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Amid Winds and Waves:  Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean – II

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The Portuguese in Sri Lanka

Analytical Lenses for a Sri Lankan Perspective

Having traced Sri Lanka’s historical trajectory—from pre-modern maritime exchanges through colonial subjugation and post-independence diplomacy—it becomes necessary to move from description to interpretation. The preceding sections have shown that the island’s experience cannot be reduced to geography alone: its position in the Indian Ocean has provided opportunities, imposed vulnerabilities, and demanded continual strategic adaptation. The question that now arises is how Sri Lanka interprets, manages, and at times redefines these conditions within the shifting architecture of regional and global power.

To approach this question, the following analysis employs four interrelated lenses that together constitute a “Sri Lankan perspective” on international strategy. Each lens illuminates a different dimension of agency in a small island state: the logics of external engagement, the material base of maritime security, the institutional field of regional cooperation, and the domestic sources of policy choice. Taken together, they offer a composite view of how Sri Lanka’s diplomacy translates structural constraint into strategic flexibility.

The first lens, Small-State Strategy, examines the repertoire of behaviours—hedging, balancing, bandwagoning, and omni-enmeshment—through which limited-power states navigate asymmetric environments. For Sri Lanka, the cultivation of strategic ambiguity has often served as both shield and instrument: a way of preserving autonomy amid competing external pressures from India, China, and the wider Indo-Pacific order.

The second lens, Maritime Security and the Blue Economy, anchors analysis in the material realities of the ocean itself. It considers how issues such as fisheries management, sea-lane protection, undersea resources, and climate vulnerability have transformed the maritime domain from a passive backdrop into an active arena of security and economic policy. The sea, once a conduit for empire, now constitutes the basis of Sri Lanka’s prosperity and sustainability.

The third lens, Regional Diplomacy and Institutions, explores how Sri Lanka has sought to amplify influence through multilateral and regional mechanisms—SAARC, IORA, BIMSTEC, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, among others. By serving as host, convener, and mediator, Sri Lanka has attempted to convert positional centrality into diplomatic capital. These institutions represent not only instruments of cooperation but also buffers against domination.

The fourth lens, Domestic–External Linkage, turns inward to consider how domestic political and economic conditions shape external alignment. In Sri Lanka, shifts in government, economic crises, and ideological contestations have repeatedly reconfigured foreign relations. The boundary between internal politics and external policy is porous: decisions on port projects, debt management, or military cooperation often mirror domestic struggles over legitimacy, identity, and development models.

Viewed collectively, these four analytical frames underscore a central proposition of this study: that Sri Lanka’s international conduct is not a reactive function of geography, but a dynamic process of interpretation. The island’s diplomacy is a continual act of translation—converting vulnerability into voice, exposure into opportunity, and geography into strategy. Through the lenses that follow, this chapter seeks to uncover the patterns and principles that give coherence to what might otherwise appear as episodic shifts in Sri Lanka’s foreign and maritime policy.

Between History and Geography: The Dual Strategic Consciousness

Beneath these four analytical lenses runs a deeper psychological and historical current that defines Sri Lanka’s external behaviour: a besieged mentality born of both geography and experience. As an island situated along the world’s busiest sea-lanes yet lacking the resources of major powers, Sri Lanka has long perceived itself as vulnerable to external encroachment and internal fragility. Centuries of colonial subjugation, post-independence power rivalries, and domestic upheavals have reinforced a pervasive sense of exposure—a belief that survival depends upon constant vigilance, diplomatic dexterity, and the maintenance of balance among contending forces. The interplay between insecurity and idealism provides the emotional and intellectual substratum against which Sri Lanka’s strategic choices must be read. The four lenses that follow—small-state strategy, maritime security and the blue economy, regional diplomacy, and domestic–external linkage—can thus be understood as successive efforts to manage, reinterpret, and transcend the island’s besieged geography through the pursuit of balance and peace.

The duality that underlies Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour can be traced to a decisive historical transformation at the end of the sixteenth century, when the centre of indigenous power shifted from the coastal plains to the central highlands. With the fall of Kotte and Sitawaka and the emergence of the Kandyan Kingdom (1591–1815), the island’s political heart retreated inland, surrounded by mountains and forests that provided natural defence but also geographic isolation. From that moment onward, Sri Lanka became—both literally and metaphorically—a besieged kingdom.

The Portuguese sought to strangle Kandy militarily, launching periodic invasions that failed to subdue the interior but succeeded in cutting it off from the coast. The Dutch, inheriting the maritime zones, preferred to strangulate economically, controlling ports and trade routes to starve the highlands of revenue and imports. Under both, the Kandyan polity survived not through strength but through strategic caution, diplomatic dexterity, and the manipulation of rivalries among foreign powers. Security, not expansion, became the paramount concern.

This prolonged experience of siege shaped the island’s political psychology. It fostered a strategic reflex centred on vigilance, balance, and suspicion of external encroachment—a pattern that persisted under British colonial rule, when the last indigenous monarchy fell but the sense of encirclement remained. Independence in 1948 restored sovereignty but not security: the mental world of the besieged kingdom survived within the institutions of the modern state.

Yet beneath this defensive posture lay another, older current—the inert cosmopolitanism of a maritime crossroads. Long before its retreat inland, Sri Lanka had been a participant in Indian Ocean exchange networks, connected by the monsoon winds to Arabia, Africa, and East Asia. This cosmopolitan habit never disappeared; it adapted. Even when confined to the highlands, Kandyan rulers engaged in careful diplomacy with Europeans, Indians, and envoys from Siam, drawing on a residual confidence in the island’s capacity to mediate between worlds.

The coexistence of these two mentalities—the besieged and the cosmopolitan—defines the deeper contradiction between history and geography. History bequeathed a memory of enclosure and caution; geography insists on openness and exchange. Together they regulate Sri Lanka’s responses to external currents in the Indian Ocean. The island is perpetually balancing the inward gaze of its historical experience with the outward pull of its maritime location.

This dual consciousness remains evident in contemporary foreign policy. The anxiety to preserve autonomy amid competing powers recalls the besieged mentality, while the simultaneous pursuit of trade, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation expresses the cosmopolitan instinct. What appears as oscillation in Sri Lanka’s diplomacy—between withdrawal and engagement, between moralism and pragmatism—is in fact the modern expression of a historical dialectic that has endured for over four centuries.

Taken together, these four analytical lenses reveal not four separate domains but a single underlying rhythm: the ongoing negotiation between Sri Lanka’s besieged mentality and its cosmopolitan impulse. The small-state strategies of balancing and ambiguity, the embrace of maritime and blue-economy initiatives, the pursuit of regional multilateralism, and the oscillations of domestic politics all express facets of this deeper duality. Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour is not merely reactive to external pressures; it is the historical continuation of a dialogue between history and geography—between the memory of enclosure and the necessity of openness. To read Sri Lanka’s diplomacy is therefore to read the modern transformation of a consciousness shaped in the mountains of Kandy and sustained along the ocean’s edge. The island’s future agency will depend on how effectively it can reconcile these two legacies: to be secure without being insular, and to be global without being vulnerable. (Part III to be published tomorrow. Part I appeared in The Island of 03 Nov. 2025))

by Prof. Gamini Keerawella 



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Opinion

Tribute to a distinguished BOI leader

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Mr. Tuli Cooray, former Deputy Director General of the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka (BOI) and former Secretary General of the Joint Apparel Association Forum (JAAF), passed away three months ago, leaving a distinguished legacy of public service and dedication to national economic development.

An alumnus of the University of Colombo, Mr. Cooray graduated with a Special Degree in Economics. He began his career as a Planning Officer at the Ministry of Plan Implementation and later served as an Assistant Director in the Ministry of Finance (Planning Division).

He subsequently joined the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC), where he rose from Manager to Senior Manager and later Director. During this period, he also served at the Treasury as an Assistant Director. With the transformation of the GCEC into the BOI, he was appointed Executive Director of the Investment Department and later elevated to the position of Deputy Director General.

In recognition of his vast experience and expertise, he was appointed Director General of the Budget Implementation and Policy Coordination Division at the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Following his retirement from government service, he continued to contribute to the national economy through his work with JAAF.

Mr. Cooray was widely respected as a seasoned professional with exceptional expertise in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and facilitating investor relations. His commitment, leadership, and humane qualities earned him the admiration and affection of colleagues across institutions.

He was also one of the pioneers of the BOI Past Officers’ Association, and his passing is deeply felt by its members. His demise has created a void that is difficult to fill, particularly within the BOI, where his contributions remain invaluable.

Mr. Cooray will be remembered not only for his professional excellence but also for his integrity, humility, and the lasting impact he made on those who had the privilege of working with him.

The BOI Past Officers’ Association

jagathcds@gmail.com

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When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers

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As a small and open country, Singapore will always be vulnerable to what happens around us. As Lee Kuan Yew used to say: “when elephants fight, the grass suffers, but when elephants make love, the grass also suffers“. Therefore, we must be aware of what is happening around us, and prepare ourselves for changes and surprises.” – Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, during the debate on the President’s Address in Singapore Parliament on 16 May, 2018, commenting on the uncertain external environment during the first Trump Administration.

“When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”

is a well-known African proverb commonly used in geopolitics to describe smaller nations caught in the crossfire of conflicts between major powers. At the 1981 Commonwealth conference, when Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere quoted this Swahili proverb, the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew famously retorted, “When elephants make love, the grass suffers, too”. In other words, not only when big powers (such as the US, Russia, EU, China or India) clash, the surrounding “grass” (smaller nations) get “trampled” or suffer collateral damage but even when big powers collaborate or enter into friendly agreements, small nations can still be disadvantaged through unintended consequences of those deals. Since then, Singaporean leaders have often quoted this proverb to highlight the broader reality for smaller states, during great power rivalry and from their alliances. They did this to underline the need to prepare Singapore for challenges stemming from the uncertain external environment and to maintain high resilience against global crises.

Like Singapore, as a small and open country, Sri Lanka too is always vulnerable to what happens around us. Hence, we must be alert to what is happening around us, and be ready not only to face challenges but to explore opportunities.

When Elephants Fight

To begin with, President Trump’s “Operation Epic Fury”.

Did we prepare adequately for changes and surprises that could arise from the deteriorating situation in the Gulf region? For example, the impact the conflict has on the safety and welfare of Sri Lankans living in West Asia or on our petroleum and LNG imports. The situation in the Gulf remains fluid with potential for further escalation, with the possibility of a long-term conflict.

The region, which is the GCC, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Azerbaijan (I believe exports to Azerbaijan are through Iran), accounts for slightly over $1 billion of our exports. The region is one of the most important markets for tea (US$546 million out of US$1,408 million in 2024. According to some estimates, this could even be higher). As we export mostly low-grown teas to these countries, the impact of the conflict on low-grown tea producers, who are mainly smallholders, would be extremely strong. Then there are other sectors like fruits and vegetables where the impact would be immediate, unless of course exporters manage to divert these perishable products to other markets. If the conflict continues for a few more weeks or months, managing these challenges will be a difficult task for the nation, not simply for the government. It is also necessary to remember the Russia – Ukraine war, now on to its fifth year, and its impact on Sri Lanka’s economy.

Mother of all bad timing

What is more unfortunate is that the Gulf conflict is occurring on top of an already intensifying global trade war. One observer called it the “mother of all bad timing”. The combination is deadly.

Early last year, when President Trump announced his intention to weaponise tariffs and use them as bargaining tools for his geopolitical goals, most observers anticipated that he would mainly use tariffs to limit imports from the countries with which the United States had large trade deficits: China, Mexico, Vietnam, the European Union, Japan and Canada. The main elephants, who export to the United States. But when reciprocal tariffs were declared on 2nd April, some of the highest reciprocal tariffs were on Saint Pierre and Miquelon (50%), a French territory off Canada with a population of 6000 people, and Lesotho (50%), one of the poorest countries in Southern Africa. Sri Lanka was hit with a 44% reciprocal tariff. In dollar terms, Sri Lanka’s goods trade deficit with the United States was very small (US$ 2.9 billion in 2025) when compared to those of China (US$ 295 billion in 2024) or Vietnam (US$ 123 billion in 2024).

Though the adverse impact of US additional ad valorem duty has substantially reduced due to the recent US Supreme Court decision on reciprocal tariffs, the turbulence in the US market would continue for the foreseeable future. The United States of America is the largest market for Sri Lanka and accounts for nearly 25% of our exports. Yet, Sri Lanka’s exports to the United States had remained almost stagnant (around the US $ 3 billion range) during the last ten years, due to the dilution of the competitive advantage of some of our main export products in that market. The continued instability in our largest market, where Sri Lanka is not very competitive, doesn’t bode well for Sri Lanka’s economy.

When Elephants Make Love

In rapidly shifting geopolitical environments, countries use proactive anticipatory diplomacy to minimise the adverse implications from possible disruptions and conflicts. Recently concluded Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations between India and the EU (January 2026) and India and the UK (May 2025) are very good examples for such proactive diplomacy. These negotiations were formally launched in June 2007 and were on the back burner for many years. These were expedited as strategic responses to growing U.S. protectionism. Implementation of these agreements would commence during this year.

When negotiations for a free trade agreement between India and the European Union (which included the United Kingdom) were formally launched, anticipating far-reaching consequences of such an agreement on other developing countries, the Commonwealth Secretariat requested the University of Sussex to undertake a study on a possible implication of such an agreement on other low-income developing countries. The authors of that study had considered the impact of an EU–India Free Trade Agreement on the trade of excluded countries and had underlined, “The SAARC countries are, by a long way, the most vulnerable to negative impacts from the FTA. Their exports are more similar to India’s…. Bangladesh is most exposed in the EU market, followed by Pakistan and Sri Lanka.”

So, now these agreements are finalised; what will be the implications of these FTAs between India and the UK and the EU on Sri Lanka? According to available information, the FTA will be a game-changer for the Indian apparel exporters, as it would provide a nearly ten per cent tariff advantage to them. That would level the playing field for India, vis-à-vis their regional competitors. As a result, apparel exports from India to the UK and the EU are projected to increase significantly by 2030. As the sizes of the EU’s and the UK’s apparel markets are not going to expand proportionately, these growths need to come from the market shares of other main exporters like Sri Lanka.

So, “also, when elephants make love, the grass suffers.”

Impact on Sri Lanka

As a small, export dependent country with limited product and market diversification, Sri Lanka will always be vulnerable to what happens in our main markets. Therefore, we must be aware of what is happening in those markets, and prepare ourselves to face the challenges proactively. Today, amid intense geopolitical conflicts, tensions and tariff shifts, countries adopt high agility and strategic planning. If we look at what our neighbours have been doing in London, Brussels and Tokyo, we can learn some lessons on how to navigate through these turbulences.

(The writer is a retired public servant and can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

by Gomi Senadhira

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Opinion

QR-based fuel quota

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The introduction of the QR code–based fuel quota system can be seen as a timely and necessary measure, implemented as part of broader austerity efforts to manage limited fuel resources. In the face of ongoing global fuel instability and economic challenges, such a system is aimed at ensuring equitable distribution and preventing excessive consumption. While it is undeniable that this policy may disrupt the daily routines of certain segments of the population, it is important for citizens to recognize the larger national interest at stake and cooperate with these temporary measures until stability returns to the global fuel market.

At the same time, this initiative presents an important opportunity for the Government to address long-standing gaps in regulatory enforcement. In particular, the implementation of the QR code system could have been strategically linked to the issuance of valid revenue licenses for vehicles. Restricting QR code access only to vehicles that are properly registered and have paid their revenue dues would have helped strengthen compliance and improve state revenue collection.

Available data from the relevant authorities indicate that a significant number of vehicles—especially three-wheelers and motorcycles—continue to operate without valid revenue licences. This represents a substantial loss of income to the State and highlights a weakness in enforcement mechanisms. By integrating the fuel quota system with revenue license verification, the government could have effectively encouraged vehicle owners to regularise their documentation while simultaneously improving fiscal discipline.

In summary, while the QR code fuel system is a commendable step toward managing scarce resources, aligning it with existing regulatory requirements would have amplified its benefits. Such an approach would not only support fuel conservation but also enhance government revenue and promote greater accountability among vehicle owners.

Sariputhra
Colombo 05

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