Features
The death of a President and the Arrest Warrant for a Prime Minister
by Rajan Philips
Neither the tragic death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi nor the ICC Prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to have any significant implications for the short term in either of the two countries or in the region. The Iranian regime’s standing in the short term is believed to be assured with the transfer of power already to Vice President Mohammad Mokhber and his likely endorsement in the national election scheduled for June 28.
The uncertainty and the speculation after President Raisi’s death are about the succession of the 85 year old Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The late President was widely expected to succeed Ali Khamenei and that would have ensured an almost seamless regime continuity. The search for an alternative successor will open opportunities both for internal power struggle in the regime and for regime opponents to take another crack at Iran’s hybrid state.
Equally, there will be no immediate change either in Israel or in Gaza arising from the bold and balanced decision of the Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan, of the International Criminal Court (ICC) based in the Hague, Netherlands, to ask for arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu, his Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as Hamas’s leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar and its political leader Ismail Haniyeh.
Mr. Netanyahu was already under pressure from his political rival and war cabinet minister Benny Gantz to come up with a postwar solution for Gaza immediately or to step down from office. Now Gantz and almost all of Israel are united in denouncing the decision of the ICC prosecutor. That lets Netanyahu off the hook for now but not for long.
Hamas too has denounced the prosecutor’s warrant application as an attempt “to equate the victim and the executioner.” Just like pro-Israeli denunciation of the warrant for allegedly drawing a false equivalence between a democratic state and a terrorist organization.” President Biden has called the arrest move “outrageous” and the Republicans in the US Congress are planning a bipartisan move to pass sanctions on Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan and other ICC officials to punish them for preparing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his defence minister.
Mixed Reactions
The Biden Administration would seem to be going along with it based on the nod to the legislators given by Secretary of State Antony Blinken when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee the day after Khan’s warrant move. Imposing sanctions would be a repeat of the US sanctions during Trump presidency against Khan’s predecessor Fatou Bensouda when she opened investigations, in 2019, into alleged war crimes by the US in Afghanistan and by Israel in the Palestinian territories. So, Mr. Khan is not doing anything new, but the US Democrats at that time ridiculed Trump and the Republicans for imposing sanctions against ICC officials.
And within three months of replacing Trump, in April 2021, the Biden Administration lifted Trump’s sanctions against Ms. Bensouda. Secretary Blinken said at that time while the US continued to “disagree strongly with the ICC’s actions relating to the Afghanistan and Palestinian situations,” the approach of the Biden Administration would be to address its concerns “through engagement with all stakeholders in the ICC process rather than through the imposition of sanctions.” Now, the Secretary and the Administration are following the example of Trump and letting the Republicans lead the sanctions process.
Whatever might be the final outcome of Prosecutor Khan’s warrant application, it has already had the unintended but inevitable effect of exposing the growing division among western countries over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The same division that the world saw in the UN vote on granting Palestine a full member status is now being replayed over the actions of the ICC. The US and Israel are standing together and are standing isolated. They are joined by a few countries like Hungary. Hungary voted against the UN resolution on Palestinian status and its Prime Minister Viktor Orban, a long-time ally of Netanyahu, has now criticized the ICC warrant decision.
In Britain, where Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has called a snap election for July 4, which The Economist has described as “odd and illogical – much like him,” the two parties are divided on the ICC warrant matter. Although irrelevant, it is worth noting that ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan is a British Barrister born to Pakistani parents and raised in Scotland. Mr. Sunak has called the warrant application “a deeply unhelpful development.” The Labour Party, on the other hand, has indicated that the UK and all members of the ICC, “have a legal obligation” to comply with ICC warrants.
Mr. Khan’s warrant application is the first to target the leader of a ‘western country’, which Israel is considered to be. The warrant is subject to review by a panel of three ICC judges who can amend, reject, or approve it. If approved as requested, the onus will be on member countries to arrest Mr. Netanyahu if he were to visit any of them. There is an outstanding ICC arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin alleging unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia. The warrant was issued on March 17, 2023, the first against the leader of one of the five permanent member countries of the UN Security Council. The warrant against Putin was welcomed by Ukraine’s western allies including the US, and it has curtailed Mr. Putin’s overseas travel for fear of being arrested.
A majority of western countries have also expressed support for the ICC Prosecutor’s warrant applications for arresting Israeli and Hamas leaders. Ireland, Norway, and Spain have gone further and made a coordinated announcement recognizing Palestine as a state to standing ovations in their respective parliaments. They now join the more than 140 countries that have already recognized Palestinian statehood. None of this would bring about a foreseeable end to the continuing tragedy in Gaza or the continuation of Netanyahu as Prime Minister. There is still a long and tortuous road ahead. But the signposts to a future Palestinian state are ever so slightly getting clearer.
President Raisi’s Funeral
At the same time, the creation of a new Palestinian State is not going to be at the expense of the State of Israel. Hence the two state solution. The State of Israel is now recognized by 165 of the UN’s 193 member states. The 28 countries that have not recognized Israel are mostly Muslim countries, many of them members of the Arab League who were signatories to the celebrated 1967 Khartoum Resolution: The Three Noes of Khartoum – no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. That was in the wake of the Six Day Arab-Israeli war of 1967. A number of countries, including Sudan, have since gone past Khartoum and have recognized Israel and established diplomatic relations. The notable exception is Iran.
Even under the Shah, Iran voted against and opposed the partition plan and the admission of Israel as a UN Member. De facto (not de jure) relations with Israel were subsequently established, but everything was severed after the 1979 Iranian revolution. The official Iranian rhetoric has since been to call for the elimination of Israel, the same rhetoric as that of Hamas, and a mutually reinforcing counter to the Netanyahu rhetoric rejecting not only the two-state solution, but also the very concept of a Palestinian state.
There is not going to be any change in Iran’s rhetoric or its position against Israel in the aftermath of President Raisi’s death. But there could be a pause in the regional needling between the two countries as both Netanyahu in Israel and the regime in Iran will have their hands full attending to other pressures and priorities. President Raisi’s funeral in Tehran became a focal point for portraying Iran’s domestic politics and its external outreach.
The funeral may have provided the first occasion for the presence of foreign dignitaries in large numbers after Trump’s disastrous abrogation of the West’s nuclear deal with Iran that was signed during the Obama presidency. If the sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration were intended to turn Iran into a pariah state, that has not happened. The US sanctions have hurt Iran economically, but they have not weakened its influence not only regionally, but also globally.
The funeral provided the occasion for the Global South to mark its presence, and for the West its ‘unwelcomeness.’ Not to mention the ritual chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” The regional countries were fully represented, including foreign ministers from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Perhaps the most significant attendee was Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, just two days after the ICC Prosecutor’s arrest warrant application. Others included Hezbollah’s deputy leader Naim Qassem and Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam Al Houthi.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to overstate the regional influence of Iran. In fact, one of the failed objectives of the 1979 Iranian revolution, at least as articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini, has been the failure of the intended ‘export’ of the revolution to Arab countries outside Iran and overwhelm their corrupt governments. Khomeini wanted to appeal to all Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites, even as he was scornful of the idea of nationalism within the Islamic umma. The revolution entrenched Iran’s historic uniqueness in the region – its Persian roots and Shiite faith, but it could not purchase faithful followers beyond its borders. The only exception has been Syria that has allied with Iran, and in this century the accidental addition of Iraq – thanks to the ill-advised Bush-Blair misadventure in Iraq.
From a domestic standpoint, President Raisi’s funeral, in terms of attendance and public grief, reportedly fell far short of the 2020 funeral of Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian General who was assassinated on the orders of US President Trump. Notable absentees were Iran’s living past presidents, some of whom have been more effective in establishing relative presidential autonomy, unlike the late Ebrahim Raisi who was believed to be more of a fig leaf President to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
Khamenei was Iran’s President under Ayatollah Khomeini’s, and became the Supreme Leader in 1989, following Khomeini’s death and allegedly thwarting the succession pursuit of Khomeini’s son. Now with President Raisi gone, there is speculation that Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei could be a potential contender to succeed his father as the next Supreme Leader. That would be filial succession and could be seen as a betrayal of the revolution that ended the Pahlavi Dynasty,
by Jehan Perera
The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.
The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.
But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Proposed Laws
The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.
The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.
Civil Society
The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.
Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.
The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.
By Ramya Kumar
According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.
An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.
The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.
Top-down check-box activities
The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.
There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).
1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….
2: And with pictures and all…
1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”
2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..
1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…
2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!
1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.
2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…
Auditing everything but power
QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.
The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.
A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.
This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.
External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.
Rethinking university QA
Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.
QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)
. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.
Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.
The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.
Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.
The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.
Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor
Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!
This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.
Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.
Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!
For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.
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