Features
The struggles within, friends and opponents, the Tea Board, the Tea Propaganda Board and CTTA

Excerpted from the autobiography of Merrill J. Fernando
If the chokehold that British interests exerted on the local entrepreneur was not strong enough to stifle him, the additional pressure needed to hobble him further was created by the machinations of the vested interests within, both wittingly and unwittingly aided by a shortsighted bureaucracy and trade associations with self-serving agendas. My relationships with all these organizations have been contentious and confrontational. Over the years I have been unapologetically critical of many of their policies and strategies, which I considered to not be in the best interests of the local brand builder and exporter.
The Ceylon Tea Traders’ Association (CTTA) came into being in 1894, in the early formative stages of the tea export trade, to mediate on behalf of growers and exporters and to solve their problems. It was a creation of the British and given the nature of colonial dominance of the country then, it was but natural that protection of British interests within the industry would be its first priority.
The Ceylonese ‘native’ tea traders who were in the minority till the late 1960s, permitted this state of submissiveness to colonial domination to prevail for decades after Independence. Whilst the CTTA committee comprised equally of sellers and exporters, five representatives of each, it was still dominated by Europeans.
The general insensitivity of the CTTA to needs of locals was exemplified by an incident in 1968, when the committee refused to suspend the tea auctions for an hour or so, to enable Muslim members to visit the mosque, on an occasion when an important Muslim religious festival coincided with an auction day. I discussed this matter with the late Abbas Akberally, then Chairman of Akbar Brothers and tea exporter Amin Suby, who were both of the firm view that a change in the CTTA representative body was an urgent need. The resentment caused by this episode eventually crystallized in a changing of the guard in the CTTA, with the ‘native’ segment taking control of its affairs for the first time in its history.
For the first time the post of Chairman was contested, and Austin Perera from the Cooperative Tea Society was voted in. The next and even bigger shock was when all Europeans in the buyer segment, with the exception of George Willis, then Chairman of Lipton, were ousted and replaced by five local shippers: Co-operative Tea Society Ltd., M.S. Heptulabhoy & Co. Ltd., Merrill J. Fernando Co., Suby Tea, and Van Rees Ceylon NV. It was a ‘palace coup,’ which the ruling parties were ignorant of until they were deposed.
Despite the first successful Ceylonese incursion into what had always been a closely-guarded preserve of British interests, there were subsequent attempts by interested parties to dilute the local influence. In 1969, an unusually large number of plantation companies in the Whittall Estate Agency, applied for membership of the CTTA. I opposed this strongly on the grounds that plantation interests were already adequately served by the Planters’ Association and that it would be inequitable to permit the sellers to outnumber the buyers in the membership of the CTTA. The subsequent vote endorsed my view, with the support of George Willis, who was one of the few servants of British interests to objectively view the aspirations of local exporters.
An objective insider speaks
The relevant extract (reproduced below) from the book ‘George Steuart & Co. Ltd., 1952-1973, A Personal Odyssey,’ by Tony Peries, former Chairman of George Steuart, provides an illuminating insider’s view of this historically significant episode. In a few well-worded paragraphs, he also outlines the impediments and obstacles which then existed to the advancement of the local exporter, and to the cause of Pure Ceylon Tea, globally.
[QUOTE:] The Colombo Tea Traders Association (CTTA) made the rules under which tea auctions were held and to buy at the auction a firm had to be a member. More or less the same firms comprised the five buyers/ five sellers committee year after year, and Forbes and Walker was always the advisory broker who had no vote. The buyers, from memory, were Brooke Bond Ceylon Ltd., Lipton Ltd., Harrison & Crossfield Ltd., Heath & Co (Ceylon) Ltd., and M.S. Heptulabhoy & Co. Ltd. The sellers were Carson Cumberbatch & Co., George Steuart & Co. Ltd., Gordon Frazer & Co. Ltd., Colombo Commercial Company and Whittall Boustead Ltd. .
As many as 411 the sellers save George Steuart and Frazer were also buyers of some significance, but I never saw or even had reason to suspect firms with dual interests doing anything adverse to affect their selling side and if anything, they occasionally gave their own teas a bit of help. However, criticism of firms ‘on both sides of the fence’ was rife.
By 1967, the small Ceylonese firms, most of them dwarfed by Brooke Bond, Lipton type giants, far outnumbered the long-established British outfits on the CTTA membership list. The owner of one such firm was Merrill J. Fernando, who had started life at A. F. Jones & Co. Ltd., become a Director there, and subsequently opened up his own firm under his name. Among those smaller firms, the majority was owned by the Muslim community. Heptulabhoys was the most significant, but Jafferjees and T Suby were also well known and respected.
The local traders, identified by the expatriate community as ‘natives,’ -felt that their needs were ignored by the CTTA (the old diehards like George Savage actually wrote N’ for native in their catalogues as they could not bother with long local names like Heptulabhoy!) A typical example was the committee’s refusal to suspend the tea auctions for an hour or so, on one occasion, on, to enable Muslim members to visit the mosque on a particular festival which fell on a tea auction day, having initially refused to reschedule the auction date. That same year the small exporters worked together to throw out the previous committee, leaving only George Steuart from the old brigade.
It fell to Merrill to give leadership to the newly-elected committee. He was intelligent, articulate, and forceful. His main objective was to get on the committee of the Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board (CPBT), where the CTTA had ex-officio sellers and buyers nominated by the committee. I had only a nodding acquaintance with Merrill and when the nomination paper came to me, I refused to endorse his nomination, which caused an awful stink.
My concern was that he lacked the knowledge to be on the CTTB. After some days of impasse, Arjuna Dias, a Tea Director at Somerville & Co. Brokers) and a close friend of Merrill, approached me with the suggestion that Merrill and I have a private meeting ng at which he would state his case.
I agreed and he very magnanimously came to 91 Steuart Place one evening, with Arjuna. Merrill’s argument was that the CTPB generated enormous amounts of money to spend on propaganda, as every pound of tea exported attracted a cess for propaganda (and research too) but that the control of that money was far too loose.
He certainly had a point, as in those days most of the propaganda money was, at the tea traders’ insistence, spent on generic propaganda, that is, tea advertised as tea and apart from the Lion symbol, which the packers were allowed to use on their packs, provided the blend comprised 50% Ceylon Tea, along with the legend `Pure Ceylon Tea, there was little done to promote Ceylon Tea specifically.
The pack contents of Ceylon Tea had to be unpoliced and the bona fides of the packers depended on a gentlemen’s agreement. Whilst I have no reason to believe there was large-scale cheating, the situation was really not very satisfactory as the major packers were in the excellent position of benefiting from tea (not Ceylon) advertising, at no cost to themselves. The CTPB ran ‘Ceylon Tea Centres’ in London and various other major cities but their impact was minimal and the London Centre, for instance, though it a fine location in the Haymarket, was best known as a good lunchtime curry house.
Merrill was by then selling some tea in Italy and other parts of Europe, but I remember Italy particularly as the CTPB representative there was a man named Egidio, who Merrill maintained was totally unhelpful to members of the trade. Merrill ‘s point was that the money spent on generic promotion and on promoting foreign-owned brands should now be expended towards helping the development of Ceylonese-owned brands.

Tony Peries — Then Chairman of George Steuart & Co, assisted me with the Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board
When we met at Steuart Place we did not discuss all this detail, but I agreed to support Merrill’s nomination. We parted friends and have remained so ever since. Merrill is the one man who has over the years established his ‘Dilmah’ brand very successfully just about everywhere in the world. I am aware of how very difficult it is to get a new brand in to the Australian supermarkets, where Dilmah’ is now widely stocked, so he has taken a hard road and persevered in putting truly pure Ceylon Tea, packed in Ceylon, on the map. I am only sorry I ever opposed him. [END OF QUOTE]
I was very pleased that Tony considered the issues sufficiently important, for them to be given prominence in his memoir, written more than 30 years after the episode. After moving to Australia in 1973, Tony carved out a very successful career for himself in the private commercial sector in that
country. About eight years ago, when I was visiting Australia, he got in touch with me with a request to address a meeting of the Sri Lanka-Sydney Business Society, of which he was the Chairman. He had always been highly appreciative of the success of Dilmah and was very keen on my explaining to the gathering, my vision for Ceylon Tea and the success of Dilmah.
I accepted with pleasure as that would have also given me the opportunity of meeting up with many of my Sri Lankan friends in Australia. However, having accepted the invitation, I realized, to my utter dismay, that the SLSBS event would coincide with a public relations event featuring 26 important journalists in New South Wales, in which I was due to appear. Eventually I compromised by making a short address at the SLSBS event and answering a few questions, before making an early departure.
Promotion of pure Ceylon tea, obstacles and pitfalls
The incisive observations of Tony Peries an objective and knowledgeable insider of the plantation industry reproduced in the previous chapter, clearly demonstrate the self-serving nature of the very organs established to assist the trade and the exporter.
The Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board (CTPB) became active in the early 1930s and was incorporated with the present Ceylon Tea Board, when the latter was established in 1976. The Chairman of the Tea Board was invariably a political appointee but the organization functioned under a full-time Director General. The first Chairman of the Tea Board was Ajith Goonatilleke, who had earlier been a Senior Estates Management Executive at the George Steuart agency.
There were also periods when the Chairman of the Tea Board and the Secretary of the Ministry of Plantations was one and the same individual, for instance the career civil servant Bradman Weerakoon. I believe that at the outset, Goonatilleke’s appointment as Chairman of the Tea Board and his substantive position as Secretary to the Ministry of Plantations, under then Minister Ratnasiri Senanayake, may have briefly overlapped.
Before the emergence of Ceylonese exporters as a force in the trade, most of the private trade representatives were from multinational companies, including Lipton and Brooke Bond. Therefore, understandably, British interests received priority support whilst there was no voice to promote Sri Lankan interests. I served two terms as a member of the CTPB, in the 1960s and ’70s, but several proposals I submitted regarding the establishing of Sri Lanka brands attracted little or no support, from the Board and the Secretariat.
I was deeply pleased by my appointment to the Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board, as it provided me a great opportunity to present to an important body, the views of a practicing tea trader. The Chairman was M.A. Bartlett, then a Director of Carson Cumberbatch, and the Secretary was Clarence Cooray, who had been with the CTPB for quite some time. The other members of the Board were chairmen of agency houses, brokers, and representatives of the smallholders.
At the very first meeting, when I spoke of the need for the promotion of value-added export of locally-owned brands, whilst Bartlett was very supportive, Maynard, Chairman of Brooke Bond, strongly vetoed the idea. His argument was that value addition at source would require blending from multiple regions and that it would not be practical.
Consequent to Bartlett’s term and Cooray’s retirement, Bertie Warusawitharana, a well-known planter from the south, was appointed Chairman, whilst Elmer Martenstyn, who had been Executive Director of the CTPB in the early 1970s, was appointed Director General and Victor Perera, Secretary. The then situation in that Board was such that Perera had filed an injunction against Martenstyn, and the two were not on speaking terms. Martenstyn was resentful of my inquiries regarding this issue but I was supported by two other Board members, Park Nadesan and Buddhi De Zoysa, the Treasury representative. Another member of the Board who supported new initiatives and new thinking was the late Stanley Jayawardena, then Chairman of Unilever.
The CTPB had within its ambit, both an overseas and a local marketing committee. The Commissioner of Domestic Marketing was one Arasanayagam. Inquiries that de Zoysa and I made revealed that although funds had been allocated for a tea promotion campaign in the east and the north, the tea had simply been handed over to some State institutions for distribution. Eventually, the Minister ordered the CTPB to immediately stop the “futile” campaign to promote tea locally (Ceylon Observer, 4 April 1969).
At the end of my first term, I found out that Martenstyn had privately requested Conrad Dias, then Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, to nominate a less-confrontational individual. Much to Martenstyn’s displeasure, I was nominated by the Chamber for the second successive term.
The CTPB came in for severe criticism by the Minister of Plantations, Colvin R. de Silva, for its “disregard for promotional” work, its inappropriate appointments to the overseas Tea Centres, such as that of an Egyptian with no previous experience on tea to its Cairo office, and the employment of Kenyan girls at the London Tea Centre, despite the easy availability of Ceylonese girls in London (Ceylon Daily News, 2 July 1971).
Features
Challenges to addressing allegations during Sri Lanka’s armed conflict

A political commentator has attributed the UK sanctions against four individuals, three of whom were top ranking Army and Navy Officers associated with Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, to the failure of successive governments to address human rights allegations, which he describes as a self-inflicted crisis. The reason for such international action is the consistent failure of governments to conduct independent and credible inquiries into allegations of war crimes; no ‘effective investigative mechanism’ has been established to examine the conduct of either the Sri Lankan military or the LTTE.
He has not elaborated on what constitutes an “effective investigative mechanism. He has an obligation and responsibility to present the framework of such a mechanism. The hard reality however is that no country, not even South Africa, has crafted an effective investigative mechanism to address post conflict issues.
INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISMS
The hallmark of a credible investigative mechanism should be unravelling the TRUTH. No country has ventured to propose how such a Mechanism should be structured and what its mandate should be. Furthermore, despite the fact that no country has succeeded in setting up a credible truth-seeking mechanism, the incumbent government continues to be committed to explore “the contours of a strong truth and reconciliation framework” undaunted by the failed experiences of others, the most prominent being South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is often cited as the gold standard for post conflict Mechanisms. Consequently, most titles incorporate the word “Truth” notwithstanding the fact that establishing the “Truth” was a failure not only in South Africa but also in most countries that attempted such exercises.
Citing the South African experience, Prof. G. L. Peiris states: “pride of place was given to sincere truth-telling which would overcome hatred and the primordial instinct for revenge. The vehicle for this was amnesty…… Despite the personal intervention of Mandela, former State President P. W. Botha was adamant in his refusal to appear before the Commission, which he deemed as ‘a fierce unforgiving assault’ on Afrikaaners” (The Island, 01 April, 2025). In the case of Sri Lanka too, disclosures to find the “Truth” would be all about the other party to the conflict, thus making Truth seeking an accusatory process, instead of a commitment to finding the Truth. The reluctance to engage in frank disclosure is compounded by the fear of recrimination by those affected by the Truth.
Continuing Prof. Peiris cites experiences in other countries. “Argentina, the power to grant amnesty was withheld from the Commission. In Columbia, disclosure resulted not in total exoneration, but in mitigating sentences. In Chile, prosecutions were feasible only after a prolonged interval since the dismantling of Augusta Pinochet’s dictatorship ….” (Ibid).
The mechanisms adopted by the countries cited above reflect their own social and cultural values. Therefore, Sri Lanka too has to craft mechanisms in keeping with its own civilisational values of restorative and not retributive justice for true reconciliation, as declared by President J. R, Jayewardene in San Francisco as to what the global attitude should be towards Japan at the conclusion of World War II. Since the several Presidential Commissions appointed under governments already embody records of alleged violations committed, the information in these commission reports should be the foundation of the archival records on which the edifice of reconciliation should be built.
ESTABLISHING DUE CONTEXT
The suggestion that an independent and credible inquiry be conducted into allegations of war crimes reflects a skewed understanding of the actual context in which the armed conflict in Sri Lanka occurred. Even the UNHRC has acknowledged that the provisions of “Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions relating to conflicts not of an international character is applicable to the situation in Sri Lanka, as stated in para. 182 of the OISL Report by the UNHRC Office. Therefore, the correct context is International Humanitarian Law with appropriate derogations of Human Rights law during an officially declared Emergency as per the ICCPR.; a fact acknowledged in the OISL report.
Consequently, the armed conflict has to conform to provisions of Additional Protocol II of 1977, because “This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions is the due context. There is no provision for “alleged war crimes” in the Additional Protocol. Although Sri Lanka has not formally ratified Additional Protocol II, the Protocol is today accepted by the Community of Nations as Customary Law. On the other hand, “war crimes” are listed in the Rome Statute; a Statute that Sri Lanka has NOT ratified and not recognized as part of Customary Law.
Therefore, any “investigative mechanism” has to be conducted within the context cited above, which is Additional Protocol II of 1977.
SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
On the other hand, why would there be a need for Sri Lanka to engage in an independent and credible inquiry into allegations, considering the following comment in Paragraph 9.4 and other Paragraphs of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)?
“In evaluating the Sri Lankan experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL (International Humanitarian Law), the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority”
9.7 “Having reached the above conclusion, it is also incumbent on the Commission to consider the question, while there is no deliberate targeting of civilians by the Security Forces, whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the NFZs was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality…” (Ibid)
The single most significant factor that contributed to violations was the taking of Civilians in the N Fire Zone hostage (NFZ) by the LTTE. This deliberate act where distinction between civilian and combatant was deliberately abandoned, exposed and compromised the security of the Civilians. The consequences of this single act prevent addressing whether military responses were proportionate or excessive, or whether the impact of firing at make-shift hospitals were deliberate or not, and whether limiting humanitarian aid was intentional or not. These issues are recorded and addressed in the Presidential Commission Reports such as LLRC and Paranagama. This material should be treated as archival material on which to build an effective framework to foster reconciliation.
UK SANCTIONS
Sanctions imposed by the UK government as part of an election pledge for Human Rights violations during the armed conflict is a direct act of intervention according to Article 3 of the Additional Protocol of 1977 that is the acknowledged context in which actions should be judged.
Article 3 Non-intervention states:
1 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government by all legislative means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State”.
2 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory on which the conflict occurs”.
Targeting specific individuals associated with the armed conflict in Sri Lanka is a direct assault of intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. The UK government should be ashamed for resorting to violating International Law for the sake of fulfilling an election pledge. If Sri Lanka had issued strictures on the UK government for not taking action against any military officers responsible for the Bloody Sunday massacre where 26 unarmed civilians participating in a protest march were shot in broad daylight, Sri Lanka would, in fact be intervening in UK’s internal affairs.
CONCLUSION
The UK’s action reflects the common practice of making election pledges to garner targeted votes of ethnic diasporas. The influence of ethnic diasporas affecting the conduct of mainstream politics is becoming increasingly visible, the most recent being the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act of Ontario that was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada on grounds the Provincial Legislations have no jurisdiction over Federal and International Laws.
However, what should not be overlooked is that the armed conflict occurred under provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This Article is developed and supplemented by Additional Protocol II of 1977. Therefore, since all Geneva Conventions are recognised as Customary Law, so should the Additional Protocol II be, because it is a development of common Article 3.
Imposing sanctions under provisions of Additional Protocol II amounts to Intervention in internal affairs of a State as stated in Article 3 of the Protocol; II cited above. Such interventions are prohibited under provisions of international law.
The need to revive independent and credible inquiries after the lapse of 16 years is unrealistic because those who were perpetrators and victims alike cannot be identified and/or located. Furthermore, the cost of disclosure because of the possibility of retribution would compromise their security. A realistic approach is to use the material recorded in the Presidential Commission Reports and treat them as archival records and use the lessons learnt from them to forge a workable framework that would foster unity and reconciliation with the survivors in all communities This is not to live in the past but to live in the here and now – the present, which incidentally, is the bedrock of Sri Lanka’s civilisational values.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
The Silent Invasion: Unchecked spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s agricultural landscape is witnessing a silent yet profound transformation with the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations. Once introduced as a commercial crop, the oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is now at the center of a heated debate, with environmentalists and scientists warning of its devastating ecological consequences.
Speaking to The Island research scientist Rajika Gamage, said: “The spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka is not just a concern for biodiversity, but also for water resources, soil stability, and even local economies that rely on traditional crops.”
A Brief History of Oil Palm Cultivation
Oil palm, originally from West and Central Africa, was first cultivated for commercial purposes in Java in 1948 by Dutch colonists. It reached Malaysia and Indonesia by 1910, where its lucrative potential drove large-scale plantations.
According to Gamage, in Sri Lanka, the first significant oil palm plantation was established in 1968 at Nakiyadeniya Estate by European planters, initially covering a mere 0.5 hectares. Today, oil palm cultivation is predominantly concentrated in Galle, Matara, and Kalutara districts, with smaller plantations in Colombo, Rathnapura, and Kegalle.
Over the decades, he says the commercial viability of oil palm has prompted its expansion, often at the cost of native forests and traditional agricultural lands. Government incentives and private investments have further accelerated the spread of plantations, despite growing concerns over their environmental and social impacts.
Economic Boon or Environmental Curse?
Supporters of oil palm industry argue that it is the most efficient crop for vegetable oil production, yielding more oil per hectare than any other alternative. Sri Lanka currently imports a significant amount of palm oil, and expanding local production is seen as a way to reduce dependence on imports and boost local industries. However, Gamage highlights the hidden costs: “Oil palm plantations deplete water sources, contribute to soil erosion, and threaten native flora and fauna. These are long-term damages that far outweigh the short-term economic benefits.”
One of the primary environmental concerns is the aggressive water consumption of oil palm, which leads to the depletion of underground aquifers. This is particularly evident in areas such as Kalu River and Kelani River wetlands, where native ecosystems are being severely affected. Additionally, soil degradation caused by extensive monoculture farming results in loss of fertility and increased vulnerability to landslides in hilly regions.
Furthermore, studies show that oil palm plantations disrupt the natural habitats of endemic species. “Unlike rubber and coconut, oil palm does not support Sri Lanka’s rich biodiversity. It alters the soil composition and prevents the regeneration of native plant species,” Gamage explains. The loss of forest cover also exacerbates human-wildlife conflicts, as displaced animals venture into human settlements in search of food and shelter.
A Threat to Indigenous Agriculture and Culture
Beyond environmental concerns, oil palm is also threatening traditional crops like kitul (Caryota urens) and palmyrah (Borassus flabellifer), both of which hold economic and cultural significance. “These native palms have sustained rural livelihoods for centuries,” says Gamage. “Their gradual replacement by oil palm could lead to economic instability for small-scale farmers.”
Kitul tapping, an age-old tradition in Sri Lanka, provides a source of income for thousands of families, particularly in rural areas. The syrup extracted from kitul is used in local cuisine and traditional medicine. Similarly, palmyrah has deep roots in Sri Lankan culture, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where its products contribute to food security and local industries.
The rise of oil palm plantations has led to the clearing of lands that once supported the traditional crops. With large-scale commercial investments driving oil palm expansion, small-scale farmers are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their livelihoods. Gamage warns, “If we allow oil palm to replace our native palms, we risk losing not just biodiversity, but also a vital part of our cultural heritage.”
The Global Perspective: Lessons from Other Nations
Sri Lanka is not the first country to grapple with the consequences of oil palm expansion. Malaysia and Indonesia, the world’s leading producers of palm oil, have faced severe deforestation, biodiversity loss, and socio-economic conflicts due to unchecked plantation growth.
In Indonesia, for example, vast tracts of rainforest have been cleared for palm oil production, leading to habitat destruction for endangered species such as orangutans and Sumatran tigers. Additionally, indigenous communities have been displaced, sparking legal battles over land rights.
Malaysia has attempted to address some of these issues by introducing sustainability certifications, such as the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard. However, implementation challenges remain, and deforestation continues at an alarming rate.
Sri Lanka can learn valuable lessons from these experiences. Implementing strict land-use policies, promoting agroforestry practices, and ensuring transparency in plantation expansion are crucial steps in mitigating environmental damage while supporting economic development.
The Urgent Need for Action
Despite these concerns, Sri Lanka has yet to enforce strict regulations on oil palm expansion. Gamage urges authorities to intervene: “It is imperative that we implement policies to control its spread before it is too late. The unchecked expansion of oil palm will lead to irreversible environmental damage.”
To address this issue, experts suggest a multi-pronged approach:
Stronger Land-Use Policies
– The government must enforce restrictions on oil palm cultivation in ecologically sensitive areas, such as wetlands and forest reserves.
Reforestation and Rehabilitation
– Efforts should be made to restore degraded lands by reintroducing native tree species and promoting sustainable agroforestry.
Supporting Traditional Agriculture
– Incentives should be provided to farmers growing traditional crops like kitul and palmyrah, ensuring that these industries remain viable.
Public Awareness and Education
– Raising awareness among local communities about the environmental and social impacts of oil palm can empower them to make informed decisions about land use.
Sustainable Alternatives
– Encouraging research into alternative vegetable oil sources, such as coconut oil, which has long been a staple in Sri Lankan agriculture, could reduce reliance on palm oil.
As Sri Lanka stands at a crossroads, the decisions made today will determine the country’s ecological and agricultural future. While the economic benefits of oil palm are undeniable, its long-term environmental and social costs cannot be ignored. The challenge now is to strike a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability before the damage becomes irreversible.
In conclusion Gamage said, “We must act now. If we allow oil palm to spread unchecked, future generations will bear the cost of our inaction.”
Sri Lanka has the opportunity to take a different path—one that prioritises biodiversity conservation, sustainable agriculture, and the well-being of local communities. The time for decisive action is now.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
A plea for establishing a transboundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay

Blue-green land and waterscapes act as ecological corridors across land and water in creating an ecological continuity in order to protect and restore the habitats of native and naturalised species.
In addition, these ecological corridors also help to conserve and improve the habitats of migratory species, as well. One of the main objectives of establishing blue-green land-waterscapes is to reconcile increasing local/regional development and human livelihood challenges in a sustainable manner while, at the same time, safeguard biodiversity and their habitats/ecosystems, as far as possible.
While green landscapes are natural and semi-natural terrestrial vegetation types like natural forests and grasslands, blue waterscapes are aquatic or semi-aquatic vegetation types such as seagrass meadows, mangroves and coastal and other wetlands. These vegetated coastal ecosystems known as ‘blue carbon’ ecosystems are some of the most productive on Earth and located at the interfaces among terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments. They provide us with essential ecosystem services, such as serving as a buffer in coastal protection from storms and erosion, spawning grounds for fish, filtering pollutants and contaminants from coastal waters thus improving coastal water quality and contributing to all important food security.
In addition, they capture and store “blue” carbon from the atmosphere and oceans at significantly higher rates per unit area than tropical forests (Figure 1) and hence act as effective carbon sinks. By storing carbon, these ecosystems help to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, thus contributing significantly to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Figure 1: Carbon storage in different vegetation types (Source – What Is Blue Carbon and Why Does It Matter? – Sustainable Travel International)
.Blue-green Carbon Markets
The recognition of blue carbon (BC) ecosystems (primarily mangroves, seagrasses and tidal marshes) as an effective natural climate solution paved the way for their inclusion within carbon markets. Blue carbon is the marine analog of green carbon, which refers to carbon captured by terrestrial (i.e., land-based) plants. The blue-green carbon market involves buying and selling carbon credits from projects that protect and restore coastal and marine ecosystems (blue carbon) and terrestrial ecosystems (green carbon). Since Blue Carbon ecosystems have higher carbon sequestration (capture and store) potential compared to their terrestrial counterparts, blue Carbon credits are worth over two times more than green carbon credits. They offer opportunities for commercial enterprises to offset carbon emissions and in turn support climate action.
Blue Carbon projects are expected to grow twofold in the near future. With the recent surge in international partnerships and funding, there is immense growth potential for the blue carbon market. However, it is critically important to look beyond the value of the carbon sequestered to ensure the rights and needs of local communities that are central to any attempt to mitigate climate change using a blue and green carbon project.
Blue Carbon projects can serve as grassroot hubs for sustainable development by developing nature-based solutions in these ecosystems thus contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Globally, numerous policies, coastal management strategies, and tools designed for conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems have been developed and implemented. Policies and finance mechanisms being developed for climate change mitigation may offer an additional route for effective coastal management. The International Blue Carbon Initiative, for example, is a coordinated, global program focused on conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems for the climate, biodiversity and human wellbeing.
Until recently, most of these opportunities focus on carbon found in the above ground vegetative biomass and do not account for the carbon in the soil. On the other hand, blue carbon, in particular has the potential for immense growth in carbon capture economics in the near future and can provide significant socioeconomic and environmental benefits. Consequently, blue -green carbon habitats in the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay region represent invaluable assets in climate change mitigation and coastal ecosystem conservation and sustainable development.
Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Trans-boundary Region
The Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region form a transboundary area within the waters of southeastern India and northwestern Sri Lanka. This region supports dense seagrass meadows having a high level of marine biodiversity including marine mammals such as dugong. Sea turtles are frequent visitors to the gulf while sharks, dolphins, sperm and baleen whales too, have been reported from this area. The Mannar region is recognized as an Important Marine Mammal Area (IMMA) of the world by IUCN (Figure 2) and also an Important Bird Area by Birdlife International. This region as a whole is a store house of unique biological wealth of global significance and as such is considered as one of the world’s richest regions from a marine biodiversity perspective.

Figure 2. Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay IMMA (Source – IUCN Joint SSC/WCPA Marine Mammal Protected Areas Task Force, 2022 IUCN-MMPATF (2022)
Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve – India
India has already declared a part of this region as the UNESCO Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve covering an area of 10,500 km2 of ocean with 21 islands and the adjoining coastline. The islets and coastal buffer zone include beaches, estuaries, and tropical dry broadleaf forests, while the surrounding seascape of the Marine National Park (established in 1986) and a 10 km strip of the coastal landscape that include seaweed communities, seagrass communities, coral reefs, salt marshes and mangrove forests form the coastal and marine component of the biosphere reserve on the Indian side of the Gulf of Mannar.
Sri Lankan ‘Proposed’ Biosphere Reserve
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay there is a semi-enclosed shallow water body between the southeast coast of India and Sri Lanka, with a water depth maximum of 13 m. To the south, a chain of low islands and reefs known as Adam’s Bridge or Rama Setu (Rama’s Bridge), separates Palk Bay from the Gulf of Mannar. The Palk Bay leads to Palk Strait (Figure 3). Palk Bay is one of the major sinks for sediments along with the Gulf of Mannar. Sediments discharged by rivers and transported by the surf currents as littoral drift settle in this sink.
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay, studies are being conducted by the Dugong and Seagrass Conservation Project to establish an additional 10,000 hectares of Marine Protected Area to support the conservation of dugongs and their seagrass habitat in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay. This project will involve the preparation of a multiple-community-based management plan in conjunction with government, fishing communities and the tourism industry.
With this valuable information emerging from projects of this nature, Sri Lanka has real opportunities to create a large marine protected area in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region and eventually merging them together with the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve of India to form a trans-boundary biosphere Reserve.
Terrestrial cum Marine Spatial Plan for the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Region
Therefore, an excellent opportunity awaits both the Governments of Sri Lanka and India to collaborate in preparing of a terrestrial and marine spatial plan for this region, a prerequisite before going further on designing and implementing large scale development plans in establishing wind energy farms, mineral sand extraction, fishing industry, oil exploration and tourism development.
Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) is an integrated, place-based approach for allocating coastal and marine resources and space, while protecting the ecosystems that provide these vital resources.
On the Indian side, the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere reserve is well established and functional. On the Sri Lankan side, already there are three DWLC managed protected areas i) Adam’s Bridge Marine National Park (# 29 in the map – 18,990 ha declared in 2015), ii) Vedithalathiv Nature Reserve (# 35 -29,180 ha declared in 2016) and iii) Vankalai Sanctuary ( # 97 -4839 ha declared in 2008) (Figure 4) which can serve as the core zone of the Sri Lankan counterpart of a trans-boundary biosphere reserve. Due to the integrated nature of shallow wetland and terrestrial coastal habitats, Vankalai Sanctuary, in particular is highly productive, supporting high ecosystem and species diversity.

Figure 4: Protected Areas in Norther Sri Lanka Managed by the Department of Wildlife Conservation Source: DWLC
This site provides excellent feeding and living habitats for a large number of water bird species, including annual migrants, which also use this area on arrival and during their exit from Sri Lanka.
Having several coastal and marine protected areas already within the Sri Lankan territory provide an excellent opportunity to establish the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay blue-green Biosphere Reserve (Sri Lanka) initially and eventually to join up seamlessly with the already established Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve on the Indian side to create a trans-boundary blue-green biosphere reserve.
This makes perfect sense because unlike sedentary plant species, mobile animal and plant groups (phytoplankton, in particular) do not respect human demarcated territorial boundaries. The provision of a common and unhindered protected coastal and marine passage for their customary movement for food and raising young is therefore of crucial importance in conservation management. Scientific evidence-based selection of additional areas, if necessary and their respective boundaries are best be determined in consultation with expert groups on marine mammals and reptiles, birds, fish, coastal vegetation conservation, sociology and industrial development from both sides of the divide.
Proper spatial planning needs to be done before large-scale development plans are designed and implemented in order to avoid conflicts of interest leading to inordinate delays and teething problems in project initiation. As a priority, the protected blue-green core and buffer regions need to be demarcated for their conservation. This could best be done in this narrow passage of land and water between Sri Lanka and India
( Palk Strait & Gulf of Mannar) by preparing a marine and terrestrial spatial plan along the UNESCO Man and Biosphere conceptual guidelines differentiating core, buffer and transition zones. While the protected areas in the core and buffer zone provide all important ecosystem services that would also serve as breeding ground for fish, crustaceans, marine reptiles, birds and mammals thereby provisioning sustainable industries to be developed in the surrounding transition areas demarcated in the joint spatial plan.
In addition, the Satoyama Global Initiative established by the Japanese at UNESCO as a global effort in 2009 to realise ‘societies in harmony with nature’ in which – Satoumi – specifically referring to the management of socio-ecological production landscapes in marine and coastal regions, is also a good model to be considered for conservation of biodiversity and co-existence between humans and nature.
Final Plea
In order to take this proposal forward from the Sri Lankan side, a number of useful baseline reports are already available including, but not limited to, the following: i. Biodiversity Profile of the Mannar District (CEJ & USAID 2022), ii. The Gulf of Mannar and its surroundings (IUCN 2012), iii) Atlas of Mangroves, Salt Marshes and Sand Dunes of the Coastal Area from Malwathu Oya to Pooneryn in the Northwestern Coastal Region, Sri Lanka (Ecological Association of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, 2020). iv. Integrated Strategic Environment Assessment of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (CEA 2014).
If this proposal to establish a Trans-boundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay is acceptable in principle to the Governments of Sri Lanka and India, it would be ideal if the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program UNESCO which is an intergovernmental scientific program whose mission is to establish a scientific basis for enhancing the relationship between people and their environments to partner with the relevant Government and non-governmental agencies in both countries in making it a reality. This proposed concept has all the necessary elements for developing a unique sustainable conservation cum industrial development strategy via nature-based solutions while at the same time contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation.
by Emeritus Professor Nimal Gunatilleke,
University of Peradeniya
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