Midweek Review

War in Ukraine: US Indo-Pacific strategy suffers as India skips several votes

Published

4 years ago

2022/03/9

Sahan Weerasooriya

…bid to isolate China fails

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Washington’s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy suffered a destructive setback in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union.

India’s decision not to back the US-led efforts, inside the UN and outside against Russia must have surprised the Western powers.

Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin ordered the offensive on February 24, just four days before the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council was to meet. The Russian offensive dominated the 49th sessions of the UNHRC, where, among the issues that had been taken up, was Sri Lanka’s alleged accountability issue.

Ironically UNHRC Chief Michelle Bachelet has turned a Nelsonian eye to all those horrific crimes that were committed by the West in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, etc.. Then what about continuing unimaginable terror tactics, employed against civilians, in places like Yemen and Palestine? What are all these bleeding heart ‘independent’ Western media, liberals, I/NGOs, saying about such horrendous crimes? Next to nothing! But see how they feel for Ukrainians-always in a virtual frenzy!

War is a terrible thing anywhere as only fools and cold blooded Nazi types would wish for such suffering on any living being.

One-time top intelligence officer having been the head of the KGB in the former East Germany when the so-called Iron Curtain of the ex-Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, Putin, President of Russia since 2012, and previously from 2000 until 2008, in addition to being the Premier from 1999 to 2000 opened up a new front at a time the West was trying to finish off China by cornering and luring it into a quagmire over Taiwan the way they are trying to do to Russia over Ukraine. Sri Lanka has been caught up with the conflict between the West and China.

The much disputed yet understandable looking at it from her security perspective, the Russian move in Eastern Europe invariably compelled nuclear powers China, a permanent member of the five-nation UN Security Council and India, to take a common stand on Ukraine. Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on Friday (March 4) that would have technically forced Putin to cease the offensive immediately and withdraw his forces. India and China skipped the vote whereas the Council’s 15 members voted in favour of the text. United Arab Emirates, too, abstained.

In spite of heavy and relentless Western pressure, India didn’t bow to any of it and threw its weight behind the Western move against Russia. The Indian position on Russian offensive, the biggest ever ground action since the end of WW II undermined the four nation Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) in the Asia-Pacific, aka the Quad, comprising the US, India, Japan and Australia. Meant to counter the growing Chinese political, military and economic power, the Russian invasion is the first real test for Quad. The failure on the part of Quad members to swiftly reach a consensus to oppose the Russian action in Ukraine would demoralise the grouping. That is the undeniable truth.

The Indian stand on Russian offensive should be examined taking into consideration its refusal to deploy ground troops in Iraq in support of the US-UK led 2003 invasion.

India reawakens as to her true friends

Western media coverage of the Indian response highlighted their disbelief and sort of ire as the Russia sustained the offensive. Perhaps the US really believed India would blindly back international sanctions against Russia. Had that happened, the Quad as well as the overall US-UK strategy in the Indo-Pacific region would have been greatly strengthened. It would be pertinent to mention that the US renamed United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on 30 May 2018. The move underscored the pivotal importance of the US-India alliance in the wake of defence relationship emerging as a major pillar of India-US strategic partnership. The signing of the ‘New Framework for India-U.S. Defence Relations’ in 2005 and the resulting intensification in defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter piracy, and exchanges between each of the three services. The Defence Framework Agreement has been updated and extended for another 10 years in June 2015.

India abstained from three votes at the UN Security Council, two at the UN General Assembly in New York, two at the UNHRC in Geneva, and one at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.

Modi follows Indira’s stand

India has no option but to walk a diplomatic tightrope over war in Ukraine as it tried to balance its ties with Russia and the West. The US humiliated Narendra Modi before the whole world with a much publicised denial of visa in 2005, over his alleged role in anti-Muslim violence three years earlier in Gujarat state, where he was the Chief Minister.

More than 1,000 people were killed, mostly Muslims in that riot. The US swiftly changed its stance soon after the Modi-led BJP romped to victory at the 2014 General Election and Washington quickly forgot the Gujarat victims, with the obvious backing of the powerful Israel lobby in America and elsewhere. Israel, surrounded by a sea of enemies, barring the corrupt regimes there beholden to the West sees India as a natural counterbalance because of the almost unbridgeable Hindu-Muslim divide emanating from the time of the Moghul invasion of Bharat. So no wonder Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was the first world leader to fly to Moscow to appease the situation and it showed how worried ‘the never say die attitude’ state is.

The State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki declared that Modi would get a visa to the US once he took office and forms a government. Modi would be eligible for an A1 visa, said Psaki. She said: “We congratulate Narendra Modi and the BJP on its victory in winning a majority of seats in India’s historic national election, which saw more voters cast their ballots freely and fairly than in any election in human history. Secretary Kerry has also offered his congratulations, and looks forward to working with the BJP on expanding our shared prosperity and security.”

Over the years, the US-India relations reached new heights with India and the US extending nuclear cooperation partnership in late Oct 2020. New Delhi and Washington, in a joint statement issued on Nov 24, 2020, declared that the original agreement that had been signed on Nov 07, 2010 was extended in recognition and appreciation of ‘the strength of the enduring partnership between the two countries on matters of security and reaffirming the important contributions of the US-India nuclear and radiological security cooperation for the benefit of their citizens and the world.’

There is no doubt China is relieved by India’s position. China must have quite rightly ascertained India wouldn’t upset its relationship with Russia by siding with the West. Modi’s stand on the war in Ukraine is very much similar to that of Indira Gandhi as regards the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late Dec 1979. That war lasted 10 years. Having failed to achieve its objectives, the Soviet Union ended the disastrous mission in Feb 1989, a year before India terminated its military mission in Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces. India brought its military project to a successful end in March 1990, having compelled the then Sri Lankan government to introduce 13th Amendment to the Constitution in Nov 1987. That objective was achieved at gunpoint.

India’s statement at the interactive session on the OHCHR’s written report on promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka reminded how New Delhi pursued the 80s strategy. India’s Permanent Representative in Geneva Ambassador Indra Mani Pande declared: “We will continue to urge the Sri Lankan Government for the early conduct of elections to the Provincial Councils in keeping with its commitment to devolution of power.”

The late J.N. Dixit, in his memoirs ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy’ discussed India’s response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their military intervention in Sri Lanka. Having referred to its their disastrous 1962 war with China, the triumph over Pakistan nine years later and achieving much desired nuclear capability in 1998, Dixit, one-time Indian High Commissioner in Colombo (1985-1989) commented on policy decisions on Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. It would be better to read verbatim what Dixit, who also served as National Security Advisor said about Indira Gandhi. The comment should be examined against the backdrop of India’s refusal to join the anti-Russia camp. Had that happened, China, would have found itself in much more complicated and difficult situation over the Russian adventure in Ukraine.

Dixit stated: “She (Indira Gandhi) redefined the ideology of nonalignment more preciously in terms of the interests of the developing countries. The two foreign policy decisions on which she could be faulted are: her ambiguous response to the Russian intrusion into Afghanistan and her giving active support to Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Whatever the criticisms about these decisions, it cannot be denied that she took them on the basis of her assessments about India’s national interests. Her logic was that she could not openly alienate the former Soviet Union when India was so dependent on that country for defence supplies and technologies. Similarly, she could not afford the emergence of Tamil separatism in India by refusing to support the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils. These aspirations were legitimate in the context of nearly 50 years of Sinhalese discrimination against Sri Lankan Tamils.

In both cases, her decisions were relevant at the point of time they were taken. History will judge her as a political leader who safeguarded Indian national interests with determination and farsightedness.”

Obviously, Modi felt the same way as the late Indira Gandhi did when he came under tremendous pressure to abandon Russia. New Delhi must have weighed how their stand on the Ukraine war affected common front against China.

Some have questioned India’s strategy. Commentators and analysts have raised questions, particularly in the West, over whether the world’s largest democracy should have backed the West. But, India, as a mature democracy has taken a principled stand. Some interpreted New Delhi’s first statement at the UN Security Council that regretted repeated calls from the international community to give diplomacy and dialogue a chance had not been heeded. But, at the end India skipped votes on Ukraine much to the dismay of the US.

Among those who abstained along with India and China were Pakistan, Vietnam, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Iran, Iraq, Cuba and Bangladesh. Altogether 35 countries abstained not because they endorsed the Russian aggression but didn’t want to back a coalition that was responsible for millions of deaths in various regions of the world. The 2003 US-UK led invasion of Iraq on the false pretext of searching for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) exposed the duplicity of those countries preaching to other nations about accountability.

It would be pertinent to ask whether those countries which staged a walk out last week as the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was addressing the UN in Geneva felt the same way when Western powers invaded Iraq. Some sections of the media quoted Ukrainian Ambassador in Geneva, Yevheniia Filipenko, who led the walkout at UNHRC as having thanked those who took part in the stunt. The Ambassador is right. It is nothing but a stunt as the then US Ambassador Nikki Haley in June 2018 called it a cesspool of political bias.

Lanka takes another beating at Geneva sessions

The Geneva agenda made further progress at the ongoing sessions overshadowed by the war in Ukraine. The Sri Lankan delegation to Geneva comprised Foreign Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, Justice Minister Ali Sabry, PC, Foreign Secretary Admiral (retd) Jayanath Colombage. The delegation joined Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative there, one-time The Island political correspondent C.A. Chandraprema.

Prof. Peiris, bitterly complained about the way the UNHRC has treated Sri Lanka and pursued a strategy severely inimical to the country. The Foreign Ministry quoted Prof. Peiris as having said: “In March 2021, the Council voted on Resolution 46/1 which was tabled without the consent of Sri Lanka as the country concerned. The consideration of this matter polarised and politicised this forum. In a startling departure from the mandate which the UN General Assembly originally conferred on this Council, operative paragraph 6 of this resolution refers to a so-called evidence-gathering mechanism, a measure that was strongly opposed by a number of countries. Such initiatives create disharmony both in the domestic and international arenas. It creates obstacles to reconciliation efforts, breeds hatred by reopening past wounds, and polarises society.”

However, Geneva repeated the same old accusations against the backdrop of Sri Lanka’s pathetic failure at least to set the record straight.

Daya Gamage, one-time US State Department employee and the author of ‘Tamil Tigers’ Debt to America: US Foreign Policy Adventurism and Sri Lanka’s Dilemma’ strongly condemned Sri Lanka’s response to the Geneva threat. In comments posted online, Gamage questioned the failure on the part of the Sri Lankan government, at least to remind Geneva how now vanquished Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) expelled the entire Muslim community from Sri Lanka’s Northern Province in Oct/Nov 1990, just a few months after India pulled out its troops from Sri Lanka. Gamage stressed that the expulsion of Muslims should have been dealt with as Sri Lanka was being accused of perpetrating genocide. The former US Embassy employee in Colombo said: “Anyone who reads the interpretation of ‘genocide’ in the UN Charter and other scholarly works can know what genocide means.”

The UK-led Sri Lanka Core Group comprising Canada, Germany, North Macedonia, Malawi and Montenegro continued its despicable strategy of persecution of this country for defeating the world’s “most ruthless terrorist organisation” against their sinister advice. That lot voted against Russia over the continuing war in Ukraine but didn’t find fault with the invasion of Iraq or military action against several other countries in the past. Canada recently unearthed hard evidence of genocide and other calculated human rights violations against its indigenous population plays a major role in the project to undermine Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka’s failure to challenge the very basis of unsubstantiated war crimes allegations in spite of Lord Naseby providing the required ammunition in Oct 2017 along with a significant US military statement (Lt. Colonel Lawrence Smith, US Defence Advisor, Colombo) in June 2011, over two years after the successful conclusion of the war is a point to ponder. Can there be an excuse for continuously failing to set the record straight in Geneva and New York. What prevents Sri Lanka from making a reference to Indian intervention at least on the basis of what Dixit stated in his widely read memoirs? Why can’t we remind the world Geneva proceeded with a contentious process based on unverified accusations that cannot be examined till 2031? Or point out the vast discrepancy in the number of dead (both civilians and combatants) as reported by the UN Colombo and the disputed Darusman report?

The current dispensation has caused countrywide chaos by extremely poor management of the national economy. There is no doubt the vast majority of people struggling to make ends meet have been deprived of the basic needs. Disruption of both fuel and gas supplies as well as daily countrywide power cuts have jolted the public. Having repeatedly promised a system change, the current government has caused gross human rights violation by depriving all communities of the basic needs. It would be a grave mistake on the part of the government to believe the crisis can be conveniently blamed on the Covid-19 global epidemic.

The Geneva didn’t receive the attention it required in the local media due to the war in Ukraine and unprecedented political crisis caused by sharp differences emerging within the SLPP-led ruling coalition. The rebel group made explosive accusations pertaining to Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, who holds Sri Lanka and US dual citizenship, of pursuing a strategy to facilitate Western intervention. The rebel group compared the current situation with that of Indonesia in the 1960s that brought military dictator Suharto to power and resulted in butchering of possibly several hundred thousand innocents suspected of being Communist sympathisers.

Regardless of pompous declarations made, Sri Lanka has been encircled on the Geneva front with so-called evidence-gathering mechanism free to proceed. Perhaps, Sri Lanka should explore the possibility of presenting its case with all available evidence, including now unclassified wartime dispatches from the British High Commission in Colombo with fresh request to the UK as well as other key diplomatic missions to submit their wartime dispatches to the UN evidence gathering mechanism. Sri Lanka never used Wiki leaks revelations for its advantage.

Let me end this piece by reproducing a section of Wikileaks managed to secrete out of US diplomatic cables from Geneva. A cable dated July 15, 2009 signed by the then Geneva-based US Ambassador Clint Williamson cleared the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) of crimes against humanity during the Vanni offensive. The cable addressed to the US State Department was based on a confidential conversation Ambassador Williamson had with the then ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacque de Maio on July 9, 2009. Ambassador Williamson wrote: “The army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at an increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it didn’t amount to genocide. He could cite examples of where the army had stopped shelling when the ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet it chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths. He concluded however, by asserting that the GoSL failed to recognise its obligation to protect civilians, despite the approach leading to higher military casualties.”

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

2 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

2 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya