Features
A People in-between East and West
The Dutch Burghers in Sri Lanka:
by Prabhath de Silva
“We are a vanishing tribe in Sri Lanka. The first paternal ancestor of my father’s family who arrived in Sri Lanka in 1774 was Pieter Scharenguivel. He was a Quarter Master in the service of the United Dutch East India Company which ruled the maritime provinces of Sri Lanka from the middle of the 17th century to 1796. The Dutch Burgher identity and consciousness within the family I grew up was extremely significant. It played a role in the conversations, traditions, customs, food, perceptions and social interactions. During the British colonial rule, our community produced eminent surgeons, doctors, legal luminaries, judges, engineers, sportsmen, musicians , historians and artists etc.” , said Anne-Marie Scharenguivel, 65, a management accountant and a member of Sri Lanka’s tiny Dutch Burgher community of less than 30,000 people. The people known as ‘Dutch Burghers are descendants of the Europeans who arrived in Sri Lanka as servants of the United East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie- VOC) which ruled Sri Lanka’s maritime provinces from 1656 to 1796 or merchants and married native women or women who were children of mixed marriages between European men and native women.
Sri Lanka’s largest ethnic group is the Sinhalese, constituting 74.9% of the population of 21 million. The Sri Lankan Tamils, who live predominantly in the north and east of the island, are the largest ethnic minority group at 11.1% of Sri Lanka’s population. The Muslims are the third largest ethnic group at 9.3% of the population. Indian Tamils comprise 4.1% of Sri Lanka’s population. Smaller minority groups include the Malays, Burghers, Chetties (an originally trading community whose ancestors arrived from the southern parts of India) and the Veddahs -Sri Lanka’s indigenous people. Malays are descendants of Malay settlers brought by the Dutch colonial rulers.
The Dutch Connection with Sri Lanka
The Portuguese were the first European colonial power to arrive in Sri Lanka in 1505 when Sri Lanka had been divided into three kingdoms, namely the Kingdom of Kotte, Kingdom of Jaffna and the interior Kingdom of Kandy. Their presence in Sri Lanka’s maritime provinces between 1505 and 1656 CE, which began as an interaction of trade and commerce, later developed into a colonial rule in the maritime provinces (sans eastern coast from Trincomalee) downwards from 1597. Admiral Joris van Spilbergen (1568-1629), the Dutch circumnavigator, who commanded the fleet of ships’ Ram’, ‘Schaap’, and ‘Lam’ belonging to the Dutch company named Balthazar de Moucheron (a trading company that had been in existence before the establishment of the United East India Company -VOC in March 1602 ), landed in Batticaloa in Sri Lanka’s eastern coast on May 31, 1602, after a 12 month voyage at sea. Van Spilbergen met King Vimaladharmasuriya I, the King of Kandy (interior native kingdom of Sri Lanka), and negotiated the possibilities of trade in cinnamon and pepper and of providing military assistance to the King of Kandy to expel the Portuguese from the coastal regions of the Island. Van Spilbergen’s visit was the first Dutch visit to the Island. Spilbergen was followed by the visits of the fleets of Dutch ships commanded by the Dutch navigator, Sebald de Weert in November 1602, Jacob Cornelisz in 1603 and Marcellus de Boschouwer in 1612.
On May 23, 1638, the Treaty of 1638 between the Kingdom of Kandy and the United East India Company was signed by King Rajasinghe II for the Kingdom of Kandy and Adam Westerwold and William Jacobsz Coster, a commander and vice commander of the Dutch Naval Forces representing the United East India Company (VOC) in Batticaloa. The treaty secured the terms under which the two nations would cooperate in defending the Kandyan Kingdom from the Portuguese. The writer vividly remembers visiting the Dutch State Archives in The Hague in 1985 accompanied by a Dutch Burgher lady friend (64 at that time) settled down in that city, to see one of the original copies of this treaty handwritten in medieval Dutch. This friend whose father was a Ceylonese Dutch Burgher named Kriekenbeek and whose mother was a native Dutch lady, having left Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1948 at the age of 24 and having lived in The Netherlands for almost 37 years, was able to translate the contents of the Treaty for me from Dutch to English. I can also remember the courtesy and kindness extended to me (then a 25 year old lawyer) by the Staff of the Dutch State Archives.
The key points of the 1638 Treaty were (a) the Dutch should provide the King of Kandy with military and naval assistance to drive the Portuguese from the Island; (b) the Kandyan King should fully settle the military and naval expenditure incurred by the Dutch for onslaughts against the Portuguese by way of providing the Dutch with commodities such as cinnamon and pepper etc (c) the King of Kandy should grant the Dutch the monopoly of collecting spices and other commodities except elephants from the territories that constituted the Kingdom of Kandy; and (d) the Dutch should vacate the fortresses that would be captured from the Portuguese if the King would desire to take them over. Between 1640 and 1658 the Dutch completely expelled the Portuguese from the maritime provinces of Sri Lanka and ruled until 1796 when the British in turn replaced the Dutch and eventually took the whole island, including its holdout interior Kingdom of Kandy.
The maritime provinces of Sri Lanka came under the rule of Dutch East India Company after its armies defeated the Portuguese in a series of battles between 1640 and 1658. When the Kandyan King, Rajasinghe II demanded the Dutch to vacate and hand over the captured Portuguese Fortresses and territories, the Dutch presented a bill of military and naval expenditure involved in the battles to oust the Portuguese and asked the King to settle the bill first. But Rajasinghe II who was unable to settle the bill, would say that the Dutch had exaggerated the expenditure. The Dutch would maintain that they could hold the territories and fortresses captured from the Portuguese until the King Rajasinghe II and his successors would fully settle their bill of military and naval expenditure of onslaughts against the Portuguese. This was the legal foundation upon which the Dutch justified their occupation of the maritime provinces in the southern, western and northern coastal areas. Later they formulated another legal argument in their search for a legal basis for their rule in those regions.
They argued that Rajasinghe’s Treaty of 1638 with them was a nullity with regard to the Kingdom of Kotte as King Don Jao Dharmapala had gifted it to the King of Portugal in 1591 and the Portuguese had acquired the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Jaffna by conquest by war 1621, and as such Rajasinghe II, the King of Kandy had legal status (locus standi) to sign a treaty claiming the sovereignty over former territories of the Kingdom of Kotte (south western coastal areas of Sri Lanka) and the Kingdom of Jaffna (northern coastal areas). After a war between the Kingdom of Kandy and the forces of the United East India Company, the dispute over the sovereignty of the maritime provinces was permanently settled by the Treaty of 1766, by which the King of Kandy conceded the territorial control of the western, southern, northern and eastern coastal areas to the Dutch. The maritime provinces were ruled by the Dutch East India Company from 1656 to 1796. During their period, a canal system was developed, a judicial system was introduced with the Roman-Dutch Law. The Roman-Dutch Law still remains to be the residuary common law in civil matters, though much of it has been replaced with English Law by statutes during the British rule.
A number of Dutch words have become naturalized in the Sinhalese language . Among many such words are: Kamaraya in Sinhalese is derived from the Dutch word ‘Kamer’ for the room, Kanthoruwa in Sinhalese for office is derived from the Dutch word ‘Kantoor” for office, ‘ boodalaya’ in Sinhalese is derived from the Dutch word ‘Boedel’ for the estate of a deceased person, ‘Kakkussiya” in Sinhalese for lavatory is derived from the Dutch word’ Kakhuis’. The British captured the maritime provinces of the Island in 1796. Among other legacies of the Dutch rule are Dutch forts and a few buildings preserved for posterity. The Dutch Burgher community in Sri Lanka is a living legacy of the Dutch period. When native feudal Chiefs ceded the sovereignty of the interior native Kandyan Kingdom to the British Empire by the Kandyan Convention of 1815, the whole Island came under the British rule. Sri Lanka gained independence from the British in1948.
Who are the Burghers and the Dutch Burghers?
The word ‘Burgher’ is derived from the Dutch word ‘Vrije Burgher ‘, meaning “free citizen” or “town dweller”. The Burghers in Sri Lanka are an Eurasian community of mixed origin, whose first paternal ancestors were European colonists (mainly from Portugal, The Netherlands and the UK) who had married native Sinhalese or Tamil women. The Portuguese men who opted to remain in Sri Lanka had married native Sinhalese or Tamil women because there were no Portuguese women in the Island. The children who were born in a marriage between the Portuguese colonists and native women in Portuguese colonies overseas were called Mesticos. The second and subsequent generations of Portuguese colonists who opted to remain in Sri Lanka preferred to marry the Mestico women and their second preference was the native women. The servants and soldiers of the Dutch East India who arrived in Sri Lanka were not only Dutch but belonged to other European nationalities too including German and French Protestants known as Huguenots, Scandinavian and Italian. Marriages between them and native women were less frequent with the passage of time.
The descendants of the European servants of the Dutch East India Company and Mestico women and native women ( Sinhalese and Tamil) became known as ‘Dutch Burghers’. In order to be considered as a Dutch Burgher, one’s father ought to have inherited an European family name from an European paternal ancestor who had come to Sri Lanka during the period Dutch East India Company ruled the maritime provinces of the Island. During the Dutch colonial period, the mother tongue or the lingua franca of the Dutch Burgher community in Sri Lanka was an Indo-Portuguese creole, though the Dutch Burghers later adopted English as their first language during the British colonial period.
Dutch Burghers during the British colonial rule in Sri Lanka
Although many portray British rule here as ‘exploitative’, of our country, they ignore the vast economic, social and educational developments that facilitated the transition from feudalism to capitalism and a parliamentary democracy. The contemporary progressive political trends in Britain with her social movements like utilitarianism, social, democratic and labour movements, too influenced colonial rule here. The British empire was an extension of British capitalism to the colonies including Ceylon. Lenin in his book “Colonialism: The Advanced Stage of Capitalism” presented a similar argument. Today, we beg for foreign investment. This is not a new phenomenon. During British colonial rule, British companies invested in the plantations and other sectors in Sri Lanka. These capitalists paid taxes to the British colonial government here on the profits they earned. Later parallel to the British and European capitalist class, an indigenous native entrepreneur class emerged. The colonial government managed the economy with its own tax revenue without borrowing from outside. The Dutch Burghers who were a sort of ‘people in between’ the west and the east were able to achieve eminent positions in the public service, medical profession, legal profession and judiciary during the British colonial period in Sri Lanka. They held a proportionately higher percentage of positions as clerks, engineers, surveyors, journalists, locomotive engine drivers and railway guards in the public service. Their presence was significant in the employment of mercantile sector. It was the eminent Dutch Burghers like Charles Ambrose Lorensz were the pioneer constitutionalists who agitated for more liberal and democratic constitutional reforms during the 19th century British colonial Sri Lanka.
The Dutch Burghers in Post -Independence Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka gained independence from the British in 1948 and inherited from the British a democratic form of government based on the Westminster parliamentary model. At the time of Independence, Sinhalese majority constituted 66% of Sri Lanka’s population and the Buddhists who were almost exclusively Sinhalese constituted 60% of the Sri Lanka’s population whilst the remaining 6% of the Sinhalese population were Christians. Sri Lanka’s ethno-religious and ethnic minorities ,at the time of independence constituted 34% of Sri Lanka’s population. Sri Lanka’s first Prime Minister, D. S. Senanayake, a Sinhalese Buddhist, was a pragmatic leader who did not want to upset the ethnic harmony prevalent at the time of Independence. He and his political party the United National Party formed coalition governments with the major Tamil and Muslim parties and formed the cabinet of ministers representing Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhalese Buddhist community and other ethno-linguistic and religious minorities.
He and his two immediate successors, Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotalawala after Senanayake’s resignation refused to accede to the demands of the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists for making Sinhalese the only official language replacing English, making Buddhism the State religion and for immediate take over of Christian denominational schools by the State. The Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists approached Solomon West Ridgway Dias Bandaranaike, who had broke away from D. S. Senanayake’s United National Party and had formed a new political party named Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Bandaranaike promised to implement all these demands of the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists in the event his party would come to power at the next General Election. Bandaranaike was a Sinhalese born to a highly anglicized Christian aristocratic family. Educated at Oxford (1919-1925), Bandaranaike was a Barrister-at-Law and an eloquent speaker at the Oxford Union. A few years after his return to the Island from Oxford, Bandaranaike adopted the national dress, learned the Sinhalese language and began to tread on a path of communal politics based on Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism.
In 1956, a coalition led by Bandaranaike’s on communal sentiments and slogans of the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism and socialism, was elected to power and Bandaranaike became the Prime Minister. One of the first things his government hurriedly did was to enact an Official Language Act making Sinhalese the only official language disregarding the Tamil and English , and the demand for making both Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages put forward by the Tamil political parties and Marxist political parties were rejected. The enactment of this piece of legislation deprived the English educated intelligentsia of Tamils, Dutch Burghers and Sinhalese of public sector jobs unless they passed an examination to prove their proficiency in Sinhala language.
Bandaranaike who began to experience the initial destructive consequences of his short sighted policies ,could not live long to witness the long term consequence of the whirlwind of communal tensions he set in motion through his unwise initiatives.
In September 1959, Bandaranaike was assassinated by a Buddhist monk named Talduwe Somarama, a misguided instrument or a cat’s paw of a conspiracy by a group of Sinhalese Buddhists (led by a prominent Sinhalese Buddhist monk) who helped him come to power , but developed an enmity with him, when in power, Bandaranaike refused to help them form a shipping company. The enactment of Bandaranaike’s ‘Sinhala Only’ and the events that followed drastically changed the political landscape of Sri Lanka, with his SLFP’s rival, the UNP’s governments too pursuing the same policies when in power, resulting in communal riots of 1958, 1977 and 1983 disturbances and tensions culminating in a 30-year civil war. Mrs. Bandaranaike who became prime minister in 1960, pursued policies of her husband rigorously, and took over the denominational schools of which an overwhelming majority were Christian in 1961. This entailed further appeasing the demands of the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists by withholding State grants and subsidies for such schools if they opted to remain private. As result only 51 Christian school out of hundreds could remain independent.
Christians, particularly Catholics considered the take over of their schools by the State a discriminatory blow. Mrs. Bandaranaike, elected to power again in 1970 with a two third majority in parliament, severed the constitutional links with the British monarch as the ceremonial head of the state and abolished right to appeal the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. Her government enacted a Republican constitution granting Buddhism the foremost place in the Sri Lankan State, casting a constitutional duty upon the State to protect and foster Buddhism. Her government went further to perpetuate the Sinhala Only policy of her late husband by making Sinhala the only official language in the Sri Lankan State by incorporating provisions for such status in the new constitution of 1972. History has shown that issues of race, caste, religion, language and blind political affiliations have always been exploited by the leaders, and that these machinations have not originated from the ordinary people or peasants. Innocent peasants may be misled, misguided and mobilized by the leaders to achieve their narrow self–serving interests and ambitions by exploiting ethnicity, religion, caste and language in the South Asian political context. The Dutch Burghers, having experienced anxieties and insecurities of their future prospects, opted to emigrate mainly to Australia.
(To be continued next week)
Features
Civilizational dialogue proving a remote possibility as realpolitik rages
Looking back over the years since the 9/11 catastrophe, it could be said that barring former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami no world political leader of note has made an earnest effort to change the nature of global political discourse for the better. Khatami won world acclaim for his pronouncement that the time is right to launch and sustain a ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’.
This was in marked contrast to US political scientist Samuel P. Huntingdon’s epochal theses, formulated in the wake of 9/11 and other global political tumults that the Post Cold War era is essentially one of conflicts among civilizations. That is, people’s identity markers, such as culture and religion, are the prime shaping forces of international conflicts.
From a Political Realism standpoint, Huntingdon’s theory may seem to have gained in credibility over the years but it is Khatami’s pronouncement that has evoked an empathetic response in the hearts and minds of publics world wide. So much so, 2001 was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly as the ‘Year of Dialogue among Civilizations’.
It could be said that the latter proclamation was an endeavour to give back to humans their essential identity of peace-makers. It was an eschewing of the position that war and conflict are central to the human condition and amounted to upholding constructive dialogue among peoples and civilizations as a path to peace.
That things have not worked out in the world in keeping with the expectations of peace makers does not in any way invalidate the thesis that peace is the essential propensity of humans.
If peace-making is seemingly ineffective it is primarily because the path to peace is narrow, tortuous and time-consuming. On the other hand, violence usually misleadingly recommends itself to the human as the more expedient, cost-effective way out of a conflictual situation. However, the ultimate cost of the latter approach is prohibitive because it brutalizes the human beyond recognition.
Some of the evidence is before our eyes. The Trump administration, for example, has, minus much forethought, unleashed what may be described as a ‘quick-fix’ war against Iran but is now finding that it is in a veritable military quagmire in West Asia. The priority for the administration now seems to be a face-saving escape strategy. Such are the costs of the war option.
However, there is no denying that much remains to be done by the world community to bring peoples and cultures together with a view to enabling them to work as one for the cause of a less dangerous world.
Meanwhile, the broad divisions in international politics continue and past political polarities are lingering to the detriment of enhanced international understanding. The East and the West and the South and the North, for instance, are continuing to work in separate collectives, more or less, and no notable efforts are being made by the international community to bring these sides together for the purpose of united constructive action that could usher greater international well being.
The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, 2026, held in Kyrgyztan was a replication of the above broad trends but there were some statements at the forum by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that deserve special scrutiny and comment.
Modi was quoted saying among other things: ‘The land of Gandhi and the land of Buddha share a single message: the path to peace!..We must move away from endless war towards an end to the war. This is essentially for the well being of humanity. A peaceful resolution to all issues at the earliest is the call of humanity, and this is India’s message.’
The above is the language of international peace and unity. It is such language that will help in building bridges among civilizations and advance the cause of world peace. Besides, it will help bring a measure of understanding between North and South.
In this regard, the Trump administration could take a leaf or more from the Modi government. Unless it makes a ‘U turn’, as it were, in the direction of peace and reconciliation it is very unlikely that the US and the world would experience any stability worth speaking of.
Right now the US is savaging the sovereignty of Venezuela. It is a question of the ‘Empire striking back’ but Venezuela is a far cry from Iran. Iran has outsmarted the US on the battle field and is in a position to influence broad trends in the world economy since it still has control over the Hormuz Straits. That is, Iran could exercise a determining influence over world oil, gas and energy prices. In short, the US consumer’s future peace of mind is very much in the hands of Iran.
Given the above backdrop it should have dawned on the US political leadership that working towards cordial relations with Iran is the most advisable option. The US, simply, has too much to lose otherwise.
Likewise, Russia too needs to take a leaf from India. It is plain to see that its invasion of Ukraine is proving totally ineffective. It has not brought any measure of peace for the Russian people. Russia is right now experiencing a rerun of its military misadventure in Afghanistan. On the other hand, sections of the peoples concerned have been victimized and even brutalized.
Accordingly, there needs to be a coming together of democratic opinion worldwide for a fresh consideration of the options facing humanity. There is a dire need for value-based politics to take the place of Realpolitik. Besides, the language of peace and humanity needs to replace current divisive discourse with its stress on polarities and antagonisms.
International organizations of the stature of the UN need to take the lead in spearheading the above initiatives. Right now the UN gives the impression of being a spent force. This columnist hopes that he would be proved wrong on this score because the UN remains the only hope of the poor and victimized. It will be in the interests of all peoples for the UN to rejuvenate itself and dedicate itself increasingly enthusiastically to the cause of international peace.
Whether it be the South or North, dynamic, visionary political leadership and direction emerges as essential. The need is for voices that would espouse peace and accord across boundaries and divisions. For South Asia, India and Pakistan have the potential to fill this lacuna.
Features
Sri Lanka’s constitutional test: Judicial independence beyond immediate political moment
by Shelton Dharmaratne
Sri Lanka has reached an important constitutional moment.
The proposed 22nd Amendment has moved beyond political debate and into the constitutional process through which its validity will be examined. That development should change the character of the national discussion.
That is understandable in a politically contested environment. But Sri Lanka should now resist reducing a question of constitutional design to a contest over political positions.
The deeper issue concerns the relationship between constitutional reform, judicial independence and public confidence in the institutions of the State.
The Supreme Court will determine the constitutional questions before it. Public commentators should therefore exercise restraint in predicting, interpreting or seeking to influence that determination. But restraint does not require silence. It requires a more rigorous discussion of the institutional principles at stake.
A narrower constitutional question than the political debate suggests
The proposed amendment principally concerns the retirement ages of judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, together with an increase in the maximum number of judges permitted on the Court of Appeal.
Under the proposal, the retirement age of Supreme Court judges would rise from 65 to 67 and that of Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65. The maximum number of Court of Appeal judges would also increase from 19 to 24.
Other proposed changes concerning the retirement ages of judges in the lower courts arise under separate legislation. This distinction matters because the public debate has sometimes treated the wider package of judicial reform as though it formed a single constitutional proposal.
Nor should the central issue be reduced to whether retaining experienced judges is inherently good or inherently dangerous. Both propositions are too simplistic.
Sri Lanka faces a substantial burden of pending litigation, and delays in the administration of justice impose significant costs on citizens, businesses and the State. Experienced judges represent an institutional resource. Continuity, accumulated knowledge and familiarity with complex areas of law cannot always be replaced immediately.
Those are legitimate policy considerations.
But the opposing concern is equally important: judicial tenure is not merely an employment condition. It is a structural component of judicial independence.
The real question is institutional
The critical question is not whether an individual judge is capable of acting impartially. It is whether the constitutional structure provides adequate protection against circumstances in which judicial tenure could become connected, directly or indirectly, with political authority.
That is an institutional question, not an accusation against individual judges.
A judge may be entirely conscientious and independent while the institutional arrangements surrounding the judiciary nevertheless create public doubts about independence. Constitutional democracies therefore cannot depend solely on the personal integrity of office-holders. They must construct institutions capable of preserving independence even when governments, individuals and political circumstances change.
This is particularly relevant when constitutional reform concerns the tenure of serving members of the superior judiciary.
The institutional sensitivity of such a proposal should neither be exaggerated into an allegation of improper motive nor dismissed as irrelevant. The appropriate response is transparency, procedural fairness and confidence in constitutional safeguards.
Legitimate objectives do not settle constitutional questions
The government has stated that its objectives include strengthening the administration of justice, addressing delays, retaining judicial experience and increasing institutional capacity.
Those objectives deserve serious consideration. Sri Lanka needs judicial reform. Citizens waiting years for their cases to be concluded experience the justice system very differently from those discussing it in Parliament, courtrooms or universities.
A government is therefore entitled to propose reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency.
But legitimate objectives do not automatically resolve constitutional objections. The relevant question is whether the means chosen are compatible with the constitutional structure and whether sufficient safeguards exist against unintended institutional consequences.
That is precisely why constitutional scrutiny matters.
The concerns of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) should likewise be examined without political labelling. Opposition to the proposed changes should not automatically be characterised as opposition to judicial reform or an attempt to obstruct the government. At the same time, invoking judicial independence does not place any argument beyond scrutiny.
The appropriate questions are straightforward:
Does extending judicial tenure strengthen the administration of justice?
What risks, if any, could it create for judicial independence?
Are adequate institutional safeguards in place?
Does the proposal operate prospectively, or does it affect judges already serving?
Could the same objectives be achieved by filling vacancies, increasing judicial capacity, improving court administration and strengthening case management?
These questions can be examined rationally without attributing improper motives to either side.
Judicial vacancies and institutional confidence
Recent concerns raised by the BASL regarding judicial vacancies add another dimension to the debate. The BASL has argued that vacancies in the Supreme Court contributed to the retirement of a senior Court of Appeal judge without promotion to the Supreme Court, despite vacancies having existed. It has also raised concerns regarding forthcoming judicial retirements and the need for timely consideration of appointments.
Such matters should not be treated as evidence of the motives behind the proposed amendment. They do, however, illustrate a broader principle.
Judicial independence is shaped not only by the retirement age written into the Constitution. It is also influenced by how vacancies are filled, how promotions are determined, how seniority and merit are assessed, and whether judicial officers and the public believe that institutional decisions are made according to transparent and defensible criteria.
The government has an opportunity to address these concerns constructively.
Prompt appointments based on publicly defensible principles would strengthen confidence in the judiciary irrespective of the eventual outcome of the constitutional debate.
Seniority, merit and transparent criteria
The controversy also exposes a longstanding question concerning judicial appointments.
Seniority has traditionally carried considerable weight in judicial advancement. Yet seniority alone need not be the sole measure of merit. Conversely, replacing established practices with undefined assessments of “merit” could create another institutional problem.
If governments or appointing authorities can determine which judges are sufficiently meritorious without clear and objective criteria, uncertainty itself may become a source of institutional anxiety.
Sri Lanka would therefore benefit from clearer, objective and defensible standards governing judicial appointments and promotions.
Such standards would protect judges as well as appointing authorities. They would reduce opportunities for favouritism, strengthen institutional confidence and make it harder for political actors to portray every appointment as politically motivated.
Institutional rules are stronger safeguards than assurances of good intentions.
The State is larger than any government
One principle deserves particular emphasis: a government is not the State.
Governments are temporary. The constitutional State is continuing. Political parties change, parliamentary majorities change and political priorities change. The judiciary, however, must continue to function independently of whoever occupies the government benches.
The judiciary is neither a government institution in the political sense nor an Opposition institution. It is an institution of the State whose legitimacy depends upon its independence from both.
For that reason, governments should exercise particular caution when proposing constitutional changes affecting the judiciary, even where the policy objectives are legitimate.
The stronger a government is politically, the greater its responsibility to demonstrate institutional restraint.
That is not political weakness. It is constitutional maturity.
Public confidence is a constitutional asset
The most consequential issue may ultimately be neither retirement age nor judicial capacity, but public confidence.
Courts do not possess political power in the conventional sense. Their authority rests substantially on the acceptance of their decisions as legitimate.
Citizens will sometimes disagree with judicial decisions. But where the judiciary is perceived as independent, even unpopular decisions can command respect. If judicial institutions are perceived as being shaped by political convenience, even legally sound decisions may become vulnerable to suspicion.
Constitutional reform affecting judicial tenure must therefore be evaluated not only by its immediate administrative benefits but also by its effect on institutional credibility.
A reform that produces short-term efficiency while weakening confidence in judicial independence could impose a greater long-term cost. Conversely, reform that improves efficiency while preserving independence can strengthen both justice and public trust.
The challenge is not to choose between judicial efficiency and judicial independence. It is to achieve both.
If a referendum arises …
If the constitutional process ultimately requires approval by the people at a referendum, the debate should rise above the conventional government versus Opposition contest.
The electorate should be given a clear constitutional question and sufficient information to assess it.
Citizens should understand what problem the amendment seeks to address, why the proposed mechanism is considered necessary, what institutional risks have been identified, what safeguards exist and whether alternative measures could achieve the same objectives.
A constitutional referendum deserves a higher standard of public discussion than an ordinary election campaign.
The people would not merely be choosing a political side. They would be deciding the institutional framework within which political power and judicial authority operate.
Beyond who wins
The most important question arising from the proposed Twenty-Second Amendment is therefore not simply whether the government succeeds or whether the Opposition and BASL prevail.
Nor is it ultimately whether judicial retirement ages become 67 and 65 or remain unchanged.
Those are immediate constitutional questions. The deeper issue is what Sri Lanka learns from the controversy.
If the government seeks to modernise and strengthen the justice system, that objective deserves serious consideration. If the BASL and others warn that particular reforms may affect judicial independence, those concerns deserve equally serious examination.
Neither side strengthens the country by assuming that the other is acting in bad faith.
The constitutional system is strongest when legitimate disagreements are resolved through institutions rather than political pressure.
Whatever the eventual constitutional outcome, Sri Lanka will still face the underlying challenges of judicial vacancies, case delays, institutional capacity, judicial appointments and public confidence. Those problems will not disappear with a judicial determination, nor should the national conversation end there.
Sri Lanka should instead seek a broader consensus around a fundamental proposition:
Judicial reform and judicial independence are not competing objectives.
The real challenge is to pursue reform in a manner that strengthens the judiciary without placing its independence under suspicion.
That requires sound legislation, transparent appointments, adequate resources, efficient court administration, responsible political conduct and safeguards capable of surviving changes of government.
The present controversy will eventually pass. Political arguments surrounding it will fade.
But constitutional arrangements can endure for decades.
That is why Sri Lanka must look beyond the immediate political contest.
The ultimate test is not who wins today’s constitutional argument. It is whether, when the political moment has passed, Sri Lanka has a judiciary that is more efficient, more accessible and more trusted—while remaining sufficiently independent to hold every government, including future governments, within the boundaries of the Constitution.
Features
Farewell to a Fashion Icon
Sri Lanka’s fashion world lost one of its brightest stars Monday morning – veteran model, actress, and elite pageant trainer Chulpadmendra “Chula” Kumarapathirana.
Her sudden demise has certainly come as a shock to many.
Chula had just completed a major event on Sunday (30th August), and was no more in the land of the living the following day (31st August).
Born in Colombo, she was an old girl of Buddhist Ladies’ College and later studied at the National Institute of Business Management, and has many awesome achievements to her credit.
In 2006, she won the “Miss Tourism Model of the World Press Award” in Tanzania.
She entered the entertainment industry, as an actress, and gained popularity through the teledrama “Wahinna Muthu Wessak.”
Chulpadmendra has been on TV, and many Sri Lankan hip-hop music videos, including “Hanthane” and “Heena Hirimal”, and has had several other minor acting jobs since then.
She hosted the Derana Miss Sri Lanka for Miss World 2008 and even participated in the reality TV show Sirasa Dancing Star.
For over 25 years Chula was active in local and international fashion and founded the Chulpadmendra Catwalk Studio to train young newcomers
She trained hundreds of models for runway, photoshoots, auditions, and international pageants.
She was known as a fierce mentor who believed in “not just learning to walk, but learning to command the runway”.
Many young models called graduating from her studio their “happiest moment.”

Chulpadmendra “Chula” Kumarapathirana: Many young models called graduating
from her studio their “happiest moment.” (L)/ Won the “Miss Tourism Model of the World Press Award” in Tanzania (R)
Chula was very fond of The Island newspaper and kept in touch with us on a regular basis.
Her last message to The Island was a ‘thank you’ note for the article ‘New benchmark in pageant industry’:
“Thank you, Ivan, for writing such a beautiful article about me. Your unwavering support, encouragement, and belief in me throughout my career mean more than words can express. I am truly grateful for your kindness and generosity.
“My heartfelt thanks also go to The Island newspaper for featuring the article. It is a great honour, and I sincerely appreciate the recognition and support.
“Thank you once again.”
In fact, just a couple weeks ago, she sent a photo of herself for our Glam Scene and that picture I publish today, as part of this story.
May she rest in peace. Our deepest condolences to her family, students, and all who loved her.
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Business6 days agoJaffna Teaching Hospital secures lifeline water supply via ADB-funded Thalaiyadi sea water desalination plant
