Opinion

The Presidential Youth Commission and current social challenges

Published

2 years ago

2025/03/21

By Professor G. L. Peiris
D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D.
(Sri Lanka);
Rhodes Scholar, Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London;
Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.

I. The Youth Commission in Retrospect

My tenure of office as Vice Chancellor of the University of Colombo coincided with the most turbulent period in the history of the university system in our country. There was a near total collapse of all systems, and the cost in terms of the loss of life, destruction of public and private property and disruption of all sectors of national life, was exorbitant.

As this time of upheaval drew to a close, the Government, in October 1989, appointed a Presidential Commission to examine, inter alia, “the causes of disquiet, unrest and discontent manifesting itself in the rejection of existing institutions and in acts of violence”.

As one of 7 Commissioners I played an active role in the work of the Commission and in the preparation of its Report. Revisiting its content recently, I was struck by the immediate relevance of its major themes and recommendations, and the thinking underpinning them, to dominant challenges in our society today.

II. Politicisation a Central Malady

“The oral and written representations to the Commission indicated virtual unanimity that politicisation and perceptions about the abuse of political power are some of the main causes of youth unrest in contemporary Sri Lanka”. This was the first sentence in the Report of the Commission which identified, as the main issue, “the abuse of political power in the undermining of democratic institutions”.

Pre-eminent among the recommendations of the Commission was the setting up of a Nominations Commission “which will recommend to the President the names of persons who will constitute the membership of (a) important Commissions responsible for recruitment, promotion,transfer and dismissal in certain vital areas; and (b) Commissions responsible for policy making in selected areas”. The composition of the Nominations Commission was to reflect the balance of political parties in Parliament.

Disenchanted youth, giving evidence before the Commission throughout the length and breadth of the Island, insisted that, although they were not averse to acceptance of adversity – inevitable at times in a nation’s history – what they would vehemently reject and rebel against was deprivation accompanied by palpable injustice.

III. An Institutional Response: The Constitutional Council

This concept of a Nominations Commission was the origin and inspiration of the Constitutional Council introduced into our Constitution by the Seventeenth Amendment in 2001.

Militating against the “winner takes all” mindset and seeking to establish merit and fairplay as the cornerstones of a rules-based system of public administration, the Constitutional Council mechanism dominated political events for a quarter of a century.

Dramatic swings of the pendulum from progress to backlash characterised developments during the whole of this period. The Seventeenth Amendment envisaged a Constitutional Council consisting of 3 Members of Parliament (Speaker, Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition) and 7 representatives of civil society nominated by political parties in Parliament. The Eighteenth Amendment, in 2010, replaced the Constitutional Council with a Parliamentary Council which departed in crucial respects from the role of its predecessor, in that the Parliamentary Council consisting of 5 members – 3 from the Legislature and 2 from outside – could only make recommendations to the appointing authority, the President, but their concurrence was not required as a condition for validity of appointments. It was, therefore, a relatively weak instrument.

The Nineteenth Amendment of 2015, which brought back into being a Constitutional Council of 10 members – 7 Parliamentarians and 3 from outside – represented movement in the opposite direction by investing the Council with real authority. A further twist in the skein was signified by the retrogressive Twentieth Amendment, in 2020, which restored the largely impotent Parliamentary Council functioning as a mere advisory body.

The wheel came full circle with the Twenty First Amendment in 2022 which embodies the current law. This precludes the President from appointing personnel of vital Commissions – dealing with elections, the public service, the national police, audit, human rights, bribery and corruption, finance, delimitation, and national procurement – without an explicit recommendation by the Council.

Moreover, a whole range of important officials – the Attorney-General, the Governor of the Central Bank, the Auditor General, the Inspector General of Police, the Ombudsman and the Secretary General of Parliament – could not be validly appointed unless the appointment had been approved by the Council on a recommendation made by the President.

IV. Vigilance the Key

These are landmark achievements, in restricting the scope for partisan political influence in the higher echelons of governance; they serve to reinforce public confidence in the integrity of institutions.

There is no room for complacency, however. The nation was witness to the unedifying spectacle of an incumbent President upbraiding the Constitutional Council, on the floor of Parliament, for purported interference with the performance of executive functions. The current controversy between the National Police Commission and the Acting Inspector General of Police has the potential to thwart the former in the exercise of its constitutional responsibilities. Institutional norms of independence and objectivity can hardly be swept away by exigencies of operational control.

V. Legislative Sovereignty and Judicial Oversight

My distinguished predecessor in the Office of Minister of Constitutional Affairs, the late Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, was a protean figure in constitution making. Unyielding in his insistence on sovereignty of the Legislature, he fiercely resisted, on grounds of principle, judicial surveillance of any kind over the legislative functions of Parliament.

The rationale for this view was set out by him pithily in an address to the United Nations Association of Ceylon in 1968: “Do we want a legislature that is sovereign, or do we not? That is the true question. If you say that the validity of a law has to be determined by anybody outside the law making body, then you are to that extent saying that your law making body is not completely the law making body”.

So unflinching was the architect of the Constitution of 1972 in his adherence to this conviction that, even when a Constitutional Court with limited functions had to be provided for, he insisted that the Secretary- General of Parliament must serve as the Registrar of the Court, and that its sittings had to be held not in Hulftsdorp but within the precincts of Parliament.

It is a matter for satisfaction that this view has not taken root in the constitutional traditions of our country. Instead,we have opted for adoption of justiciable fundamental rights as a restraint on the competence of Parliament, in the interest of protection of the citizenry. This is a measure of acknowledgement of the dangers of untrammelled power and the lure of temptation. Contemporary experience demonstrates the wisdom of this choice.

The idea itself is not unfamiliar to our legal culture. Although the Constitution Order-in-Council of 1948 made no explicit provision for judicial review, our courts showed no disinclination to embark on substantive judicial review of important legislation including the Citizenship Act of 1948, the Sinhala Only Act of 1956, and the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act of 1962. The latter statute was struck down in its entirety by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the ground of repugnance to the basic scheme of the Constitution.

Judicial oversight of legislation, then, is a defining principle of our legal system. However, the manner of its application is exposed to legitimate criticism in two ways.

(a) The Content of Fundamental Rights

It is disappointing that only civil and political rights have been deemed worthy of entrenchment in our Constitution, to the rigid exclusion of economic,social and cultural rights.This approach, which continues to receive expression in Chapter III of the present Constitution, runs counter to current international recognition that the latter category of rights is of overriding importance,especially in the context of the developing world.

(b) Exclusion of Post-enactment Review

Judicial scrutiny of legislation is confined in our system to pre-enactment review. There is provision for gazetting of bills and for challenge by the public on the basis of conflict with constitutional provisions. The proposed legislation cannot be debated or passed in Parliament until the Determination of the Supreme Court is received by the Speaker. The Court is required to decide, within a stipulated period, whether the legislation, or any portion of it, contravenes the Constitution and, if so, whether a special majority (two-thirds of the total membership of the House) is sufficient to secure its enactment or whether endorsement by the People at a Referendum is needed, as well. Amendments required by the Court must be compulsorily included at the Committee Stage, as a condition of validity (Articles 78 and 121).

A serious lacuna has been laid bare by recent events. In an egregious affront to the mandatory constitutional scheme, the Government, during passage of the Online Safety Bill, secured enactment of the legislation at the Third Reading, without moving all of the Amendments insisted upon by the Court. This resulted in a Vote of No Confidence being moved by the Opposition against the Speaker for intentional violation of the Constitution.

There have been other instances of flagrant abuse of the legislative process. A Bill which, as presented to Parliament and adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court, dealt with representation of women in Provincial Councils, was fundamentally altered in content AFTER judicial scrutiny through extensive Amendments at the Committee stage, making it virtually impossible to hold Provincial Council elections at all.

Deliberate manipulation of this kind, enabling subversion of constitutional procedures, goes without remedy because of the unqualified exclusion of post-enactment review. This derives from the conclusive bar imposed by Article 80 (3) of the Constitution: “When a Bill becomes law upon the certificate of the Speaker, no court or tribunal shall inquire into, pronounce upon or in any manner call in question the validity of such Act on any ground whatsoever”.

In the overall reform envisaged in the near future, this anomaly calls for urgent attention as a key issue.

VI The Public Service: Neutrality or Control?

Provision for an enabling environment for public officials to fulfil their responsibilities in a spirit of independence, without fear or favour, is generally considered an essential feature of a robust democracy.

However, this has not been looked upon as elf-evident at every stage of our constitutional history. On the contrary, political control of the public service has been sanctified as a cardinal virtue, and its cultivation assiduously promoted.

Root and branch opposition to the idea of a public service beyond the reach of political authority is exemplified by the Constitution of 1972, the sheet anchor of which was the principle that “The National State Assembly is the supreme instrument of State power of the Republic” (Article 5). Political control of the public service was held to be a necessary corollary.

This found expression in the emphatic statement that “The Cabinet of Ministers shall have the power of appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of all State officers” (Article 106 (2)). For the exercise of this power, it was declared that the Cabinet “shall be answerable to the National State Assembly” (Article 106 (1)).

The State Services Advisory Board consisting of 3 persons appointed by the President, as its designation made clear, was no more than an advisory body. This, indeed, was true even of the Judicial Services Advisory Board set up under the Constitution of 1972: “The appointment of judges shall be made by the Cabinet of Ministers after receiving the recommendation of the Judicial Services Advisory Board” (Article 126). This Board was required to send a list, but the Cabinet had full power to appoint persons not on the list, with the reasons applicable tabled in the National State Assembly.

The Legislature, then, with the Cabinet as its delegate, became under the Constitution of 1972 the clearly identified source of authority over all State officers including judicial officers. The seed had been sown; and an abundant harvest was reaped in succeeding years.

Happily, our constitutional values took a different trajectory, leaving this tradition behind. The aborted Constitution Bill, which I presented to Parliament as Minister of Constitutional Affairs on behalf of President Chandrika Kumaratunga in August 2000, sought to reverse this trend frontally.

Making a radical departure from the policy stance of political control over the public service, the present Constitution provides unequivocally that this authority “shall be vested in the Public Service Commission” (article 55 (3)). An exception is made in the case of Heads of Department, in relation to whom the corresponding power is vested in the Cabinet of Ministers (Article 55 (2)). The power of appointment of Heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force is placed in the hands of the President (Article 61E). These are reasonable exceptions.

VII Precept vs. Example

Laws, skilfully crafted, do not furnish cast-iron guarantees. They simply provide a conducive environment for persons of goodwill and competence to fulfil their public duties, unencumbered by pressure: the rest is up to individual conscience. Constitutional provisions confer security of tenure on judges, prevent reduction of salary and other benefits during their tenure of office and protect them against attacks harmful to the dignity of their office.

The Lawyers’ Collective, comprising public-spirited members of the legal profession, pointed out last week the danger of judges, upon retirement, accepting lucrative appointments within the gift of the government in power. Public perception is the overriding factor in this field. To be remiss is to invite debilitating weakness and to risk erosion of confidence in the foundations of a functioning democracy.

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Opinion

Sri Lanka’s geopolitical positioning for future prosperity

Published

2 days ago

2026/09/25

Thilina Walpola

Kariyawasam

By Chula Goonasekera
For the LEADS Forum (admin@srilankaleads.com)

Sri Lanka’s future prosperity will depend on how effectively it positions itself within an increasingly complex global environment. At a recent LEADS Forum discussion (https://youtu.be/Bbr3e_qU1Fw), veteran diplomat Prasad Kariyawasam, former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, High Commissioner to India, Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador /Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and Geneva —outlined the strategic choices Sri Lanka must make to secure long term stability and economic advancement. Kariyawasam offered a rare blend of historical perspective, diplomatic experience and practical guidance.

His central message was clear: Sri Lanka must exercise strategic agency—engaging all major partners while safeguarding its national interests.

Foreign Policy as an Extension of National Aspirations

Foreign policy, Kariyawasam emphasised, is inseparable from domestic priorities. As your text notes, “foreign relations often reflect the medium- and long-term aspirations of a country’s people and its leadership.” Governments must therefore craft external relations that reflect the public’s economic and social expectations, avoiding short-term political impulses that undermine long-term national interests.

For a small nation, foreign policy cannot be symbolic or personality driven. It must be purposeful, pragmatic and directed towards the security and prosperity of the people.

A History of Global Connectivity

Sri Lanka’s history demonstrates that the island has never been isolated. From ancient ties with India and Southeast Asia to Arab, Persian and Chinese maritime networks, the island prospered when connected to the wider world. We must realise that “geography creates opportunity, but geography alone does not create prosperity.” Institutions, infrastructure and policy determine whether geographic advantage becomes economic success.

Colombo’s emergence as a cosmopolitan trading hub and Galle’s role as a resupply station for Indian Ocean shipping in colonial times , illustrate how deeply Sri Lanka has been embedded in global commerce for centuries.

Lessons from Asia’s High Performers

Kariyawasam highlighted the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. Their paths differ, but their success rests on common foundations:

• investment in human capital and infrastructure

• merit based institutions

• integration into global markets

• attraction of investment and technology

• export oriented industries

• strategic engagements with both China and Western economies

The lesson for Sri Lanka is not imitation but continuous adaptation and constructive integration with the global economy.

India: Sri Lanka’s Closest Major Partner

India’s transformation into a global economic power presents Sri Lanka with both opportunity and responsibility. India is already Sri Lanka’s largest source of tourists and a major investor. Kariyawasam states, “The larger question is how effectively Sri Lanka can participate in and benefit from India’s growth.”

A partnership should encompass modern, more open pathways for trade, investment, logistics, energy, technology, digital services, education and professional mobility—And asymmetry between the two economies must be handled with maturity and foresight, seeking special and differential treatment .

China and Other Global Partners

China remains a significant economic partner. Sri Lanka must avoid viewing this relationship through a zero sum lens. The goal should be productive and transparent engagement, ensuring better terms of trade and meaningful technology transfer.

Equally Important relations must be nurtured with the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf.

All these relationships can be vibrant partnerships that does not lead towards , dependency but mutually beneficial pragmatic arrangements .

A Fragmenting International System

Global geopolitics is becoming more volatile. Trade tensions, wars, sanctions, supply chain disruptions, climate change and technological competition increasingly shape national security. We must realise, “foreign policy cannot be separated from economic policy.”

Sri Lanka’s recent economic crisis demonstrated the importance of international confidence, access to finance and resilient supply chains. Energy security, food security, cybersecurity and digital infrastructure are now core elements of national strategy.

Strategic Agency: The Guiding Principle

Sri Lanka must avoid becoming an arena for great power competition. Strategic agency means making decisions based on national interest, expanding Sri Lanka’s choices, not restricting them.

India is essential. China is important. The United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf are important. The objective is a web of partnerships that strengthens resilience and autonomy.

Sri Lanka’s Strategic Assets

1. Location: Sri Lanka’s geography is a long standing advantage. Ports such as Colombo, Hambantota, Trincomalee and Galle can become specialised hubs—if connected to logistics, manufacturing, services and exports.

2. Digital Connectivity: Submarine cables, data centres, cloud services and cybersecurity are now as important as physical geography. Sri Lanka can turn its location into both a maritime and digital advantage.

3. Tourism and Natural Heritage: The focus should shift from tourist numbers to value creation—wellness, heritage, ecotourism, cruise tourism, education and MICE tourism.

4. Human Resources and Demographics: High literacy is no longer enough. Skills in technology, engineering, AI, logistics and advanced manufacturing are essential, especially with an ageing population.

5. Migrant Workforce: Migrant workers are a strategic asset, not merely a source of remittances. Bilateral labour agreements, skills recognition and diaspora engagement should be central to foreign policy.

Requirements for Sustained Prosperity

Sri Lanka’s future depends on:

• peace and security

• access to international markets

• productive investment

• a skilled, productive workforce

• modernised agriculture

• higher value tourism

• demographic preparedness

• climate resilience

• strong, predictable institutions

Please note that “foreign policy can open doors. Domestic institutions determine whether we can walk through them.”

The Role of the State

Sri Lanka does not need a larger state—only a more capable one. Policy continuity, professional institutions, predictable regulation and reduced corruption are essential. Geography does not change; long-term national interests do not change. Intentional relationships built over decades should not be reinvented with each election cycle.

Building Trust Internationally

Trust is a strategic asset. Sri Lanka must be known as a country that honours commitments and maintains predictable policies. This is vital not only for diplomacy but also for investment and long term partnerships.

Avoiding Zero Sum Geopolitics

Sri Lanka does not need to choose between India and China, or between Asia and the West. The task is to identify what each relationship can contribute to national development while protecting sovereignty and freedom of decision making.

Sri Lanka’s geography is an inheritance, but prosperity is not guaranteed. The world is changing rapidly—great-power competition, technological disruption, and climate vulnerability demand a foreign policy that is pragmatic, adaptive, and anchored in national interest.

Sri Lanka must build partnerships without dependencies, maintain strategic agency without isolation, and integrate with the global economy while strengthening domestic capacity.

“We cannot change where Sri Lanka is. We can, however, determine what Sri Lanka becomes because of where it is”

Opinion

A tariff deal with the US? Make haste slowly

Published

3 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Gomi Senadhira

Sri Lanka’s former ambassador to the United States Mahinda Samarasinghe is back in Sri Lanka lobbying for speedier finalisation of a new tariff deal with the United States. According to news reports, delivering the keynote address at the Sri Lanka Institute of Directors’ Annual Meeting last week, he stated, “I have recommended very strongly to the government that we need to conclude the agreement so that we can lock in the very favourable tariff rate that Sri Lanka has got up to now“.

I do not understand why the former ambassador is urging the government to expedite the finalisation of a new tariff deal or what is “the very favourable tariff rate” he refers to in his speech. However, given the ongoing terrible tariff turbulence in the United States and the fragile economic situation in Sri Lanka, I believe, this is not the right time to rush into finalising any trade agreement with the United States. I am also of the opinion that at this juncture Sri Lanka should maintain strategic patience and explore all available options.

Lessons from the countries that rushed for trade deals

To better comprehend this, let’s look at experiences of the countries that rushed to conclude tariff deals with the United States after President Donald Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in April 2025. As Samarasinghe stated in his keynote, “The bottom line on all these negotiations was that every country that finally agreed to sign the agreement had to give either complete duty-free access for American exports into those markets, or near complete duty-free access.” In exchange for these tariff concessions and other market access commitments these countries managed to get the newly introduced country specific “reciprocal tariffs” reduced.

However, in February 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) struck down these “reciprocal tariffs” under the IEEPA. With that, the market access gains these countries received in exchange for complete duty-free access for American exports into their markets evaporated under U.S. domestic law. By moving too fast to conclude bilateral tariff agreements with the United States these countries are now bound to strict obligations whereas the benefits they bargained from the U.S. administration are not worth the paper those were written on.

Sri Lanka’s experience

In April 2025, President Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” and labelled Sri Lanka as the worst offender, imposing one of the highest additional duties at 44%. Since then, Ambassador Samarasinghe and other negotiators have managed to negotiate this down to 20%. I do not know what the deal was through which Sri Lanka managed to reduce the 44% tariff to 20% or what we gave in return for this “concession.” However, what we received in return has absolutely no value after the decision by the SCOTUS.

Current state of US tariffs

After the decision by SCOTUS, the U.S. administration introduced a temporary 10% additional tariff on all countries for 150 days. At the end of that period, this 10% tariff was replaced by a new “forced labor tariff ” of 10% to 12.5% on all trading partners under Section 301 of U.S. trade law. Twenty-five U.S. states and several small businesses have already filed lawsuits against these tariffs in U.S. courts. This new “forced labour tariff ” on Sri Lanka was first fixed at 12.5%. Later, after President Anura Kumara Dissanayake issued a gazette notice prohibiting the importation of goods produced using forced labour, it was reduced to 10%. That means Sri Lanka has already made a substantial commitment to receive this “tariff concession,” and I presume our negotiators understand the implications of this commitment.

Make haste slowly

After President Trump imposed 44% “reciprocal tariffs” on Sri Lanka, through an article published in The Island on 25th April 2026 (), I urged the government to engage immediately with the US administration on these tariffs. However, I also emphasised that the best way to move forward was to make haste slowly.

Two millennia ago, Augustus Caesar, the first emperor of Rome, frequently used the phrase, “make haste slowly”, because he detested rashness and haste in his military commanders. It was the recurring guiding maxim that he emphasised throughout his 40-year imperial rule. After 2000 years, this classical oxymoron remains a definitive golden rule for professional trade negotiators. More importantly it is the exact blueprint required when navigating turbulence in trade negotiations with the Trump administration.

The endgame – The most dangerous moment in trade negotiation

Samarasinghe has also stated the agreement is 90% complete. Any experienced trade negotiator should know that the final 10% contains high-stakes provisions and is the most dangerous moment in a trade negotiation. A single misplaced comma or ambiguous product description in a tariff schedule can cost millions through unintended loopholes. Rushing this last stretch to secure a deal can permanently expose Sri Lanka to sudden shifts in American trade policy, heavy compliance costs, or strict enforcement under Section 301 regarding supply-chain labour standards. Hence, this is the time for strategic patience.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

Opinion

Buddhist law and constitutional amendments

Published

3 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Upon reading the article titled “Prof. Pieris says Buddha Dhamma recognized as source of law under Constitution” (Island, September 12, 2026), the classical Sinhala idiom “Yanne Koheda? Malle Pol” immediately comes to mind. The expression, translating literally to answering “I have coconuts in my bag” when asked “Where are you going?”, underscores a complete disconnect in logic. Because it is uncertain whether the article accurately represents the professor’s precise words, the following critique addresses the contents of the report rather than the speaker himself.

The central premise of the report concerns a statement delivered by the Chief Justice regarding a petition filed against the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution. According to the report, the Chief Justice’s observation that the determination would be made strictly on the basis of established law rather than Buddhist teachings was characterised as a “cavalier dismissal” of the Buddha Dhamma. This assertion carries a host of unexamined assumptions. Had the writer specified precisely which tenets of the Buddha Dhamma were violated, a direct legal or philosophical evaluation could take place. However, no specific Buddhist tenet or law was identified as having been transgressed, and for good reason: no such statutory legal framework exists within the Buddha’s teachings.

To understand the flaw in this argument, one must examine the constitutional context alongside the canonical meaning of the terms involved. Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka mandates that the Republic shall give Buddhism the foremost place and that it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all religions under Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).

While “Buddhism” and “Buddha Dhamma” are frequently used as interchangeable terms in casual dialogue, they represent distinct concepts. “Buddhism” is an umbrella term coined by 19th-century Western scholars to classify the global institutionalised religion, incorporating its diverse sects, cultural traditions, rituals, and socio-political histories. Conversely, Sasana is the ancient term designating the structural framework established by the Buddha to preserve and transmit his teachings, comprising the monastic order (Sangha) and its supporting institutions.

In classical Theravada commentarial literature, the Sasana operates as a functional three-tiered structure. It encompasses Pariyatti Sasana, the preservation and study of sacred texts; Paṭipatti Sasana, the practical execution of the doctrine through ethical conduct and meditation; and Paṭivedha Sasana, the direct experiential realization of ultimate truth, or enlightenment. This structural breakdown raises fundamental questions about state capacity. While a state can readily support Pariyatti Sasana through academic institutions, textual preservation, and educational funding, it cannot legislate or enforce Paṭipatti or Paṭivedha. Practical engagement and spiritual realisation are inherently internal, first-person experiences. Expecting the state to codify or guarantee enlightenment is a conceptual impossibility.

Furthermore, the Buddha Dhamma refers specifically to the unconditioned truths of existence and the teachings imparted to realize them, including the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and Dependent Origination. As the late Venerable Professor Kotagama Wachissara Thera observed, there is no rigid ideologue or “ism” in the core Dhamma. The teachings do not constitute a system of divine commandments or a legal statute enforced through reward and punishment. Rather, Buddhist ethics function as self-directed guidelines for psychological clarity and moral inquiry. Even the Vinaya Pitaka, which contains explicit rules of conduct, functions as an internal monastic code rather than a civil or criminal law intended for the laity.

Throughout the Pali Canon, guidance regarding governance focuses on the moral character of leadership and the social duties of statecraft rather than rigid legal codification. In discourses such as the Cakkavatti Sihanada Sutta (DN 26), the Buddha observes that social instability and crime cannot be eliminated solely through punitive measures, emphasising instead that states must provide economic opportunities, fair wages, and resource distribution to maintain societal balance. Crucially, in the Maha Parinibbana Sutta (DN 16), the Buddha explicitly highlights the importance of respecting established laws and traditions rather than enacting arbitrary regulations.

The natural laws articulated in the Dhamma, such as the law of cause and effect or the three characteristics of existence, govern all phenomena universally, regardless of legal statutes or personal belief. They are not human laws to be applied or suspended by a court of law. Therefore, characterizing the Chief Justice’s adherence to constitutional jurisprudence over religious doctrine as a “cavalier dismissal” lacks logical and textual foundation. Framing the judiciary’s adherence to legal precedent as an attack on the Dhamma distracts from fundamental constitutional principles and risks misguiding the public for political ends.

Geewananda
Gunawardana,
Ph.D.