada claimed it as a ‘Poetic film that Neruda never made’ it was a straightforward narrative film. I have argued in a long essay (‘Psycho-Sexual Violence in the Sinhala Cinema: Parasathumal & Alborada’, in Lamentation of the Dawn, ed. S. Chandrajeewa, 2022, also tr. into Sinhala, 2023), that the staging of the rape of the nameless, silent, Dalit woman is conceived in a melodramatic manner playing it for both critique and exciting thrills. This is a case of both having his cake and eating it.

Swarna’s Melodramatic Turn

The film appears to be constructed, plotted melodramatically, to demonstrate Swarna’s ability to perform dramatic scenes of high excitement in areas of taboo, the opportunity for which is unavailable to a Sinhala actress, in a Sinhala film, playing the role of a Sinhala Buddhist mother, who has lost her son to an act of terror unleashed by the Sinhala-Buddhist State terror and Sinhala-Buddhist JVP.

In short, Swarna has been given the opportunity to demonstrate how well she can perform a range of Melodramatic emotions that go from say A to, say D. She has been given the chance to move smoothly from English to Sinhala as the middle classes do; use the two most common American expletives which are part of the American vernacular; drink for pleasure but also to the point of getting drunk; offer alcohol to her baffled domestic worker; coax her son and  friends to drink; dance with them in an inebriated state; pour alcohol, whisky, not arrack, like one would pour water from a bottle; chain smoke furiously; dash a full mug of tea on the floor in a rage; crumple on the floor sobbing uncontrollably; shout at her loyal aid Karu; speak with sarcasm to a police officer insisting that she is ‘Dr Manorani …’ not ‘Miss or Mrs’, like feminists did back in the day; chat intimately with a minister of the government; look angrily and scowl at President Premadasa when he comes to the funeral house to condole with her; stage Richard’s funeral in a Catholic church with a stain glass window of the Pieta; to quote a well-known Psalm of David from the Bible, ‘Oh Absalom my son, Oh my son!’; etc.

Rani is Swarna’s chance to show that she can perform in ways that no Sinhala script has allowed a Sinhala actor to do up to now, that is, behave like the Sinhala cinema’s fantasy of how the upper-class Anglophone Lankan women behave. In short not unlike, but much worse, than the ‘bad girls’ in the Sinhala melodramatic genre cinema who always ended up in a Night Club, the locus of licentiousness that tempt them. I am thinking of Pitisara Kella from the 50s and a host of other films. Sinhala cinema simply cannot convincingly present the upper-class English-speaking milieu, with any nuance and conviction, it just feels very stilted, poorly acted therefore. Saying this is not class snobbery on my part. Even Lester James Peries from this very upper class and a Roman Catholic, in Delowak Atara couldn’t do it with Irangani Serasinghe and others. The dialogue meant to be serious or just plain normal sounded stilted and even funny. But when Lester did the Walauwa as in Nidhahanaya, it was brilliant, one of our classics. Brecht it was who said (on the eve of WW2, creating a Modern Epic mode of theatre in exile, that it’s not easy to make drama about current events. It’s much easier to look back with nostalgia at a genteel aristocratic Sinhala past for sure.

In taking the opportunity to explore kinetic and emotional behaviour considered to be taboo for a Sinhala woman, a fantasy Tamil woman has been fabricated. The plot of Rani is constructed by Asoka to provide Swarna the opportunity to indulge in these very taboos. In short, the fictional Tamil Rani offers Swarna an acting opportunity to improve her career prospects in the future. In so doing she has weakened her ability, I fear, to evolve as an actress.

A Domestic Melodrama: The House Suspended in a Void

If Swarna so desired, if the script ‘allowed her’ to, she could have tried to develop a quieter, more restrained and therefore a more powerful Rani. A friend of the family, when asked, said that, “The most striking feature of Manorani was her quiet, confident dignity, before and after Richard.” To testify to such a person, Asoka and Swarna could have asked the obvious question, did she have any close friendships formed as undergraduates, who supported her during this tragedy, as there certainly were cherished friends who shared her grief.  After all, she was among the elite first generations of Ceylonese women to enter University in the 1940, to medical school at that!

Asoka and Swarna have entrapped their Rani in a vacuum of a house, friendless, with a little cross on Richard’s wall to signify religion. A lot of effort has gone into the set decoration and art direction of the house, as in Alborada, to stage a fantasy/phantasy melodramatic scenario. There is no real sensory, empathetic feel and understanding of the ethos (character), of this urbane Anglophone Ceylonese-Lankan mother and son, hence the fictionalised scenarios feel synthetic, cosmetic in the best traditions of the Sinhala genre cinema’s representation of the ‘excessive and even grotesque upper-class’. Except, here the Realism of the mise-en-scene (the old-world airy house and furniture and composition of the visual components) makes claims to a realist authenticity. A little modest research would have shown that Manorani and Richard moved from one rented apartment to another in the last few years of his life and when he was abducted, lived on the upper-floor of a house, in a housing estate in Rajagiriya. Asoka said in an interview that it wasn’t possible to find in Colombo the kind of old house they required for Rani. So, they went out of town to find the ideal house suited to stage their phantasy.

I suspect that it was Swarna who called shots this time, not Asoka who was recovering from a serious illness. He said that she brought the project to him and the producer and that he had no idea of making a film on Manorani, but added that he wrote the script within 3 months. I suspect that this Rani, (this out of control, angry, scowling, bad tempered, lamenting, hysterical Rani, reaching for the alcohol and cigarettes to assuage her grief, performing one sensational, thrilling melodramatic turn after another), was Swarna’s conception, her version of Manorani that she has nursed for 28 long years. Had she resisted this temptation to display her high-intensity acting-out skills yet again, she might just have been able to tap unsuspected resources within herself which she may still have as a serious actress. Its these latent affective depths that Rukmani Devi undoubtedly tapped when she was invited to play the drunken and lost Blanche Dubois, in A Streetcar Named Desire in Sinhala, as a desperate, drunken, aristocratic lady, in Dhamma Jagoda’s Vesmuhunu (1971?).

Jagoda / Irangani

It is reported that before going on stage, Rukmani Devi went on her hands and knees to pay her respects to Dhamma, not as feudal act of deference but to acknowledge his Shilpiya Nuwana, craft knowledge/intelligence’, as one very perceptive Sinhala critic put it. That gesture of Vandeema was foreign to the Tamil Christian Rukmani Devi, but nevertheless it shows her sense of immense gratitude to Dhamma for having taken her into a zone of expression (a dangerous territory emotionally for dedicated vulnerable actors), that she had never experienced before, so late in her life. But ‘late’ is relative to gender, then she was only in her 50s!

Challenge is what serious actors yearn for, strange beings who may suggest to us intensities that sustain and amplify life, all life. Swarna might usefully think about Rukmani Devi, her life and her star persona as a Tamil star in countless sarala Sinhala films, in whose shadow and echo every single Sinhala actress has entered the limelight, Swarna more so now than any other!

As for Asoka, he needs to rest and take care of himself before he commits himself to this recent track of films which are yielding less and less with each of the two films done back to back. His body of work is too important to trash it with this kind of half thought out ‘Tales of Sound and Fury’, which is a precise definition of Melodrama at its best. This film, alas, is not one of those.

That young Tamil women, often silent and traumatised, appeared following Sinhala soldiers in Lankan ‘civil-war cinema’ of the modernists, all male, is a troubling phenomenon. A ‘Sinhala Orientalism’, an exoticising of Tamil and Dalith young women as Other, is at work in some of the civil war films, as in Alborada and Rani. And then this very elevation always leads to unleashing psycho/sexual and/or other forms of violence, because the elevation (Mother Goddess in Alborada) only feeds violent male psychosexual phantasies, which in the Sinhala cinema often leads to the violence of rape and other forms of violence towards women, both Tamil and Sinhala. (To be continued)

by Laleen Jayamanne 

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Midweek Review

Thirty Thousand and Counting….

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Many thousands in the annual grades race,

Are brimming with the magical feel of success,

And they very rightly earn warm congrats,

But note, you who are on the pedestals of power,

That 30,000 or more are being left far behind,

In these no-holds-barred contests to be first,

Since they have earned the label ‘All Fs’,

And could fall for the drug-pusher’s lure,

Since they may be on the threshold of despair…

Take note, and fill their lives with meaning,

Since they suffer for no fault of theirs.

By Lynn Ockersz

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