Features
The ethnic factor inSri Lanka’s foreign policy, 1948-1956
By Uditha Devapriya

The linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy represent an interesting, if not intriguing, object of study. There may be convergences between the two, but more often one comes across significant differences as well. This is as it should be: the factors which determine a country’s domestic politics are clean different from those which determine its foreign relations. Not least among these factors is ethnicity: at home, it becomes a divisive issue, a tokenistic abstraction used to win votes and elections and entrench a certain group over all others, but abroad, internationally, it becomes a non-issue.
For obvious reasons, it makes sense to follow a progressive set of policies over these issues, at home and abroad. However repugnant it may be, to give one example, ethnic nationalism has become a playbook of populist politicians, even in the most “liberal” and “developed” countries. Yet ethnic politics can be, and is, a hindrance to a country’s image abroad. This is as true for Sri Lanka as it is for the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Sri Lanka’s inability to defend itself properly at international forums and organisations, over such themes as human rights and accountability, thus betrays a failure to manage these issues well. Today, local officials talk of revamping Sri Lanka’s foreign policy establishment, starting from the Foreign Service. They have tasked entire think-tanks and institutions with a review of the country’s external relations. Yet reformist rhetoric is hardly a substitute for actual reform. The truth is that no number of reforms will be effective unless the country takes stock of its fundamental weakness: its failure to balance domestic politics with foreign policies, particularly over issues like ethnicity. To do so, scholars need to examine the roots of this failure, which can be traced back to the 1940s and 1950s.
Immediately following independence, Sri Lanka endeavoured to become a part of the international order through membership of multilateral bodies like the UN. Largely because of its Cold War alliances, however, it was deprived of these opportunities until a good 10 years later. In this, the country had only itself to blame. Its foreign policy choices during this period were guided less by pragmatism than by ideological affinities with a power bloc. Even in its more laudable achievements, such as its stance on the nationalist uprising in Dutch Indonesia, the regime of the day followed a certain line: “[i]n the course of discussions,” S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike later recounted, “it appeared to me that I was expected… to follow the line Great Britain adopted over the Indonesian issue.”
A state of affairs like this could only come about because of the non-modernising character of the country’s elite. D. S. Senanayake is constantly celebrated as the Father of the Nation, with not a few commentators comparing him to historical figures like Lincoln, Gandhi, and even Nehru. Yet the truth of the matter is that, going by his ideological predilections and his foreign policy postures, Senanayake resembled Hastings Banda, the pro-Western leader of independent Malawi, rather than those other historical personages. Moreover, the elite of which he was a member were deeply compradorist and unable to prioritise anything other than their property and privilege, be it in domestic politics or foreign policy. This, in the long run, led them to side with certain countries and antagonise all others.
The foreign policies adopted by the UNP had the effect of limiting the country to a Western bloc and preventing it from becoming a part of the international system. While the West had played a leading part in the establishment of multilateral institutions, especially the UN, these institutions were now quickly being dominated by the newly decolonised countries of Africa and Asia, and by the socialist bloc. This was only to be expected, and in refusing to recognise that reality, Sri Lanka could only limit its choices. The blame for this, of course, has to go to the colonial elite: as Dayan Jayatilleka has noted aptly, the crème de la crème of the country paradoxically failed to produce a Nehru.

It is my contention here that the Sri Lankan elite resorted to the most divisive politics at home to buttress its pro-Western foreign policy stances. To give one example, all three UNP regimes from 1948 to 1956 summoned and then played to Sinhalese fears of Indianisation, in tandem with its anti-Indian line abroad. A corollary of this was the Indian Tamil problem: D. S. Senanayake’s decision to deprive Indian Tamils of citizenship, an act that was as racist as it was classist, was linked to the UNP’s rather irrational and silly fears of a Leftist takeover of the country, given the Left’s impressive performance in the Estates.
Not surprisingly, the UNP’s upper echelons neglected to manage these tensions, which more or less followed from its failure to balance domestic political and foreign policy concerns. Its increasingly archaic policies also fuelled much discontent, especially among Sinhalese and Buddhist communities, who felt out of place in an administration manned by a colonial and colonised, un-Buddhist elite. This discontent, symbolised by the defection of the Buddhist clergy from the UNP to the SLFP, should have provoked a rational response from the party, but all it did was to force it to adopt even more archaic, divisive, and fundamentally flawed policies, personified rather fittingly in the character of John Kotelawala. It was a two-way process: the UNP was not above using race and religion to quash dissent, while the SLFP led Opposition and its front-guard deployed both in return.
The problem with the SLFP’s front-guard, particularly the Buddhist clergy, was that it did not possess, still less mobilise, the progressive, anti-imperialist ideology that its counterparts in the Left did and had. A great many of those who joined forces with the SLFP had themselves been part of the UNP; some of them would later return to the UNP. But the battle lines in the late 1950s were between the proverbial forces of light and darkness, and for better or worse, the former were represented by those who had once associated with the latter. In such a scheme progressive politics had no place: the Opposition mustered all it had to quash the government of the day. It did this, successfully, by depicting the UNP and its leadership as a historical anachronism, and by deploying populist, divisive rhetoric.

The clash between these parties produced two contradictory results. On the one hand, the SLFP broke away the UNP’s foreign policies, from the high-strung pro-Western posturing of the past to a more proactive approach, which won Sri Lanka the respect of the world and of the Global South in particular. On the other hand, having benefitted from an upsurge in nationalism, it kowtowed to forces that represented, at almost every level, the antithesis of its progressive foreign policy record. Thus, while S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike transformed into Nehru’s equivalent of Sri Lanka abroad, in his own country he became anything but a Nehru. The Indian Congress Party would have, as it did, put a stop to the racialist politics of the RSS, achieving a congruence between domestic politics and foreign policies. Neither the UNP nor the SLFP had the will or the power to put a stop to the Saffron Brigade.
I would contend that this was, and is, the biggest failure of the 1956 election. Instead of leading to a congruence of values between domestic politics and foreign policies, the election served to disfigure both, producing not one, but two Sri Lankas: a Sri Lanka that touted progressive policies abroad, and a Sri Lanka that practised populist, reactionary politics at home. A large part of the blame for this must, of course, go to the architect of that year’s election win, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. At the same time, the blame must also be placed on the UNP’s non-modernising, archconservative bourgeoisie. Their actions – and worse, their indecisiveness – served to draw a wedge between Sri Lanka’s aspirations in the world and its actual, less than laudable political record at home.
It is this gap, between domestic politics and foreign policy – as witness the government’s unforgivable record on COVID-19 burials, versus its laudable stance on issues concerning the Muslim world, such as Palestine – which has hindered the country from becoming what it should be in the world. For the country to develop, to go beyond where it is now, it thus has to take stock of the past, where it went wrong, and seek to adjust accordingly. If it is to be more Nehruvian, Nasserian, or more progressive abroad, it must deploy progressive politics at home. In other words, it must practice what it preaches, and preach what it practices. Unless it follows this strategy, it will continue to show one face to the world and another to its own citizens: a policy hardly conducive to the country’s image overseas.
The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com.
Features
Trump’s tariffs, AKD’s gazette and Sri Lanka’s diplomatic slumber
“We are rather respectable in Colombo. We go to bed fairly early, and we remain there till morning. “
According to Sri Lanka’s diplomatic folklore, the late S.W. R. D. Bandaranaike uttered these words while explaining the reasons for Sri Lanka’s abstention on the UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Apparently, SWRD’s foreign ministry officials were asleep at home when the diplomatic cable seeking instructions was received from New York. In those days, there were no cell phones, Internet, or even fax or telex machines. The diplomatic cables were sent through post offices. Decoding them was a slow and time-consuming process. Thus, the government could not provide appropriate instructions to our mission in New York in time, and the Sri Lankan delegation abstained on that sensitive UN vote.
Sri Lanka’s Absence from Section 301 Consultations
But then, how does one explain Sri Lanka’s absence from the crucial bilateral consultation held in Washington by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) during March-April on “Forced Labour” under the Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974? Didn’t our foreign and trade ministries send appropriate instructions to Washington in time? Even if the instructions from the foreign ministry were transmitted to our embassy in Washington by pigeon carriers, there was enough time for Sri Lanka to participate in those meetings.
In March, the USTR initiated these 301 investigations on 60 trading partners, and invited all of them for confidential consultations. Out of the 60, 46 participated in these consultations. Sri Lanka was not one of them. Other countries that didn’t participate in these consultations included China, Russia, and Venezuela! In addition to that, the Section 301 Committee conducted a public hearing with interested parties on April 28 and 29. Washington-based diplomats, representatives from few trade ministries as well as representatives from many foreign trade associations and chambers participated in these hearings. Sri Lanka was once again conspicuously absent.
As a result, when the USTR published the proposed forced labour tariffs on June 2nd, Sri Lanka ended up with a 12.5% duty. Pakistani and Indonesian diplomats participated in these consultations and took appropriate follow-up measures, and managed to enter the 10% duty category. As even a threat of a modest tariff hike could disrupt supply chains and reduce competitiveness, particularly in an industry such as garments, I discussed this issue on 15 June and underscored the importance of Sri Lanka’s participation at the next hearing, which was scheduled to be held from July 7th .
Awakening from Diplomatic Slumber and AKD’s Gazette
Fortunately, Sri Lanka finally awoke from weeks of diplomatic slumber, and Ambassador Mahinda Samarasinghe participated in the public hearing on 9 July, and promised, “…. · We have agreed to the text in our negotiations with the USTR on forced labour, …. The gazette as we speak is being printed and I’m getting the gazette tomorrow morning, and the gazette will be shared with USTR as I get it“.
As promised, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake issued a gazette on 10 July banning the imports of goods produced by forced labour. These new regulations are very similar to what Pakistan and Indonesia enacted in April, after their consultations with USTR in March. Why couldn’t we do it in April? Why did we wait till the very last minute?
Challenges ahead
“War is too important to be left to generals alone,” is a famous saying attributed to former French Premier Georges Clemenceau. Similarly, monitoring our main markets is too important to be left to diplomats alone. The United States is the largest single-country market for Sri Lanka. Therefore, Sri Lankan trade chambers and associations should become more proactive in these markets and participate in these events. For example, the chairman of the Pakistani apparel exporters association participated in the April hearings. Similarly, representatives from the Indian Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Confederation of Indian Industry, and Reliance Industries also participated in July hearings. At an event where each speaker is given only five minutes (strictly enforced), having a number of speakers from a country is an advantage. The presence of industry representatives in these kinds of events also help them understand the market dynamics and the future challenges. This is important, particularly because there will be many more challenges with Trump’s tariffs.
With the gazette issued on 10 July, Sri Lanka has imposed a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labour. Now, the challenge will be to effectively enforce the prohibition. And what are the goods produced with forced labour? The USTR list only focuses on aluminum, cotton, electronics, lithium-ion batteries, rice, and tobacco. However, according to the U.S. Department of Labour, the list is much longer. Hence, this list may change continuously during the next two years and tariffs may fluctuate once again.
So, this is definitely not the time to slumber.
(The writer, a retired public servant, can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)
by Gomi Senadhira ✍️
Features
Tales of Mystery and Suspense 10 Casino for Sale
After the overwhelming grotesquerie of J K Rowling’s latest Cormoran Strike novel (written, I should have noted, as the others were, under the pseudonym Robert Galbraith), I thought I should return to the world of fun, and also a much shorter description since this thriller moves quickly without the layers of detail that Rowling engages in.
I then move to the second comic thriller by Caryl Brahms and S J Simon. This, their second story to feature Vladimir Stroganoff and Adam Quill, was Casino for Sale, as lunatic a romp as the first, though without the emphasis on the ballet that characterized A Bullet in the Ballet.
This one begins with the impresario Stroganoff buying a casino cheap from Baron Sam de Rabinovich, only to find that it was a rundown place, not the grand casino of La Bazouche, a resort on the Frenc+h Riviera, as he had initially thought. The grand one belonged to Lord Buttonhooke, and Stroganoff could not compete, until he thought of bringing the Ballet Stroganoff to the casino – which of course leads to Buttonhooke deciding to have ballet performances in his Casino too.
Stroganoff invites Quill to visit him, which Quill decides to do since he has left Scotland Yard, having come into a legacy. No one believes this, and he has to face questions as to what he did to have been sacked, with sympathy for having been found out.
The day he arrives in La Bazouche there is a murder, of a vitriolic critic called Citrolo, in Stroganoff’s office. He had been going to write a damning review of the opening night of the ballet and Stroganoff, when he realizes Citrolo cannot be swayed, drugs him and dictates the review himself to the papers. He leaves Citrolo sleeping and finds him shot the next morning, whereupon he decides to muddy the waters and leave a suicide note and lots of other murder weapons. So much overkill, as it were, of course ensures that he is arrested.
But the excitable French detective who makes the arrest follows up his suggestion that Buttonhooke was also involved, and so the two casino owners find themselves in cells next door to each other, with the detective Gustave quite happy to provide creature comforts for a fee.
Quill decides he must investigate, and finds Gustave most cooperative, since he has a laid back attitude to work. So it is Quill that finds a notebook which makes it clear Citrolo is an accomplished blackmailer, and that there are lots of possible murderers, including Stroganoff’s croupier, who was crooked, Rabinovich, who was now working for Buttonhooke, a confidence trickster called Kurt Kukumber, whose prospectus for a dud gold mine was found in the office and Prince Alexis Artishok who was engaged in a deal to buy diamonds from the ballerina Dyra Dyrakova.
Stroganoff had been trying to get Dyrakova to dance for him, but having done so previously she had refused. But then to Stroganoff’s chagrin she agreed to dance for Buttonhooke. The clearly crooked Artishok had told Buttonhooke’s mistress Sadie Souse, who was not very bright, that Dyrakova possessed diamonds she was willing to sell cheap, and Sadie was determined to have them.
Quill meanwhile finds out that there was a secret passage to Stroganoff’s office, the obvious solution to what had begun as a locked room mystery, and that this was known by almost everyone apart from Stroganoff himself. And then Rabinovich is murdered, just after Gustave had released his two original suspects, leading him to blame Quill for having insisted on that and thus allowing them to kill again.
Soon afterwards Dyrakova arrives, and the town is full of posters announcing that she will appear in the casinos, elaborate posters for either one, since Stroganoff is determined that she will dance for him, and if she does not come willingly, he has devised a scheme to make her do so unwillingly. So, though Buttonhooke has her taken off to his yacht immediately she arrives at the station, Quill along with Arenskaya gets her into a launch and to Stroganoff’s casino, where she performs to tumultuous applause, not knowing for whom she is dancing.
When Quill asked her about the diamonds, she said she had sold them long ago, and that gave Quill the solution to the mystery. Rabinovich had known about this, and Artishok had killed him to prevent Sadie learning it from him, he had killed Citrolo who had recognized him for an accomplished card sharper, not a Russian prince at all. But before he is arrested, he gets away in a boat, and the police launch that pursues him is on the point of catching him up when it runs out of petrol.
Again, lots of excitement, and entertaining references – Gustave grows marrows – and if not quite as brilliant as its predecessor, Casino was certainly a delightful read.
Features
The challenge of being positive about SAARC
It was a few years back that a former President of Sri Lanka took it on himself to pronounce SAARC ‘dead’. Since then there have been other sections of Sri Lankan opinion that have joined the critics of SAARC and taken the solemn stance that SAARC has indeed died what may be called a natural death.
Their fatalism is understandable. SAARC has failed to meet at heads of government or state level for the past several years to take the SAARC process notably forward. Regional cooperation has more or less been only an appealing idea. No substantive concrete projects have taken off to make the idea a hard reality. ‘Inner paralysis’ seems to be SAARC’s lot. Hence the fatalism in these circles.
However, being one of the worst cash-strapped regions of the world and a teemingly populated one with people virtually left to their devices, what choices do the ‘SAARC Eight’ have other than to try their best to band together and continue with their cooperation efforts, however small they may be?
There is no escaping the mounting debt trap for many of these countries and bankrupt Sri Lanka is a glaring example, but ‘throwing in the towel’ and abandoning themselves entirely to the diktats of the strongest economies and their agencies will prove a ‘living death’ for many countries in the SAARC fold.
The gains may be meagre but giving-up on SAARC cooperation in full would prove self-defeating for the organization and South Asia. Right now, the collective intention ought to be to salvage what the region could from the tenuous cooperative efforts. Moreover, such initiatives could go some distance to generate a degree of goodwill among the Eight and help in sustaining a dialogue process.
Given this backdrop it proved ‘a stich in time’ for the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo, to recently host the SAARC Secretary General Ambassador Md. Golam Sarwar to a round table discussion on the unifying potential of SAARC and its future possibilities, besides other related issue areas.
Held on June 24th and moderated by RCSS Executive Director and former ambassador Ravinatha Aryasinha, the forum brought together a vibrant, wide ranging audience comprising academicians, diplomats, senior public servants, civil society activists and many others. Following the presentation by Ambassador Golam Sarwar titled, ‘Reigniting SAARC: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Ahead’, a lively Q&A followed.
The above forum could be described as an act of lighting the proverbial ‘candle’ rather than ‘cursing the darkness.’ It surely is a ‘darkness’ that could be seen as daunting considering that the region’s pivotal powers, India and Pakistan, are failing to act in a spirit of accord but are engaged in bitter finger-pointing on a number of questions of vital importance to SAARC.
On the other hand, what is the rest of the region doing to bring the above sides together? It is disappointing that to date the rest of SAARC has failed to launch a major diplomatic drive to bring peace between the feuding regional heavyweights. It needs to act without delay and establish its earnestness and this effort would need to prove SAARC’s staying power in the unfolding months and even years.
In assessing SAARC’s seeming failure local opinion in particular has failed to factor in what could be described as weak leadership. Since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, the founding father of SAARC, the region has failed to produce a visionary leader who could advance the SAARC cause with charisma and drive.
Among other reasons, weak leadership accounts considerably for the faltering and stuttering status, as it were, of SAARC. Badly needed are leaders who could go the extra mile, think less of narrow national interests and work diligently towards the collective well being of the region but SAARC’s millions of ordinary people have been made to wait in vain for leaders of such stature. Instead, they have been burdened with politicians who seem to be relishing the apparently moribund state of SAARC.
Looking back, it could be said that it was the dynamic leadership factor that led to the launching of the Non-Aligned Movement and for its sustenance for a few decades. True, it could be seen in some quarters that NAM is no more, but as in the case of SAARC, the former too has been unfortunate to be burdened over the years with politicians who lack the vision and drive to unflaggingly advance the fortunes of the South. NAM and SAARC lack the dynamism and vision of leaders of the stature of Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, to give them the required guidance and intellectual depth.
The reasons are complex for there not being among us currently political leaders with the vision and the steadfast commitment to advance the legitimate interests of the South. However, it could be stated with conviction that the majority of Southern leaders have too easily caved in to the demands of the global North and its financial agencies.
These leaders have failed to see, for instance, that the largely market economy oriented Northern governments would not view with favour a centrist economic model that attaches priority to the interests of the dis-empowered publics of the South. This realization ought to have dawned on the current government in Sri Lanka, for instance, some while ago but it has no choice but to abide by IMF dictates since economic survival at present is unthinkable without the latter’s succour.
Accordingly for SAARC this should be the time for some soul-searching. Priority needs to be attached to ending the feuding between India and Pakistan since at present the material fortunes of the region hinge largely on these regional giants giving peaceful relations among them a try. This is no easy challenge to meet but some daring, visionary diplomacy needs to take hold among the rest of SAARC.
There is some sense in SAARC bringing the peoples of the region together through programs that address their best collective interests. A meeting of minds among SAARC nations could enable SAARC and its agencies to build a region-wide people’s movement for progressive political and economic change that could in turn lead to the region’s political leaders sensitizing themselves more to the neglected needs of their publics.
However, the time is ‘now’ for the initiation of these progressive changes and the voice of SAARC well wishers would need to drown out those of their critics.
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