Features
Trade or geopolitics?
Though not directly referred to in the MOU, one of IMEC‘s implicit objectives is to counter China‘s BRI, which strengthens its connectivity with countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America with an extensive network of land and sea routes.
By AFTAB ALAM
One of the major outcomes of the recently concluded G20 Summit in New Delhi was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) among the governments of India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the European Union (EU), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, Germany, and Italy to create the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) for establishing an economic corridor stretching from India to Europe.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed IMEC as “a beacon of cooperation, innovation, and shared progress charting a journey of shared aspirations and dreams,” which he again highlighted on September 24 in his monthly radio programme, Mann Ki Baat. Many commentators and leaders have also described IMEC as a “historic” development that would prove to be a “game changer”.
Leaving aside the euphoria generated by the announcement of IMEC as the modern incarnation of the ancient “spice route”, some hard questions need to be asked about its financing, credibility, and profitability. Who will foot the bill? Does the limited volume of trade involved justify a new and isolated rail line when there is already convenient maritime transport between India, the Middle East and Europe?
For example, India is the EU’s 10th largest trading partner, accounting for just 2 per cent of the total EU trade in goods. Is IMEC part of the US grand strategy to contain China’s growing foothold in the Asia-Pacific, Middle-East, and African regions by drawing other countries into its fold and using them as pawns? Will China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) be successfully countered by IMEC, an objective that the United States and India have been striving for? We are mistaken if we think that IMEC is merely an infrastructure project.
The proposal represents a multimode transit corridor spanning over 3,000 miles, consisting of two separate wings, the east corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf and the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe. It will be a combination of railroads, ship routes, and roadways.
According to the MOU, the participants also intend to lay along the rail routes a pipe for clean hydrogen export and cables for electricity and communications. IMEC is being seen as effective transport connectivity, which would promote investments and strengthen regional supply chains. It is expected to increase trade accessibility and facilitate the movement of goods and services by reducing transaction time by 40 per cent and cost by 30 per cent, compared to the present Suez Canal route, as estimated by an analyst from the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security.
However, the claim that IMEC would substantially reduce the time and cost is doubtful, as due to the combination of transportation means involved, this would also entail multiple loading and unloading costs and time in each port along the way, as well as transit tolls and fees.
The normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia is a crucial factor for the success of IMEC and the seamless transport of goods, which appears to be a remote possibility. The political stability in the Middle East is yet another important factor in its success, whose longevity is always questionable. The proposed corridor offers India a specific geopolitical advantage as it would find an alternative trade overland connectivity route to the west, independent of Pakistan.
India’s growing economic and strategic ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which IMEC aims at, would help isolate its arch rival Pakistan in the region. There are many challenges and roadblocks that IMEC will face once the project is finally rolled out. Financing is one thorny issue on which the MOU is silent. It is not yet clear what the cost of the project would be, and how the requisite funds would be mobilised.
According to the initial estimate, the project would require around US$20 billion, which would have to be generated by the participating nations. The substantial funding is expected to come from the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII), a collective endeavour by G7 nations to finance transparent, climateresilient, and gender-equal critical infrastructure projects in developing nations.
Though not directly referred to in the MOU, one of IMEC’s implicit objectives is to counter China’s BRI, which strengthens its connectivity with countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America with an extensive network of land and sea routes. Despite accusations of promoting predatory lending practices and “debt trap diplomacy” which undermine international norms and values, BRI has bolstered China’s clout at the international level.
What worries the US the most about BRI is the inclusion in it of many of its very close allies and IMEC partners, such as Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. While Italy has recently expressed its desire to withdraw from the BRI, it would still instead work on its broader economic relationship with China. It remains to be seen how a balance is struck between the two commitments.
India is deeply upset with China’s BRI, as one of its major components, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), passes through Pakistan’s illegally occupied Kashmir. India considers CPEC a direct infringement on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The divergence of interests among the partner countries may also undermine the prospect of IMEC’s success. It must be noted that all participants in IMEC are not necessarily ranged against China. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two main pillars of the corridor, are opposed to a bipolar world order that forces them to choose between these two rivals, China and the United States.
This is evident from the fact that they not only recently joined the BRICS group but are also trying hard to become members of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was established in 2001 as a political, economic, and security forum to rival Western institutions. Saudi Arabia may not share the United States’ objective to counter China’s BRI through IMEC. Saudi Arabia is getting closer to China, which recently mediated its landmark agreement with its arch-rival, Iran.
This has the potential to change the strategic dynamics of the region. It is worth noting that Saudi’s net trade with China has substantially risen to US$87 billion, while its trade with the US has declined to US$25 billion, which was almost the same as a decade ago. Saudi Arabia is also seeking to become a member of the Shanghai-based BRICS Bank, which is being developed by the world’s major developing economies as an alternative to the West-dominated World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The growing cooperation between China and many middle-eastern countries would pose a major challenge to the successful operationalisation of IMEC, as China’s economic engagement with these countries far exceeds that of the United States’ and its European allies. Over the last few years, China’s trade with the Middle East has grown by US$100 billion, with the total volume exceeding US$300 billion.
Obsessed with China’s growing global footprint and its desperate desire to rein it in, the US is looking for opportunities to wean away the nations that were enticed by China through BRI. IMEC is thus America’s endeavour to project itself as an alternative partner and investor for developing countries to contain China’s growing economic and political influence.
Our euphoria about IMEC should not blind us to the fact that many similar infrastructure projects like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (2017) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (2022), despite United States commitments, have remained nonstarters for want of fundraising and questions about the sincerity of the United States. In the long run, if the United States or EU withholds funding due to changes in domestic and international political dynamics, IMEC would also meet the same fate. The success of IMEC will depend on the sincerity of the member states in addressing these challenges. (The Statesman/ANN)
(The writer is a professor at Aligarh Muslim University and heads its Strategic and Security Studies Programme)
Features
Addressing human rights needs multi-pronged approach
by Jehan Perera
The ongoing 63rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which runs from September 7 to October 7, 2026, in Geneva is important to Sri Lanka. Its outcome will send a signal to other international actors, including the European Union, as to whether Sri Lanka’s reform policy is on track. The written update on Sri Lanka, prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights under High Commissioner Volker Türk and presented by Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif, has taken a more holistic approach to the government’s performance over the past year. It acknowledged the progress Sri Lanka has made under the NPP government in relation to accountability for financial fraud and other economic crimes. At the same time, the High Commissioner’s update made clear that progress in relation to economic crime cannot be equated with progress in relation to accountability for grave human rights violations committed during the armed conflict and in other periods of political violence.
The government may have felt sufficiently confident that its response to the High Commissioner’s update could be handled by its representative in Geneva and did not require the attendance of Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath. Sri Lanka’s representative Sumith Dassanayake called for a fundamental review of country-specific mandates within the UN Human Rights Council. Sri Lanka has been facing repeated scrutiny in the form of successive UNHRC resolutions from 2012 onwards. Ambassador Dassanayake argued that such mandates should not continue indefinitely and must be regularly assessed against measurable objectives and tangible outcomes. This may reflect confidence that its record of reform is beginning to receive recognition internationally. The reports and statements at the Human Rights Council acknowledged progress in the government’s efforts to address corruption and economic crime.
The government’s anti-corruption drive has included investigations into allegations involving individuals who held the highest political offices in the country. The arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe in connection with alleged misuse of public funds, and the investigation into the controversial SriLankan Airlines Airbus transaction involving former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s son, are examples of the reach of these investigations. The arrest of SLPP National Organiser and Member of Parliament Namal Rajapaksa in connection with allegations relating to the Airbus purchase scandal has also demonstrated that the government is willing to pursue cases involving politically powerful figures.
Wide Range
The ongoing investigations appear to encompass a wide range of parliamentarians and government members, both past and present. They suggest that accountability for corruption is not being confined to lower-level officials or to individuals who lack political influence. This is precisely the kind of accountability that the public has long demanded and that previous governments have too often failed to deliver. The government is also reaching into the upper levels of the military hierarchies of the past. The case in which 11 young men, most of them Tamil, disappeared after being abducted in Colombo between 2008 and 2009 involved allegations that some families were asked to pay ransoms. The investigation into this case has reached senior military figures. The willingness to pursue such cases is important because it challenges the assumption that those who exercised power during the war are beyond the reach of the law. Such cases would provide a practical test of whether the government’s commitment to accountability for economic crimes is part of a broader commitment to the rule of law.
Success in prosecuting corruption cannot substitute for justice for those who were unlawfully killed, disappeared, tortured or otherwise victimised. The UN report noted that there had been no recognition or accountability for crimes under international law, gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties during the war. The government has yet to establish a credible and effective process to address the many cases of enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, torture and other serious violations. The government needs to take the international commitments it has inherited on human rights issues seriously. It needs to adopt a multi-pronged approach and go beyond focusing primarily on financial and corruption-related accountability.
Need Action
As a member of the international community, Sri Lanka has a responsibility to abide by the commitments it has made. It cannot selectively uphold international obligations postponing those that are politically difficult. Also, as a small country, Sri Lanka has a self-interest in ensuring the survival of international law, which is all that it has to protect it from the depredations of the bigger international actors. The erosion of international law by powerful states makes it all the more important that smaller states uphold the principles on which the international system is based. Sri Lanka cannot credibly appeal to international law when it is threatened from outside while disregarding its own obligations within. Sri Lanka also needs to win the confidence of its own population that it is committed to justice and equality for all. Public opinion polls and community-level research have disclosed that ethnic and religious minorities are appreciative of the sense of greater security they enjoy under the present government from ethnic or religious extremists.
But a sense of security is not the same as the fulfilment of rights. As far as the Tamil people are concerned, the government has yet to deliver on several of its specific promises. These include the long-standing problems of missing persons, the release of political prisoners who have been members of Tamil militant organisations, and the return of land taken over for military purposes during the war. The issue of Buddhist statues and archaeological sites found on their properties which are then taken from their control continue to trouble them especially as they see no signs of resolution of those disputes. The issue of pastureland in the east of the country in Mylathamadu is particularly concerning to them as they see orders by successive presidents, both President Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, being disregarded on the ground. The Mylathamadu pastureland dispute is where traditional Tamil dairy farmers have engaged in multi-year protests against the ongoing encroachment of their ancestral grazing lands by Sinhalese crop cultivators relocated under government development schemes.
The government’s failure to hold Provincial Council elections is particularly troubling. The provincial council system is the only one that can provide the Tamil people and other ethnic minorities the opportunity to wield political power and exercise a measure of self-determination in the areas in which they are the numerical majority. The continued postponement of Provincial Council elections therefore has consequences that go beyond an ordinary electoral delay. It deprives communities of an important constitutional avenue for democratic participation and power-sharing. The ethnic and religious minorities appreciate what the government is doing in the larger national interest, but they must not be made to feel that their special concerns are being ignored. The government cannot resolve Sri Lanka’s entire legacy of rights violations overnight. But it does need to demonstrate that it is willing to move forward on multiple fronts, not only on a few.
Features
The emptying university: why are academics leaving?
by Hasini Lecamwasam
Brain drain in Sri Lanka is at an all-time high. The latest Human Flight and Brain Drain Index for 2024 shows that we are 16th of 175 countries on this count, and first in South Asia. That this is a crisis goes without saying. Brain drain affects all sectors, and is a huge strain on the resources of a developing country. Particularly in Sri Lanka, where considerable public investment is made in the moulding of professionals through the system of free education, this amounts to transferring the resources of poorer countries to richer ones with top migration destinations. It is, therefore, important to consider the push and pull factors behind skilled outmigration, specifically from the public university system of Sri Lanka, a key focus of the Kuppi column.
From frustration to exit
Several bitter realities in our crumbling public university system act as push factors in the migration decisions of academics. Many essays on this column have, over several years, attempted to highlight numerous aspects of this erosion. Perhaps, primary among them is the lack of adequate funding, which has debilitating ramifications for the system: very little investment is made in the up-keep of infrastructure (and even less in its expansion), resulting in serious constraints in accommodating growing batches of students and the wellbeing of the staff (particularly in regional universities); research funding is negligible, severely curtailing academics’ ability to effectively discharge their primary duty of teaching which should ideally be informed by their research (and the research of others, access to which is also, unfortunately, mediated by funding); a funding crunch also means a slash in (or greater constraints on) recruitments, increasing the workloads of academics, currently in service, and eating into the quality of their teaching and research.
What recruitments are done frustrate those with any faith in merit. As many of our interventions in this column have shown, recruitment processes are characterised by archaic selection criteria that place very little weight on a candidate’s postgraduate growth and the advantages of interdisciplinary training. Added to this is the general preference for ‘culturally compliant’ candidates who would not rock the boat too much. The combined effect is that those with the capacity and spirit to try out innovations in education are discouraged from joining or staying on in the public university system. Some, or many, of them may instead seek appointments abroad.
A thread that binds all of these problems together is pervasive hierarchy which, again, many interventions on this column have sought to highlight. It is the interest in preserving hierarchy that leads to the preference for alumni in recruitment processes. Hierarchy within universities can be particularly frustrating for younger faculty and women, who typically have to bear the brunt of the workload of their senior, often male, colleagues. In a context of funding, and, therefore, recruitment, restrictions, this translates into a disproportionate burden being placed on junior (usually female) faculty, seriously hindering their prospects of growing into successful academics due to the time constraints within which they have to operate. Junior academics, therefore, are more likely to look to educational institutions abroad for what they hope would be a different work culture that respects them more.
Ideological ruses
On top of these structural frustrations are also the workings of neoliberal ideology. For one, the nature of relations between the global metropole and peripheral countries like Sri Lanka largely dictates what is desirable and what is not. The apparent lifestyles of Western countries – from food to clothing, housing, appliances, and so on – have continued to lure people from the periphery with the promise of a ‘better’ life, alongside better career advancement opportunities. This, of course, masks much of the struggle that goes on behind the scenes to survive in Western societies. For instance, in most cases highly attractive public infrastructure such as roads, public transport, clean air, quality control of food, and so on belie the astronomical privatised costs of healthcare and education. Health insurance is usually mandatory and steep in most high-income settings, while even subsidised education (for which eligibility criteria are strict) creates a serious dent in household earnings. Of course, the happy images of glossy trams and gleeful international travellers don’t convey this.
A second ideological ruse is the myth of greater opportunities and recognition abroad. While there is no denying that local skilled sectors – be it higher education, health, civil service, or private white-collar positions – are replete with issues that inhibit merit-based professional advancement, the notion that things are fundamentally different in Western countries stems from an uninformed optimism. As is now increasingly known and discussed, Western labour markets are notoriously racialised, and equivalent skills are rarely treated as such. Instead, it is usually demanded that skilled migrants clear certain formal examinations in their host countries. In fields like medicine, this is followed by an interview that may also be racially prejudiced. Once these initial steps are cleared, remuneration reverts to square one irrespective of experience accumulated abroad, not to mention the many subtle aggressions, rejections, and trials one has to go through in the negotiation of everyday life. In the many cases where professional qualifications are used as leverage for a move abroad, sights are set on a better future for one’s children, which again is informed by the misplaced faith in greater opportunities and a lack of awareness of the factors outlined above. Needless to say, in the global swing to the Right, things have become even more challenging. In such a context, considering the few rare cases where skilled migrants live extremely comfortable lives as the norm becomes a dangerous misconception.
The two ideological pull factors mentioned above are complemented by a push factor, which has to do with a highly classed understanding of what a white-collar professional is due in their society. Many of these aspirations are clearly articulated in academic trade union action demanding separate quotas for school entry, increased fuel allowances, winning back the presently stalled vehicle permit scheme, salary hikes, and so on. While working people have every right to agitate for better material conditions, insofar as it remains unconnected to a broader movement for improving the conditions of the lot of the working class, it remains self-serving and very much within the class logic of capitalist society. Since these demands are articulated as a means of maintaining distinction, it is clear that they are not envisaged as part of a class movement. The frustration of not having these needs for distinction satisfied may push some to seek greener pastures abroad, at least financially, (perhaps as a means of social mobility based on it), only to be disappointed on most occasions.
What is to be done?
Addressing the systemic push factors listed above requires, first and foremost, greater allocations for free public higher education. This would immediately translate into more recruitments and less work per academic, and better research and teaching in the long haul. An increase in funding would also ideally lead to greater infrastructural investments, especially including improving the living conditions of those who work in regional universities amid untold hardships. Next, fairer, more creative, and, therefore, more effective recruitment policies are badly needed to attract talented individuals to university positions. Rather than carving out a ‘special category’ for academics to achieve this purpose, which is informed by a classed logic, this needs to be done through fundamental reforms in recruitment processes. Third, a persistent attack on the entrenched hierarchy within universities through internal reform is much called for. Reforming recruitment practices will go a long way towards addressing this. Measures should also be taken to introduce more stringent policies against SGBV (not to mention ragging, even though it is not directly connected to brain drain). Such measures would create a safer, fairer, and more attractive workplace, which would give more reasons for people to stay.
On top of greater allocations, we also need a transformation of our aspirations themselves if this situation is to change. That necessitates a kind of education capable of questioning the ‘paradise’ conception of Western societies, and lays bare their colonial material and ideological dimensions, in both their historical and contemporary manifestations. These colonial understandings of the ‘good life’, moreover, have devastating ecological implications for the planet, not to mention social justice. An education with the ability to transform this mindset would hopefully prove to be more than a mere path to social mobility, rather being a tool of social emancipation that renders mobility moot.
(Hasini Lecamwasam is with the Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Friends favourite Suzi Croner returns for Oktoberfest 2026
Charming audiences in Switzerland as Suzi Flückiger, Sri Lanka’s own Suzi Croner is coming home… for a very special occasion.
The bubbly former frontline vocalist of 90s band Friends will take the stage at a popular venue in Colombo for Oktoberfest 2026.
Known in Europe for her country and classic hits, Suzi has remained a much-loved name back home. This will be a rare chance for local fans to see her live and celebrate the voice behind so many Friends memories.
Oktoberfest 2026 in Colombo promises an evening of live music, traditional Bavarian food and beer, colourful dirndls and lederhosen, folk dancing, and plenty of community cheer.

Suzi Croner (Flückiger)
Against this lively backdrop, Suzi will take the stage for a special solo set, featuring her own pre-recorded music. She performed at the event last year too, as a solo artiste, but a German band providing the music.
This year, however she says, it’s a different scene.
“The novel attraction will be the dancers from Germany — all girls, clad in German outfits,” Suzi said. She added that the event will also highlight the activities generally connected with Oktoberfest, which should generate a lot of fun and excitement for those who join her in Colombo next month.
Suzi has become a much-in-demand artiste in Europe, and has even performed Down Under, in Melbourne.
In Switzerland, where she has been based for the past 42 years, she continues to charm audiences with country and classic hits, performing at private events and community nights across Europe.
“My weekends are generally loaded with my work as a singer,” she said. “And I also play tennis three times a week, because I need to keep fit to entertain my audience in an active way.”
Her repertoire is made up mainly of Swiss, German and English songs.
And true to form, Suzi loves springing surprises.
“So watch out when you join me at Oktoberfest 2026, in Colombo!” she said.
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