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Afghanistan without America at last, Sri Lanka under Emergency Rule again



by Rajan Philips

On September 1, the people of Afghanistan woke up for the first time in 44 years without a foreign power on their soil. Two days earlier the people of Sri Lanka found themselves under a “surreptitiously declared” (as it has been aptly called) Emergency Rule – yet again in more than 70 years after independence. I am not drawing any far fetched comparisons between the American withdrawal in Afghanistan and the imposition of emergency rule in Sri Lanka, except to make two points.

One, the imposition of emergency rule on August 30 under the pretext of dealing with the emerging food scarcity situation, is once again a reminder that governments and rulers have no qualms about restricting or putting on hold civil liberties in their countries for their own authoritarian reasons. They not necessarily require a foreign military or agency for it. I am not sure if one should be surprised or not by the government’s decision to impose emergency rule now after steadfastly rejecting calls for emergency measures last year during the first wave of Covid-19.

As many others have pointed out, the imposition of emergency rule as a food emergency measure is quite unnecessary and an obvious overreach. It could also be argued that the government has committed another characteristic blunder and done itself a huge disservice just weeks before its biannual tryst in Geneva. Professor GL Pieris (or PGLP, as he has been delightfully abbreviated) will have his work cut out in arguing his government’s case before UNHRC while the country has been placed under emergency rule by the selfsame government.

Second, there is a critical lesson for Sri Lanka from the experience of Afghanistan over the last 20 years. That experience is also the world’s most spectacular failure of a massive development initiative backed by an equally massive military deployment. Put another way, blind investments in infrastructure development do not automatically produce economic growth and social benefits. When misapplied, they can in fact turn out to be counterproductive. Equally, the efficiency and security benefits often predicated on military deployment are ultimately unsustainable. Either they disappear as soon as the military is withdrawn, or they will degenerate if the military overstays its initial purpose.

American Withdrawal

These failures have not been quite identified as inherent to the whole American project in Afghanistan. Rather, they have been noted mostly for their symptoms. Corruption was pervasive from top to bottom in the American-backed and now deposed Afghan government. Not to mention the profits and kickbacks that would obviously have figured in the network of public-private American contracts in Afghanistan, as in Iraq, which became an essential part of the Cheney-Rumsfeld military forays. Infrastructure investments were remarkable for their mis-allocation and inappropriateness. Palatial houses and buildings were constucted without roads, water supply, or power supply. Those who were close to power in Kabul benefited conspicuously, while the majority of the population outside Kabul were deprived equally conspicuously. The Afghan economy was virtually propped by the US dollar, and it is now estimated that since 2001, the US spent a total of $ 8 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan, or a third of US GDP.

There was nothing organic about the whole exercise and the vast majority of Afghans creatively responded by siding with both the government in Kabul and the Taliban in hinterland. The division of labour was made easy by kinship and extended family networks, and this is part of the reason for the swift collapse of the official army, who knew their Taliban kinsmen more than they knew the government in Kabul. In the end, the threat to women’s rights and freedoms under the Taliban was left to be the only justification for the American project and the main west-stream criticism of its abrupt termination.

Women’s rights were not the reason why Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld prodded their Commander in Chief, President Bush, the younger, to invade first Afghanistan and then Iraq. On the morrow of the invasion of Afghanistan, First Lady Laura Bush, no less, touted women’s rights as justification for taking on the Taliban. In Iraq, there was no gender reason because under Saddam Hussein, Iraqi women were among the freest in the public realm in the Middle East. The private sphere might be a different story but that is so in many societies. Women were and are oppressed in Middle Eastern countries that are traditional allies of America. No one in Washington will think of invading Saudi Arabia to liberate its women. Admittedly, the Taliban went to barbaric extents in ruling Afghanistan after driving out the Soviet army. But who helped the Taliban to drive out the Soviets and seize power?

Historically, there have been significant improvements in women’s rights in Afghanistan from the 1950s, and gender equality was written into the 1964 constitution. After their incursion in 1978, the Soviets pushed hard on women’s equality to the point that the Taliban made it a mobilizing call to defend Islamic traditions against Soviet infidels. The US backed the Taliban to fight the Soviets, directly and through Pakistan, even giving US dollars to buy arms from China. So, it is rather rich for the Americans to claim that they went after the Taliban ten years later to restore women’s rights in Afghanistan. All of this is now water under the bridge.

The Taliban is now saying both publicly and in diplomatic channels that it will allow women and ethnic minorities to continue to work, that senior government positions will be filled on merit, but, however, “in the top posts, in the cabinet, there may not be women.” It will not be easy for the ‘new’ Taliban to house-arrest women as it did in its first coming. Women’s education and employment have risen to impressive levels, with nearly half of government jobs being filled by women. They cannot be easily dispensed with. Additionally, the western governments have considerable economic leverage over the Taliban, and they have made it quite clear that they will use it to hold the Taliban to its word. As well, while the Taliban will increasingly turn to Russia and China for countervailing support, neither country will likely countenance the oppression of women in the name, mistakenly of course, of Sharia law.

On Tuesday, August 31, as the Taliban celebrated the American military’s final flight out of Kabul, President Biden addressed the media and the country from his White House pulpit in Washington. While defiantly defending his pullout decision, the President also stressed that the “era of major military operations to remake other countries” has ended. Some have noted that no previous president has ever said such words before. But the statement in itself is not indicative of any significant change in direction. And after Trump, the world knows that America can become mercurial and unreliable without any warning after a mere electoral college vote count. While there is cross-party public support for not committing American troops to ground wars, Washington can always use other means, such as drones, to wage wars. It is not only the Taliban that has to live up to its word, but also the US government that has to demonstrate that after Afghanistan there could be a different America.

There was in fact a different diplomatic demonstration in Southeast Asia even as the US was airlifting itself out of Afghanistan. In late August, Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore and Vietnam capping off a flurry of visits by senior Biden Administration officials to ASEAN countries in recent months. Defense, digital trade and Covid-19, and not Afghanistan, figured prominently in the bilateral discussions in the two countries. In Vietnam, President Nguyen Xuan Phuc was effusive about the growing US-Vietnamese co-operation, which he said was “in line with the wishes of the peoples of the two countries, and the wish the late President Hồ Chí Minh had conveyed in his letter to US President Harry Truman 75 years ago.” Truman of course ignored the now famous letter and its plea for American support to end French colonial rule in Vietnam. America is now fully courting Vietnam while the EU and France are reconsidering their total reliability on the US for their security.

Emergency Rule

In Sri Lanka, the TNA is calling on the government “to present a solution” to the problems faced by the Tamil people in the North and East, and wants the US to be “the mediator that studies and approves these solutions.” That is a tall ask by any measure and it has come in the wake of dinner diplomacy by the outgoing US US Ambassador Alaina B. Teplitz, that included TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran and the new Foreign Minister GL Pieris (PGLP) who apparently was directed to attend by his SLPP boss, Finance Minister and dual citizen Basil Rajapaksa. The TNA has been asking for an appointment with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa “to discuss their proposals with him prior to the UNHRC session.” Now they have been put on the spot to talk about the government’s decision to declare Emergency Rule.

When President Jayewardene imposed Emergency Rule exclusively on the Jaffna Peninsula in 1979, the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice & Equality (MIRJE) placed it in the context of Sri Lanka’s historical experience of emergency rule – imposed either to quell working class agitations or political protests. Before and after their 1977 landslide win, JRJ and his UNP severely criticized the prolonged emergency rule of the previous (United Front) government and vowed not to impose emergency rule again. The promise was broken first in Jaffna – ostensibly to “eliminate the menace of terrorism in all its forms,” and over time more inclusively in every part of the country. At the time the Public Security Ordinance No. 25 was enacted in 1947, fundamentally in response to the General Strike of that year, neither Sri Lanka’s first parliament nor anyone else would have foreseen the law becoming, 30 years later, a powerful weapon in the hands of a single individual, namely, an elected president.

Even under the presidential system, parliament retained the power to periodically review and endorse the continuation of emergency rule. The second Rajapaksa regime (2010-2014) managed to find ways to finesse around this requirement. One of the achievements of the one-term Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government was its success in avoiding the imposition of emergency rule. As well, the same government put an end to arbitrary arrests and detentions, and to kidnappings and disappearances outside the law’s radar. Emergency rule is back now, surreptitiously or not, and we know not how far its tentacles will be set to stretch during the remainder of this regime’s tenure. What we know is that emergency rule is not going to be of any help in either controlling Covid-19 or helping people to survive the current ordeal.

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Singarasa Case should guide GoSL’s Geneva policy



BY Dharshan Weerasekera

In 2005, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court ruled in the seminal case Singarasa v. Attorney General (SC/SPLA/182/99) that the U.N. Human Rights Commission (the predecessor of today’s U.N. Human Rights Council) did not have jurisdiction, within Sri Lanka, to make recommendations on behalf of the petitioner. In doing so, the court decided that Sri Lanka’s accession to the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1997 had been done in a manner contrary to the Constitution, and hence illegal.

This case has invaluable lessons to teach in regard to the present government’s ‘Geneva Policy.’ By ‘Geneva Policy,’ I mean the government’s stance to the UNHRC’s follow-up resolutions to Sri Lanka’s unilateral withdrawal, in March 2020, from the co-sponsorship of Resolution 30/1 of October 2015. In response, the Council adopted Resolution Resolution than 30/1. Among other things, it establishes an evidence-gathering mechanism to collect evidence of war crimes and other crimes against Sri Lankans.

Meanwhile, in September 2022, the High Commissioner released a report on Sri Lanka’s progress in implementing the recommendations of Resolution 46/1. The government has officially rejected both, Resolution 46/1 and the High Commissioner’s report, on grounds that they were done without Sri Lanka’s consent and, therefore, contrary to the founding principles of the Council. (See A/HRC/51/G/1, paras 1.1, 1.2). However, the Foreign Ministry, in its response, lists various things that the government is doing to comply with Resolution 46/1.

I argue that the government, continuing to comply with the Resolution while, at the same time, rejecting it in principle, without first obtaining a definitive interpretation of the relevant legal position, from an international forum, or even the Sri Lankan Supreme Court, creates a dangerous precedent. Given the fact that state practice is one of the sources of customary international law, the government’s conduct has the potential to do irreparable harm to the long-term interests of the country.

Unfortunately, there is little, or no, discussion of these issues in local newspapers, and academic journals, and it is in the public interest to start one. In this article, I shall discuss: i) the facts and reasoning of the Singarasa judgment, ii) the High Commissioner’s report and the government’s reply, iii) assess of the government’s position, and draw the relevant conclusions.

The Singarasa case

In 1991, the High Court of Colombo convicted Singarasa of five charges, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The charges dealt with alleged attempts by Singarasa, and others, to attack the Army camps,in Jaffna and its suburbs. Singarasa appealed against the conviction to the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court. He also complained to the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The HRC could entertain petitions under the Optional Protocol to ICCPR. Sri Lanka had ratified the ICCPR, in 1980, and acceded to the protocol, in 1997. The HRC said that, Sri Lanka was under obligation to release Singarasa.

The main issue, in this case, is whether Sri Lanka’s accession to the ICCPR, and the related protocol, gives a right to an international body to intervene in the domestic sphere to determine Singarasa’s fate. The court answers ‘no,’ because of the following reasons. The court starts with the premise that the authority for the President to enter into international agreements comes from Article 33(f) of the Constitution. Article 33(f) states: “To do all such acts as, not being inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution…he is required or authorized to do.” It follows that the President cannot agree to anything inconsistent with the Constitution.

The court then assesses the signing of the ICCPR, in 1980, and the subsequent accession to the optional protocol, in 1997, separately. The court points out that the ICCPR requires that the respective signatories adopt domestic legislation to implement the provisions of the covenant. This does not conflict with our Constitution and hence is lawful.

However, when acceding to the optional protocol, the government had issued a declaration that envisioned that the rights of Sri Lankan citizens could be adjudicated in tribunals, and forums, outside this country. The court points out that the institutions, through which Sri Lankans can vindicate their rights, within this country, are exhaustively set out in Article 105 of the Constitution, and the HRC is not one of them. Therefore, the court deems the accession to the optional protocol illegal. The court states:

“Where the President enters into a treaty or accedes to a covenant the content of which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or written law it would be a transgression of the limitation in Article 33 (f) and ultra vires—such acts of the President would not bind the Republic qua State.” (p. 11)

The High Commissioner’s report and the Government’s reply

The most disturbing aspect of the High Commissioner’s report is its description of the progress made by the impugned evidence-gathering mechanism. It states: “OHCHR continues to develop the information and evidence repository using an e-discovery platform….OHCHR commenced identifying material held by other actors and engaging with information providers. To date, the databases of two organisations have been migrated into the repository, and negotiations with other information providers are ongoing.” ((A/HRC/51/5, 4th October 2022, para 54.)

The report also details what the OHCHR plans to do with this information. It says: “To develop possible strategies for future accountability processes, the project team started mapping potential accountability process at international level, including through consultations with relevant stakeholders, in particular national authorities, victims and civil society organisations.” (para 56.)

In sum, it is clear that a vast operation is underway, not just to collect evidence against Sri Lanka but to set the groundwork to help prosecute Sri Lankans before various national and international forums. To the best of my knowledge, the founding statutes of the UNHRC, as well as the OHCHR, do not give enforcement capabilities to these institutions to prosecute or assist in the prosecution of people for violations of human rights and other offences.

Their respective mandates to protect and promote human rights are to be carried out with the consent of all nations concerned and in a spirit of “cooperation and constructive international dialogue.” Therefore, through the impugned mechanism the OHCHR has now arguably expanded its mandate to include an enforcement component, seemingly without any debate or discussion of the matter before the Council.

To turn to the government’s response, in the introductory paragraphs of the said document, the government rejects both resolution 46/1 as well as the High Commissioner’s report on grounds that they violate the UN’s founding principles. However, for much of the remainder of the report (which runs to 16 pages) the government enumerates the various things it has been doing to implement various provisions of the resolutions. For instance, the government discusses the work being done under the Office on Missing Persons, Office for Reparations, and so on.

On the OMP, the report states inter alia: “The OMP conducted panels of inquiries as part of the verification process. More than 89% of persons (1207 of 1370 applicants invited for inquiries) met with members of the panel and their testimonials were recorded.” (A/HRC/51/G/1, 9th September 2022, para 46)

Meanwhile, on the Office for Reparations, the report says, “The office processed 5964 claims for payment, by the end of 2021, and paid a sum of Rs. 399.8 million in settlement, out of the allocated sum of Rs. 800 million….Upto the end of 2022, the OR received Rs. 226 million to pay compensation and 2097 claims were settled utilizing Rs. 153 million.” (para 56)

In sum, even though the government has nominally rejected resolution 46/1 and by extension resolution 30/1 as well, the government is expending great energy, including enormous sums of money, to comply with various provisions of those resolutions.

Assessment of the policy

The Singarasa case establishes that the President, when conducting foreign policy, is exercising the power conferred under Article 33 (f) of the Constitution. One cannot suppose that it is consistent with the Constitution to comply with the provisions of a resolution that the Government itself considers to be in violation of the founding principles of the UNHRC.

Admittedly, a resolution of the UNHRC does not rise to the level of a treaty or covenant. However, there should now be a serious debate in this country about whether the reasoning above should apply to such resolutions which continue to target Sri Lanka on the world stage.

Furthermore, if, as I have suggested, the OHCHR has expanded its mandate by exploiting the provisions of Resolution 46/1 to acquire capabilities that were never envisioned in the relevant founding statutes, permitting such conduct to continue has the potential to set precedents in customary international law, with grave consequences for Sri Lanka, as well as other nations.

Therefore, Sri Lankan citizens are entitled to know the legal basis for the government’s continued compliance with provisions of Resolution 46/1, while nominally rejecting the Resolution. The only institution that can provide a legal opinion binding on the government is the Supreme Court. The President has the capacity, under Article 129 of the Constitution, to request an advisory opinion of the Supreme Court on any matter of public importance.

In these circumstances, it is incumbent on the government to seek an advisory opinion as to whether it is lawful for the government to continue complying with provisions of Resolution 46/1 unless and until the UNHRC clarifies its position in regard to the impugned mechanism.


It is in the interest of all Sri Lankans to keep a close eye on what the government is presently doing in Geneva. There is a famous legal maxim that says, “The laws assist the vigilant, not the sleepy.” Ultimately, it is the Sri Lankan people who will pay the price for any mistakes or missteps that successive governments make in regard to their “Geneva Policy.’

(The writer is an Attorney-at-Law)

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Human Papillomavirus vaccine: one that can prevent a cancer



This article has been written as a fervent plea to the parents of little girls of the eligible age group. Please make sure that your precious daughters get this vaccine. It will be an investment for their happiness in the future.

By Dr B. J. C. Perera

All vaccines by definition are substances that are used to stimulate immunity against a particular infectious disease or a specific causative organism. Such vaccines are used to prevent the occurrence of the said diseases in humans and animals. Several vaccines have been introduced to combat such infectious diseases over the last few decades. In some countries, the use of some of these vaccines has led to the elimination of dreaded diseases like Diphtheria, Tetanus, Whooping Cough or Pertussis, Polio, Measles, German Measles or Rubella, just to name a few.

Sri Lanka has a very efficient and inherently equitable system that looks after the Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI) for children and young people. In general, we have been extremely successful in this programme and can boast of over 90 per cent coverage for the vaccination of all children. We have successfully eliminated polio, the last case being confirmed as far back as 1993, and we are free of diphtheria, tetanus, measles and German measles or rubella. The success of the EPI is due to many factors that include government commitment, the unstinted dedication of parents, the promotion of the programme through all media channels and the dedicated work of all grades of healthcare personnel. The very high literacy rate of the populace of our country enables all information regarding vaccination to be most conveniently conveyed to the population. Sri Lanka has been hailed as a country that has achieved so much in this field, but with so few resources. It has been cited as a model to the entire Asian region as well as even the world.

In addition to their undoubted effectiveness in protecting against infective microorganisms, some of these vaccines have other bonus effects. At least two of the vaccines in use today have telling effects in preventing certain cancers. One is the Hepatitis B vaccine. It provides protection against liver cancer. The other is the more recent Human Papillomavirus vaccine (HPV vaccine) which protects females against cancer of the neck of the womb, which is also referred to as the cervix of the womb. That disease is generally referred to as Cervical Cancer.

The Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is sexually transmitted and most people become infected sometime during their lifetime. In the majority, it is soon after becoming sexually active. Most infections are asymptomatic and usually clear up spontaneously, accounting for remission in 90% within two years. Only 10% of persistent HPV infections with certain genotypes of HPV can persist and progress to changes in the cervix. If infection from cancer-causing HPV types persists over 10-15 years, women can go on to develop precancerous lesions that, if left untreated, develop into cervical cancer. This process takes an average of 20-30 years from infection to the development of cervical cancer.

In 1995, Dr Anne Szarewski, a renowned researcher from the United Kingdom, led a team who outlined the role of human papillomavirus in uterine cervical cancer detection and screening. Then the researchers began work on an HPV vaccine. Szarewski was also a chief investigator, principal investigator and author of key HPV vaccine trials and publications, who helped to develop the bivalent HPV vaccine. The word bivalent is used to indicate that it contains two strains of HPV. HPV infections are very common, often with minimal symptoms, but high-risk HPV strains can go on to cause other medical conditions, particularly cervical cancer.

In 2006, the first vaccine for Human Papillomavirus (HPV) to be used globally was approved. HPV vaccination has now gone on to become a key part of the effort to eliminate cervical cancer. According to the available research results, HPV vaccination could reduce the lifetime risk of cervical cancer by 35–80%; the rather wide range being due to several studies with different methods. The vaccine was initially promptly snapped up in the West, especially in the Scandinavian countries. In Sweden, the coverage of the vaccine is over 80 per cent. However, according to the data put out by the World Health Organization (WHO) in November 2022, the human papillomavirus vaccine against cervical cancer has been introduced in just 41 per cent of low-income countries, even though they represent much of the disease burden, compared to 83% of high-income countries. We have a set of 10-year data on the benefits of the vaccine and in certain Western countries, a significant drop in the morbidity and mortality rates of cervical cancer is already evident.

In Sri Lanka, the National Vaccine Summit in January 2015 recommended the usage of the HPV vaccine and the government introduced it in 2017 for girls within the age range of 10 to 13 years. That age group was decided on the premise that to get the best results, we need to introduce the vaccine before sexual activity starts. The vaccine was to be administered to the selected age groups in the schools free of charge and in the fee-levying private sector. To date, the vaccine is not available through the Immunisation Clinics of the Provinces and the MOH Clinics.

NOW HERE IS THE REAL CRUX OF THE MATTER. For a variety of reasons, the coverage of the HPV vaccine in the entire cohort of eligible girls in Sri Lanka is somewhere between 30 and 40 per cent. This is woefully inadequate coverage to get the best possible results, especially when looked upon in the light of over 90 per cent coverage of the other vaccines in the National Expanded Programme of Immunisation. Cervical cancer ranks among the five commonest cancers in women in Sri Lanka. HPV vaccine is just one of two vaccines that can prevent cancers. All children have had the Hepatitis B vaccine which protects against liver cancer, as it is given through the National Programme of Immunisation. But, and this is a BIG BUT, the only other vaccine, the HPV vaccine that can prevent cervical cancer, shows a rather low uptake.

We do need to escalate the uptake rate of the HPV vaccine to at least around 80 per cent to get reasonable benefits in the reduction of the morbidity and mortality that is currently seen in cervical cancer. I think we have to admit that due to very many reasons, the message has not gone through to the general population in the country. When inquiries are made from the mothers of eligible girls, the vast majority of them are not even aware of the existence of this vaccine and more importantly, the future beneficial potential of this endeavour. The age group selected is a rather tricky cohort. They get upset at the drop of a hat. The last thing they want is an injection. They will run away, as fast as possible, to avoid it. Some are so frightened that it is not uncommon to see them faint even at the sight of the syringe and the needle. One way of getting the cooperation of these little girls is to allow either the mother or the father to be present to hold her hand most reassuringly when the vaccine is administered. An additional initiative would be to make it widely available through the Immunisation Clinics for it to be administered to all those who have missed it when it was given in the school. This is particularly important as the vaccine is quite expensive when administered in the private sector.

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Latest position on debt restructuring process



By Jayampathy Molligoda

According to the announcement made by the Managing Director of the IMF Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF Executive board meeting will be held on 20 March to consider and hopefully approve the EFF arrangement for Sri Lanka. In the meantime, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank in consultation with IMF have finalised the latest position of Sri Lanka’s Public Debt as at end 2022 just prior to commencement of debt restructuring negotiations with creditors. Having perused the document uploaded to the Ministry of Finance (MOF website) recently, which is a comprehensive summary of debt stock as at end 2022, I have tabulated the summary of the main facts and figures (See Table). As can be seen, the total public debt stock has skyrocketed to US $ 83.6 billion, which includes total foreign debt of US$ 45.6 billion and the local debt of 38 billion in US $ equivalent. The total debt as a % of GDP as stated in the above MOF doc is 128%. The public debt is expected be reduced to 100% of GDP in order to ensure debt sustainability in line with IMF supported program parameters coupled with ‘comparability of treatment principle’ whilst ensuring equitable burden sharing for all restructured debt.

However, I have my doubts about GDP computation here. As per the MOF doc page 1, the Nominal GDP was stated as Rs. 23.7 trillion for the year 2022. The $ exchange rate used for conversion as Rs.363.10 clearly indicating that it is the year end figure, they have taken the year end Exchange rate of Rs 363.10 per US$. It is pertinent to ask the question as to why ‘year- end exchange rate’ figure to convert our annual GDP in rupee to US dollars? It should have been the ‘average exchange rate’ as in the past so many years computed by CBSL. As a result, the GDP (in US$ terms) works out to US$ 65.2 billion only. That’s why the total public debt stock of US$ 83.6 billion works out to 128% of GDP – my initial query is; why did they take year-end figure of Rs363.10 instead of taking the average exchange rate?

Besides, the real critical issue is how to reduce the debt stock to a level of 100% of GDP in the context of declining GDP (- 7.8% in 2022) and on the other hand, our debt stock is on the rise. More importantly, if we take the total ‘multilateral debt’ out, then the foreign debt is US $ 34 billion only, which includes ISBs and bilateral loans. Assuming a higher ‘haircut’ of 33% for foreign debt is agreed upon, it works out to 11 billion thus reducing the total public debt to 73 billion only.

In this regard, The President in his latest open letter dated 14 March ‘23 to Sri Lanka’s official Bilateral creditors has clearly indicated that there will be equitable treatment of burden sharing in respect of all creditors (except IMF/WB/ADB) Quote; ” ..we reiterate our commitment to a comparable treatment of all our external creditors with a view to ensuring all round equitable burden sharing for all restructured debt. To that end, we will not conclude debt treatment agreements with any official bilateral creditor or any commercial creditors or any group of such creditors on terms more favourable than those agreed. …To this end we also confirm that we have not and we will not make any side agreements with any creditor aimed at reducing the debt treatment impact on that creditor.”

In the circumstances, my own view is we are reluctantly compelled to restructure local debt i.e.; TBs and, it is inevitable that the local debt of USD equivalent of 38 billion would also need to be taken into consideration for debt restructuring – otherwise there is no way of reducing the total public debt stock to the level that is required as per IMF conditions. This would create a serious issue for our ‘finance system stability’ and all our commercial banks will be in trouble. Further the deposit holders including pension funds are badly affected. The temperature of social unrest is brought closer to the boiling point.

As stated in the global research article by Jonathan Manz recently, former Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank, and Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, has slammed the IMF for unleashing riots on nations the IMF is dealing with; he has pointed out that the riots are written into the IMF plan to force nations to agree with the average 111 conditions laid down by the IMF and they destroy a country’s democracy and independence. He has been a critique of IMF causing great damage to countries through the economic policies it has prescribed countries to follow in order to qualify for IMF loans. However, neither Stiglitz nor any other eminent economist has yet to come out with a practical and alternative policy framework to overcome the most serious economic and financial crisis faced in the 75 years of Sri Lanka’s independence.

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