Features
An autochthonous Constitution

1972 Constitution in Retrospect – I
By Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel
This week marks the 50th anniversary of Sri Lanka becoming a republic. We observe the anniversary at a time when the large majority of our people are yearning for comprehensive constitutional reform – “system change,” as they put it. Many believe that, after the failure of the first and second republican constitutions, the time is right for the Third Republic.
This article, in three parts, is based on a paper that I contributed to a collection of essays, titled, Sirimavo, published by the Bandaranaike Museum Committee, in 2010. When Sunethra Bandaranaike invited me to contribute an essay on the 1972 Constitution, I told her that I would be unable to say much good about it. This, I explained, was despite Dr Colvin R. De Silva, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs of the United Front government who steered the constitution-making process, being a former leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party to which I belonged and my senior in several fundamental rights cases, beginning with Palihawadana v. Attorney-General (Job Bank Case), the first fundamental rights case, under the 1978 Constitution. “You can write anything”, Sunethra assured me. My friend, Tissa Jayatilleke, edited the publication.
Replacing the Soulbury Constitution
The Independence Constitution of 1947, popularly known as the Soulbury Constitution, conferred dominion on Ceylon. The Governor-General was appointed by the British sovereign. The Parliament of Ceylon consisted of the King/Queen, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Executive power continued to be vested in the Crown and was exercised by the Governor-General. The Cabinet of Ministers was charged with the general direction and control of the government and was collectively responsible to Parliament. The form of government was in the Westminster model, which meant that the Governor-General would act on the advice of the Prime Minister. By the oath of allegiance, Senators, Members of Parliament, and all holders of office, including the Prime Minister, Ministers and heads of departments and judicial officers, swore to ‘be faithful and bear true allegiance to the King/Queen.The first move towards making Ceylon a Republic was made by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who, on becoming Prime Minister, in 1956, informed the other governments of the British Commonwealth of Ceylon’s intention to become a Republic, within the Commonwealth. A Joint Select Committee of the two Houses of Parliament, on the revision of the Constitution, accepted the principle of establishing a Republic, within the Commonwealth. It was also agreed that the parliamentary form of government would continue with the President being a constitutional head of state. The President and the Vice-President would be elected by the legislature, fundamental rights recognized, appeals to the Privy Council abolished, and a court established to adjudicate constitutional matters and hear appeals from the Supreme Court.
Although sub-section 4 of section 29 of the 1947 Constitution provided that ‘in the exercise of its powers under this section, Parliament may amend or repeal any of the provisions of this Order, or of any other Order of Her Majesty in Council in its application to the Island’, the question whether Parliament could replace the British sovereign, who was a source of the legal authority of the Constitution and a constituent part of Parliament, had been raised, among others, by J.A.L. Cooray in his Review of the Constitution. The Privy Council stated in Ibralebbe v The Queen (65 NLR 433, 443) that the reservations specified in section 29 were ‘fundamental’ and in Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe that section 29 (2) was ‘unalterable under the Constitution’(66 NLR 73, 78). Although obiter (not essential for the decision), these statements gave support to a move initiated by the Left parties towards a new ‘homegrown’ or ‘autochthonous’ Constitution with a complete legal break from the existing constitutional order in preference to amending the Constitution. There was also a definite trend in the Commonwealth towards enacting ‘homegrown’ constitutions to replace those given by the United Kingdom.
The Constituent Assembly route
It was this trend towards and desire for an autochthonous Constitution that led the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP) to not support the call of the 1965 government of Dudley Senanayake of the United National Party (UNP) to re-establish the Joint Select Committee on the Revision of the Constitution. The SLFP, LSSP and CP, which later combined to form the United Front (UF), whilst declining to serve on the Joint Select Committee, proposed that a Constituent Assembly be set up to adopt and enact a new constitution. At the general election of May 1970, the UF, as reflected in its manifesto, sought from the electorate a mandate to permit the Members of Parliament to function simultaneously as a Constituent Assembly. The Assembly would draft, adopt and operate a new constitution, the primary objective of which was to make the country a free, sovereign and independent republic dedicated to the realisation of a socialist democracy that would guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens.
At the above-referenced general election, 84.9% of the voters, a significantly high percentage even for an electorate known for its enthusiastic participation in elections, exercised their franchise. The UF won 116 out of 151 seats on offer but obtained 48.8% of the total votes cast. With the support of the six nominated members and the two independent members who won their seats with the help of the UF, the latter now commanded 124 seats in the 157-member Parliament. The UNP was down to 17 seats. The Federal Party (FP) won 13 seats while Tamil Congress (TC) won 03.
The Governor-General, in the course of delivering the first Throne Speech of the new Parliament, called upon the Members of Parliament to form a Constituent Assembly in keeping with the mandate asked for and given by the people at the general election.
That the Address of Thanks to the Throne Speech was passed without a division is also important. On 11 July, 1970, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike wrote to all members of the House of Representatives to invite them for a meeting to be held on 19 July, 1970, to consider and adopt a resolution for constituting themselves into a Constituent Assembly.
The meeting was to be held at the Navarangahala, the newly constructed auditorium of Royal College, Colombo, and not in the chamber of the House of Representatives, signifying the intention of the UF to make a complete break from the 1947 Constitution. Dr Colvin R. de Silva, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, emphasised that what was contemplated was not an attempt to create a new superstructure on an old foundation. It is a matter of great significance that all political parties, represented in Parliament, participated in the formation of the Constituent Assembly on 19 July, 1970.
J.R. Jayewardene, the Leader of the Opposition and Deputy Leader of the UNP, joining the debate on the resolution to set up a Constituent Assembly, reminded the UF that it had a mandate only from less than 50% of the people. Nevertheless, if both sides of the legislature, the victors and the vanquished, agreed to make common cause in enacting a new basic law through a legal revolution, that new law, if accepted by the people, will become the full expression of the hopes, desires and aspirations of the present generation.
V. Dharmalingam of the FP, while questioning the need to go outside the existing Constitution, noted: “We are making common cause with you in enacting a new Constitution not as a vanquished people but as the representatives of a people who have consistently at successive elections since 1956 given us a mandate to change the present Constitution which has been the source of all evil to the Tamil people.”
The leader of the FP, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, urged the Assembly to reach common ground on controversial issues and quoted Jawaharlal Nehru in support: “We shall go to the Constituent Assembly with the fixed determination of finding a common basis for agreement on all controversial issues.”
V. Anandasangaree, speaking on behalf of the TC, stated that his party did not wish to be a stumbling block but requested the Government to be fair and adopt the new Constitution unanimously.
Indicating the acceptance of the Constituent Assembly route towards the adoption of a new constitution by all political parties, the proposed resolution to form the Constituent Assembly was unanimously passed on 21 July 1970.
It is significant that all political parties represented in Parliament participated in the formation of the Constituent Assembly, thus giving legitimacy to the process. However, the Constitution that the Constituent Assembly adopted lacked similar legitimacy. The Federal Party discontinued participation after the Assembly decided to make Sinhala the only official language. The United National Party voted against the Constitution. With all political parties agreeing on the Constituent Assembly process, it was a unique opportunity to adopt a constitution that had the support of the people at large. But Assembly proceedings show that the United Front, which had a two-thirds majority but had received a little less than 50% of the popular vote, imposed a constitution of its choice. The Constitution also extended the term of the legislature by two years which had a chilling effect on Sri Lankan democracy. There is certainly a lot to learn from the 1970-72 reform process.
Retaining the parliamentary form of government
Whilst the desire of the UF was to make a complete break from the Soulbury Constitution modelled on the British system, it nevertheless considered the Westminster model of parliamentary government to be suitable for Sri Lanka.
However, J.R. Jayewardene proposed the introduction of an executive presidency, a proposal opposed even by Dudley Senanayake, a former prime minister and the leader of the UNP. Interestingly though, Jayewardene was to have the last word. After he was elected Prime Minister in 1977, the UNP he led having obtained an unprecedented five-sixths majority in Parliament, Jayewardene introduced the executive presidency through the Second Amendment to the 1972 Constitution. He followed it up with the Second Republican Constitution of 1978, based on an executivepresidency sans any checks and balances usually found in countries with a presidential form of government.
It is salutary, in the above context, to recall the words and sentiments expressed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike during the debate on the Second Amendment to the Constitution: “The effect of this amendment is to place the President above the National State Assembly. Above the law and above the courts, thereby creating a concentration of State power in one person, whoever he might be. This has happened in other countries before, and history is full of examples of the disastrous consequences that came upon such nations that changed their Constitutions by giving one man too much power. (…) We oppose this Bill firmly and unequivocally. It will set our country on the road to dictatorship and there will be no turning back. This Bill will mark the end of democracy in Sri Lanka, as the late Dudley Senanayake realized when these same ideas were put to him in the United National Party.”
Dr De Silva warned against the danger of counterposing the Prime Minister chosen by the people who are sovereign against a President who is directly elected: “Let me put it directly and more strongly. You have the Prime Minister chosen by the people who are sovereign. Then, if you have a President, chosen also by the sovereign people directly through the exercise of a similar franchise, you have at the heart and apex of the State two powers counterposed to each other, each drawing its power from the same source, the sovereign people, but each drawing the power independent of the other.” No Constitution will be able to define adequately and satisfactorily the relationship between the two, he explained.
(Next: Part II: A Majoritarian Constitution)
Features
An opportunity to move from promises to results

The local government elections, long delayed and much anticipated, are shaping up to be a landmark political event. These elections were originally due in 2023, but were postponed by the previous government of President Ranil Wickremesinghe. The government of the day even defied a Supreme Court ruling mandating that elections be held without delay. They may have feared a defeat would erode that government’s already weak legitimacy, with the president having assumed office through a parliamentary vote rather than a direct electoral mandate following the mass protests that forced the previous president and his government to resign. The outcome of the local government elections that are taking place at present will be especially important to the NPP government as it is being accused by its critics of non-delivery of election promises.
Examples cited are failure to bring opposition leaders accused of large scale corruption and impunity to book, failure to bring a halt to corruption in government departments where corruption is known to be deep rooted, failure to find the culprits behind the Easter bombing and failure to repeal draconian laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In the former war zones of the north and east, there is also a feeling that the government is dragging its feet on resolving the problem of missing persons, those imprisoned without trial for long periods and return of land taken over by the military. But more recently, a new issue has entered the scene, with the government stating that a total of nearly 6000 acres of land in the northern province will be declared as state land if no claims regarding private ownership are received within three months.
The declaration on land to be taken over in three months is seen as an unsympathetic action by the government with an unrealistic time frame when the land in question has been held for over 30 years under military occupation and to which people had no access. Further the unclaimed land to be designated as “state land” raises questions about the motive of the circular. It has undermined the government’s election campaign in the North and East. High-level visits by the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet ministers to these regions during a local government campaign were unprecedented. This outreach has signalled both political intent and strategic calculation as a win here would confirm the government’s cross-ethnic appeal by offering a credible vision of inclusive development and reconciliation. It also aims to show the international community that Sri Lanka’s unity is not merely imposed from above but affirmed democratically from below.
Economic Incentives
In the North and East, the government faces resistance from Tamil nationalist parties. Many of these parties have taken a hardline position, urging voters not to support the ruling coalition under any circumstances. In some cases, they have gone so far as to encourage tactical voting for rival Tamil parties to block any ruling party gains. These parties argue that the government has failed to deliver on key issues, such as justice for missing persons, return of military-occupied land, release of long-term Tamil prisoners, and protection against Buddhist encroachment on historically Tamil and Muslim lands. They make the point that, while economic development is important, it cannot substitute for genuine political autonomy and self-determination. The failure of the government to resolve a land issue in the north, where a Buddhist temple has been put up on private land has been highlighted as reflecting the government’s deference to majority ethnic sentiment.
The problem for the Tamil political parties is that these same parties are themselves fractured, divided by personal rivalries and an inability to form a united front. They continue to base their appeal on Tamil nationalism, without offering concrete proposals for governance or development. This lack of unity and positive agenda may open the door for the ruling party to present itself as a credible alternative, particularly to younger and economically disenfranchised voters. Generational shifts are also at play. A younger electorate, less interested in the narratives of the past, may be more open to evaluating candidates based on performance, transparency, and opportunity—criteria that favour the ruling party’s approach. Its mayoral candidate for Jaffna is a highly regarded and young university academic with a planning background who has presented a five year plan for the development of Jaffna.
There is also a pragmatic calculation that voters may make, that electing ruling party candidates to local councils could result in greater access to state funds and faster infrastructure development. President Dissanayake has already stated that government support for local bodies will depend on their transparency and efficiency, an implicit suggestion that opposition-led councils may face greater scrutiny and funding delays. The president’s remarks that the government will find it more difficult to pass funds to local government authorities that are under opposition control has been heavily criticized by opposition parties as an unfair election ploy. But it would also cause voters to think twice before voting for the opposition.
Broader Vision
The government’s Marxist-oriented political ideology would tend to see reconciliation in terms of structural equity and economic justice. It will also not be focused on ethno-religious identity which is to be seen in its advocacy for a unified state where all citizens are treated equally. If the government wins in the North and East, it will strengthen its case that its approach to reconciliation grounded in equity rather than ethnicity has received a democratic endorsement. But this will not negate the need to address issues like land restitution and transitional justice issues of dealing with the past violations of human rights and truth-seeking, accountability, and reparations in regard to them. A victory would allow the government to act with greater confidence on these fronts, including possibly holding the long-postponed provincial council elections.
As the government is facing international pressure especially from India but also from the Western countries to hold the long postponed provincial council elections, a government victory at the local government elections may speed up the provincial council elections. The provincial councils were once seen as the pathway to greater autonomy; their restoration could help assuage Tamil concerns, especially if paired with initiating a broader dialogue on power-sharing mechanisms that do not rely solely on the 13th Amendment framework. The government will wish to capitalize on the winning momentum of the present. Past governments have either lacked the will, the legitimacy, or the coordination across government tiers to push through meaningful change.
Obtaining the good will of the international community, especially those countries with which Sri Lanka does a lot of economic trade and obtains aid, India and the EU being prominent amongst these, could make holding the provincial council elections without further delay a political imperative. If the government is successful at those elections as well, it will have control of all three tiers of government which would give it an unprecedented opportunity to use its 2/3 majority in parliament to change the laws and constitution to remake the country and deliver the system change that the people elected it to bring about. A strong performance will reaffirm the government’s mandate and enable it to move from promises to results, which it will need to do soon as mandates need to be worked at to be long lasting.
by Jehan Perera
Features
From Tank 590 to Tech Hub: Reunited Vietnam’s 50-Year Journey

The fall of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City – HCM) on 30 April 1975 marked the end of Vietnam’s decades-long struggle for liberation—first against French colonialism, then U.S. imperialism. Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh, formed in 1941, fought Japanese occupiers and later defeated France at Dien Bien Phu (1954). The Geneva Accords temporarily split Vietnam, with U.S.-backed South Vietnam blocking reunification elections and reigniting conflict.
The National Liberation Front (NLF) led resistance in the South, using guerrilla tactics and civilian support to counter superior U.S. firepower. North Vietnam sustained the fight via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, despite heavy U.S. bombing. The costly 1968 Tet Offensive exposed U.S. vulnerabilities and shifted public opinion.
Of even more import, the Vietnam meat-grinder drained the U.S. military machine of weapons, ammunition and morale. By 1973, relentless resistance forced U.S. withdrawal. In March 1975, the Vietnamese People’s Army started operations in support of the NLF. The U.S.-backed forces collapsed, and by 30 April the Vietnamese forces forced their way into Saigon.
At 11 am, Soviet-made T-54 tank no. 843 of company commander Bui Quang Than rammed into a gatepost of the presidential palace (now Reunification Palace). The company political commissar, Vu Dang Toan, following close behind in his Chinese-made T-59 tank, no. 390, crashed through the gate and up to the palace. It seems fitting that the tanks which made this historic entry came from Vietnam’s principal backers.
Bui Quang Than bounded from his tank and raced onto the palace rooftop to hoist the NLF flag. Meanwhile, Vu Dang Toan escorted the last president of the U.S.-backed regime, Duong Van Minh, to a radio station to announce the surrender of his forces. This surrender meant the liberation not only of Saigon but also of the entire South, the reunification of the country, and a triumph of perseverance—a united, independent nation free from foreign domination after a 10,000-day war.
Celebrations
On 30 April 2025, Vietnam celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Liberation of the South and National Reunification. HCM sprouted hundreds of thousands of national flags and red hammer-and-sickle banners, complemented by hoardings embellished with reminders of the occasion – most of them featuring tank 590 crashing the gate.
Thousands of people camped on the streets from the morning of 29 April, hoping to secure good spots to watch the parade. Enthusiasm, especially of young people, expressed itself by the wide use of national flag t-shirts, ao dais (traditional long shirts over trousers), conical hats, and facial stickers. This passion may reflect increasing prosperity in this once impoverished land.
The end of the war found Vietnam one of the poorest countries in the world, with a low per capita income and widespread poverty. Its economy struggled due to a combination of factors, including wartime devastation, a lack of foreign investment and heavy reliance on subsistence agriculture, particularly rice farming, which limited its potential for growth. Western sanctions meant Vietnam relied heavily on the Soviet Union and its socialist allies for foreign trade and assistance.
The Vietnamese government launched Five-Year Plans in agriculture and industry to recover from the war and build a socialist nation. While encouraging family and collective economies, it restrained the capitalist economy. Despite these efforts, the economy remained underdeveloped, dominated by small-scale production, low labour productivity, and a lack of modern technology. Inflexible central planning, inept bureaucratic processes and corruption within the system led to inefficiencies, chronic shortages of goods, and limited economic growth. As a result, Vietnam’s economy faced stagnation and severe hyperinflation.
These mounting challenges prompted the Communist Party of Vietnam to introduce Đổi Mới (Renovation) reforms in 1986. These aimed to transition from a centrally planned economy to a “socialist-oriented market economy” to address inefficiencies and stimulate growth, encouraging private ownership, economic deregulation, and foreign investment.
Transformation
Đổi Mới marked a historic turning point, unleashing rapid growth in agricultural output, industrial expansion, and foreign direct investment. Early reforms shifted agriculture from collective to household-based production, encouraged private enterprise, and attracted foreign investment. In the 2000s, Vietnam became a top exporter of textiles, electronics, and rice, shifting towards high-tech manufacturing (inviting Samsung and Intel factories). By the 2020s, it emerged as a global manufacturing hub, the future focus including the digital economy, green energy, and artificial intelligence.
In less than four decades, Vietnam transformed from a poor, agrarian nation into one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, though structural reforms are still needed for sustainable development. Growth has remained steady, at 5-8% per year.
Vietnam’s reforms lifted millions out of poverty, created a dynamic export-driven economy, and improved education, healthcare, and infrastructure. This has manifested itself in reducing extreme poverty from 70% to 1%, increasing literacy to 96%, life expectancy from 63 to 74 years, and rural electrification from less than 50% to 99.9%. Industrialisation drove urbanisation, which doubled from 20% in 1986 to 40% now.
This change displayed itself during the celebrations in HCM, amid skyscrapers, highways and the underground metro system. Everybody dressed well, and smartphones could be seen everywhere – penetration has reached three-fourths of the population. Thousands turned out on motorbikes and scooters (including indigenous electric scooters) – two-wheeler ownership is over 70%, the highest rate per capita in ASEAN. Traffic jams of mostly new cars emphasised the growth of the middle class.
At the same time, street food vendors and makeshift pavement bistro owners joined sellers of patriotic hats, flags and other paraphernalia to make a killing from the revellers. This reflects the continuance of the informal sector– currently representing 30% of the economy.
The Vietnamese government channelled tax income from booming sectors into underdeveloped regions, investing in rural infrastructure and social welfare to balance growth and mitigate urban-rural inequality during rapid economic expansion. Nevertheless, this economic transformation came with unequal benefits, exacerbating income inequality and persistent gender gaps in wages and opportunities. Sustaining growth requires tackling corruption, upgrading workforce skills, and balancing development with inequality.
NLF flag

Tank 390 courtesy Bao Hai Duong
The parade itself, meticulously carried out (having been rehearsed over three days), featured cultural pageants and military displays and drew admiration. Of special note, the inclusion of foreign military contingents from China, Laos, and Cambodia for the first time signalled greater regional solidarity, acknowledging their historical support while maintaining a balanced foreign policy approach.
Veteran, war-era foreign journalists noted another interesting fact: the re-emergence of the NLF flag. Comprising red and blue stripes with a central red star, this flag had never been prominent at the ten-year anniversary celebrations. The journalists questioned its sudden reappearance. It may be to give strength to the idea of the victory being one of the South itself, part of a drive to increase unity between North and South.
Before reunification in 1975, North and South Vietnam embodied starkly contrasting economic and social models. The North operated under a centrally planned socialist system, with collectivised farms and state-run industries. It emphasised egalitarianism, mass education, and universal healthcare while actively preserving traditional Vietnamese culture. The South, by contrast, maintained a market-oriented economy heavily reliant on agricultural exports (rice and rubber) and foreign aid. A wealthy elite dominated politics and commerce, while Western—particularly American—cultural influence grew pervasive during the war years.
Following reunification under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1976), the government moved swiftly to integrate the two regions. In 1978, it introduced a unified national currency (the đồng, VND), merging the North’s and South’s financial systems into a single, state-controlled framework. The unification of monetary policy symbolised the broader ideological project: to erase colonial and capitalist legacies.
Unity and solidarity
However, the economic disparities and cultural divides between regions persist, though less pronounced than before. The South, particularly HCM, remains Vietnam’s economic powerhouse, with a stronger private sector and international trade connections. The North, including Hanoi, has a more government-driven economy. Southerners tend to have a more entrepreneurial mindset, while Northerners are often seen as more traditional and rule-bound. Conversely, individuals from the North occupy more key government positions.
Studies suggest that people in the South exhibit lower trust in the government compared to those in the North. HCM tends to have stronger support for Western countries like the United States, while Hanoi has historically maintained closer ties with China. People in HCM tend to use the old “Saigon” city name.
Consequently, the 50th anniversary celebrations saw a focus on reconciliation and unity, reflecting a shift in perspective towards peace and friendship, as well as accompanying patriotism with international solidarity.
The exuberant crowds, modern infrastructure, and thriving consumer economy showcased the transformative impact of Đổi Mới—yet lingering regional disparities, informal labour challenges, and unequal gains remind the nation that sustained progress demands inclusive reforms. The symbolic return of the NLF flag and the emphasis on unity underscored a nuanced reconciliation between North and South, honouring shared struggle while navigating enduring differences.
As Vietnam strides forward as a rising Asian economy, it balances its socialist legacy with global ambition, forging a path where prosperity and patriotism converge. The anniversary was not just a celebration of the past but a reflection on the complexities of Vietnam’s ongoing evolution.
(Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute. He is a convenor of the Asia Progress Forum, which can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com.)
By Vinod Moonesinghe
Features
Hectic season for Rohitha and Rohan and JAYASRI

The Sri Lanka music scene is certainly a happening place for quite a few of our artistes, based abroad, who are regularly seen in action in our part of the world. And they certainly do a great job, keeping local music lovers entertained.
Rohitha and Rohan, the JAYASRI twins, who are based in Vienna, Austria, are in town, doing the needful, and the twosome has turned out to be crowd-pullers.
Says Rohitha: Our season here in Sri Lanka, and summer in the south hemisphere (with JAYASRI) started in October last year, with many shows around the island, and tours to Australia, Japan, Dubai, Doha, the UK, and Canada. We will be staying in the island till end of May and then back to Austria for the summer season in Europe.”
Rohitha mentioned their UK visit as very special.

The JAYASRI twins Rohan and Rohitha
“We were there for the Dayada Charity event, organised by The Sri Lankan Kidney Foundation UK, to help kidney patients in Sri Lanka, along with Yohani, and the band Flashback. It was a ‘sold out’ concert in Leicester.
“When we got back to Sri Lanka, we joined the SL Kidney Foundation to handover the financial and medical help to the Base Hospital Girandurukotte.
“It was, indeed, a great feeling to be a part of this very worthy cause.”
Rohitha and Rohan also did a trip to Canada to join JAYASRI, with the group Marians, for performances in Toronto and Vancouver. Both concerts were ‘sold out’ events.
They were in the Maldives, too, last Saturday (03).

Alpha Blondy:
In action, in
Colombo, on
19th July!
JAYASRI, the full band tour to Lanka, is scheduled to take place later this year, with Rohitha adding “May be ‘Another legendary Rock meets Reggae Concert’….”
The band’s summer schedule also includes dates in Dubai and Europe, in September to Australia and New Zealand, and in October to South Korea and Japan.
Rohitha also enthusiastically referred to reggae legend Alpha Blondy, who is scheduled to perform in Sri Lanka on 19th July at the Air Force grounds in Colombo.
“We opened for this reggae legend at the Austria Reggae Mountain Festival, in Austria. His performance was out of this world and Sri Lankan reggae fans should not miss his show in Colombo.”
Alpha Blondy is among the world’s most popular reggae artistes, with a reggae beat that has a distinctive African cast.
Calling himself an African Rasta, Blondy creates Jah-centred anthems promoting morality, love, peace, and social consciousness.
With a range that moves from sensitivity to rage over injustice, much of Blondy’s music empathises with the impoverished and those on society’s fringe.
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