Features
CBK at 80: A Trailblazer’s Legacy in Perspective
As Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, Sri Lanka’s first female Executive President, turns 80 on June 29, a timely question arises: how will history remember her legacy? Born into a political family as the daughter of two Prime Ministers, her path to leadership was steeped in legacy. But it was not lineage alone that defined her public life. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, commonly known as CBK, carved out a political identity marked by her bold decisions, reformist ambition, and resilience in the face of violence and controversy. Historians may debate the long-term impact of her policies, but they are unlikely to overlook her key milestones— first, most notably, her key role in ushering in two of the most consequential regime changes in modern Sri Lankan history: in 1994 and again in 2015.
In analyzing critical political transformations, historians often emphasize the dynamic interplay between subjective factors and objective conditions. While objective conditions may signal the potential for political change, such change cannot occur without the presence of key subjective factors—such as leadership and the formation of alternative political alliances. In the absence of subjective factors, even a repugnant system that appears ripe for transformation may continue to persist. Conversely, powerful subjective forces can themselves generate or intensify the objective conditions necessary for political change. The pivotal role of CBK as a decisive subjective factor in shaping and mobilizing the objective conditions for these two regime changes has been widely recognized in historical accounts of modern Sri Lankan political history.
Her role in ending the 17-year rule of the United National Party (UNP) in both the parliamentary elections and presidential elections in 1994 is particularly remarkable, especially given the deep internal divisions within the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the broader disunity among anti-UNP forces. Following the assassination of her husband, Vijaya Kumaratunga, the United Left Front quickly disintegrated, and under threat from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), she temporarily left the country and lived in London. During this period, the main opposition party, the SLFP, was fractured at its core, while the nation was engulfed in political violence, widespread corruption, and a wave of political assassinations. This period of crisis culminated in the assassination of President Ranasinghe Premadasa in a suicide bombing during the May Day rally in 1993.
Amid this bleak political landscape, CBK re-entered politics and took on the leadership of the opposition. She initiated the formation of a new political alliance rooted in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and successfully united various fragmented anti-UNP parties and groups under the banner of the People’s Alliance (PA), with the support and endorsement of her mother, former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Uniting the different factions within the SLFP alone was a formidable challenge. At the same time, Kumaratunga introduced a reformist political agenda that marked a clear departure from the traditional policy framework of SLFP. Her platform prioritized a political solution to the ethnic conflict through extensive devolution of power and included a strong commitment to democratic reform, most notably the proposed abolition of the Executive Presidency. She led the People’s Alliance to a decisive victory, winning 62.28% of the vote in the 1994 presidential election.
A new phase of political reform began in the wake of the People’s Alliance (PA) victory in 1994. This discussion does not seek to evaluate the overall successes or failures of the CBK administration, but rather to highlight the significance of two key—though ultimately unfulfilled—initiatives that merit scholarly attention. The first was a peace initiative aimed at resolving the ethnic conflict and ending the Eelam war; the second, a proposed constitutional reform intended to broaden democratic governance, including the abolition of the Executive Presidency. While neither initiative came to fruition, both reflect the reformist ambition that characterized the early years of her tenure, as well as the contradiction between political aspirations and political realities.
The euphoria generated by CBK’s 1994 electoral victory for a swift peace through a negotiated political settlement with the LTTE was shattered after the collapse of direct talks with them in April 1995. In July 1995 the concept paper on constitutional reforms embodying devolution of power to regions was published. Concurrently, CBK launched the Sudu Nelum Movement, an extensive public awareness campaign aimed at preparing the public for a peaceful settlement of the ethnic conflict. However, these initiatives unfolded alongside an escalating armed conflict, as the LTTE resumed its violent campaign. Despite the escalating military threat, CBK remained steadfast in her commitment to a political solution rooted in meaningful national integration. She was the first to establish a separate cabinet portfolio directly under the President. This steadfast pursuit of peace remains a significant chapter in Sri Lanka’s ongoing search for a lasting resolution to the ethnic conflict. The end of the war created a historic opportunity to find a durable solution to the ethnic issue by building a unified nation through genuine national integration. Revitalizing her vision—with necessary refinements—could offer a viable path forward.
One of the most politically significant initiatives undertaken by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (CBK) was the push for a new constitution, which notably proposed the abolition of the Executive Presidency. This initiative consumed considerable political energy and involved extensive consultation. The draft was presented to the Parliamentary Select Committee, where it was discussed on 77 separate occasions—reflecting the seriousness and depth of the deliberations. Additionally, representatives of the People’s Alliance (PA) and the United National Party (UNP) held 17 rounds of bilateral discussions on the proposed reforms. However, despite this intensive engagement, the UNP employed delaying tactics and ultimately withdrew its support during the final stage in the Parliament. This last-minute reversal effectively derailed what could have been a historic move toward a more democratic constitutional framework. Since then, the abolition of the Executive Presidency has remained a central—but still unrealized—topic in Sri Lanka’s political discourse.
CBK
Although CBK had retired from the presidency in 2005, her influential political and social engagement did not cease. In retrospect, her pivotal role in the ousting of the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime in 2015 stands out as a significant contribution to Sri Lanka’s contemporary political history. Despite the urgent demand for regime change, it is unlikely that such a transformation would have been possible without CBK’s strategic intervention. Her efforts were instrumental in uniting diverse civil society actors—most notably those led by Rev. Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero—and aligning them with various opposition parties and groups. Through her respected political standing and behind-the-scenes diplomacy, CBK successfully facilitated consensus-building among civil society groups and major opposition parties, including Tamil political entities in the North. This coalition-building was crucial to presenting a unified front and ultimately defeating what had appeared to be the invincible Rajapaksa regime at the 2015 presidential elections.
In the 2015 presidential election, President Mahinda Rajapaksa went to early polls with a self-adorned halo as the leader who brought an end to Sri Lanka’s 30-year civil war. The end of war was indeed a real solace to the people and Rajapaksa was able to leverage it for considerable political gain. In addition, he also took credit for launching several large-scale infrastructure projects. These included the Mattala International Airport, the Hambantota Port, the Colombo Port City, the Southern Expressway, the Norochcholai Coal Power Plant, and the Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project.
By the time of the 2015 presidential election, widespread public disillusionment with the prevailing political system had reached a critical point. The system was widely perceived as deeply corrupt and dysfunctional. The centralization of power within the Rajapaksa family and their close associates, combined with increasingly authoritarian tendencies masked by a democratic façade, led to the alienation of many within the country’s educated and politically aware segments. Moreover, the regime’s excessive political interference in administrative affairs and excessive politicization of the public service disenchanted a significant portion of government employees. As a result, the demand for a fundamental transformation of the political order grew considerably. While opposition political parties remained fragmented and lacked cohesion, civil society organizations, spearheaded by Rev. Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero, emerged as the primary force resisting the democratic backsliding of the regime. It was in this context that CBK stepped forward to play a pivotal role in uniting the intensely divided opposition and civil society forces. She was instrumental in identifying an unexpected political figure and facilitating his emergence as the common presidential candidate.
The country’s political atmosphere changed markedly after the unseating of the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime. Soon after assuming office, the Yahapalana government introduced the 19th Amendment to the Constitution on April 28, 2015. It curtailed the President’s executive powers and incorporated provisions aimed at enhancing good governance, marking an initial step toward broader democratic reforms. . Despite these early initiatives, the government struggled to maintain its reformist momentum. The cohabitation arrangement between the President and the Prime Minister proved ineffective, and from the outset, competing centers of power emerged within the Government. Meanwhile, the Central Bank bond scandal severely undermined the government’s credibility in its commitment to anti-corruption. The political rift culminated in a constitutional crisis on October 26, 2018, when the President dismissed the Prime Minister and appointed Mahinda Rajapaksa in his place. The Supreme Court later deemed the President’s actions unconstitutional and reinstated the dismissed Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the Yahapalana government had lost much of its legitimacy, and the political environment had become increasingly unstable and pessimistic.
The Yahapalana government’s failure to fulfill its mandate does not render the unseating of the Rajapaksa regime in 2015 politically futile. Before 2015, the Rajapaksa regime had evolved into a deeply entrenched system based on a political class that permeated nearly every aspect of the state and society. That same political class could not fully reemerge in its old form by 2019. The Yahapalana government’s shortcomings did not make Rajapaksa-style authoritarianism any more acceptable to the public. In the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections, many voters turned to Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, partly as a rebuke to Yahapalana’s failures and partly due to the absence of a credible alternative. Although the Rajapaksas returned to power under Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the reestablishment of their earlier political hegemony proved elusive. Gotabya Rajapaksa was no Mahinda Rajapaksa. The structural changes in the political landscape set in motion in 2015 could not be easily reversed. Perhaps most significantly, the public had acquired the confidence that even a powerful and seemingly invincible leader like Mahinda Rajapaksa could be sent home through democratic means. The contributions of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Ven. Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero were instrumental, albeit in different ways, in fostering this public confidence for a political change.
Though certain actions by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa accelerated the collapse, the economic breakdown of 2022 was ultimately the result of years of systemic mismanagement. A key factor was the launching of economically unviable mega-projects, often funded through high-interest foreign loans, which significantly burdened the national economy. At its core, the economic crisis reflects a deeper and long-standing political crisis that has gripped the post-war Sri Lankan state. The social and political forces that emerged in 2015—despite setbacks during the disillusionment with the Yahapalana government—resurfaced in a new form through the Aragalaya. The political significance of the Aragalaya cannot be reduced to its immediate outcomes, such as the elevation of Ranil Wickremesinghe to the presidency.
More fundamentally, it delivered a severe blow to Rajapaksa hegemony and disrupted the entrenched dominance of the ‘political class’. It also opened the door for the unprecedented electoral success of the Jathika Jana Balavegaya (NPP). History unfolds in unexpected ways—marked by both continuity and rupture—and it is often only in retrospect that the true direction of these forces becomes clear, leaving observers both reflective and astonished. Within this longer trajectory, the role of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in 1994 and 2015 remains equally significant—highlighting the enduring impact of a political figure, who helped shape key transitional moments.
Assessing Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s political legacy requires a long historical perspective, one that accounts for the complexities of her time and the broader trajectory of Sri Lankan politics. As she marks her 80th year, CBK remains a symbol of resilience in a deeply contested political landscape. Her presidency—characterized by both bold initiatives and contentious decisions—continues to prompt reflection and debate. Whether in her pursuit of peace, her efforts at navigating entrenched political rivalries, or her advocacy for reconciliation, Kumaratunga’s legacy endures as a significant chapter in the island’s post-independence history. As Johan Huizinga reminds us, “All profound changes awaken profound anxieties, and that is why history is never finished.”
by Gamini Keerawella ✍️
Professor Emeritus of History,
University of Peradeniya
A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.
This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.
The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.
Task Force
The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.
An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.
Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.
Malaiyaha Tamils
The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.
The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.
Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.
by Jehan Perera
When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.
This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.
International Standards
The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”
In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.
Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023
A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.
While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.
In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.
PSTA Proposal
Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:
Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-
(a) provoking a state of terror;
(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;
(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or
(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.
The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.
Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.
The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”
While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.
When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.
The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.
by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel
We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.
Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.
It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.
Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY
This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.
According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.
Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.
Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”
Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE
Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”
Showers in the Northern, North-central, Uva, Western, Eastern, Sabaragamuwa, North-western and Central provinces and Galle and Matara districts
Govt. extends ban on LTTE
Police obtain court order banning Wimal’s protest
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expresses optimism that Sri Lanka is on the right path to progres
India plans to restore northern regular train services to pre-Ditwah frequencies before traditional New Year 2026
Inauguration of first Bailey Bridge under Indian assistance package for post-Ditwah reconstruction
‘Dates have the highest sugar content to fight Coronavirus’
Sunday Island 27 December – Headlines
#SundayIsland 17th December – Headlines
Sunday Island – 28th March
Sunday Island Headlines – 21 March
Sunday Island – 21st February – Headlines
-
News2 days agoSajith: Ashoka Chakra replaces Dharmachakra in Buddhism textbook
-
Business2 days agoDialog and UnionPay International Join Forces to Elevate Sri Lanka’s Digital Payment Landscape
-
Features2 days agoThe Paradox of Trump Power: Contested Authoritarian at Home, Uncontested Bully Abroad
-
Features2 days agoSubject:Whatever happened to (my) three million dollars?
-
News2 days agoLevel I landslide early warnings issued to the Districts of Badulla, Kandy, Matale and Nuwara-Eliya extended
-
News2 days agoNational Communication Programme for Child Health Promotion (SBCC) has been launched. – PM
-
News2 days ago65 withdrawn cases re-filed by Govt, PM tells Parliament
-
Opinion4 days agoThe minstrel monk and Rafiki, the old mandrill in The Lion King – II