Opinion
Devolution and Comrade Anura
By Austin Fernando
(Former Secretary to the President)
About ten months ago, among other things, I informally discussed the devolution of power with Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who was an MP at the time. The consequences of his low-priority approach to devolution, as predicted then, were reflected in the presidential election results in the North and the East. Perhaps, there were other reasons also for the low level of popular support for him over there. Now that he is the President of 23 million Sri Lankans, he must consider the presidential election results in the North and the East as a guide. Probably, the Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has already reminded him of that.
Sri Lankan politicians’ mood changes
The policies of Sri Lankan politicians on power sharing are characterized by inconsistencies. Former Ministers Basil Rajapaksa and Prof. G.L. Peiris promised Indians the implementation of the 13th Amendment (13A). Though Namal Rajapaksa has specifically rejected the devolution of Land and Police powers, President Mahinda Rajapaksa promised “13A+,” including those. In Delhi, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa said 13A could not be implemented “against the wishes and feelings of the majority (Sinhala) community.” But he had solemnly declared that he would uphold and defend the Constitution, of which 13A is an integral part! The Indian political leaders’ policy on the devolution here has remained consistent.
We have conveniently forgotten that during the Oslo Peace Talks on 05 December 2002, the Sri Lankan delegation led by G. L. Peiris and the LTTE delegation led by Anton Balasingham agreed to “explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure, within a united Sri Lanka.”
“Federal,” “areas of historical habitation,” and “internal self-determination” are anathema to many Southern politicians and not understood by civilians. Today, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Pieris will certainly dissociate themselves from the Oslo Declaration.
Wickremesinghe, who supported the passage of 13A and appurtenant legislations, was Prime.
Minister (PM) when the Oslo Declaration was made. But now he is unwilling to devolve police powers to Provincial Councils (PCs). Gotabhaya Rajapaksa informed Indians that he must “look at weaknesses and strengths of 13A.” Had he said so as an inexperienced President in 2019, it would have been tolerable, but he said so after 22 months in office. It reflected a lack of knowledge of governance systems on his part or something up his sleeve.
Evolution of 13A
In this background, it is appropriate, to reflect the evolution of 13A to evaluate it as against what was demanded in the name of devolution.
Sri Lanka came under pressure to devolve power following Black July (1983) and the beginning of the armed conflict. The contention that the Indians wished for Sri Lanka’s division through devolution is not true. India has always respected our sovereignty and territorial integrity owing to its experience with conflicts in Mizoram, Nagaland, etc.
On 01 March 1985, President J. R. Jayewardene personally sought Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s intervention to prevent the movement of armed terrorists from India and Sri Lankans seeking refuge in India. On 01 December 1985, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) presented its proposals for devolution to Gandhi in a bid to pressure Sri Lanka to agree to power-sharing.
The salient features of the proposal were as follows:
• Sri Lanka—”Ilankai” be a union of states,
• Amalgamated Northern and Eastern Provinces, a ‘Tamil Linguistic State’, which cannot be altered without their consent,
• Parliament reflecting ethnic proportion shall be empowered to make laws under “List 1″ for Defense, Foreign Affairs, Currency, Posts / Telecommunications, Immigration/Emigration, Foreign trade/Commerce, Railways, Airports /Aviation, Broadcasting/Television, Customs, Elections, and Census only, • List 2” had all other subjects, inclusive of Law and Order, Land, etc., with the State Assembly possessing law-making powers, • Any person resident in Sri Lanka, on 1st November 1981, who is not a foreigner shall be a Sri ankan citizen, • No Resolution or Bill affecting any “nationality” should be passed by Parliament without the agreement of that “nationality,” (The term ‘nationality’ is misleading.)
• The State Assembly to be empowered to levy taxes, cess/fees, and mobilize loans/grants,
• Special provisions for Indian Tamils,
• The elected members are to be given enhanced powers, • Upgrading the judicial system, e.g. Provincial High Court to Appeal Court, and, • Muslim rights to be cared for.
The Jayewardene Government rejected the proposal out of hand. The TULF again addressed Gandhi (17-1-1986), incorporating more sensitive issues such as ‘traditional homelands,’ demographic imbalance, etc. Jayewardene steadfastly advocated a military solution and the war was dubbed as “genocide” by former Indian Minister B.R. Bhagat and several Lok Sabha members. The latter demanded punitive interventions such as ‘crushing Sri Lanka in 24 hours” (Sri Kolandaivelu on 29-4-1985), and Sri Gopalaswamy on 13-5-1985, asking India “to undertake every possible means, including military interventions.”
Gandhi would have been satisfied with the Sri Lankan proposals of 09 July 1986, prepared after consulting Minister P. Chidambaram, which fitted the Sri Lankan constitutional basics. There were ‘Notes’ incorporated into the proposals on PCs, law and order, and land settlements inclusive of land alienation under the Mahaweli Project, with allottees identified based on ethnicity. On 30 Sept.,
1986, the TULF responded to India in detail to the government’s proposals, adding more propositions.
Gandhi was mindful of Lok Sabha’s demands. He vented frustration in Lok Sabha and abroad (e.g. Harare). Efforts to project him and India as weak exasperated him and drove him to get tough. On 02 June 1987, he threatened to send a flotilla with ‘humanitarian assistance’, and on 04 June 1987, Indian Aircraft violated Sri Lanka’s airspace and carried out aid drops in the North. No superpower stood with us on this blatant violation. No wonder Jayewardene agreed to sign an Accord and follow up by introducing 13A.
After the signing of the Accord, the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) were deployed in Sri Lanka.
Lt. General A. S. Kalkat, in an interview with Nithin Ghokle, has admitted that the deployment of the Indian army here was a mistake. Jaishankar (one-time political adviser to the IPKF- 1988-1990), has said in his ‘The India Way,’ that it was a ‘misadventure.’ We are aware of the IPKF’s ‘mistakes’ and ‘misadventures’ like the Valvettithurai Massacre of 64 persons on 02 August 1989, and more, best known to Kalkat and Jaishankar. Importantly, the IPKF operations instilled fear, especially conditioning Tamil people’s minds to search for whatever possible solution.
Concurrently, as explained by then-Indian Foreign Secretary A. P. Venkateswaran, Jayewardene met Gandhi in mid-November 1986 in Bangalore, along with Ministers Natwar Singh, Chidambaram, and himself, and Jayewardene allegedly ‘pleaded’ with Gandhi to send the Indian Army to prevent his government from collapsing, due to the JVP attacks in the South, and LTTE in the North. It was his sheer desperation that drove Jayewardene to opt for the Accord and 13A. After this meeting, Gandhi sent Chidambaram and Natwar Singh to Colombo knowing our vulnerability.
On 19 December 1986, they submitted the “emerged” proposals. The salient points were as follows:
* The Eastern Province to be demarcated minus Sinhala majority Ampara Electorate.
* A PC was to be established for the new Eastern Province.
* Earlier discussed institutional linkages to be refined for Northern and Eastern PCs. The
intention would have been to merge later under a second-stage constitutional development.
* Sri Lanka was willing to create a Vice Presidency for a specified term.
* The five Muslim parliamentarians from the Eastern Province may be invited to India to discuss matters of mutual concern.
The foregoing demands show how India tried to match the Tamils’ interest, vis-a-vis the wishes of the majority community.
Military operations continued provoking India, which threatened to abandon its intervenor role on 09 February 1987, unless Colombo pursued a political solution. Jayewardene responded on 12 February 1987, insinuating calming down on military actions, promoting negotiation and administration, and paving the release of persons in custody. This was how India reacted when rubbed wrongly.
Under successive governments, PCs were weakened by the withdrawal of powers and lacked cooperation. This may have led Jaishankar to address President Dissanayake, whose party is considered averse to 13A. This is the perception of the Tamil MPs, who have recently sought US Ambassador Julie Chung’s intervention for correction. Such aversion to PCs is hard to overcome as evident from an NPP’s public statement that devolution will not include Land and Police powers. It said so close on the heels of Jaishankar’s request that 13A be fully implemented.
Flashback to 1986
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stalwart, Jaswant Singh posed seven questions in Lok Sabha on 13 May 1986, based on the situation in Sri Lanka. They are relevant even today.
* What is the Indian stand in the debate on devolution and delegation?
* Where do India and Sri Lanka stand on the Northern and Eastern Provinces merger?
* What is the stand on land use by the Indian Government, the Government of Sri Lanka, and
the Tamil groups?
* What is the status of the language?
* What is the stand on Law and Order?
* What is the time frame for reaching a solution?
* What is the Indian Government’s stand on the foreign threats emerging in the context of the Sri Lankan issues?
If Jaswant Singh were alive today, he would either join the critical Lok Sabha Members or question PM Modi and Jaishankar why the Accord has not been implemented. Jaishankar’s reminder to President Dissanayake would have been due to his frustration stemming from:
* 13A being “paralyzed” by partial implementation, and delayed elections.
* The demerger of the North and the East legally
* The delay in devolving land and police powers
* The language issue has not been fully resolved despite constitutional guarantees
* Absence of a timeframe for a solution, even after crushing the Tigers in 2009, and,
* Increasing threat to India, especially from China.
Parallelly, the field situations have changed. Military operations have ceased. Public attention has been shifted from conflict to human rights and humanitarian concerns, returning refugees, and reconciliation. 13A has been internationalized owing to the incorporation thereof into UNHRC Resolutions by Mahinda Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe in 2009 and 2015 respectively. Intense lobbying by Diaspora groups has also contributed to this situation. These are daunting challenges before President Dissanayake. 13A is only one of them.
What is in store?
As seen above, the 13A has trudged a rough path to be accepted domestically or in India. Parliamentarians resigned, opposition politicians and Bhikkus protested on roads against it and violence was experienced. If the rejected proposals had been accepted the consequences would have been disastrous. However, devolution has come to stay and is viewed as a ‘Made-in-India’ solution.
President Dissanayake must be prepared for negotiations with relevant parties on devolution and hence needs to study India’s experience with devolution. For instance, on the devolution of land powers, Dissanayake can refer to how the Indian government changed Jammu Kashmir rules allowing the center to release lands to Indians to attract development/investment. They permitted even non-residents to own immovable property in Jammu and Kashmir and transfer agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. India considered changes as her “internal affairs”, which may not be acceptable to them if we say so on 13A!
PM Modi has declared that such abrogation brought about security, dignity, and opportunity for all communities that had been deprived of development, and helped eliminate corruption. If he wishes, President Dissanayake can make similar reasoning to bolster his arguments concerning devolution.
Indians also have asymmetrical administration in the Himachal and Uttarakhand States but do not apply that to Jammu-Kashmir, which we also could duplicate. However, asymmetrical devolution is extremely complex and warrants serious legal attention.
It is now up to President Dissanayake’s legal and administrative experts to propose how to
incorporate propositions concerning devolution into the proposed new Constitution. India might compromise on devolution and concentrate more on economic and humanitarian rights interventions. Such attitudinal change is the need of the hour.
Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, a respected negotiator/strategist, recognised even by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazan, has advised Tamil politicians to negotiate with a winnable candidate and secure Tamil aspirations through negotiations. His wise counsel was not heeded by some Tamil politicians, who, while rejecting 13A, demanded a federal system with self-determination powers for Tamils, which is a non-starter. By reminding President Dissanayake of the need to implement 13A after Doval’s visit, New Delhi sent a clear message concerning Sri Lanka: that it does not consider self-determination or a federal system as a solution.
Hence, Tamil politicians also must revise their approach in light of the aforesaid message. Based on Jaswant Singh’s queries and current political trends, if Tamil groups reject 13A, a new power-sharing mechanism sans federalism must be proposed. Perhaps, the new Constitution promised by Dissanayake may offer an alternative to bring about nation-building, with equality, dignity, justice, self-respect, and inclusivity, through a political process. They are the crux of Tamil demands.
Some believe that devolution can be achieved through Local Government Authorities in contravention of international norms of devolution and the Principle of Subsidiarity. Additionally, making all political parties think out of the box is a formidable challenge. Yet, consensual decision-making is needed to ensure the sustainability of any mechanism.
Meera Srinivasan of The Hindu has said:
“Despite India’s known support to the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration in defeating the LTTE in 2009, sections among the Sri Lankan southern population remain India-sceptics, wary of the big neighbour, who ‘interfered’ in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, ‘sided with Tamils’. They resist India’s commenting on power devolution or conduct of elections to PCs and oppose any Indian role in developing national assets.”
India and the Tamil political establishment may adapt to this Sinhala mindset. The upcoming parliamentary election is expected to enable the NPP to form a government. If so, it will be timely to change narratives, without risking the redirection of the government’s political allegiances elsewhere. India should be cautious. Change should be achieved through wider consultations and agreements.
From Bhandari to Vikram Mistri, and Rajeev Gandhi to Narendra Modi, Indians also have acted like their Sri Lankan counterparts in managing the national question here, as evident from Sri Lanka’s failure to implement the 13A fully for 37 years, and India’s failure to convince Sri Lanka of the need to use 13A to solve the national question.
Today India has to deal with a Sri Lankan leader, who is different from predecessors. It is hoped that Jaishankar and others will be able to persuade him to get to the genuine track to explore a solution for the national question. Good luck to Ministers Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Vijitha Herath, Secretaries Vikram Mistri and Aruni Wijewardane, and High Commissioners Santhosh Jha and Kshenuka Senevirathe!
Opinion
War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – II
Broader Strategic Consequences
One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.
Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.
The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.
A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system
The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.
The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.
The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.
Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.
Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.
However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.
Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon
History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.
European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.
by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)
Opinion
University admission crisis: Academics must lead the way
130,000 students are left out each year—academics hold the key
Each year, Sri Lanka’s G.C.E. Advanced Level examination produces a wave of hope—this year, nearly 175,000 students qualified for university entrance. Yet only 45,000 will be admitted to state universities. That leaves more than 130,000 young people stranded—qualified, ambitious, but excluded. This is not just a statistic; it is a national crisis. And while policymakers debate infrastructure and funding, the country’s academics must step forward as catalysts of change.
Beyond the Numbers: A National Responsibility
Education is the backbone of Sri Lanka’s development. Denying access to tens of thousands of qualified students risks wasting talent, fueling inequality, and undermining national progress. The gap is not simply about seats in lecture halls—it is about the future of a generation. Academics, as custodians of knowledge, cannot remain passive observers. They must reimagine the delivery of higher education to ensure opportunity is not a privilege for the few.
Expanding Pathways, Not Just Campuses
The traditional model of four-year degrees in brick-and-mortar universities cannot absorb the demand. Academics can design short-term diplomas and certificate programmes that provide immediate access to learning. These programmes, focused on employable skills, would allow thousands to continue their education while easing pressure on degree programmes. Equally important is the digital transformation of education. Online and blended learning modules can extend access to rural students, breaking the monopoly of physical campuses. With academic leadership, Sri Lanka can build a reliable system of credit transfers, enabling students to begin their studies at affiliated institutions and later transfer to state universities.
Partnerships That Protect Quality
Private universities and vocational institutes already absorb many students who miss out on state admissions. But concerns about quality and recognition persist. Academics can bridge this divide by providing quality assurance and standardised curricula, supervising joint degree programmes, and expanding the Open University system. These partnerships would ensure that students outside the state system receive affordable, credible, and internationally recognised education.
Research and Advocacy: Shaping Policy
Academics are not only teachers—they are researchers and thought leaders. By conducting labour market studies, they can align higher education expansion with employability. Evidence-based recommendations to the University Grants Commission (UGC) can guide strategic intake increases, regional university expansion, and government investment in digital infrastructure. In this way, academics can ensure reforms are not reactive, but visionary.
Industry Engagement: Learning Beyond the Classroom
Sri Lanka’s universities must become entrepreneurship hubs and innovation labs. Academics can design programmes that connect students directly with industries, offering internship-based learning and applied research opportunities. This approach reduces reliance on classroom capacity while equipping students with practical skills. It also reframes education as a partnership between universities and the economy, rather than a closed system.
Making the Most of What We Have
Even within existing constraints, academics can expand capacity. Training junior lecturers and adjunct faculty, sharing facilities across universities, and building international collaborations for joint programmes and scholarships are practical steps. These measures maximise resources while opening new avenues for students.
A Call to Action
Sri Lanka’s university admission crisis is not just about numbers—it is about fairness, opportunity, and national development. Academics must lead the way in transforming exclusion into empowerment. By expanding pathways, strengthening partnerships, advocating for policy reform, engaging with industry, and optimizing resources, they can ensure that qualified students are not left behind.
“Education for all, not just the fortunate few.”
Dr. Arosh Bandula (Ph.D. Nottingham), Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna
by Dr. Arosh Bandula
Opinion
Post-Easter Sri Lanka: Between memory, narrative, and National security
As Sri Lanka approaches the seventh commemoration of the Easter Sunday attacks, the national mood is once again marked by grief, reflection, and an enduring sense of incompleteness. Nearly seven years later, the tragedy continues to cast a long shadow not only over the victims and their families, but over the institutions and narratives that have since emerged.
Commemoration, however, must go beyond ritual. It must be anchored in clarity, accountability, and restraint. What is increasingly evident in the post-Easter landscape is not merely a search for truth, but a contest over how that truth is framed, interpreted, and presented to the public.
In recent times, public discourse has been shaped by book launches, panel discussions, and media interventions that claim to offer new insights into the attacks. While such contributions are not inherently problematic, the manner in which certain narratives are advanced raises legitimate concerns. The selective disclosure of information particularly when it touches on intelligence operations demands careful scrutiny.
Sri Lanka’s legal and institutional framework is clear on the sensitivity of such matters. The Official Secrets Act (No. 32 of 1955) places strict obligations on the handling of information related to national security. Similarly, the Police Ordinance and internal administrative regulations governing intelligence units emphasize confidentiality, chain of command, and the responsible use of information. These are not mere formalities; they exist to safeguard both operational integrity and national interest.
When individual particularly those with prior access to intelligence structures enter the public domain with claims that are not subject to verification, it raises critical questions. Are these disclosures contributing to justice and accountability, or are they inadvertently compromising institutional credibility and future operational capacity?
The challenge lies in distinguishing between constructive transparency and selective exposure.
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks provided one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the attacks. Its findings highlighted a complex web of failures: lapses in intelligence sharing, breakdowns in inter-agency coordination, and serious deficiencies in political oversight. Importantly, it underscored that the attacks were not the result of a single point of failure, but a systemic collapse across multiple levels of governance.
Yet, despite the existence of such detailed institutional findings, public discourse often gravitates toward simplified narratives. There is a tendency to identify singular “masterminds” or to attribute responsibility in ways that align with prevailing political or ideological positions. While such narratives may be compelling, they risk obscuring the deeper structural issues that enabled the attacks to occur.
Equally significant is the broader socio-political context in which these narratives are unfolding. Sri Lanka today remains a society marked by fragile intercommunal relations. The aftermath of the Easter attacks saw heightened suspicion, polarisation, and, in some instances, collective blame directed at entire communities. Although there have been efforts toward reconciliation, these fault lines have not entirely disappeared.
In this environment, the language and tone of public discourse carry immense weight. The framing of terrorism whether as a localized phenomenon or as part of a broader ideological construct must be handled with precision and responsibility. Overgeneralization or the uncritical use of labels can have far-reaching consequences, including the marginalization of communities and the erosion of social cohesion.
At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that the global discourse on terrorism is itself contested. Competing narratives, geopolitical interests, and selective historiography often shape how events are interpreted. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is to avoid becoming a passive recipient of external frameworks that may not fully reflect its own realities.
A professional and unbiased approach requires a commitment to evidence-based analysis. This includes:
· Engaging with primary sources, including official reports and judicial findings
·
· Cross-referencing claims with verifiable data
·
· Recognizing the limits of publicly available information, particularly in intelligence matters

It also requires intellectual discipline the willingness to question assumptions, to resist convenient conclusions, and to remain open to complexity.
The role of former officials and subject-matter experts in this discourse is particularly important. Their experience can provide valuable insights, but it also carries a responsibility. Public interventions must be guided by professional ethics, respect for institutional boundaries, and an awareness of the potential impact on national security.
There is a fine balance to be maintained. On one hand, democratic societies require transparency and accountability. On the other, the premature or uncontextualized release of sensitive information can undermine the very systems that are meant to protect the public.
As Sri Lanka reflects on the events of April 2019, it must resist the temptation to reduce a national tragedy into competing narratives or political instruments. The pursuit of truth must be methodical, inclusive, and grounded in law.
Easter is not only a moment of remembrance. It is a test of institutional maturity and societal resilience.
The real question is not whether new narratives will emerge they inevitably will. The question is whether Sri Lanka has the capacity to engage with them critically, responsibly, and in a manner that strengthens, rather than weakens, the foundations of its national security and social harmony.
In the end, justice is not served by noise or conjecture. It is served by patience, rigor, and an unwavering commitment to truth.
Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.
by Mahil Dole
Former Senior Law Enforcement Officer National Security Analyst; Former Head of Counter-Intelligence, State Intelligence Service)
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