Features
A survival strategy amidst geopolitical rivalry
by Neville Ladduwahetty
During the course of his address, as Chair of the 55th Annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank, Sri Lanka’s President, Ranil Wickremesinghe, said, “As they say, in many of our countries, when the elephants fight, it is the grass that is crushed”. As far as Sri Lanka is concerned, its strategically significant location in the Indian Ocean makes it the turf for the rivalry between the QUAD made up of the United States, India, Japan and Australia on the one hand, and China on the other, to manifest itself. How Sri Lanka strategises its survival in such an environment is key not only to its immediate economic revival but also for all time.
The single most critical issue affecting Sri Lanka’s economic revival is debt, and therefore the need to restructure it. In this regard, the expectation is that the role played by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) backed up by the Extended Fund Facility of US$ 2.9 billion is expected to encourage the creditors to be more accommodative towards Sri Lanka, when addressing its debt crisis. This however is not an assured outcome. The President during his address announced the progress made with the IMF when he stated: “Towards this end we have already undertaken major macroeconomic policy reform measures. I am pleased to inform you that we have now reached a Staff Level agreement with the International Monetary Fund on a four-year program supported by the Extended Fund Facility. The program is aligned with the commitment of the Government to implement an ambitious and comprehensive package of reforms that will help restore the sustainability of our public finances, addressing external imbalances, and restarting our growth engine through structural reforms and improvements in governance”.
The question addressed below is the need for Sri Lanka to explore alternative strategies in the event Sri Lanka fails to reach a common agreement with the creditors despite the Staff-Level Agreement reached with the IMF, and Sri Lanka is left to its own devices to get back on a sustainable track. For these reasons, it is imperative that Sri Lanka engage earnestly in an alternative exercise to be prepared to meet unexpected exigencies that could arise from geopolitical rivalries.
IMF CONDITIONALITIES
Presented below is a press release issued following the Staff-Level Agreement reached with the IMF team. Parts of the “Key elements of the program” are highlighted to emphasise what it takes for Sri Lanka to comply with the 48-month arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility of about US $ 2.9 billion”
End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.
IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities have reached a staff-level agreement to support Sri Lanka’s economic policies with a 48-month arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of about US$2.9 billion.
The objectives of Sri Lanka’s new Fund-supported program are to restore macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability, while safeguarding financial stability, protecting the vulnerable, and stepping up structural reforms to address corruption vulnerabilities and unlock Sri Lanka’s growth potential.
Debt relief from Sri Lanka’s creditors and additional financing from multilateral partners will be required to help ensure debt sustainability and close financing gaps. Financing assurances to restore debt sustainability from Sri Lanka’s official creditors and making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with private creditors are crucial before the IMF can provide financial support to Sri Lanka.
Key elements of the program (emphasis mine) are:
RAISING FISCAL REVENUE TO SUPPORT FISCAL CONSOLIDATION.
Starting from one of the lowest revenue levels in the world, the program will implement major tax reforms. THESE REFORMS INCLUDE MAKING PERSONAL INCOME TAX MORE PROGRESSIVE AND BROADENING THE TAX BASE FOR CORPORATE INCOME TAX AND VAT. The program aims to reach a primary surplus of 2.3 percent of GDP by 2025.
INTRODUCING COST-RECOVERY BASED PRICING FOR FUEL AND ELECTRICITY
to minimize fiscal risks arising from state-owned enterprises. The team welcomed the authorities’ already announced substantial revenue measures and energy pricing reforms;
MITIGATING THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS ON THE POOR AND VULNERABLE BY RAISING SOCIAL SPENDING,
and improving the coverage and targeting of social safety net programs;
RESTORING PRICE STABILITY
through data-driven monetary policy action, fiscal consolidation, phasing out monetary financing, and stronger central bank autonomy that allow pursuing a flexible inflation targeting regime. A NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT IS A CORNERSTONE OF THIS STRATEGY;
REBUILDING FOREIGN RESERVES THROUGH RESTORING A MARKET-DETERMINED AND FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE,
supported by the comprehensive policy package under the program;
Safeguarding financial stability by ensuring a healthy and adequately capitalized banking system, and by upgrading financial sector safety nets and regulatory standards with a revised Banking Act; and
REDUCING CORRUPTION VULNERABILITIES THROUGH IMPROVING FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, INTRODUCING A STRONGER ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK, AND CONDUCTING AN IN-DEPTH GOVERNANCE DIAGNOSTIC, SUPPORTED BY IMF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.
These Key Elements of the program were known to the government at the time the Staff-Level Agreements was reached. It must then mean that the Sri Lankan government has agreed to commit itself to fulfilling the undertakings specified above to receive “about US$ 2.9 over 48 months to support its economic policies” notwithstanding the nature and range of its scope that amount to intrusion into the domestic affairs of a sovereign State. The other even more daunting challenge is reaching a common agreement on debt restructuring with countries such as Japan, India, China and private creditors. However, the fact that Sri Lanka is prepared to resolutely face such extreme challenges reflects the desperation Sri Lanka finds itself in at this juncture.
The question that arises and it is imperative that it is answered is: WHAT IF, after banking so heavily on support from the IMF for Sri Lanka’s economic revival, Sri Lank fails to meet the benchmarks and parameters set by the “key elements” in the IMF program or fails to reach a common agreement for debt restructuring with the creditors? Since such a prospect cannot be ruled out in a background of geopolitical rivalries, it is imperative that Sri Lanka prepare itself by seriously exploring alternative options independent of support from the sources currently being pursued. If Sri Lanka does not explore alternative options. its economic revival program would be severely impacted, and Sri Lanka would then be left to its own devices to meet all challenges.
THE FOCUS of the SURVIVAL STRATEGY
One key area that would impact on Sri Lanka’s economic revival program is the cost of fuel oil. A Special Press Release dated June 13, 2021by the Cost of Living Committee chaired by the President states: “Sri Lanka has become a country that not only spends a large amount of foreign exchange for fuel imports, but also a country where its transport services, power generation and the function of some of the factories are based on these imports. In 2019 alone, the foreign exchange spent on oil imports was US$ 3, 677 million”. However, with the reduction in international oil prices coupled with the ban on vehicle imports the cost of fuel imports was reduced to US$ 2,325″. DESPITE, SUCH FLUCTUATIONS, THE PRESS RELEASE STATES: “THE EXPENDITURE FROM THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS FOR PETROLEUM IMPORTS WOULD BE AROUND US$ 4,000 MILLION. THIS AMOUNT IS CLOSE to 1/3 of the TOTAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNED FROM THE EXPORTS… THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ACCOUNTS FOR NEARLY 60%OF THE FUEL CONSUMPTION”.
With the introduction of the QR system for transport and the continued ban on vehicle imports together with the fact that the cost of importing fuel oil is highly dependent on global developments, a more realistic import bill for fuel oil could be assumed to be US$ 2,500 to 3,000 million annually. This means that Sri Lanka would need US$ 10, 000 to 12,000 million over a period of 4 years. Since the Extended Fund Facility of about 2.9 Billion proposed by the IMF pales in significance to meet the fuel oil needs of Sri Lanka, and because fuel oil is fundamental to the economic revival program, it is imperative that Sri Lanka explores fresh strategies to meet fuel oil needs without which there would not be an economic recovery.
The following are the hard realities:
The economy cannot revive without sustained supplies of fuel oil.
Sri Lanka does not have the foreign exchange to sustain importing its fuel oil needs.
The economy cannot revive if Sri Lanka has to live from ship load to ship load, or on negotiated credit lines.
The Strategy:
Therefore, Sri Lanka has to negotiate a government to government arrangement or one that is underwritten by governments where the payment for immediate fuel oil needs is deferred to a later date, until a Refinery is set up and functioning on the basis of a Joint Venture. Furthermore, such a Joint Venture would enable Sri Lanka to repay deferred commitments from Sri Lanka’s share of the proceeds from the Joint Venture.
Savings arising by deferring payment while the refinery is being set up could be used to repay outstanding debts.
The Refinery should be located in Trincomalee.
The Capacity of the Refinery should be to meet Sri Lanka’s needs with the excess being exported to Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries.
Sri Lanka’s equity to the Joint Venture could be part of the Tank Farm in Trincomalee, its Harbour and its strategic location for distribution of finished petroleum products.
Equity of the Partner is the Refinery and the steady supply of fuel oil.
THE URGENCY of the SITUATION REQUIRES THAT SRI LANKA EXPLORES THIS OPTION at the HIGHEST LEVEL — an OPTION that is REFLECTIVE of the CORE VALUE of SELF-RELIANCE.
CONCLUSION
The Staff-Level agreement that Sri Lanka has reached with the IMF backed up by an Extended Fund Facility of about US$ 2.9 billion is expected to boost the confidence of the creditors and encourage them to be accommodative towards Sri Lanka in their efforts to reach a common restructuring arrangement to address its debts. If such a positive outcome materializes, the prospects of an economic revival would be real. On the other hand, if outcomes of the negotiations do NOT turn out to be as encouraging as hoped for, it is imperative that Sri Lanka prepares itself beforehand with alternative strategies, one of which would be to earnestly explore arrangements at the highest level to secure its fuel oil needs on the basis proposed above, if it hopes to revive its economy. If by a stroke of unusual good fortune, the outcomes relating to restructuring and a Joint venture to secure Sri Lanka’s fuel oil needs are both positive, the economic revival would be that much faster.
Features
Addressing human rights needs multi-pronged approach
by Jehan Perera
The ongoing 63rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which runs from September 7 to October 7, 2026, in Geneva is important to Sri Lanka. Its outcome will send a signal to other international actors, including the European Union, as to whether Sri Lanka’s reform policy is on track. The written update on Sri Lanka, prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights under High Commissioner Volker Türk and presented by Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif, has taken a more holistic approach to the government’s performance over the past year. It acknowledged the progress Sri Lanka has made under the NPP government in relation to accountability for financial fraud and other economic crimes. At the same time, the High Commissioner’s update made clear that progress in relation to economic crime cannot be equated with progress in relation to accountability for grave human rights violations committed during the armed conflict and in other periods of political violence.
The government may have felt sufficiently confident that its response to the High Commissioner’s update could be handled by its representative in Geneva and did not require the attendance of Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath. Sri Lanka’s representative Sumith Dassanayake called for a fundamental review of country-specific mandates within the UN Human Rights Council. Sri Lanka has been facing repeated scrutiny in the form of successive UNHRC resolutions from 2012 onwards. Ambassador Dassanayake argued that such mandates should not continue indefinitely and must be regularly assessed against measurable objectives and tangible outcomes. This may reflect confidence that its record of reform is beginning to receive recognition internationally. The reports and statements at the Human Rights Council acknowledged progress in the government’s efforts to address corruption and economic crime.
The government’s anti-corruption drive has included investigations into allegations involving individuals who held the highest political offices in the country. The arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe in connection with alleged misuse of public funds, and the investigation into the controversial SriLankan Airlines Airbus transaction involving former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s son, are examples of the reach of these investigations. The arrest of SLPP National Organiser and Member of Parliament Namal Rajapaksa in connection with allegations relating to the Airbus purchase scandal has also demonstrated that the government is willing to pursue cases involving politically powerful figures.
Wide Range
The ongoing investigations appear to encompass a wide range of parliamentarians and government members, both past and present. They suggest that accountability for corruption is not being confined to lower-level officials or to individuals who lack political influence. This is precisely the kind of accountability that the public has long demanded and that previous governments have too often failed to deliver. The government is also reaching into the upper levels of the military hierarchies of the past. The case in which 11 young men, most of them Tamil, disappeared after being abducted in Colombo between 2008 and 2009 involved allegations that some families were asked to pay ransoms. The investigation into this case has reached senior military figures. The willingness to pursue such cases is important because it challenges the assumption that those who exercised power during the war are beyond the reach of the law. Such cases would provide a practical test of whether the government’s commitment to accountability for economic crimes is part of a broader commitment to the rule of law.
Success in prosecuting corruption cannot substitute for justice for those who were unlawfully killed, disappeared, tortured or otherwise victimised. The UN report noted that there had been no recognition or accountability for crimes under international law, gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties during the war. The government has yet to establish a credible and effective process to address the many cases of enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, torture and other serious violations. The government needs to take the international commitments it has inherited on human rights issues seriously. It needs to adopt a multi-pronged approach and go beyond focusing primarily on financial and corruption-related accountability.
Need Action
As a member of the international community, Sri Lanka has a responsibility to abide by the commitments it has made. It cannot selectively uphold international obligations postponing those that are politically difficult. Also, as a small country, Sri Lanka has a self-interest in ensuring the survival of international law, which is all that it has to protect it from the depredations of the bigger international actors. The erosion of international law by powerful states makes it all the more important that smaller states uphold the principles on which the international system is based. Sri Lanka cannot credibly appeal to international law when it is threatened from outside while disregarding its own obligations within. Sri Lanka also needs to win the confidence of its own population that it is committed to justice and equality for all. Public opinion polls and community-level research have disclosed that ethnic and religious minorities are appreciative of the sense of greater security they enjoy under the present government from ethnic or religious extremists.
But a sense of security is not the same as the fulfilment of rights. As far as the Tamil people are concerned, the government has yet to deliver on several of its specific promises. These include the long-standing problems of missing persons, the release of political prisoners who have been members of Tamil militant organisations, and the return of land taken over for military purposes during the war. The issue of Buddhist statues and archaeological sites found on their properties which are then taken from their control continue to trouble them especially as they see no signs of resolution of those disputes. The issue of pastureland in the east of the country in Mylathamadu is particularly concerning to them as they see orders by successive presidents, both President Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, being disregarded on the ground. The Mylathamadu pastureland dispute is where traditional Tamil dairy farmers have engaged in multi-year protests against the ongoing encroachment of their ancestral grazing lands by Sinhalese crop cultivators relocated under government development schemes.
The government’s failure to hold Provincial Council elections is particularly troubling. The provincial council system is the only one that can provide the Tamil people and other ethnic minorities the opportunity to wield political power and exercise a measure of self-determination in the areas in which they are the numerical majority. The continued postponement of Provincial Council elections therefore has consequences that go beyond an ordinary electoral delay. It deprives communities of an important constitutional avenue for democratic participation and power-sharing. The ethnic and religious minorities appreciate what the government is doing in the larger national interest, but they must not be made to feel that their special concerns are being ignored. The government cannot resolve Sri Lanka’s entire legacy of rights violations overnight. But it does need to demonstrate that it is willing to move forward on multiple fronts, not only on a few.
Features
The emptying university: why are academics leaving?
by Hasini Lecamwasam
Brain drain in Sri Lanka is at an all-time high. The latest Human Flight and Brain Drain Index for 2024 shows that we are 16th of 175 countries on this count, and first in South Asia. That this is a crisis goes without saying. Brain drain affects all sectors, and is a huge strain on the resources of a developing country. Particularly in Sri Lanka, where considerable public investment is made in the moulding of professionals through the system of free education, this amounts to transferring the resources of poorer countries to richer ones with top migration destinations. It is, therefore, important to consider the push and pull factors behind skilled outmigration, specifically from the public university system of Sri Lanka, a key focus of the Kuppi column.
From frustration to exit
Several bitter realities in our crumbling public university system act as push factors in the migration decisions of academics. Many essays on this column have, over several years, attempted to highlight numerous aspects of this erosion. Perhaps, primary among them is the lack of adequate funding, which has debilitating ramifications for the system: very little investment is made in the up-keep of infrastructure (and even less in its expansion), resulting in serious constraints in accommodating growing batches of students and the wellbeing of the staff (particularly in regional universities); research funding is negligible, severely curtailing academics’ ability to effectively discharge their primary duty of teaching which should ideally be informed by their research (and the research of others, access to which is also, unfortunately, mediated by funding); a funding crunch also means a slash in (or greater constraints on) recruitments, increasing the workloads of academics, currently in service, and eating into the quality of their teaching and research.
What recruitments are done frustrate those with any faith in merit. As many of our interventions in this column have shown, recruitment processes are characterised by archaic selection criteria that place very little weight on a candidate’s postgraduate growth and the advantages of interdisciplinary training. Added to this is the general preference for ‘culturally compliant’ candidates who would not rock the boat too much. The combined effect is that those with the capacity and spirit to try out innovations in education are discouraged from joining or staying on in the public university system. Some, or many, of them may instead seek appointments abroad.
A thread that binds all of these problems together is pervasive hierarchy which, again, many interventions on this column have sought to highlight. It is the interest in preserving hierarchy that leads to the preference for alumni in recruitment processes. Hierarchy within universities can be particularly frustrating for younger faculty and women, who typically have to bear the brunt of the workload of their senior, often male, colleagues. In a context of funding, and, therefore, recruitment, restrictions, this translates into a disproportionate burden being placed on junior (usually female) faculty, seriously hindering their prospects of growing into successful academics due to the time constraints within which they have to operate. Junior academics, therefore, are more likely to look to educational institutions abroad for what they hope would be a different work culture that respects them more.
Ideological ruses
On top of these structural frustrations are also the workings of neoliberal ideology. For one, the nature of relations between the global metropole and peripheral countries like Sri Lanka largely dictates what is desirable and what is not. The apparent lifestyles of Western countries – from food to clothing, housing, appliances, and so on – have continued to lure people from the periphery with the promise of a ‘better’ life, alongside better career advancement opportunities. This, of course, masks much of the struggle that goes on behind the scenes to survive in Western societies. For instance, in most cases highly attractive public infrastructure such as roads, public transport, clean air, quality control of food, and so on belie the astronomical privatised costs of healthcare and education. Health insurance is usually mandatory and steep in most high-income settings, while even subsidised education (for which eligibility criteria are strict) creates a serious dent in household earnings. Of course, the happy images of glossy trams and gleeful international travellers don’t convey this.
A second ideological ruse is the myth of greater opportunities and recognition abroad. While there is no denying that local skilled sectors – be it higher education, health, civil service, or private white-collar positions – are replete with issues that inhibit merit-based professional advancement, the notion that things are fundamentally different in Western countries stems from an uninformed optimism. As is now increasingly known and discussed, Western labour markets are notoriously racialised, and equivalent skills are rarely treated as such. Instead, it is usually demanded that skilled migrants clear certain formal examinations in their host countries. In fields like medicine, this is followed by an interview that may also be racially prejudiced. Once these initial steps are cleared, remuneration reverts to square one irrespective of experience accumulated abroad, not to mention the many subtle aggressions, rejections, and trials one has to go through in the negotiation of everyday life. In the many cases where professional qualifications are used as leverage for a move abroad, sights are set on a better future for one’s children, which again is informed by the misplaced faith in greater opportunities and a lack of awareness of the factors outlined above. Needless to say, in the global swing to the Right, things have become even more challenging. In such a context, considering the few rare cases where skilled migrants live extremely comfortable lives as the norm becomes a dangerous misconception.
The two ideological pull factors mentioned above are complemented by a push factor, which has to do with a highly classed understanding of what a white-collar professional is due in their society. Many of these aspirations are clearly articulated in academic trade union action demanding separate quotas for school entry, increased fuel allowances, winning back the presently stalled vehicle permit scheme, salary hikes, and so on. While working people have every right to agitate for better material conditions, insofar as it remains unconnected to a broader movement for improving the conditions of the lot of the working class, it remains self-serving and very much within the class logic of capitalist society. Since these demands are articulated as a means of maintaining distinction, it is clear that they are not envisaged as part of a class movement. The frustration of not having these needs for distinction satisfied may push some to seek greener pastures abroad, at least financially, (perhaps as a means of social mobility based on it), only to be disappointed on most occasions.
What is to be done?
Addressing the systemic push factors listed above requires, first and foremost, greater allocations for free public higher education. This would immediately translate into more recruitments and less work per academic, and better research and teaching in the long haul. An increase in funding would also ideally lead to greater infrastructural investments, especially including improving the living conditions of those who work in regional universities amid untold hardships. Next, fairer, more creative, and, therefore, more effective recruitment policies are badly needed to attract talented individuals to university positions. Rather than carving out a ‘special category’ for academics to achieve this purpose, which is informed by a classed logic, this needs to be done through fundamental reforms in recruitment processes. Third, a persistent attack on the entrenched hierarchy within universities through internal reform is much called for. Reforming recruitment practices will go a long way towards addressing this. Measures should also be taken to introduce more stringent policies against SGBV (not to mention ragging, even though it is not directly connected to brain drain). Such measures would create a safer, fairer, and more attractive workplace, which would give more reasons for people to stay.
On top of greater allocations, we also need a transformation of our aspirations themselves if this situation is to change. That necessitates a kind of education capable of questioning the ‘paradise’ conception of Western societies, and lays bare their colonial material and ideological dimensions, in both their historical and contemporary manifestations. These colonial understandings of the ‘good life’, moreover, have devastating ecological implications for the planet, not to mention social justice. An education with the ability to transform this mindset would hopefully prove to be more than a mere path to social mobility, rather being a tool of social emancipation that renders mobility moot.
(Hasini Lecamwasam is with the Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Friends favourite Suzi Croner returns for Oktoberfest 2026
Charming audiences in Switzerland as Suzi Flückiger, Sri Lanka’s own Suzi Croner is coming home… for a very special occasion.
The bubbly former frontline vocalist of 90s band Friends will take the stage at a popular venue in Colombo for Oktoberfest 2026.
Known in Europe for her country and classic hits, Suzi has remained a much-loved name back home. This will be a rare chance for local fans to see her live and celebrate the voice behind so many Friends memories.
Oktoberfest 2026 in Colombo promises an evening of live music, traditional Bavarian food and beer, colourful dirndls and lederhosen, folk dancing, and plenty of community cheer.

Suzi Croner (Flückiger)
Against this lively backdrop, Suzi will take the stage for a special solo set, featuring her own pre-recorded music. She performed at the event last year too, as a solo artiste, but a German band providing the music.
This year, however she says, it’s a different scene.
“The novel attraction will be the dancers from Germany — all girls, clad in German outfits,” Suzi said. She added that the event will also highlight the activities generally connected with Oktoberfest, which should generate a lot of fun and excitement for those who join her in Colombo next month.
Suzi has become a much-in-demand artiste in Europe, and has even performed Down Under, in Melbourne.
In Switzerland, where she has been based for the past 42 years, she continues to charm audiences with country and classic hits, performing at private events and community nights across Europe.
“My weekends are generally loaded with my work as a singer,” she said. “And I also play tennis three times a week, because I need to keep fit to entertain my audience in an active way.”
Her repertoire is made up mainly of Swiss, German and English songs.
And true to form, Suzi loves springing surprises.
“So watch out when you join me at Oktoberfest 2026, in Colombo!” she said.
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