Features
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THE KILLING OF A PRIME MINISTER
by Sanjiva Senanayake
PART IV
(continued from last week)
SOMARAMA’S ‘CONFESSION’
In addition to the evidence of the three eye-witnesses, a statement made by Somarama to the Chief Magistrate of Colombo on November 14, 1959 was used by the prosecution to convince the jury that he was the assassin. Somarama retracted the statement long before the SC trial started, and its admissibility as evidence was contested in the SC.
Somarama had been moved to the prison hospital within a few days of the shooting and was then questioned in prison many times by police teams. The most senior police officer in the team was Superintendent of Police B.W. Perera.
Finally, on November 7, Somarama gave a statement to the police but it was short, vague and only mentioned Jayawardena. Then, a week later, he made the following statement to the Chief Magistrate of Colombo –
“One day in August 1959, when I was in the dispensary of the Ayurvedic Hospital in Borella, Reverend Buddharakkitha, the high priest of the Kelaniya temple, and H. P. Jayawardena came by car to see me. Inviting me into the car, Buddharakkitha began to complain bitterly about the general situation in the country. He said that vast sums of money were being lost at the port through strikes and mismanagement. He expressed grave fears that, if the current trends were not arrested, there would be no place for us in the land, nor would there be a future for the Sinhalese people, their religion or their language.
“He suggested that we take steps to do away with the Prime Minister, as we would then be free to fashion things as we wished. I asked him what would befall us if we were to do such a thing. “Nothing will happen to us”, he replied. ‘I have made all the arrangements with those whose assistance we need’. Jayawardena said, “If you should only do this job, we shall ensure that you are out of remand in two or three weeks’ time”.
“Buddharakkitha in turn reassured me that everything would be alright – that I had nothing to fear. I acceded to their request, explaining that I was consenting to do such a thing to one who had done me no wrong only for the sake of my country, my religion and my race. I told them that I had two pupils and also my temple to look after, but they promised to see to all that. They then said that in a day or two they would bring me a revolver, after which all details could be discussed.
“Two or three days later, Buddharakkitha brought me a revolver about a foot in length. It was a six-chambered one and was loaded. We then went to Ragama, met Dickie de Zoysa and proceeded along with him to Muthurajawela. There I fired several times at the fruits of a ‘kaduru’ tree. When I struck a fruit and felled it, someone in the party exclaimed, ‘Bravo, well done!’ After the firing we returned to my temple, having dropped Dickie de Zoysa at Ragama.
Thereafter Rev. Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena visited me often. One day, Amarasinghe, the Chairman of the Kolonnawa Urban Council, also came along with Buddharakkitha.
“Buddharakkitha, Jayawardena and I had agreed that the job be done on September 25. That morning, in order to pluck up courage, I drank a mixture which I had prepared myself and went to the Prime Minister’s residence at Rosmead Place. When the Prime Minister was talking to another monk on the verandah, I started trembling through fear. But the mixture I had taken sustained my courage. On the verandah I shot at the Prime Minister once. That shot struck him. While he was running into the house, I ran behind him and fired three more shots. Then I was overpowered. Someone shot me too and I was rendered unconscious. I do not know what happened next.”
There are several interesting features. There was no mention of visiting Amarasinghe’s house, just a discussion in a car in August, and no mention of Newton Perera either. Dickie de Zoysa had tagged along for the ride to Muthurajawela but, one month later, when hearings commenced at the magistrate’s court, the police withdrew the case against him for lack of evidence. There’s no mention of training but Somarama says he aimed at some fruits at Muthurajawela and succeeded in hitting them, establishing that he was somehow handy with a revolver. He states that he ran behind the PM and shot him but all the entry wounds on the PM were in the front or side of his body.
Somarama retracted this ‘confession’ at the end of the magisterial inquiry (on July 15, 1960), seven months before the SC trial began. In the retraction he stated –
“When I expressed reluctance to make a false statement as required by the police, I was shown a newspaper which said that the death penalty had been re-introduced and was told that, in view of this development, there could be no doubt that I would be sentenced to death and hanged. If, however, I were to make a statement to a magistrate professing that I was doing so voluntarily, the police promised to have me released and made a crown witness. To me, who now lived in the shadow of death, the offer of freedom was irresistible. Therefore, I made a statement to the Magistrate as required by the police, asserting that I was making it of my own free will. In it I implicated the persons whom the police wanted me to implicate. I now state that statement was absolutely untrue.”
The first visit to Somarama in prison by the police team was on October 2, the date on which the government had issued an extraordinary Gazette repealing the suspension of capital punishment. Somarama in a statement from the Dock, made on April 6, 1961, went further and said that B.W. Perera showed him the front page of the newspaper, explained that the death penalty had been reintroduced and he would certainly be hanged. Perera had then asked him to give a statement that he had shot the PM on the instructions of Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena and in exchange he would be made a Crown Witness and escape death. Somarama also said that Perera had mentioned the pardon given to Rupananda, one of the accused in the Turf Club robbery and murder case, as an example. Perera had been on the police team that handled that famous case ten years earlier. It should be noted that Amarasinghe had already been made a Crown Witness six months before Somarama’s retraction. Somarama also said that he had developed an addiction to opium after being medically treated earlier for haemorrhoids, and that he was offered some opium by Perera.
Incidentally, B.W. Perera subsequently committed suicide, in early 1960, when it came to light that he had provided some ammunition to an intermediary, ostensibly acting on behalf of Buddharakkitha. There was no evidence of those bullets being used to assassinate the PM.
Visiting prisoners in remand to question them regarding cases in which they themselves were involved was considered irregular. During the SC trial, the Chief Magistrate of Colombo and some senior Prisons officers stated that it had never happened before in their experience. However, despite objections by Somarama’s counsel, the Judge ruled that it was acceptable since Somarama had been jailed before the police had an opportunity to question him adequately.
Somarama’s counsel also argued that, according to the law, the retracted ‘confession’ should not be admissible as evidence since there were circumstances that showed that it had been made as a result of inducement, threat or promise. He emphasized that in accordance with the prevailing Evidence Ordinance, even the ‘appearance’ of such influence would render it inadmissible, but Justice T.S. Fernando ruled that there should be clear evidence of influence.
The judgement of the Court of Criminal Appeal (https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/the-queen-v-mapitigama-buddharakkita-thera-and-2-others/) contains a rather ambiguous comment on this matter. It states –
“Held, (i) that the admission in evidence of a confession made by the 4th accused to the Magistrate, even assuming that the confession was not voluntary and was obnoxious to section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance or was otherwise inadmissible, could not vitiate the conviction of the 4th accused, because the fact that the 4th accused killed the deceased was established beyond any manner of doubt by the direct evidence of some of those present at the deceased’s house at the time when he was shot there.”
Interestingly, that court had a different view on the value of the ‘confession’ as well. Another passage in the judgement reads –
“Even if any or all of these submissions are entitled to succeed, that would make no difference in the instant case, because the fact that the 4th accused killed the deceased was established beyond any manner of doubt by the direct evidence. Indeed, it is surprising that with that evidence available the prosecution thought it necessary to lengthen the proceedings so much by seeking to prove the confession.”
The prosecution appears to have had a different assessment of the adequacy of the ‘direct evidence’ at their disposal.
MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
The PM knew Somarama well and had interacted with him on matters relating to the College of Indigenous Medicine even a few weeks before the shooting. Somarama had been involved in campaigning for the MEP and had chaired meetings where Bandaranaike had spoken. Yet, in his ‘Address to the Nation’ written for broadcast by radio, he did not say the assailant was Somarama. He didn’t even say it was a genuine monk – just “a foolish man” wearing robes. The PM was known to be very precise in his use of words, especially in English. He had been joking with doctors and nurses at the hospital despite his injuries, fully expecting to survive, so he was in control of his mental faculties. It’s hard to believe that the PM could not recognize Somarama at such close quarters.
Somarama’s behaviour that fateful morning also raises doubts about his guilt. When he set out that morning in a taxi, which is easily traceable, he offered a lift to two people for part of the way – hardly the behaviour of an assassin primed for action within a couple of hours. Then, while sitting on the verandah of the PM’s house, he had quite normal conversations with others minutes before he allegedly became homicidal. Ananda even asked Somarama for an appointment for a friend with an eye ailment, and was requested to send him the following Thursday.
Somarama’s movements on the eve of the shooting (September 24, 1959) were quite normal too. In fact, when Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena visited Somarama’s temple that evening (for last minute consultations and instructions, according to the prosecution), they found him missing. Somarama was relaxing at a temple in Kotahena, having a chat with his friend, Colamba Saranankara. Is it likely that the master-mind and his chosen instrument of death didn’t know each other’s whereabouts, or even that they were due to meet, on the day before the long-planned assassination of the Prime Minister?
The police recovered three outer robes and an inner jacket worn by Buddhist monks lying discarded in the premises after the shooting. Somarama’s outer robe and inner jacket were pulled off in the struggle and that accounted for one robe. Even if Somarama wore two robes that day, as the prosecution argued, one more robe remained a mystery. The prosecution suggested, rather facetiously, that they had probably been kept in the house to be gifted to monks.
A woman who was cooking in a house across the road had come out on hearing the shots and saw a man vault over the perimeter wall of the PM’s house. He shouted “Hari machang” to someone in one of two cars parked on the road outside, jumped into the other one and both cars sped off towards Borella. The prosecution did not call her to give evidence, but Weeramantry did. When the prosecution could not shake her evidence, they suggested that the escapee was probably a ‘look-out’ working in league with the conspirators, and even argued that it bolstered the ‘fact’ that there was a conspiracy. It seems far-fetched that a ‘look-out’ would have had two private cars at his disposal whereas the alleged assassin, Somarama, arrived alone in a taxi that could be easily traced.
Several other common-sense questions come to mind re Buddharakkitha’s motivations and actions.
= why would a young, powerful and street-smart monk like Buddharakkitha, with his life before him, risk losing everything by killing the PM, without even having a replacement ‘sponsor’ in place?
= was he the type to wait for over one year, as the indictment indicated, before taking his revenge?
= why did he not use his close links with underworld characters to kill the PM in some remote location, perhaps as he campaigned?
= why would he draw attention to himself by sending another Buddhist monk to murder the PM in public and in broad daylight?
= why would the ‘plan’ be for Somarama to go into the house after the shooting, where he was sure to be captured, rather than escape in the ensuing chaos?
In addition to the bullet-points above, is it conceivable that Somarama could have expected to be believed when he pleaded innocence, after shooting the PM in front of so many people? On the day, he did not proudly exult that he did it for country, religion and race, as he did in his ‘confession’.
CONCLUSION
As stated earlier, the jury operated in a politically charged, pressure-cooker atmosphere, with limited technical facilities and under tremendous time pressure. On top of that, there was quite a lot of evidence presented that appeared to have little relevance to the assassination per se, which they still had to take note of and assess. The judge’s summing up alone was spread over six days. They didn’t have the luxury, that we now do, of being able to refer to documents and contemplate at leisure.
In the end, the members of the Special Jury were convinced that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, and that is what finally mattered. As Justice Fernando mentioned in his charge to the Jury, they were the sole judges of fact and therefore the real judges in the case. Besides, their opinion was in consonance with that of the experienced judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
In that Court, the focus was mainly on legalistic aspects, such as whether the Judge misinterpreted or misguided the jury in matters of law. It was not a full re-assessment of the evidence, but specific submissions made by the defence counsel were considered and addressed. Deliberations were concluded on January 15, 1962.
The main focus of this series of articles is on the testimony in the SC of the witnesses, especially the ‘eye-witnesses’, and the forensic evidence as they relate very specifically to the case against Somarama. His culpability is at the core of the case.
Obviously, there are many other aspects of the alleged conspiracy – in and out of court, legal and political – that could not be covered in an article of this length. There were also many colourful characters who played their parts in this long drama that held the entire nation spellbound all those years ago. Adding even some of them on, would have diverted attention from the main actor – Talduwe Somarama.
It all boils down to a key question.
Can we be reasonably sure of anything beyond the fact that the assassin was a man – foolish or fiendish – “dressed in the robes of a monk”? That is all we know for certain from the only 100% reliable eye-witness …. the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike himself.
And, if the murderer was not Somarama, who was it, and why did he come dressed as a Buddhist monk?
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The writer can be contacted on this subject at skgsenanayake@gmail.com
Features
From Windrush to Brexit: Redrawing Britain’s Migration Map
For much of its modern history, Britain was an imperial power connected to every corner of the globe, yet it was not a major destination for large-scale international migration. Different waves of newcomers arrived over the centuries, but the overall foreign-born population remained relatively small by contemporary standards. The 1901 Census recorded 82,844 people from Eastern Europe living in Britain, while the Chinese population numbered just 387. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, migrants from Asia and other parts of the world constituted only a tiny fraction of the country’s population. Britain was a nation shaped by migration, but not yet one transformed by it. That would begin to change dramatically in the aftermath of the Second World War.
One of the most significant changes in Britain’s migration patterns after World War II came from the former colonies of the British Empire. Faced with acute labour shortages and the demands of post-war reconstruction, the government introduced the British Nationality Act of 1948, granting citizens of the Commonwealth the right to live and work in the United Kingdom. Although immigration controls were tightened through legislation, such as the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, migration from former colonies continued. Many of those who arrived belonged to the educated middle classes of their home countries. Having passed through education systems established by Britain during the colonial period, they were already familiar with the English language, British institutions and aspects of British culture. For them, Britain represented a land of opportunity, professional advancement and social mobility.
A different set of motivations drove migration from continental Europe, particularly from Eastern European countries. For these migrants, the United Kingdom offered significantly higher wages, stronger labour markets and living standards that often exceeded those available in their countries of origin. This trend accelerated further after Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973, initiating a period in which citizens of member states gradually acquired rights to move, work, study and establish businesses across national borders. The expansion of the European Union in the early 21st century, particularly the accession of several Eastern European states in 2004, would later transform these flows on an unprecedented scale.
Immigration has rarely been determined solely by economic forces; it has also reflected the priorities of governments in power. During the period between 1997 and 2010, when the Labour Party was in power, immigration policies became comparatively more open in several key areas. Combined with economic growth and labour demand, these policies contributed to a substantial increase in migration, with net migration reaching levels that had few historical precedents in modern Britain. The debate over whether this growth was an economic necessity, a policy success or a political miscalculation continues to influence British politics to this day.
The next major turning point came with the Brexit referendum of 2016 and Britain’s eventual departure from the European Union. For decades, European citizens had enjoyed relatively unrestricted access to the British labour market through the principle of free movement. As the post-Brexit immigration system took shape, that privilege largely disappeared. The result was not the end of migration, but a significant shift in its composition. Labour shortages remained across sectors, ranging from healthcare and social care to information technology, logistics and higher education. As European migration declined, employers increasingly turned to other parts of the world to meet these demands.
This created new opportunities for migrants from countries such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and several other Asian nations. In many respects, these arrivals filled a vacuum left by the reduction in European labour mobility. The overall pattern suggests that Britain’s economy continued to require migrant labour even as its immigration framework underwent fundamental change. Migration flows did not disappear; rather, they were redirected.
Yet this shift has done little to calm public anxieties surrounding immigration. If anything, concerns over migration have remained a central feature of British political debate. Governments of different political persuasions, including those that once defended relatively liberal immigration policies, have increasingly adopted tougher rhetoric and stricter measures aimed at reducing migration levels. Across the political spectrum, there is growing pressure to demonstrate greater control over borders, tighten visa pathways and, in some cases, encourage or require migrants to leave once their economic or educational purpose has ended.
This pressure has translated into a series of policy changes. In 2025, the government announced new restrictions designed to reduce migration and increase employer reliance on the domestic workforce. Among the most significant measures were plans to shorten the list of occupations for which employers could sponsor workers from overseas and to introduce tougher compliance requirements for sponsoring organisations. Social care, a sector that had become heavily dependent on international recruitment, was particularly affected, with employers facing tighter limitations on recruiting care workers from abroad. These changes reflected a broader political commitment to lowering migration numbers, even as many sectors continued to report persistent staffing shortages.
The higher education sector has also found itself at the centre of this debate. International students have become one of the most important contributors to Britain’s universities and local economies. They pay tuition fees that help sustain institutions, support jobs in university towns and cities, and contribute billions of pounds annually through spending on housing, transport and everyday living expenses. For many students, however, studying in Britain is not merely an educational experience but a substantial personal and financial investment made with the expectation that it will open pathways to professional opportunities.
Against this backdrop, proposals to reduce the standard length of the graduate visa have generated considerable concern. The graduate route has allowed international students to remain in the United Kingdom after completing their studies in order to gain work experience and establish careers. Supporters of restrictions argue that student visas should not become a long-term migration pathway. Critics counter that reducing post-study opportunities risks making Britain less attractive in an increasingly competitive global market for talent. Countries such as Canada, Australia and Germany continue to compete aggressively for skilled international graduates, and students weighing their options may choose destinations that offer clearer prospects after graduation.
These debates often frame migration as a problem to be solved through numerical reductions. Yet, what should be noted here is that many of the pressures commonly attributed to immigration are connected to wider economic and political challenges. The decade following Britain’s departure from the European Union has been marked by an unusual degree of political instability. Since the Brexit referendum, the country has seen seven prime ministers, with governments frequently changing direction on economic strategy, public spending and immigration policy. Such instability has contributed to uncertainty about Britain’s long-term trajectory and has complicated efforts to build a consistent approach to migration.
Public concerns about immigration are real and cannot simply be dismissed. Anti-immigration demonstrations and calls for stricter border controls continue to attract significant support in some parts of the country. At the same time, these concerns often become a focal point through which broader anxieties about housing, public services, economic stagnation and national identity are expressed. Immigration is therefore not merely a migration issue; it is also a lens through which deeper social and political tensions are debated.
The increasingly restrictive tone of migration policy has also raised questions about community cohesion and the treatment of migrants already living in Britain.
While much public attention focuses on new arrivals, long-term residents can also find themselves affected by changing rules and enforcement practices. Earlier proposals such as the Rwanda asylum plan, announced in 2022, sought to relocate certain asylum seekers to Rwanda for the processing of their claims, though the policy was never ultimately implemented. More recently, cases involving migrants being instructed to leave the country despite having established families, employment and community ties have generated public debate. One widely discussed example involved Chamila Dilrukshi, a Sri Lankan mother, who was instructed by the Home Office to leave the United Kingdom with her three children while her husband remained in Britain. Cases such as these illustrate how immigration policy extends beyond statistics and labour markets, affecting family life, community relationships and the sense of belonging experienced by migrants who have built their lives in the country.
This raises a more fundamental question than the familiar debate over whether immigration numbers should rise or fall. If Britain continues to face an ageing population, labour shortages in critical sectors and increasing competition for global talent, can it realistically sustain economic growth while simultaneously reducing its reliance on migrants? Equally important, can successive governments build a migration system that balances economic necessity, public confidence and social cohesion at a time of continuing political uncertainty? The answer may prove decisive not only for Britain’s future migration policy, but for the broader question of what kind of society, economy and national identity the United Kingdom hopes to shape in the decades ahead.
by Viran Maddumage
Assistant Lecturer & PhD(Reading) Department of Human Geography and Migration, Macquarie University, Australia
and Sanduni Rathnayake
Lecturer (Probationary) Faculty of Law, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University
Features
Tolerance and Diversity
Today all the major religions of the world must respond to a double challenge. On one side is the challenge of secularism, a trend which has swept across the globe, battering against the most ancient strongholds of the sacred and turning all man’s movements towards the Beyond into a forlorn gesture, poignant but devoid of sense. On the other side is the meeting of the great religions with each other. As the most far-flung nations and cultures merge into a single global community, the representatives of humankind’s spiritual quest have been brought together in an encounter of unprecedented intimacy, an encounter so close that it leaves no room for retreat. Thus, at one and the same time each major religion faces, in the amphitheater of world opinion, all the other religions of the earth, as well as the vast numbers of people who regard all claims to possess the Great Answer with a skeptical frown or an indifferent yawn.
In this situation, any religion which is to emerge as more than a relic from humanity’s adolescence must be able to deal, in a convincing and meaningful manner, with both sides of the challenge. On the one hand it must contain the swelling tide of secularism, by keeping alive the intuition that no amount of technological mastery over external nature, no degree of proficiency in providing for humanity’s mundane needs, can bring complete repose to the human spirit, can still the thirst for a truth and value that transcends the boundaries of contingency. On the other hand, each religion must find some way of disentangling the conflicting claims that all religions make to understand our place in the grand scheme of things and to hold the key to our salvation. While remaining faithful to its own most fundamental principles, a religion must be able to address the striking differences between its own tenets and those of other creeds, doing so in a manner that is at once honest yet humble, perspicacious yet unimposing.
In this brief essay, I wish to sketch the outline of an appropriate Buddhist response to the second challenge. Since Buddhism has always professed to offer a “middle way” in resolving the intellectual and ethical dilemmas of the spiritual life, we may find that the key to our present problematic also lies in discovering the response that best exemplifies the middle way. As has often been noted, the middle way is not a compromise between the extremes but a way that rises above them, avoiding the pitfalls into which they lead. Therefore, in seeking the proper Buddhist approach to the problem of the diversity of creeds, we might begin by pinpointing the extremes which the middle way must avoid.
The first extreme is a retreat into fundamentalism, the adoption of an aggressive affirmation of one’s own beliefs coupled with a proselytizing zeal towards those who still stand outside the chosen circle of one’s co-religionists. While this response to the challenge of diversity has assumed alarming proportions in the folds of the great monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam, it is not one towards which Buddhism has a ready affinity, for the ethical guidelines of the Dhamma naturally tend to foster an attitude of benign tolerance towards other religions and their followers. Though there is no guarantee against the rise of a militant fundamentalism from within Buddhism’s own ranks, the Buddha’s teachings can offer no sanctification, not even a remote one, for such a malignant development.
For Buddhists the more alluring alternative is the second extreme. This extreme, which purchases tolerance at the price of integrity, might be called the thesis of spiritual universalism: the view that all the great religions, at their core, espouse essentially the same truth, clothed merely in different modes of expression. Such a thesis could not, of course, be maintained in regard to the formal creeds of the major religions, which differ so widely that it would require a strenuous exercise in word-twisting to bring them into accord. The universalist position is arrived at instead by an indirect route. Its advocates argue that we must distinguish between the outward face of a religion — its explicit beliefs and exoteric practices — and its inner nucleus of experiential realisation. On the basis of this distinction, they then insist, we will find that beneath the markedly different outward faces of the great religions, at their heart — in respect of the spiritual experiences from which they emerge and the ultimate goal to which they lead — they are substantially identical. Thus, the major religions differ simply in so far as they are different means, different expedients, to the same liberative experience, which may be indiscriminately designated “enlightenment,” or “redemption,” or “God-realization,” since these different terms merely highlight different aspects of the same goal. As the famous maxim puts it: the roads up the mountain are many, but the moonlight at the top is one. From this point of view, the Buddha Dhamma is only one more variant on the “perennial philosophy” underlying all the mature expressions of man’s spiritual quest. It may stand out by its elegant simplicity, its clarity and directness; but a unique and unrepeated revelation of truth it harbors not.
On first consideration the adoption of such a view may seem to be an indispensable stepping-stone to religious tolerance, and to insist that doctrinal differences are not merely verbal but real and important may appear to border on bigotry. Thus, those who embrace Buddhism in reaction against the doctrinaire narrowness of the monotheistic religions may find in such a view — so soft and accommodating — a welcome respite from the insistence on privileged access to truth typical of those religions. However, an unbiased study of the Buddha’s own discourses would show quite plainly that the universalist thesis does not have the endorsement of the Awakened One himself. To the contrary, the Buddha repeatedly proclaims that the path to the supreme goal of the holy life is made known only in his own teaching, and therefore that the attainment of that goal — final deliverance from suffering — can be achieved only from within his own dispensation. The best known instance of this claim is the Buddha’s assertion, on the eve of his Parinibbana, that only in his dispensation are the four grades of enlightened persons to be found, that the other sects are devoid of true ascetics, those who have reached the planes of liberation.
The Buddha’s restriction of final emancipation to his own dispensation does not spring from a narrow dogmatism or a lack of good will, but rests upon an utterly precise determination of the nature of the final goal and of the means that must be implemented to reach it. This goal is neither an everlasting afterlife in a heaven nor some nebulously conceived state of spiritual illumination, but the Nibbana element with no residue remaining, release from the cycle of repeated birth and death. This goal is effected by the utter destruction of the mind’s defilements — greed, aversion and delusion — all the way down to their subtlest levels of latency. The eradication of the defilements can be achieved only by insight into the true nature of phenomena, which means that the attainment of Nibbana depends upon the direct experiential insight into all conditioned phenomena, internal and external, as stamped with the “three characteristics of existence”: impermanence, suffering, and non-selfness. What the Buddha maintains, as the ground for his assertion that his teaching offers the sole means to final release from suffering, is that the knowledge of the true nature of phenomena, in its exactitude and completeness, is accessible only in his teaching. This is so because, theoretically, the principles that define this knowledge are unique to his teaching and contradictory in vital respects to the basic tenets of other creeds; and because, practically, this teaching alone reveals, in its perfection and purity, the means of generating this liberative knowledge as a matter of immediate personal experience. This means is the Noble Eightfold Path which, as an integrated system of spiritual training, cannot be found outside the dispensation of a Fully Enlightened One.
Surprisingly, this exclusivistic stance of Buddhism in regard to the prospects for final emancipation has never engendered a policy of intolerance on the part of Buddhists towards the adherents of other religions. To the contrary, throughout its long history, Buddhism has displayed a thoroughgoing tolerance and genial good will towards the many religions with which it has come into contact. It has maintained this tolerance simultaneously with its deep conviction that the doctrine of the Buddha offers the unique and unsurpassable way to release from the ills inherent in conditioned existence. For Buddhism, religious tolerance is not achieved by reducing all religions to a common denominator, nor by explaining away formidable differences in thought and practice as accidents of historical development. From the Buddhist point of view, to make tolerance contingent upon whitewashing discrepancies would not be to exercise genuine tolerance at all; for such an approach can “tolerate” differences only by diluting them so completely that they no longer make a difference. True tolerance in religion involves the capacity to admit differences as real and fundamental, even as profound and unbridgeable, yet at the same time to respect the rights of those who follow a religion different from one’s own (or no religion at all) to continue to do so without resentment, disadvantage or hindrance.
Buddhist tolerance springs from the recognition that the dispositions and spiritual needs of human beings are too vastly diverse to be encompassed by any single teaching, and thus that these needs will naturally find expression in a wide variety of religious forms. The non-Buddhist systems will not be able to lead their adherents to the final goal of the Buddha’s Dhamma, but that they never proposed to do in the first place. For Buddhism, acceptance of the idea of the beginningless round of rebirths implies that it would be utterly unrealistic to expect more than a small number of people to be drawn towards a spiritual path aimed at complete liberation. The overwhelming majority, even of those who seek deliverance from earthly woes, will aim at securing a favorable mode of existence within the round, even while misconceiving this to be the ultimate goal of the religious quest.
To the extent that a religion proposes sound ethical principles and can promote to some degree the development of wholesome qualities such as love, generosity, detachment and compassion, it will merit in this respect the approbation of Buddhists. These principles advocated by outside religious systems will also conduce to rebirth in the realms of bliss — the heavens and the divine abodes.
Buddhism by no means claims to have unique access to these realms, but holds that the paths that lead to them have been articulated, with varying degrees of clarity, in many of the great spiritual traditions of humanity. While the Buddhist will disagree with the belief structures of other religions to the extent that they deviate from the Buddha’s Dhamma, he will respect them to the extent that they enjoin virtues and standards of conduct that promote spiritual development and the harmonious integration of human beings with each other and with the world. (Courtesy Buddhist Publication Society.)
by Bhikkhu Bodhi
Features
Seeing things as they truly are
Buddhism offers a profound moral and philosophical framework aimed at guiding individuals toward enlightenment and alleviating suffering. A key aspect of this journey is understanding reality through the lens of the Three Marks of Existence, a concept deeply rooted in Buddhist scriptures and teachings. This understanding can often become obscured by delusion and ignorance, hindering our ability to perceive the true nature of reality and trapping us in cycles of suffering.
The Three Marks of Existence, also known as the Three Universal Truths, are (1) impermanence (Anicca), (2) suffering or unsatisfactoriness (Dukkha), and (3) non-self or insubstantiality (Anatta). These principles, articulated by the Buddha over 2,500 years ago, reveal universal truths applicable to all beings and serve as a foundation for deeper insights into life. They emphasise that all phenomena are transient, that lasting happiness is elusive, and that the notion of a fixed self is fundamentally illusory.
In the Pali Canon, teachings highlight that all conditioned phenomena (saṅkhārāā) are subject to Anicca and Dukkha, while Anatta extends even further, applying to all dhammas. As stated in the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, the Buddha underscores the reality that there is no enduring self within the five aggregates, indicating that the belief in “I” or “mine” is a source of Dukkha that must be relinquished. Understanding Anatta encourages practitioners to recognise the emptiness of the self and to understand how clinging to identity leads to suffering.
These three characteristics are incontrovertible facts that apply to both animate and inanimate things. Whether Buddhas arise or not, these truths exist in the world. In Buddhism, to see things as they truly are means to consistently view them through the lens of the Three Marks. Failing to do so, or deceiving oneself about their reality and range of application, is the defining mark of ignorance (avijja). This ignorance of our true nature and the true nature of our surroundings leads to actions based on delusions, accumulating karma that keeps us bound to the cycle of rebirth and death.
Dissolving that ignorance through direct insight into the Three Marks is said to bring an end to samsara and the resulting suffering (dukkha nirodha or nirodha sacca, as described in the third of the Four Noble Truths). To perceive things as they truly are, one must cultivate an understanding of these truths—not merely through intellectual contemplation but also through insights gained from personal experiences. A deeper comprehension of the Three Universal Truths fosters wisdom and leads to liberation from the cycle of rebirth, culminating in Nibbana, the ultimate goal of Buddhism.
Recognising the interplay of these three characteristics in our lives is essential. Ignorance of these truths breeds delusion and results in actions that generate karma, confining us to a persistent cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. Gaining direct insight into the Three Marks of Existence enables us to transcend suffering (Dukkha Nirodha), aligning with the third of the Four Noble Truths.
Moreover, a lack of understanding regarding these universal truths can lead to frustration and despair. Conversely, a clear grasp of the Three Marks equips us to navigate life’s complexities, allowing for realistic expectations, resilient acceptance of suffering, and protection against misleading beliefs.
The Satipatthana Sutta highlights mindfulness as a vital tool for engaging with reality as it is. By observing our thoughts, feelings, and sensations without attachment or aversion, we cultivate a clearer perception of impermanence, suffering, and non-self. The realisation that all phenomena are fleeting allows us to develop a compassionate response to ourselves and others, breaking the cycle of craving and clinging that fuels suffering.
Rev. Nyanapoke further articulates that the Three Marks are observable in every facet of existence—physical, emotional, mental, and social. He notes that natural cycles, shifts in emotions, evolving thoughts, and changing relationships epitomise the transient nature of life. Even when contemplating minute aspects of life, we encounter an immense variety of living forms, from microbes to humans, demonstrating that these three basic features are common to everything that possesses animate existence. Through this comprehensive understanding, we can better navigate the complexities of life and deepen our connection to the essence of existence.
By reflecting on the first of the Three Marks of Existence, the universal truth of impermanence, we come to understand the stark reality that everything we acquire and hold dear—possessions, achievements, cherished relationships, and loved ones—will ultimately succumb to time and cease to exist. This notion is poignantly captured by the philosopher Heraclitus, who famously remarked, “No man ever steps in the same river twice,” underscoring the idea that both the river and the man are in constant flux, the transient nature of existence.
This idea of impermanence also resonates with the biblical acknowledgement, “Why do you not even know what will happen tomorrow? What is your life? You are but a mist that appears for a little while and then vanishes” (James 4:14). The first truth, impermanence, is intricately connected to all aspects of our existence.
The second characteristic. Dukkha is an important concept in Buddhism, commonly referred to as suffering. It is the first of the Four Noble Truths. Suffering is an inescapable part of life, and it can come in many forms. It refers to the habitual experience of mundane life as fundamentally unsatisfactory and painful. There are many times in our lives when we feel overwhelmed by our suffering and wonder how we can overcome it. Dukkha refers to the inherent unsatisfactoriness and suffering present in life. It encompasses a broad range of experiences, including physical pain, emotional distress, and existential dissatisfaction. In other words, dukkha can vary from minor irritations to profound suffering, and it is not limited to overt suffering. It also highlights the subtle discomfort that arises from life’s impermanence and the transient nature of happiness. Even moments of joy are often tinged with the knowledge that they are fleeting, leading to a perpetual sense of longing or fear of loss. The Buddha applies the characteristic of suffering to all conditioned things in the sense that for living beings, everything conditioned is a potential cause of experienced suffering and is, at any rate, incapable of giving lasting satisfaction.
Buddha says, “The world is established on suffering, is founded on suffering” (Dukkha loko patitthito). His whole doctrine rests on the pivot of suffering. He perceived the universality of suffering and propounded a remedy (Noble Eightfold Path) for the universal sickness of humanity. By that, Buddhism does not denote an attitude of hopelessness and pessimism toward life. Buddha did not expect his adherents to be constantly brooding over the ills of life and so make their lives unhappy.
If you look at the world with dispassionate discernment, it becomes abundantly clear that there is only one problem in the world, which is suffering, dukkha. Today, people all over the world suffer untold suffering and agony, and there is so much misery all around us. People’s lives are plucked at a young age. Many people suffer from incurable diseases and tragic deaths. Humanity is continuously grappling with many natural disasters and destruction. Yet, through ignorance, people go chasing after shadows, dwelling in delusion, unable to confront the adversities that life brings. Suffering appears and passes away, only to reappear in other forms. All forms of suffering are either physical or psychological. All is in a whirl; nothing escapes this inexorable, unceasing change.
Understanding Dukkha is crucial for practitioners, as it invites introspection about the nature of existence and our responses to experiences. Instead of viewing suffering as something to be avoided, Buddhism encourages us to confront it, recognize its roots, and understand its universal presence in human life. This acknowledgement allows us to cultivate compassion for ourselves and others who are also caught in this cycle of suffering. By facing Dukkha with awareness, we can begin to unravel the causes of our suffering and start the journey toward alleviation.
The third truth, Anatta, embraces the concept of non-self or insubstantiality, suggesting that there is no permanent, unchanging self within us. This realisation challenges the deeply ingrained belief in a fixed identity or essence. Instead, Buddhism teaches that what we consider the “self” is actually a collection of ever-changing physical and mental components, known as the five aggregates: form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness.
Understanding Anatta is liberating in that it encourages us to let go of attachments to our identities, beliefs, and notions of self. When we cling to a fixed identity, we create suffering through desires and fears related to maintaining that identity. By recognising that the self is contingent and fluid, we can reduce suffering and anxiety associated with self-identity and experience greater freedom. Embracing Anatta allows individuals to break free from the confines of ego, leading to a deeper connection with the world and others.
Together, the truths of Dukkha and Anatta highlight the importance of understanding suffering and the illusion of self in the journey toward enlightenment. By facing these truths, practitioners can cultivate wisdom, compassion, and ultimately find liberation from the cycles of rebirth and suffering.
by Dr. Justice Chandradasa Nanayakkara
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