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The beginning of the end for the regime, but no new beginning for the country

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by Rajan Philips

The countrywide people’s protests and the November 16 Colombo political protest have made one thing clear. The Rajapaksa brand is now irreparably damaged in the Sri Lankan political market. The regime is not going to fall tomorrow. The 160/60 budget vote in parliament proves that. For all the turmoil in the country, the Opposition Leaders cannot make all their MPs vote against the government on a budget that everyone is laughing about. But there is no mistaking the beginning of the end for the Rajapaksa hold on state power. The fall will be softened if the end and the exit are democratic and constitutional. It will turn hard and violent if extra-constitutional methods are unwisely deployed to stay in power by putting down protests. Such methods are foredoomed to fail in the end. The fury of the people is unmistakable and unstoppable. And in Sri Lanka’s social formations with myriads of kinship and old-school ties, the soldiers are more socialized than the state is militarized. Military-led Task Forces notwithstanding!

At the same time, the beginning of the end for the Rajapaksas is not automatically the start of a new beginning for the country. The prospects of the decline and fall of the Rajapaksa dynasty have triggered prognostications about who is best positioned to pick up the reins after the newest dynasty fall. In particular, the Colombo protest rally defying all attempts by the government to scuttle it, has inspired a flurry of commentaries and predictions on the political fortunes of Sajith Premadasa. In fact, the commentaries about him, be they for or against, are more cutting and colorful than what the man himself has to say about himself or his politics.

Contenders and Pretenders

Of all the opposition detractors of the regime, Mr. Premadasa has the largest parliamentary contingent and electoral following. But he is yet to make a convincing impact on the people about his own self-belief and political intentions. Among other contenders, if not pretenders, Champika Ranawaka is by far the biggest self-believer in his own qualifications, credentials, and even destiny, to become President – one day. But he also has the thinnest of a political base or presidential launch pad. The JVP/NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake has been consistently scoring high marks among seasoned political observers and politically sensitized middle classes – including those who would rather have him not say anything about socialism. Recently, he has even exorcised the JVP of its 1980s (second coming) past. How that will reward the JVP in an election is still a known unknown.

Speculations and contentions are rife about who should/would take the lead in the emerging vacuum and how ‘new’ alliances are likely to be formed. There is something common about these speculations, and it is also the same thing that is missing from them. More often than not, speculations are predicated on past political experiences, on one or more versions and interpretations of past experiences. This is inevitable in political commentary and analysis. You look (longitudinally) to the past for comparison, and/or (cross-sectionally) to other societies for similarities and differences. But at times, past comparisons are becoming ‘period narratives’ of historical parallels, akin to period (historical) dramas in television entertainment.

What seems to be getting missed, or not sufficiently emphasized, is the specific set of current circumstances in Sri Lanka. Some of them are even unique, either when looked back to the past, or looked across among other societies. Apart from commentators, and among frontline political leaders, only Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Champika Ranawaka come anywhere close to formulating anything substantial in interpreting the current situation and suggesting a response to it. This is quite different from the 1950s and 1960s when Sri Lanka’s parliament dominated the national discourses on politics, political economy, and yes, the constitution. The Hansard then was the go-to reference book for academics and journalists. Now, what is produced in parliament might be too toxic to qualify even for the President’s organic fertilizer specifications. And the challenges facing parliament and the country are far more daunting than what they were facing then.

Even as parallels go, it would be a stretch to see parallels between now and say 1964 or 1970, if not 1977. When a Political Scientist contrived a parallel between SWRD Bandaranaike’s electoral defeat in 1952 and Sajith Premadasa’s in 2019, an Emeritus Engineering Professor dismissed it as trying to find parallels between skew lines in 3-D space! Inasmuch as we are discussing the displacement of the Rajapaksa alliance potentially by a new alliance led by Sajith Premadasa, it is possible to see some similarities between 1994 regime change and what might happen as the final act in the current scenario. There are also significant differences.

1994 and 2021

In 1994, the UNP government after 17 years in power was long past toppling time. The UNP had accomplished many significant feats – a new constitution, the open economy, accelerated Mahaweli development, countrywide housing schemes, Test Cricket status etc. Many of them were controversial, not all of them beneficial, and some of them patently harmful. After 1994, the SLFP, its offshoots and their allies have been in power for 27 years, but with a clear internal break that came about in 2005. For eleven years between 1994 and 2005, it was Chandrika Kumaratunga who was at the helm, and she has been the only President in 43 years of the presidential system, to serve two full elected terms and retire in accordance with JRJ’s Constitution.

From 2005 to the present, it has been the Rajapaksa dynasty, and if President Gotabaya Rajapaksa were to serve out his full term till 2024/25, the dynasty would have lasted a full twenty years, including the five-year yahapalana interregnum. In fairness, this is only President GR’s second year of his first term. But he has come at the tail end of a tired family tenure. And although his admirers have been expecting him to magically rejuvenate the family, its power and, as a side effect, even the country, President Rajapaksa is presiding over withering family power and a suffering country. As in 1994, it is getting to be past toppling time. But there is a difference. There is no People’s Alliance or anything that can be seen as a parallel.

What is crucially missing is not the absence of a figure like Chandrika Kumaratunga who was seized by charisma in 1994 and led the PA to spectacular victories. What is crucial in missing is the groundswell of politics that sustained the People’s Alliance as a movement and energized its electoral machinery at every level and in every corner in the country. In his “Analysis of the Southern Provincial Council Election in 1994,” W. A. Wisva Warnapala recounts this dynamic and its effects in the South. They were successfully carried over to the presidential and the parliamentary election campaigns later that same year. There is no denying that President Kumaratunga’s achievements in office equally spectacularly fell short of her campaign promises. That disappointment 20 years ago raises key questions for the campaigns of today.

On the one hand, the organizational strength of the PA is not there today. On the other, all the institutional and individual factors that led to President Kumaratunga’s failures are abundantly present and even multiplied today. And the challenges facing the government and the country today are far more severe than they have been for any previous government. What is unique to today’s circumstances is the anger of the people against the government, against its incompetence and its insensitivity. The government is on the ropes because of the people’s anger and their spontaneous protests. If the government’s impending fall is a given, what cannot be taken for granted is that those who replace the Rajapaksas will govern differently and start a new beginning for the country.

Let us take the three factors differentiating 1994 from today – organizational strength in the campaign; institutional and individual failings in government; and new challenges facing the government and the country. In building up its organizational strength, the PA benefited from the fact that its constituent parties have been out of government for 17 years, and from the presence of new faces among its frontline leaders. Neither is the case today. There are no new faces today. And the current opposition parties are tarnished by their association with the betrayals and blunders of the Yahapalana administration.

The Yahapalana experience also seems to be making it difficult for the opposition parties and leaders to work towards a new alliance. These shortcomings, even if an SJB-led alliance were to come to power eventually in one or the other of the next elections, will fuse with the overall institutional failings within the state apparatus and make a new government to be no different from the current government, or its immediate predecessors. It will be, as the Yogi Berra saying goes, “Deja vu all over again”!

Fundamentally, nothing will change until political parties stop behaving as if they are in the pre-1977 political system. As I have been arguing recently, there have to be changes in how political parties operate, how they nominate candidates for elections, and once elected how parties and MPs work together constructively in parliament. Simply put, nothing is going to work if political parties and parliamentarians are not prepared to work together between elections. In the current situation, this work should be started in the current parliament by opposition MPs before the next elections, if they are honest and serious about governing differently after the elections. Although Sri Lanka is world apart from Germany in political ethos and culture, it will be instructive for any serious Sri Lankan MP to look at recent developments in Germany.

After 16 years, Angela Merkel and her centre-right Christian Democrats are being replaced in government by a new ‘traffic-light coalition’ led by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (red), and including the environmental Greens (green) and the business-friendly Federal Democratic Party (amber). The process of coalition forming went on for two months since the elections on September 26, to strike a governing agreement running into 177 pages. The agreement, reportedly based on firm continuity and bold changes, will be presented for ratification by the general membership of the three parties before the new government can assume office. This is expected to be in the second week of December. No one rushed, and no one wanted more power, a new amendment, or a new constitution.

In 1994, the People’s Alliance campaigned promising a new constitution and the abolishing of the executive presidency. Today, the present government is insisting on producing a new constitution drafted by an outside Committee of Experts. The government has not explained why a new constitution is needed if it is going to retain the existing presidential system. The real question is if this government, given its record so far on everything it has touched, can be trusted with the task of producing a new constitution.

Even informed constitutional observers seem to be missing this danger. The opposition parties have not pro-actively challenged the need for a new constitution. Instead, they seem to be waiting to react to the government’s unilateral draft when it is presented in parliament for adoption. What is needed is not a new constitution, but changes to election laws which may require amendments to the constitution. The opposition parties must push for new election laws even though their leading lights have not much credibility left after their pathetic record in the yahapalana government.

As for the new challenges facing the country, public health, public finance, economic hardships and climate change effects are new problems that were not there even five years ago – on the current scale and with potential to get worse. The present government has clearly demonstrated that it does not have the wherewithal to deal with them. For that, the people have turned against the government. The opposition parties can take advantage of the people’s anger against the government. But what do they have to show as alternative approaches before they get their turn to govern? Until this question is answered there will be no start of a new beginning for the country. Only the beginning of the end for the old regime.



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An opportunity to move from promises to results

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The local government elections, long delayed and much anticipated, are shaping up to be a landmark political event. These elections were originally due in 2023, but were postponed by the previous government of President Ranil Wickremesinghe. The government of the day even defied a Supreme Court ruling mandating that elections be held without delay. They may have feared a defeat would erode that government’s already weak legitimacy, with the president having assumed office through a parliamentary vote rather than a direct electoral mandate following the mass protests that forced the previous president and his government to resign. The outcome of the local government elections that are taking place at present will be especially important to the NPP government as it is being accused by its critics of non-delivery of election promises.

Examples cited are failure to bring opposition leaders accused of large scale corruption and impunity to book, failure to bring a halt to corruption in government departments where corruption is known to be deep rooted, failure to find the culprits behind the Easter bombing and failure to repeal draconian laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In the former war zones of the north and east, there is also a feeling that the government is dragging its feet on resolving the problem of missing persons, those imprisoned without trial for long periods and return of land taken over by the military. But more recently, a new issue has entered the scene, with the government stating that a total of nearly 6000 acres of land in the northern province will be declared as state land if no claims regarding private ownership are received within three months.

The declaration on land to be taken over in three months is seen as an unsympathetic action by the government with an unrealistic time frame when the land in question has been held for over 30 years under military occupation and to which people had no access. Further the unclaimed land to be designated as “state land” raises questions about the motive of the circular. It has undermined the government’s election campaign in the North and East. High-level visits by the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet ministers to these regions during a local government campaign were unprecedented. This outreach has signalled both political intent and strategic calculation as a win here would confirm the government’s cross-ethnic appeal by offering a credible vision of inclusive development and reconciliation. It also aims to show the international community that Sri Lanka’s unity is not merely imposed from above but affirmed democratically from below.

Economic Incentives

In the North and East, the government faces resistance from Tamil nationalist parties. Many of these parties have taken a hardline position, urging voters not to support the ruling coalition under any circumstances. In some cases, they have gone so far as to encourage tactical voting for rival Tamil parties to block any ruling party gains. These parties argue that the government has failed to deliver on key issues, such as justice for missing persons, return of military-occupied land, release of long-term Tamil prisoners, and protection against Buddhist encroachment on historically Tamil and Muslim lands. They make the point that, while economic development is important, it cannot substitute for genuine political autonomy and self-determination. The failure of the government to resolve a land issue in the north, where a Buddhist temple has been put up on private land has been highlighted as reflecting the government’s deference to majority ethnic sentiment.

The problem for the Tamil political parties is that these same parties are themselves fractured, divided by personal rivalries and an inability to form a united front. They continue to base their appeal on Tamil nationalism, without offering concrete proposals for governance or development. This lack of unity and positive agenda may open the door for the ruling party to present itself as a credible alternative, particularly to younger and economically disenfranchised voters. Generational shifts are also at play. A younger electorate, less interested in the narratives of the past, may be more open to evaluating candidates based on performance, transparency, and opportunity—criteria that favour the ruling party’s approach. Its mayoral candidate for Jaffna is a highly regarded and young university academic with a planning background who has presented a five year plan for the development of Jaffna.

There is also a pragmatic calculation that voters may make, that electing ruling party candidates to local councils could result in greater access to state funds and faster infrastructure development. President Dissanayake has already stated that government support for local bodies will depend on their transparency and efficiency, an implicit suggestion that opposition-led councils may face greater scrutiny and funding delays. The president’s remarks that the government will find it more difficult to pass funds to local government authorities that are under opposition control has been heavily criticized by opposition parties as an unfair election ploy. But it would also cause voters to think twice before voting for the opposition.

Broader Vision

The government’s Marxist-oriented political ideology would tend to see reconciliation in terms of structural equity and economic justice. It will also not be focused on ethno-religious identity which is to be seen in its advocacy for a unified state where all citizens are treated equally. If the government wins in the North and East, it will strengthen its case that its approach to reconciliation grounded in equity rather than ethnicity has received a democratic endorsement. But this will not negate the need to address issues like land restitution and transitional justice issues of dealing with the past violations of human rights and truth-seeking, accountability, and reparations in regard to them. A victory would allow the government to act with greater confidence on these fronts, including possibly holding the long-postponed provincial council elections.

As the government is facing international pressure especially from India but also from the Western countries to hold the long postponed provincial council elections, a government victory at the local government elections may speed up the provincial council elections. The provincial councils were once seen as the pathway to greater autonomy; their restoration could help assuage Tamil concerns, especially if paired with initiating a broader dialogue on power-sharing mechanisms that do not rely solely on the 13th Amendment framework. The government will wish to capitalize on the winning momentum of the present. Past governments have either lacked the will, the legitimacy, or the coordination across government tiers to push through meaningful change.

Obtaining the good will of the international community, especially those countries with which Sri Lanka does a lot of economic trade and obtains aid, India and the EU being prominent amongst these, could make holding the provincial council elections without further delay a political imperative. If the government is successful at those elections as well, it will have control of all three tiers of government which would give it an unprecedented opportunity to use its 2/3 majority in parliament to change the laws and constitution to remake the country and deliver the system change that the people elected it to bring about. A strong performance will reaffirm the government’s mandate and enable it to move from promises to results, which it will need to do soon as mandates need to be worked at to be long lasting.

by Jehan Perera

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From Tank 590 to Tech Hub: Reunited Vietnam’s 50-Year Journey

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The fall of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City – HCM) on 30 April 1975 marked the end of Vietnam’s decades-long struggle for liberation—first against French colonialism, then U.S. imperialism. Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh, formed in 1941, fought Japanese occupiers and later defeated France at Dien Bien Phu (1954). The Geneva Accords temporarily split Vietnam, with U.S.-backed South Vietnam blocking reunification elections and reigniting conflict.

The National Liberation Front (NLF) led resistance in the South, using guerrilla tactics and civilian support to counter superior U.S. firepower. North Vietnam sustained the fight via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, despite heavy U.S. bombing. The costly 1968 Tet Offensive exposed U.S. vulnerabilities and shifted public opinion.

Of even more import, the Vietnam meat-grinder drained the U.S. military machine of weapons, ammunition and morale. By 1973, relentless resistance forced U.S. withdrawal. In March 1975, the Vietnamese People’s Army started operations in support of the NLF. The U.S.-backed forces collapsed, and by 30 April the Vietnamese forces forced their way into Saigon.

At 11 am, Soviet-made T-54 tank no. 843 of company commander Bui Quang Than rammed into a gatepost of the presidential palace (now Reunification Palace). The company political commissar, Vu Dang Toan, following close behind in his Chinese-made T-59 tank, no. 390, crashed through the gate and up to the palace. It seems fitting that the tanks which made this historic entry came from Vietnam’s principal backers.

Bui Quang Than bounded from his tank and raced onto the palace rooftop to hoist the NLF flag. Meanwhile, Vu Dang Toan escorted the last president of the U.S.-backed regime, Duong Van Minh, to a radio station to announce the surrender of his forces. This surrender meant the liberation not only of Saigon but also of the entire South, the reunification of the country, and a triumph of perseverance—a united, independent nation free from foreign domination after a 10,000-day war.

Celebrations

On 30 April 2025, Vietnam celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Liberation of the South and National Reunification. HCM sprouted hundreds of thousands of national flags and red hammer-and-sickle banners, complemented by hoardings embellished with reminders of the occasion – most of them featuring tank 590 crashing the gate.

Thousands of people camped on the streets from the morning of 29 April, hoping to secure good spots to watch the parade. Enthusiasm, especially of young people, expressed itself by the wide use of national flag t-shirts, ao dais (traditional long shirts over trousers), conical hats, and facial stickers. This passion may reflect increasing prosperity in this once impoverished land.

The end of the war found Vietnam one of the poorest countries in the world, with a low per capita income and widespread poverty. Its economy struggled due to a combination of factors, including wartime devastation, a lack of foreign investment and heavy reliance on subsistence agriculture, particularly rice farming, which limited its potential for growth. Western sanctions meant Vietnam relied heavily on the Soviet Union and its socialist allies for foreign trade and assistance.

The Vietnamese government launched Five-Year Plans in agriculture and industry to recover from the war and build a socialist nation. While encouraging family and collective economies, it restrained the capitalist economy. Despite these efforts, the economy remained underdeveloped, dominated by small-scale production, low labour productivity, and a lack of modern technology. Inflexible central planning, inept bureaucratic processes and corruption within the system led to inefficiencies, chronic shortages of goods, and limited economic growth. As a result, Vietnam’s economy faced stagnation and severe hyperinflation.

These mounting challenges prompted the Communist Party of Vietnam to introduce Đổi Mới (Renovation) reforms in 1986. These aimed to transition from a centrally planned economy to a “socialist-oriented market economy” to address inefficiencies and stimulate growth, encouraging private ownership, economic deregulation, and foreign investment.

Transformation

Đổi Mới marked a historic turning point, unleashing rapid growth in agricultural output, industrial expansion, and foreign direct investment. Early reforms shifted agriculture from collective to household-based production, encouraged private enterprise, and attracted foreign investment. In the 2000s, Vietnam became a top exporter of textiles, electronics, and rice, shifting towards high-tech manufacturing (inviting Samsung and Intel factories). By the 2020s, it emerged as a global manufacturing hub, the future focus including the digital economy, green energy, and artificial intelligence.

In less than four decades, Vietnam transformed from a poor, agrarian nation into one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, though structural reforms are still needed for sustainable development. Growth has remained steady, at 5-8% per year.

Vietnam’s reforms lifted millions out of poverty, created a dynamic export-driven economy, and improved education, healthcare, and infrastructure. This has manifested itself in reducing extreme poverty from 70% to 1%, increasing literacy to 96%, life expectancy from 63 to 74 years, and rural electrification from less than 50% to 99.9%. Industrialisation drove urbanisation, which doubled from 20% in 1986 to 40% now.

This change displayed itself during the celebrations in HCM, amid skyscrapers, highways and the underground metro system. Everybody dressed well, and smartphones could be seen everywhere – penetration has reached three-fourths of the population. Thousands turned out on motorbikes and scooters (including indigenous electric scooters) – two-wheeler ownership is over 70%, the highest rate per capita in ASEAN. Traffic jams of mostly new cars emphasised the growth of the middle class.

At the same time, street food vendors and makeshift pavement bistro owners joined sellers of patriotic hats, flags and other paraphernalia to make a killing from the revellers. This reflects the continuance of the informal sector– currently representing 30% of the economy.

The Vietnamese government channelled tax income from booming sectors into underdeveloped regions, investing in rural infrastructure and social welfare to balance growth and mitigate urban-rural inequality during rapid economic expansion. Nevertheless, this economic transformation came with unequal benefits, exacerbating income inequality and persistent gender gaps in wages and opportunities. Sustaining growth requires tackling corruption, upgrading workforce skills, and balancing development with inequality.

NLF flag

Tank 390 courtesy Bao Hai Duong

The parade itself, meticulously carried out (having been rehearsed over three days), featured cultural pageants and military displays and drew admiration. Of special note, the inclusion of foreign military contingents from China, Laos, and Cambodia for the first time signalled greater regional solidarity, acknowledging their historical support while maintaining a balanced foreign policy approach.

Veteran, war-era foreign journalists noted another interesting fact: the re-emergence of the NLF flag. Comprising red and blue stripes with a central red star, this flag had never been prominent at the ten-year anniversary celebrations. The journalists questioned its sudden reappearance. It may be to give strength to the idea of the victory being one of the South itself, part of a drive to increase unity between North and South.

Before reunification in 1975, North and South Vietnam embodied starkly contrasting economic and social models. The North operated under a centrally planned socialist system, with collectivised farms and state-run industries. It emphasised egalitarianism, mass education, and universal healthcare while actively preserving traditional Vietnamese culture. The South, by contrast, maintained a market-oriented economy heavily reliant on agricultural exports (rice and rubber) and foreign aid. A wealthy elite dominated politics and commerce, while Western—particularly American—cultural influence grew pervasive during the war years.

Following reunification under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1976), the government moved swiftly to integrate the two regions. In 1978, it introduced a unified national currency (the đồng, VND), merging the North’s and South’s financial systems into a single, state-controlled framework. The unification of monetary policy symbolised the broader ideological project: to erase colonial and capitalist legacies.

Unity and solidarity

However, the economic disparities and cultural divides between regions persist, though less pronounced than before. The South, particularly HCM, remains Vietnam’s economic powerhouse, with a stronger private sector and international trade connections. The North, including Hanoi, has a more government-driven economy. Southerners tend to have a more entrepreneurial mindset, while Northerners are often seen as more traditional and rule-bound. Conversely, individuals from the North occupy more key government positions.

Studies suggest that people in the South exhibit lower trust in the government compared to those in the North. HCM tends to have stronger support for Western countries like the United States, while Hanoi has historically maintained closer ties with China. People in HCM tend to use the old “Saigon” city name.

Consequently, the 50th anniversary celebrations saw a focus on reconciliation and unity, reflecting a shift in perspective towards peace and friendship, as well as accompanying patriotism with international solidarity.

The exuberant crowds, modern infrastructure, and thriving consumer economy showcased the transformative impact of Đổi Mới—yet lingering regional disparities, informal labour challenges, and unequal gains remind the nation that sustained progress demands inclusive reforms. The symbolic return of the NLF flag and the emphasis on unity underscored a nuanced reconciliation between North and South, honouring shared struggle while navigating enduring differences.

As Vietnam strides forward as a rising Asian economy, it balances its socialist legacy with global ambition, forging a path where prosperity and patriotism converge. The anniversary was not just a celebration of the past but a reflection on the complexities of Vietnam’s ongoing evolution.

(Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute. He is a convenor of the Asia Progress Forum, which can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com.)

By Vinod Moonesinghe

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Hectic season for Rohitha and Rohan and JAYASRI

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Rohitha and Rohan: Doing it in London … for kidney patients in Sri Lanka

The Sri Lanka music scene is certainly a happening place for quite a few of our artistes, based abroad, who are regularly seen in action in our part of the world. And they certainly do a great job, keeping local music lovers entertained.

Rohitha and Rohan, the JAYASRI twins, who are based in Vienna, Austria, are in town, doing the needful, and the twosome has turned out to be crowd-pullers.

Says Rohitha: Our season here in Sri Lanka, and summer in the south hemisphere (with JAYASRI) started in October last year, with many shows around the island, and tours to Australia, Japan, Dubai, Doha, the UK, and Canada. We will be staying in the island till end of May and then back to Austria for the summer season in Europe.”

Rohitha mentioned their UK visit as very special.

The JAYASRI twins Rohan and Rohitha

“We were there for the Dayada Charity event, organised by The Sri Lankan Kidney Foundation UK, to help kidney patients in Sri Lanka, along with Yohani, and the band Flashback. It was a ‘sold out’ concert in Leicester.

“When we got back to Sri Lanka, we joined the SL Kidney Foundation to handover the financial and medical help to the Base Hospital Girandurukotte.

“It was, indeed, a great feeling to be a part of this very worthy cause.”

Rohitha and Rohan also did a trip to Canada to join JAYASRI, with the group Marians, for performances in Toronto and Vancouver. Both concerts were ‘sold out’ events.

They were in the Maldives, too, last Saturday (03).

Alpha Blondy:
In action, in
Colombo, on
19th July!

JAYASRI, the full band tour to Lanka, is scheduled to take place later this year, with Rohitha adding “May be ‘Another legendary Rock meets Reggae Concert’….”

The band’s summer schedule also includes dates in Dubai and Europe, in September to Australia and New Zealand, and in October to South Korea and Japan.

Rohitha also enthusiastically referred to reggae legend Alpha Blondy, who is scheduled to perform in Sri Lanka on 19th July at the Air Force grounds in Colombo.

“We opened for this reggae legend at the Austria Reggae Mountain Festival, in Austria. His performance was out of this world and Sri Lankan reggae fans should not miss his show in Colombo.”

Alpha Blondy is among the world’s most popular reggae artistes, with a reggae beat that has a distinctive African cast.

Calling himself an African Rasta, Blondy creates Jah-centred anthems promoting morality, love, peace, and social consciousness.

With a range that moves from sensitivity to rage over injustice, much of Blondy’s music empathises with the impoverished and those on society’s fringe.

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