Features
The New Constitution and political intrigues

Excerpted from volume ii of Sarath Amunugama’s autobiography
One of the important pledges made by the UNP at the 1977 election was the abolition of the 1972 Constitution of the United Front, associated with Colvin R de Silva, and the introduction of it new constitution w ith an Executive Presidency. This far reaching proposal had been made by JRJ many years earlier in an address to the Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science. As with all of JRJ’s proposals from the days of the Ceylon National Congress and the State Council, they were novel, well considered and designed to make a significant change in the ‘status quo’.
It was not taken seriously even by the UNP of the time which was under Dudley’s leadership. However, JRJ as usual was serious and thorough. He discussed its implications primarily with his top legal advisors led by his brother Harry and J.L. Cooray – a constitutional expert. He also consulted two scholars of constitution making – Kingsley de Silva and A.J. Wilson, both of Peradeniya University. With the requisite ffive sixths majority in Parliament he gained in 1977, the stage was set to enact the revolutionary constitutional changes he had advocated years earlier.
It was no secret that JRJ would introduce a radically new constitution for the country. He had advocated the need for a constitution with a powerful Executive Presidency both at public meetings and in Parliament. Within two months of his victory, he set up a select committee of Parliament to “consider the revision of the Constitution and other written laws as the Committee may consider necessary”. By November these changes were presented as the second amendment to the 1972 Constitution to Parliament and passed with more than a two third majority.
Consequently, JRJ took his oaths as Executive President on Independence Day February 4, 1978 on Galle Face Green. In our discussions regarding the oath taking JRJ with his usual panache said that he wanted the oath taking to be before a large gathering of the people. He proposed the Galle Face green. Our Ministry proposed that the morning ceremony be followed by a mass musical show on Galle Face Green in the evening. That was a sure way of filling the grounds and GVP Samarasinghe who chaired the preparatory meeting gave us his enthusiastic support.
To improve on the shining hour I asked the SLBC to get down the top popular singers of Hindi film songs for the musical show. This was not difficult because Hindi film makers depended on SLBC broadcasts on their India beam to popularize their products. We had a virtual monopoly of All India broadcasts. Consequently, we got down Mohammed Rafi, Mahendra Kapoor and Asha Bhosle.. The show was announced by SLBC over the airwaves.
From early morning crowds began to throng the green and JRJ’s dream of swearing in before a multitude of people was realized. He may have thought that they all came to cheer him. GVP was happy to receive accolades on our behalf for his stage arrangements. JRJ gifted the pen he used to sign the pledge to the national archives.
We in the Information Ministry had no role in planning the new constitution, unlike in the case of the 1972 constitution which I have described in Volume One. But we could comprehend the background to JRJ’s move in our informal discussions with Ministers and other Parliamentarians. The first information was that JRJ had been traumatized by the 1956 defeat of the UNP and his own defeat in the Kelaniya electorate. He had continuously represented Kelaniya for several decades from the State Council days.
Yet he had been easily defeated by R.G. Senanayake whose sole objective was to get personal revenge. In 1956 the UNP had actually won more votes than the MEP. But due to the prevailing electoral system the UNP had won only a few seats. JRJ concluded that the solution was to find away to give value to every vote through the ‘Proportional Representation’ system. PR had the added advantage in his view, that it would always provide for a strong opposition in Parliament which would prevent radical and hasty legislation. The second imperative was to strengthen the role of the Party; mainly because the UNP had been up to then the largest and best organized political party in the country. His original idea was to have an election in which the voter would only vote for a party of his choice.
On the allocation of seats depending on the number of votes polled, the relevant Party, through its Secretary, would nominate its quota of members to Parliament. To further strengthen the hold of the Party, any MP crossing over would forfeit his seat. Younger advisors Lalith and Gamini however suggested that the conferring of all powers to the Party officials would discourage their grass roots supporters who tend to gather round individual leaders. It was too heavily stacked in favour of the seniors who were not necessarily more intelligent or popular.
Accordingly the original proposal was amended to include a preferential ballot system which would enable the voter to choose three candidates from the party list. That proposal, which was adopted, came from Athulathmudali. But the biggest change was the introduction of the Executive Presidency. The Executive President would be elected on the basis of a nationwide poll. He would form a cabinet from the MPs and one of whom would be the Prime Minister whose basic responsibility would be to ensure the passage of legislation as proposed by the Cabinet led by the President.
He was essentially a manager of Parliamentary affairs whom Premadasa derisively said was ‘no more than a peon’. Thus, the legislature is brought in as an accessory to the Executive President who any way had the power to dissolve parliament after one year of its term. The President also appointed the senior judges and the Judicial and Public Service Commissions. It was a constitution in which the President is supreme.
The Constitutional scholar A.J. Wilson called it a ‘Gaullist Constitution’ though in reality it was an amalgam of the French and American Executive Presidential systems. The concentration of powers in the hands of the President was its primary objective. It alarmed the Opposition precisely because of that. As Dr. N.M. Perera, himself a constitutional expert, said “What if the President goes mad?” thereby highlighting the danger of an individualistic approach to the use, or abuse, of State power.
Some safeguards were included no doubt but, as we saw later, they were insufficient. At the base of this transformation however was the five sixths majority that JRJ had obtained in the 1977 election. The new constitution with PR was designed to ensure that it did not happen again. It did because President Gotabaya Rajapaksa managed to win nearly a two third majority in Parliamentary election of 2020.
JRJ with his long political experience and commitment to Parliamentary values may have hoped to tailor a constitution which could promote quick economic growth while maintaining basic human rights. But a series of unfortunate decisions led to a sense of bitterness in the Opposition that did not auger well for a consensual approach which was necessary if the new Constitution was not to descend to autocracy.
Parliament
The 1977 Parliament was like no other. The long-standing balance between the Government and the Opposition did not prevail. For the first time the Parliamentary Opposition could not be considered a government in waiting. Also for the first timer the Leader of the Opposition was not a Sinhalese. The Sirimavo regime was routed in 1977 because JRJ had cunningly removed all the props of the SLFP-led United Front. The Left, particularly the LSSP and the CP, were alienated from Mrs. B And after bringing a damning no—confidence motion against her personally, they formed their own Left Alliance. At the hustings they criticized Mrs. B and the SLFP more than the UNP. The Left even promoted a breakaway group of SLFPers, including Mrs. B’s relative, Nanda Ellawela, to join them, which added to the misery of the PM.
Then JRJ deftly neutralized the JVP. Wijeweera and his top leadership who were languishing in prison, struck a deal whereby they would be released after a UNP victory. Reciprocally, the JVP then attacked Mrs. B thinking that by sinking the SLFP they could sweep up the anti-UNP votes and become the main opposition in the country. After isolating Mrs. Bandaranaike, JRJ made overtures through Colombo Tamil businessmen to the TULF These businessmen were smarting under the austerity measures of the SLFP regime and its promotion of favourite Sinhala Mudalalis.
Finally he reached out to disgruntled SLFPers like R.S. Perera, Maithripala Senanayake and Kalugalle who had been attacked by the UK returned Anura Bandaranaike. Anura was angry that JRJ’s offer to get him to Parliament unopposed from a Rajarata seat was sabotaged by Maitripala and his supporters. All these maneuvers worked and the SLFP was decimated. The SLFP defeat was so decisive that they trailed behind the TULF in numbers in the opposition. As a result, Amithalingam, the TULF leader was made the Leader of the Opposition and Mrs. B was made to eat humble pie. There was mounting criticism of her rule from within the party. She had to expend her energy in keeping the warring SLFP groups together. To make matters worse her son and favourite, Anura turned against her.
Inherent Problems
In retrospect all these maneuvers may be seen as a JRJ exercise in overkill. He had, by trying to be too smart, created an environment which came back to haunt him later, particularly during his second term. By marginalizing Mrs. B and the SLFP he pushed them to an extreme Sinhala nationalist position. Their only concern then became to wrong foot JRJ and his policies at any cost. By making Amirthalingam the Leader of the Opposition, JRJ provided him with many facilities to peddle a separatist line which added to the fears of the Sinhalese.
This soured ethnic relations even further. JRJ’s solution was to promote Cyril Mathew as the voice of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism within his Cabinet. Mathew went on the rampage alienating not only the Tamils but also middle of the road Sinhalese who wanted to settle the ethnic issue peacefully. Since Mathew was Esmond’s friend I knew through him that it was JRJ who was behind his outbursts. But the net result of these stratagems was a rapid worsening of ethnic relations in the country.
To make matters worse Mrs. B used her considerable influence with Indira Gandhi to paint the new Government as Anti-Indian and Pro-American. Unfortunately for Sri Lanka this was a time when there was a radical shift in Indian foreign policy wherein Indira Gandhi adopted a theory of ‘Bharat as a regional hegemon’. Indian strategic think tanks were promoting a concept of the ‘Indian sphere of influence’. The open economy and globalization that JRJ and Ronnie turned to was interpreted as a ‘test case’ and a challenge to Indian interests in the region.
This led to a special concern in the fate of the Tamils particularly as Indira Gandhi, pushed into the opposition, wished to play the ‘Tamil Nadu’ card in the increasingly murky political atmosphere of the time. This was particularly ironic because the northern dominated Indian Government had just emerged from a grueling linguistic conflict with its southern states which resisted the imposition of Hindi as the national language over Tamil and other regional languages. This conflict between the North and South of India had been resolved with the acceptance of the notion of ‘linguistic states’ – a development which did not go unnoticed by the Sri Lankan Tamils.
While JRJ’s tactics were Applauded by the UNP, the country was slipping step by step into a quagmire of regional misunderstandings and domestic ethnic conflict which finally destabilized the country for three decades and blunted the trajectory of economic growth which had started with much promise in 1977. The new President could not see it coming. Nor did his advisors and our Foreign Ministry which was still dominated by the ‘Anti-Indianist’ officials. As Gabriel Marques has written “It is easy to start a war but it is not easy to stop one.” Sri Lanka was on the slippery slope to an ethnic war.
Tension was intensified with the deprivation of the civic rights of Mrs. B, Felix and several senior officials. Whatever may have been the reasons given for this decision, which was facilitated by the Government’s steamroller majority in Parliament, it was clear that there were other, and less altruistic, motives for this drastic move. One obvious need was to eliminate the prospect of Mrs. B being JRJ’s rival at the next Presidential election. Since under the new constitution a President could have two terms of office, JRJ was the automatic choice of the UNP for the election due in 1983. Mrs. B would equally have been the automatic choice of the SLFP as his rival.
Without her the SLFP would be at a disadvantage since it had no other leader of her stature. The numerous aspirants to succeed her began to fight with each other. At that time the talk in town was that there was something more personal in JRJ’s insistence on depriving his rival of her civic rights. The President believed, it was said, that Mrs. B had deliberately ordered the arrest of his only son Ravi during the early days of the 1971 JVP uprising. Ravi was an Olympic level marksman and it was not difficult for rumor mongers to convince her that he had a hand in training insurgents in the use of firearms.
A few days later, after JRJ had made representations, Ravi was released. But it was said that he harbored a grudge because “my son was forced eat out of a tin plate”. Since I was in Temple Trees in April 1971, as I have described in Volume One of my Autobiography, I knew personally that Mrs. B had at that time, no grudge against JRJ or Ravi and she quickly released him after she was informed of his arrest and Police clearance was obtained. But in the poisoned atmosphere of the time facts did not matter and revenge was high on the agenda.
I too felt that it was not proper to deprive the former PM of her civic rights. Many prevailed on my friend minister Gamini Dissanayake to try and stop this misadventure. Among those who advised Gamini were many Kandyans who said that Mrs. B did not deserve this treatment. At that time Gamini was cannily wooing the Kandyans in Colombo who were it considerable number. JRJ, in a typical sleight of hand, sought to put this matter before Cabinet. Gamini was requested by many to intervene in Cabinet on Mrs. B’s behalf.
He, on the other hand faced a dilemma because he knew that JRJ was the author of this convoluted scenario and would not be pleased if his cabinet paper was challenged. Gamini, who did not want to alienate the supporters of Mrs B decided to have a top secret meeting with Hector Kobbekaduwa who at that time was living in Aloe Avenue. Unfortunately for him, Gamini Athukorale, at that time a UNP Junior minister, also lived in Aloe Avenue and spotted Minister Dissanayake sneaking into Kobbekaduwa’s house. The following day he reported this to JRJ, who was furious.
He even spoke to his friends about removing Gamini from the Cabinet on grounds of breaching Cabinet confidentiality. That night Gamini came to my house at Siripa road in a panic. He told me that I could help him by persuading my Minister Anandatissa to defend him at the Cabinet meeting and also raise his voice against JRJ’s proposal. By this time Amanda had told me that he too was unhappy about this move. So it was not difficult for me to approach him on Gamini’s behalf. When I spoke to him, I got the feeling that the canny Gamini, fighting for his political life, had got others also to influence my Minister. The upshot was that Ananda made a strong case on Mrs. B’s behalf at the Cabinet meeting.
Though he and Gamini were out voted, JRJ noted that there was resistance especially because many other Ministers kept silent during the discussion. He made up with Gamini and good relations were re-established; but Mrs. B was stripped of her civic rghts. There is a postscript to this episode. Mrs. B was grateful to Gamini for his gesture and would treat him with great courtesy when he and I saw her during our DUNF days. In the days of the Premadasa impeachment she had absolute confidence in Gamini and allowed her party to join Lalith and Gamini in their reckless bid to take revenge from Premadasa.
I was told that Mrs. B cried when she heard of Gamini’s death. This episode also created an enmity between Gamini and Athukorale which persisted up till the former’s death. Premadasa cashed in on this enmity and appointed Athukorale as the successor Minister to Gamini in the Mahaweli Ministry. Athukorale immediately began a witch hunt and wanted to implicate Wickrema Weerasooria in a land deal, but he was not successful. Later in the Gamini–Ranil conflict in the UNP, Athukorale became Ranil’s chief supporter. But here again he failed because Gamini beat Ranil by one vote in the leadership contest. Then Ranil and Athukorale tried hard to sabotage Gamini’s Presidential bid.
Features
Challenges to addressing allegations during Sri Lanka’s armed conflict

A political commentator has attributed the UK sanctions against four individuals, three of whom were top ranking Army and Navy Officers associated with Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, to the failure of successive governments to address human rights allegations, which he describes as a self-inflicted crisis. The reason for such international action is the consistent failure of governments to conduct independent and credible inquiries into allegations of war crimes; no ‘effective investigative mechanism’ has been established to examine the conduct of either the Sri Lankan military or the LTTE.
He has not elaborated on what constitutes an “effective investigative mechanism. He has an obligation and responsibility to present the framework of such a mechanism. The hard reality however is that no country, not even South Africa, has crafted an effective investigative mechanism to address post conflict issues.
INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISMS
The hallmark of a credible investigative mechanism should be unravelling the TRUTH. No country has ventured to propose how such a Mechanism should be structured and what its mandate should be. Furthermore, despite the fact that no country has succeeded in setting up a credible truth-seeking mechanism, the incumbent government continues to be committed to explore “the contours of a strong truth and reconciliation framework” undaunted by the failed experiences of others, the most prominent being South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is often cited as the gold standard for post conflict Mechanisms. Consequently, most titles incorporate the word “Truth” notwithstanding the fact that establishing the “Truth” was a failure not only in South Africa but also in most countries that attempted such exercises.
Citing the South African experience, Prof. G. L. Peiris states: “pride of place was given to sincere truth-telling which would overcome hatred and the primordial instinct for revenge. The vehicle for this was amnesty…… Despite the personal intervention of Mandela, former State President P. W. Botha was adamant in his refusal to appear before the Commission, which he deemed as ‘a fierce unforgiving assault’ on Afrikaaners” (The Island, 01 April, 2025). In the case of Sri Lanka too, disclosures to find the “Truth” would be all about the other party to the conflict, thus making Truth seeking an accusatory process, instead of a commitment to finding the Truth. The reluctance to engage in frank disclosure is compounded by the fear of recrimination by those affected by the Truth.
Continuing Prof. Peiris cites experiences in other countries. “Argentina, the power to grant amnesty was withheld from the Commission. In Columbia, disclosure resulted not in total exoneration, but in mitigating sentences. In Chile, prosecutions were feasible only after a prolonged interval since the dismantling of Augusta Pinochet’s dictatorship ….” (Ibid).
The mechanisms adopted by the countries cited above reflect their own social and cultural values. Therefore, Sri Lanka too has to craft mechanisms in keeping with its own civilisational values of restorative and not retributive justice for true reconciliation, as declared by President J. R, Jayewardene in San Francisco as to what the global attitude should be towards Japan at the conclusion of World War II. Since the several Presidential Commissions appointed under governments already embody records of alleged violations committed, the information in these commission reports should be the foundation of the archival records on which the edifice of reconciliation should be built.
ESTABLISHING DUE CONTEXT
The suggestion that an independent and credible inquiry be conducted into allegations of war crimes reflects a skewed understanding of the actual context in which the armed conflict in Sri Lanka occurred. Even the UNHRC has acknowledged that the provisions of “Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions relating to conflicts not of an international character is applicable to the situation in Sri Lanka, as stated in para. 182 of the OISL Report by the UNHRC Office. Therefore, the correct context is International Humanitarian Law with appropriate derogations of Human Rights law during an officially declared Emergency as per the ICCPR.; a fact acknowledged in the OISL report.
Consequently, the armed conflict has to conform to provisions of Additional Protocol II of 1977, because “This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions is the due context. There is no provision for “alleged war crimes” in the Additional Protocol. Although Sri Lanka has not formally ratified Additional Protocol II, the Protocol is today accepted by the Community of Nations as Customary Law. On the other hand, “war crimes” are listed in the Rome Statute; a Statute that Sri Lanka has NOT ratified and not recognized as part of Customary Law.
Therefore, any “investigative mechanism” has to be conducted within the context cited above, which is Additional Protocol II of 1977.
SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
On the other hand, why would there be a need for Sri Lanka to engage in an independent and credible inquiry into allegations, considering the following comment in Paragraph 9.4 and other Paragraphs of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)?
“In evaluating the Sri Lankan experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL (International Humanitarian Law), the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority”
9.7 “Having reached the above conclusion, it is also incumbent on the Commission to consider the question, while there is no deliberate targeting of civilians by the Security Forces, whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the NFZs was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality…” (Ibid)
The single most significant factor that contributed to violations was the taking of Civilians in the N Fire Zone hostage (NFZ) by the LTTE. This deliberate act where distinction between civilian and combatant was deliberately abandoned, exposed and compromised the security of the Civilians. The consequences of this single act prevent addressing whether military responses were proportionate or excessive, or whether the impact of firing at make-shift hospitals were deliberate or not, and whether limiting humanitarian aid was intentional or not. These issues are recorded and addressed in the Presidential Commission Reports such as LLRC and Paranagama. This material should be treated as archival material on which to build an effective framework to foster reconciliation.
UK SANCTIONS
Sanctions imposed by the UK government as part of an election pledge for Human Rights violations during the armed conflict is a direct act of intervention according to Article 3 of the Additional Protocol of 1977 that is the acknowledged context in which actions should be judged.
Article 3 Non-intervention states:
1 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government by all legislative means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State”.
2 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory on which the conflict occurs”.
Targeting specific individuals associated with the armed conflict in Sri Lanka is a direct assault of intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. The UK government should be ashamed for resorting to violating International Law for the sake of fulfilling an election pledge. If Sri Lanka had issued strictures on the UK government for not taking action against any military officers responsible for the Bloody Sunday massacre where 26 unarmed civilians participating in a protest march were shot in broad daylight, Sri Lanka would, in fact be intervening in UK’s internal affairs.
CONCLUSION
The UK’s action reflects the common practice of making election pledges to garner targeted votes of ethnic diasporas. The influence of ethnic diasporas affecting the conduct of mainstream politics is becoming increasingly visible, the most recent being the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act of Ontario that was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada on grounds the Provincial Legislations have no jurisdiction over Federal and International Laws.
However, what should not be overlooked is that the armed conflict occurred under provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This Article is developed and supplemented by Additional Protocol II of 1977. Therefore, since all Geneva Conventions are recognised as Customary Law, so should the Additional Protocol II be, because it is a development of common Article 3.
Imposing sanctions under provisions of Additional Protocol II amounts to Intervention in internal affairs of a State as stated in Article 3 of the Protocol; II cited above. Such interventions are prohibited under provisions of international law.
The need to revive independent and credible inquiries after the lapse of 16 years is unrealistic because those who were perpetrators and victims alike cannot be identified and/or located. Furthermore, the cost of disclosure because of the possibility of retribution would compromise their security. A realistic approach is to use the material recorded in the Presidential Commission Reports and treat them as archival records and use the lessons learnt from them to forge a workable framework that would foster unity and reconciliation with the survivors in all communities This is not to live in the past but to live in the here and now – the present, which incidentally, is the bedrock of Sri Lanka’s civilisational values.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
The Silent Invasion: Unchecked spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s agricultural landscape is witnessing a silent yet profound transformation with the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations. Once introduced as a commercial crop, the oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is now at the center of a heated debate, with environmentalists and scientists warning of its devastating ecological consequences.
Speaking to The Island research scientist Rajika Gamage, said: “The spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka is not just a concern for biodiversity, but also for water resources, soil stability, and even local economies that rely on traditional crops.”
A Brief History of Oil Palm Cultivation
Oil palm, originally from West and Central Africa, was first cultivated for commercial purposes in Java in 1948 by Dutch colonists. It reached Malaysia and Indonesia by 1910, where its lucrative potential drove large-scale plantations.
According to Gamage, in Sri Lanka, the first significant oil palm plantation was established in 1968 at Nakiyadeniya Estate by European planters, initially covering a mere 0.5 hectares. Today, oil palm cultivation is predominantly concentrated in Galle, Matara, and Kalutara districts, with smaller plantations in Colombo, Rathnapura, and Kegalle.
Over the decades, he says the commercial viability of oil palm has prompted its expansion, often at the cost of native forests and traditional agricultural lands. Government incentives and private investments have further accelerated the spread of plantations, despite growing concerns over their environmental and social impacts.
Economic Boon or Environmental Curse?
Supporters of oil palm industry argue that it is the most efficient crop for vegetable oil production, yielding more oil per hectare than any other alternative. Sri Lanka currently imports a significant amount of palm oil, and expanding local production is seen as a way to reduce dependence on imports and boost local industries. However, Gamage highlights the hidden costs: “Oil palm plantations deplete water sources, contribute to soil erosion, and threaten native flora and fauna. These are long-term damages that far outweigh the short-term economic benefits.”
One of the primary environmental concerns is the aggressive water consumption of oil palm, which leads to the depletion of underground aquifers. This is particularly evident in areas such as Kalu River and Kelani River wetlands, where native ecosystems are being severely affected. Additionally, soil degradation caused by extensive monoculture farming results in loss of fertility and increased vulnerability to landslides in hilly regions.
Furthermore, studies show that oil palm plantations disrupt the natural habitats of endemic species. “Unlike rubber and coconut, oil palm does not support Sri Lanka’s rich biodiversity. It alters the soil composition and prevents the regeneration of native plant species,” Gamage explains. The loss of forest cover also exacerbates human-wildlife conflicts, as displaced animals venture into human settlements in search of food and shelter.
A Threat to Indigenous Agriculture and Culture
Beyond environmental concerns, oil palm is also threatening traditional crops like kitul (Caryota urens) and palmyrah (Borassus flabellifer), both of which hold economic and cultural significance. “These native palms have sustained rural livelihoods for centuries,” says Gamage. “Their gradual replacement by oil palm could lead to economic instability for small-scale farmers.”
Kitul tapping, an age-old tradition in Sri Lanka, provides a source of income for thousands of families, particularly in rural areas. The syrup extracted from kitul is used in local cuisine and traditional medicine. Similarly, palmyrah has deep roots in Sri Lankan culture, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where its products contribute to food security and local industries.
The rise of oil palm plantations has led to the clearing of lands that once supported the traditional crops. With large-scale commercial investments driving oil palm expansion, small-scale farmers are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their livelihoods. Gamage warns, “If we allow oil palm to replace our native palms, we risk losing not just biodiversity, but also a vital part of our cultural heritage.”
The Global Perspective: Lessons from Other Nations
Sri Lanka is not the first country to grapple with the consequences of oil palm expansion. Malaysia and Indonesia, the world’s leading producers of palm oil, have faced severe deforestation, biodiversity loss, and socio-economic conflicts due to unchecked plantation growth.
In Indonesia, for example, vast tracts of rainforest have been cleared for palm oil production, leading to habitat destruction for endangered species such as orangutans and Sumatran tigers. Additionally, indigenous communities have been displaced, sparking legal battles over land rights.
Malaysia has attempted to address some of these issues by introducing sustainability certifications, such as the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard. However, implementation challenges remain, and deforestation continues at an alarming rate.
Sri Lanka can learn valuable lessons from these experiences. Implementing strict land-use policies, promoting agroforestry practices, and ensuring transparency in plantation expansion are crucial steps in mitigating environmental damage while supporting economic development.
The Urgent Need for Action
Despite these concerns, Sri Lanka has yet to enforce strict regulations on oil palm expansion. Gamage urges authorities to intervene: “It is imperative that we implement policies to control its spread before it is too late. The unchecked expansion of oil palm will lead to irreversible environmental damage.”
To address this issue, experts suggest a multi-pronged approach:
Stronger Land-Use Policies
– The government must enforce restrictions on oil palm cultivation in ecologically sensitive areas, such as wetlands and forest reserves.
Reforestation and Rehabilitation
– Efforts should be made to restore degraded lands by reintroducing native tree species and promoting sustainable agroforestry.
Supporting Traditional Agriculture
– Incentives should be provided to farmers growing traditional crops like kitul and palmyrah, ensuring that these industries remain viable.
Public Awareness and Education
– Raising awareness among local communities about the environmental and social impacts of oil palm can empower them to make informed decisions about land use.
Sustainable Alternatives
– Encouraging research into alternative vegetable oil sources, such as coconut oil, which has long been a staple in Sri Lankan agriculture, could reduce reliance on palm oil.
As Sri Lanka stands at a crossroads, the decisions made today will determine the country’s ecological and agricultural future. While the economic benefits of oil palm are undeniable, its long-term environmental and social costs cannot be ignored. The challenge now is to strike a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability before the damage becomes irreversible.
In conclusion Gamage said, “We must act now. If we allow oil palm to spread unchecked, future generations will bear the cost of our inaction.”
Sri Lanka has the opportunity to take a different path—one that prioritises biodiversity conservation, sustainable agriculture, and the well-being of local communities. The time for decisive action is now.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
A plea for establishing a transboundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay

Blue-green land and waterscapes act as ecological corridors across land and water in creating an ecological continuity in order to protect and restore the habitats of native and naturalised species.
In addition, these ecological corridors also help to conserve and improve the habitats of migratory species, as well. One of the main objectives of establishing blue-green land-waterscapes is to reconcile increasing local/regional development and human livelihood challenges in a sustainable manner while, at the same time, safeguard biodiversity and their habitats/ecosystems, as far as possible.
While green landscapes are natural and semi-natural terrestrial vegetation types like natural forests and grasslands, blue waterscapes are aquatic or semi-aquatic vegetation types such as seagrass meadows, mangroves and coastal and other wetlands. These vegetated coastal ecosystems known as ‘blue carbon’ ecosystems are some of the most productive on Earth and located at the interfaces among terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments. They provide us with essential ecosystem services, such as serving as a buffer in coastal protection from storms and erosion, spawning grounds for fish, filtering pollutants and contaminants from coastal waters thus improving coastal water quality and contributing to all important food security.
In addition, they capture and store “blue” carbon from the atmosphere and oceans at significantly higher rates per unit area than tropical forests (Figure 1) and hence act as effective carbon sinks. By storing carbon, these ecosystems help to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, thus contributing significantly to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Figure 1: Carbon storage in different vegetation types (Source – What Is Blue Carbon and Why Does It Matter? – Sustainable Travel International)
.Blue-green Carbon Markets
The recognition of blue carbon (BC) ecosystems (primarily mangroves, seagrasses and tidal marshes) as an effective natural climate solution paved the way for their inclusion within carbon markets. Blue carbon is the marine analog of green carbon, which refers to carbon captured by terrestrial (i.e., land-based) plants. The blue-green carbon market involves buying and selling carbon credits from projects that protect and restore coastal and marine ecosystems (blue carbon) and terrestrial ecosystems (green carbon). Since Blue Carbon ecosystems have higher carbon sequestration (capture and store) potential compared to their terrestrial counterparts, blue Carbon credits are worth over two times more than green carbon credits. They offer opportunities for commercial enterprises to offset carbon emissions and in turn support climate action.
Blue Carbon projects are expected to grow twofold in the near future. With the recent surge in international partnerships and funding, there is immense growth potential for the blue carbon market. However, it is critically important to look beyond the value of the carbon sequestered to ensure the rights and needs of local communities that are central to any attempt to mitigate climate change using a blue and green carbon project.
Blue Carbon projects can serve as grassroot hubs for sustainable development by developing nature-based solutions in these ecosystems thus contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Globally, numerous policies, coastal management strategies, and tools designed for conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems have been developed and implemented. Policies and finance mechanisms being developed for climate change mitigation may offer an additional route for effective coastal management. The International Blue Carbon Initiative, for example, is a coordinated, global program focused on conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems for the climate, biodiversity and human wellbeing.
Until recently, most of these opportunities focus on carbon found in the above ground vegetative biomass and do not account for the carbon in the soil. On the other hand, blue carbon, in particular has the potential for immense growth in carbon capture economics in the near future and can provide significant socioeconomic and environmental benefits. Consequently, blue -green carbon habitats in the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay region represent invaluable assets in climate change mitigation and coastal ecosystem conservation and sustainable development.
Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Trans-boundary Region
The Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region form a transboundary area within the waters of southeastern India and northwestern Sri Lanka. This region supports dense seagrass meadows having a high level of marine biodiversity including marine mammals such as dugong. Sea turtles are frequent visitors to the gulf while sharks, dolphins, sperm and baleen whales too, have been reported from this area. The Mannar region is recognized as an Important Marine Mammal Area (IMMA) of the world by IUCN (Figure 2) and also an Important Bird Area by Birdlife International. This region as a whole is a store house of unique biological wealth of global significance and as such is considered as one of the world’s richest regions from a marine biodiversity perspective.

Figure 2. Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay IMMA (Source – IUCN Joint SSC/WCPA Marine Mammal Protected Areas Task Force, 2022 IUCN-MMPATF (2022)
Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve – India
India has already declared a part of this region as the UNESCO Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve covering an area of 10,500 km2 of ocean with 21 islands and the adjoining coastline. The islets and coastal buffer zone include beaches, estuaries, and tropical dry broadleaf forests, while the surrounding seascape of the Marine National Park (established in 1986) and a 10 km strip of the coastal landscape that include seaweed communities, seagrass communities, coral reefs, salt marshes and mangrove forests form the coastal and marine component of the biosphere reserve on the Indian side of the Gulf of Mannar.
Sri Lankan ‘Proposed’ Biosphere Reserve
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay there is a semi-enclosed shallow water body between the southeast coast of India and Sri Lanka, with a water depth maximum of 13 m. To the south, a chain of low islands and reefs known as Adam’s Bridge or Rama Setu (Rama’s Bridge), separates Palk Bay from the Gulf of Mannar. The Palk Bay leads to Palk Strait (Figure 3). Palk Bay is one of the major sinks for sediments along with the Gulf of Mannar. Sediments discharged by rivers and transported by the surf currents as littoral drift settle in this sink.
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay, studies are being conducted by the Dugong and Seagrass Conservation Project to establish an additional 10,000 hectares of Marine Protected Area to support the conservation of dugongs and their seagrass habitat in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay. This project will involve the preparation of a multiple-community-based management plan in conjunction with government, fishing communities and the tourism industry.
With this valuable information emerging from projects of this nature, Sri Lanka has real opportunities to create a large marine protected area in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region and eventually merging them together with the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve of India to form a trans-boundary biosphere Reserve.
Terrestrial cum Marine Spatial Plan for the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Region
Therefore, an excellent opportunity awaits both the Governments of Sri Lanka and India to collaborate in preparing of a terrestrial and marine spatial plan for this region, a prerequisite before going further on designing and implementing large scale development plans in establishing wind energy farms, mineral sand extraction, fishing industry, oil exploration and tourism development.
Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) is an integrated, place-based approach for allocating coastal and marine resources and space, while protecting the ecosystems that provide these vital resources.
On the Indian side, the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere reserve is well established and functional. On the Sri Lankan side, already there are three DWLC managed protected areas i) Adam’s Bridge Marine National Park (# 29 in the map – 18,990 ha declared in 2015), ii) Vedithalathiv Nature Reserve (# 35 -29,180 ha declared in 2016) and iii) Vankalai Sanctuary ( # 97 -4839 ha declared in 2008) (Figure 4) which can serve as the core zone of the Sri Lankan counterpart of a trans-boundary biosphere reserve. Due to the integrated nature of shallow wetland and terrestrial coastal habitats, Vankalai Sanctuary, in particular is highly productive, supporting high ecosystem and species diversity.

Figure 4: Protected Areas in Norther Sri Lanka Managed by the Department of Wildlife Conservation Source: DWLC
This site provides excellent feeding and living habitats for a large number of water bird species, including annual migrants, which also use this area on arrival and during their exit from Sri Lanka.
Having several coastal and marine protected areas already within the Sri Lankan territory provide an excellent opportunity to establish the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay blue-green Biosphere Reserve (Sri Lanka) initially and eventually to join up seamlessly with the already established Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve on the Indian side to create a trans-boundary blue-green biosphere reserve.
This makes perfect sense because unlike sedentary plant species, mobile animal and plant groups (phytoplankton, in particular) do not respect human demarcated territorial boundaries. The provision of a common and unhindered protected coastal and marine passage for their customary movement for food and raising young is therefore of crucial importance in conservation management. Scientific evidence-based selection of additional areas, if necessary and their respective boundaries are best be determined in consultation with expert groups on marine mammals and reptiles, birds, fish, coastal vegetation conservation, sociology and industrial development from both sides of the divide.
Proper spatial planning needs to be done before large-scale development plans are designed and implemented in order to avoid conflicts of interest leading to inordinate delays and teething problems in project initiation. As a priority, the protected blue-green core and buffer regions need to be demarcated for their conservation. This could best be done in this narrow passage of land and water between Sri Lanka and India
( Palk Strait & Gulf of Mannar) by preparing a marine and terrestrial spatial plan along the UNESCO Man and Biosphere conceptual guidelines differentiating core, buffer and transition zones. While the protected areas in the core and buffer zone provide all important ecosystem services that would also serve as breeding ground for fish, crustaceans, marine reptiles, birds and mammals thereby provisioning sustainable industries to be developed in the surrounding transition areas demarcated in the joint spatial plan.
In addition, the Satoyama Global Initiative established by the Japanese at UNESCO as a global effort in 2009 to realise ‘societies in harmony with nature’ in which – Satoumi – specifically referring to the management of socio-ecological production landscapes in marine and coastal regions, is also a good model to be considered for conservation of biodiversity and co-existence between humans and nature.
Final Plea
In order to take this proposal forward from the Sri Lankan side, a number of useful baseline reports are already available including, but not limited to, the following: i. Biodiversity Profile of the Mannar District (CEJ & USAID 2022), ii. The Gulf of Mannar and its surroundings (IUCN 2012), iii) Atlas of Mangroves, Salt Marshes and Sand Dunes of the Coastal Area from Malwathu Oya to Pooneryn in the Northwestern Coastal Region, Sri Lanka (Ecological Association of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, 2020). iv. Integrated Strategic Environment Assessment of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (CEA 2014).
If this proposal to establish a Trans-boundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay is acceptable in principle to the Governments of Sri Lanka and India, it would be ideal if the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program UNESCO which is an intergovernmental scientific program whose mission is to establish a scientific basis for enhancing the relationship between people and their environments to partner with the relevant Government and non-governmental agencies in both countries in making it a reality. This proposed concept has all the necessary elements for developing a unique sustainable conservation cum industrial development strategy via nature-based solutions while at the same time contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation.
by Emeritus Professor Nimal Gunatilleke,
University of Peradeniya
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