I. Imminent Danger

While the economy of Sri Lanka has achieved some degree of stabilisation after the most dire crisis in history, progress along a growth trajectory remains a clear imperative. Fragility of the current situation has been massively increased by the devastating tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration, making our country’s exports to the United States – especially apparel and rubber products – starkly vulnerable.

Against this backdrop the GSP+ facility, affording preferential access to the vast markets of the European Union, becomes a lifeline for our exports. Exemption from import duty for a wide array of products involves an advantage of immense value.

This is, however,neither a right nor an entitlement, and its availability is by no means assured in perpetuity. Its continued enjoyment is conditional upon compliance with provisions contained in 27 treaties, principally the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Aspects of this have been incorporated into the domestic legal system of Sri Lanka, by legislation in the drafting of which,as Minister of Export Development and International Trade, I played a key role in 2007.

GSP+ privileges for Sri Lanka are now coming up for review, with a delegation from Brussels expected to arrive very shortly.

One of Sri Lanka’s abiding commitments is a fundamental modification of the Online Safety Act, No. 9 of 2024, an unforgiving onslaught on media freedom, which was vehemently opposed by political parties across the spectrum, and representatives of the media and civil society. Despite the outrageous contents of the Act, no action whatever has been taken up to now, to amend this legislation. There is no doubt that this situation, if it is allowed to continue, will gravely impede vital interests in respect of our international trade. Certainly, the government’s professed intention of enhancing the value of exports to the European Union to the threshold of 3.6 billion dollars in the short term, will be reduced to a fanciful expectation.It is, therefore, a matter of urgent practical importance to identify the most obnoxious features of the law and to set in motion the legislative procedures necessary to effect their repeal or radical reform.

II. Overbroad Definition of Offences

A defect going to the very root of the legislation is a definition which is strikingly vague and overbroad: “Any person, whether in or outside Sri Lanka, who poses a threat to national security, public health or public order or promotes feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of people, by communicating a false statement, commits an offence” (Section 12).

The central criterion itself is an attack on basic democratic values. There has been judicial recognition of the reality that “Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” (New York Times vs. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 at p. 270 – 1 (1964). The solution, in a democratic culture, is not suppression but refutation of falsehood through enhanced engagement and challenge.

The central objection is to the use of subjective language like “ill-will” and “hostility” as elements of the definition of a penal offence carrying condign penalties, including long periods of rigorous imprisonment. Inherent vagueness leads to unpredictability of consequences.

Equally compelling considerations apply to the use of “national security” as a lever for restraint on expression and publication. Public policy, as set out in the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (Preamble to UN Document E/CN 4/1996/39), adopted on 1 October 1995, emphasises the need “to discourage governments from using the pretext of national security to place unjustified restrictions on the exercise of freedom of speech and expression”.

It is the absence of necessary qualification that violates the basic ethos of a democratic society.A “threat” to national security, public health or public order as the basis of restriction on free speech and communication is unacceptable without essential limitation.The internationally accepted test of “clear and present danger”(Schenk vs. U.S. 249 U.S. 247 at p.52 (1919)) is in no way reflected as a qualifying element in the Sri Lankan legislation.

III. Overarching Authority of the Commission

The crux of the pivotal offence is a “false statement”. The truth or falsity of the statement complained of, is a matter to be determined at the untrammelled discretion of the Online Safety Commission, the central authority created by the law. It is composed of 5 members appointed by the President,with the concurrence of the Constitutional Council.

A vital circumstance is that members of the Online Safety Commission, unlike the membership of other independent Commissions established under the Constitution, are not recommended for appointment by the Constitutional Council. The initiative is that of the President, not the Constitutional Council, the function of the latter being confined to “approval” (Section 5 (1)). This is a marked, and in principle unacceptable, departure from the pattern of constitutional provisions governing the appointment of independent Commissions.

This difference of approach undeniably impacts public perceptions regarding performance of the Commission’s functions in a spirit of total independence – a result much to be regretted, in view of the awesome sweep of powers conferred on the Commission. These include the prohibition, by mere fiat of the Commission,of statements pertaining to a diversity of matters such as physical security,ethnic and religious harmony,disaffection to the State, personal wellbeing and privacy, and interference with the right of association.

In any event, given the invasion of seminal rights and freedoms as the direct consequence of exercise of the Commission’s powers, it is reasonable to assume the desirability of a process of consultation which would include, among others, internet service providers, internet intermediaries, and representatives of media organisations, as well as the professional, business and academic communities.

Incompatibility of scope and objectives of this Act with the irreducible norms of a functioning democracy is clear from judicial pronouncements of impeccable authority: “The freedom of speech and expression is one which cannot be denied without violating those principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions” (Mark Fernando J. in Amaratunga v. Sirimal, The Jana Ghose Case, S.C. Application No. 468/92).

The reality of this danger is reinforced by implications of the definition of a “false statement”, the anchor of criminal liability in terms of the Act: “A ‘false statement’ means a statement that is known or believed by the maker to be incorrect or untrue and is made especially with the intent to deceive or mislead but does not include a caution, an opinion or imputation made in good faith” (section 52). The manner of formulation suggests that the concluding phrase is in the nature of an exception from criminal liability, the burden of proof in this regard falling on the shoulders of the accused. In practice, this is an intolerably onerous burden.

In sum, the behemoth of the Commission is destructive of the foundations of civil liberty.

IV. Remoteness of Causal Nexus

One of the reasons why the law is indefensibly wide in its operation is the imposition of criminal liability for consequences which are not proximately linked to the conduct of the accused.It is declared to be an offence to communicate “a false statement which gives provocation to any person or incites any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation or incitement will cause the offence of rioting to be committed” (section 14).

In the envisaged situation, rioting is committed by a third party. Criminal liability on the part of the person communicating through an online account or online location, is grounded solely in assumed knowledge of likely behaviour of the third party. Indeed, criminal liability of the communicator is established, even when the consequence of rioting does not take place at all, the only difference being reduction of sentence (section 14 (f)). Similarly, the communicator of the statement is held criminally responsible for disturbance of a religious assembly, with no clear nexus being insisted upon between the act of the accused and the rioting which takes place (section 15)).

The net of criminal liability is cast far too wide by this approach, the lack of a sufficiently clear causal nexus being the underlying defect.

V. Expanding Frontiers of Criminalisation

A prominent feature of the Online Safety Act is the indiscriminate use of criminal sanctions to attain its objectives. A wide range of offences is created by Part III of the legislation. Many of these are of amorphous scope, lacking in precise definition of constituent elements – for example, “wantonly” giving provocation by a false statement to cause riot (section 14), “voluntarily” causing disturbance to a religious assembly (section 15) and “malicious” communication of a false statement to outrage religious feelings (section 16). The ambit of the offence against “public tranquillity” (section 19) is equally unclear. These are all offences which carry deterrent sentences of imprisonment, in one case for up to 3 years and in the other for a maximum of 7 years, in addition to, or as an alternative to, a substantial fine.

The Commission, on satisfaction that an offence has been committed under the Act, is empowered to “take steps to initiate criminal proceedings in terms of s. 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979” (section 38(2)). Moreover, every offence established by the Act is characterised as a non-cognisable offence within the meaning of the laws governing criminal procedure (section 43(a)).

Penal consequences of daunting severity are visited upon bodies corporate. Every director or other principal officer is held criminally responsible (section 44(a)). If the offender is a firm, criminal liability is imposed on every partner of the firm (section 44(b)) and, in the case of an unincorporated body, “every individual who is a controlling member and every principal officer responsible for management and control” (section 44(c)) is exposed to criminal sanctions. Lack of knowledge or exercise of due diligence is recognised as an exculpatory circumstance but, in keeping with general evidentiary principles, the burden of proof in this regard is borne by the accused.

VI. Chilling Effect of the Law

The core of the statute resides in the powers vested in the Commission, to apply an extensive range of measures to deal with “prohibited statements” (Part II). These include orders “to stop the communication of such statements” (section 11 (b)), “to disable access to an online location” (section 11 (c)) and to direct removal of prohibited statements (section 11 (e)). A worrying factor is the absence of a proper definition of “prohibited statements”, the purported definition consisting merely of a reference to the provisions which use the phrase (section 52).

When the Commission is satisfied that a “prohibited statement” has been made, its coercive powers which come into play, are of a drastic nature. These extend to the authority to issue a notice to the communicator of the statement, ordering the adoption of measures to prevent circulation (section 23 (f)). This renders applicable the draconian provision that the recipient of the notice “shall comply with such notice immediately but not later than 24 hours from such notice” (section 23 (b) and (f)). Failure results in criminal proceedings in a Magistrate’s Court (section 23 (g)).

The Commission has power to name an online location as a “declared online location” if 3 or more prohibited statements have been communicated on that location to end users in Sri Lanka (section 28 (i)). An internet service provider or an internet intermediary, on the making of such a declaration by the Commission, is obliged to cease communication instantly on pain of imprisonment for a term of up to 7 years or a maximum fine of 10 million rupees, the penalty being doubled in the event of a subsequent offence (section 29 (6)).

Especially in light of the broad definition of “inauthentic online account”, “internet service provider”, “internet intermediary” and “internet intermediary service” (section 52), the chilling effect of the law is evident.

It is hardly surprising, then, that prominent internet and technology companies active in Sri Lanka, in their response to the legislation, have sounded a strong note of caution, even indicating the risk of withdrawal from their operations in our country.

The Asian Internet Coalition (AIC) which consists of 13 companies of international stature, commenting on this legislation when it was in Bill form, declared: “Despite our commitment to constructive collaboration, the AIC has not been privy to proposed amendments to the Bill. We unequivocally stand by our position that the Online Safety Bill, in its current form, is unworkable and would undermine potential growth and direct foreign investment into Sri Lanka’s digital economy. We firmly believe that for the Bill to align with global best practices, extensive revisions are imperative” (Emergency Media Statement of 23 January 2024).

This can hardly be disregarded in cavalier fashion.As the government has emphatically acknowledged, digitalization and other technology innovations are central to current plans for economic development and, of equal importance, for ensuring equitable distribution of the benefits of progress. Swift and ready access to market information – be it for farmers, the fishing community, manufacturers of industrial products, providers of services and the small and medium sector in particular – is an indispensable requirement for the success of current strategies. If companies of the calibre of Facebook, Google,X,Apple,Amazon,Cloudflare and Yahoo,contemplate discontinuation of their services because of the oppressive character of the law, economic development, far from being advanced, is certain to be retarded.

VII. The Need for Imperative Change

Parliament debated the Online Safety Bill for 2 full days on 23 and 24 February 2024. Pervasive deficiencies of the law were convincingly identified during this rich and rewarding debate. No one was more forthright than the current Prime Minister, Dr. Harini Amarasuriya, at that time speaking from the ranks of the Opposition, in her unreserved condemnation of the Bill and her strident call for its withdrawal: “The intent of the Government is clear. It is about controlling dissent; it is about taking control of public discourse or public narrative at a crucial time in this country when democracy needs to be protected at all costs. That every instrument is gong to be used to stifle dissent, is very clear” (Hansard of 24 January 2024, Column 224).

The Online Safety Act stands as a monument to illiberalism and as an anchor of State apparatus infringing the substance of civil liberty. Its removal from the statute laws of our country is a dire necessity, no longer to be delayed.

By Professor G. L. Peiris
D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D.
(Sri Lanka);
Rhodes Scholar,Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London;
Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.

Just visualise the scenario where you spend years of your life building up a defence team in your body that remembers every invading enemy it has fought, from chickenpox to the flu, from pneumonia to skin infections and many, many, more. The body then goes on to build up a robust armamentarium to fight them the next time they attempt to cause trouble. This is what usually happens with our natural defence systems of the human body. The memory of the attackers is the thing that leads to war being declared on them subsequently.

Now, imagine a setting where disaster strikes in the form of some intruder who breaks in and erases those memories, leaving your body exposed and unprotected. We now know for sure that this is not a scene from a science fiction movie. It is a real thing that takes place in the human body, called Immune Amnesia; the word amnesia being a glorified term for forgetting something. It is a situation where the body “disremembers” how to fight off diseases it once defeated. This kind of immune memory loss leaves the body wide open to catching infections that one was previously protected against. It is not merely about getting sick again. It is about becoming vulnerable to a whole list of diseases, some of them serious, or even deadly.

The human immune system is like an army that defends the body against harmful invaders like bacteria and viruses. It has two main parts. One is the Innate Immune System, the first line of defence, a quick response team that is inherent in humans, which attacks anything unfamiliar. Humans are born with the capacity to direct this Innate Immune System to respond unreservedly to any harmful agent that invades the body. The second line of resistance of the human defensive army is the Adaptive Immune System, which is the smarter component that specifically remembers past infections and builds explicit and precise weapons to fight them off more efficiently when the perpetrators try to attack the body a second time. These weapons include antibodies and immune memory cells. Thanks to this adaptive immune system, if you had chickenpox as a child, your body remembers how to fight it. That is why one does not usually get it again. The flip side of the coin is that vaccines also work by training this adaptive memory system without one having to go through the actual disease. They are like military drills: safe practice sessions that teach the immune system to recognise and destroy certain pathogens before they get in and cause disease.

Think of your immune system as a vast library filled with records of every infection you have ever encountered. Each record contains information about the specific pathogen and instructions on how to fight it off. When you get a disease or receive a vaccine, new records are added to this library, ensuring that your body is prepared for future encounters.

This phenomenon of Immune Amnesia can occur after certain infections, most famously after contracting the measles virus. In recent years, scientists have come to understand this strange and troubling side effect of an illness that many once believed was simply “a childhood rite of passage.” Measles is not just a fever followed by a rash. It is one of the most contagious diseases known to man, and it can have long-lasting effects on the immune system, even after recovery. Studies in the last decade have shown that measles can erase 20% to 70% of the immune system’s memory. In other words, if you’ve had 100 disease-fighting memory cells, measles might destroy even up to 70 of them. As to how measles does it? Scientists believe that the virus attacks Immune Memory B cells and Memory T cells; these being the two types of specialised immune cells in the body that remember how to fight past infections. Once these cells are damaged or destroyed, your body has to start over from scratch, relearning how to fight infections it already knew how to handle before the “wiping out” of the process.

The really creepy part is that Immune Amnesia does not make you feel sick right away. You may feel perfectly fine after recovering from measles or a similar infection. But your immune system is now more vulnerable. A child who gets measles might recover from the rash and fever. But in the months or years that follow, they could get pneumonia, ear infections, or diarrhoea far more easily than before. These secondary infections can be dangerous, even fatal. In fact, before widespread vaccination, measles did not just kill children through the measles virus itself. Many died from other infections they caught in the months after measles had wiped out their immune memory. That is the reason why countries that introduced the measles vaccine not only saw a drop in measles cases, but also a drop in deaths from other diseases. It turns out that protecting against measles was protecting against a whole range of infections by safeguarding the memory of the immune system.

While measles is the best-known cause of immune amnesia, some scientists are exploring whether other infections might cause similar problems. There’s growing curiosity about whether certain viruses, like the flu viruses or even COVID-19, might temporarily reduce immune memory or even cause immune “confusion”, the latter term referring to a confused immune system attacking normal human tissues or exhibiting less effective responses against disease-causing organisms. While the research is still in early stages, one thing is clear: our immune systems are delicate. Some infections do not just challenge the body, they even rearrange the entire system.

This is where the conversation comes full circle. Vaccination is not just about avoiding a rash or a few days of fever. It is about protecting the long-term memory of your immune system. If you prevent measles through vaccination, you do not just avoid one disease. You also prevent your immune system from being reset and losing its ability to fight off dozens of others. This is why experts emphasise the importance of the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine. Despite its safety and effectiveness, some specific communities and groups of anti-vaxxers have become hesitant or sceptical about vaccines, often due to misinformation and disinformation. But studies have shown that in communities where vaccination rates drop, not only does measles come back, but so do many other infections. It is just like pulling a thread and watching an entire sweater unravel and disintegrate.

Immune amnesia also has consequences for entire populations, not just individuals. When a community is mostly vaccinated, herd immunity kicks in. This means that even people who cannot get vaccinated, like little babies or those with weak immune systems, are protected because the disease has nowhere to spread. But when vaccination rates fall and diseases like measles spread, immune amnesia weakens the immune systems of those who get infected. This creates a ripple effect where many other infections spread more easily, even to people who never had measles. In other words, immune amnesia can help fuel epidemics of other diseases. That is a very heavy price to pay for skipping a simple vaccine.

Immune amnesia is not just a curious biological fact. It is not just another strange scientific fact that might just blow away. It has very serious implications for public health. It could explain why some people get sick more often after recovering from certain infections, and it adds weight to the importance of vaccinations.

The good news is, immune amnesia can be prevented, and the solution is quite a bit straightforward. ONE CLEAR POSITIVE STEP IS TO GET VACCINATED AGAINST DISEASES, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT ARE KNOWN TO INDUCE IMMUNE AMNESIA. This is particularly important against measles. We need to educate the general public, and this article is a committed attempt to do just that. The society at large should intensely support the public health measures undertaken to facilitate satisfactory vaccination initiatives. If the general public has some concerns regarding vaccines and vaccination, they should promptly ask relevant questions from the proper authorities. It would be most unwise to be guided by portals such as social media.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) recently reported that measles cases in the European region more than doubled from 2023 to 2024, reaching about 127,000, the highest number since 1997. The increase has been linked to a lack of vaccination coverage. It is estimated that half a million children across some parts of the world, which comprises 53 countries in Europe and Central Asia, missed their first dose of the measles vaccine in 2023. Children aged 5 years or younger accounted for about 2 out of 5 cases of the highly transmissible infectious virus.

Immune amnesia is a powerful reminder of how interconnected our health profile really is. One little bug can undo years of carefully crafted immune protection, making the body forget how to fight off old foes. Measles is the best-known example, but scientists are watching for other culprits. The takeaway message is very clear: diseases like measles are not harmless childhood illnesses. They can cause long-term damage, even after the obvious symptoms are gone. Vaccines protect us not just from the disease, but from its deeper and widespread consequences, including Immune Amnesia. So, the next time you think of measles as just a spotty rash, remember that it also can wipe the slate clean, leaving your immune system defenceless and your body at woeful risk.

BY Dr B. J. C. Perera 
MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paed), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)

Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow of the Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child HealthSection Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal

(Part VIII of this article appeared yesterday)

Reflections on Perplexity in Sri Lankan Foreign Policy (1990-2024)

Since the end of the Cold War, the three geopolitical spheres of Sri Lanka have been significantly shifted.  At the same time, the internal politics and the economy have also faced intense volatility, moving from war to a post-war environment. However, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy moved without a clear strategic direction, often following an inconsistent, zigzagging path. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy objectives shifted frequently, driven more by internal political winds than by a coherent long-term vision. Hence, the country’s foreign policy was proceeding without a clear strategy, pursuing immediate yet undefined goals in an ad hoc manner. As a result, contradictions and inconsistencies became the hallmark of foreign policy. Decisions were often made on the spur of the moment, with little consideration for their alignment with other policy stances within the same administration.

Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was once staffed by internationally famed, highly skilled foreign policy professionals who possessed deep understanding of global affairs and international trends. These professionals provided essential guidance to political leadership, ensuring the country’s diplomatic effectiveness. However, mirroring broader governance deficits across various sectors of the state, the MFA has later gradually lost its skilled manpower and effectiveness. In particular, following the departure of Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who sought to restore order and proper procedures to the MFA, excessive politicisation and the lack of effective refresher programmes on global affairs and diplomacy have severely undermined the ministry’s ability to fulfill its crucial role during this challenging period. As a result, the MFA has struggled to formulate and implement a coherent foreign policy. Internal feuds among staff and the pursuit of political favour for lucrative diplomatic appointments have further eroded its focus on substantive diplomatic engagement. Consequently, the MFA has become increasingly ineffective in advancing Sri Lanka’s foreign policy objectives, reflecting the overall governance deficit facing the Sri Lankan state.

Policy, in general, consists of two fundamental components: clearly identifying and prioritising goals and objectives and developing effective strategies to achieve them. These elements work together to ensure that policies are actionable and aligned with desired outcomes. Policy-making is a dynamic and evolving process that requires continuous assessment of the context in which it operates. At the same time, without viable implementation mechanisms, even the most thoughtfully crafted policies remain theoretical rather than practical. Therefore, successful policy-making demands not only clear objectives and strategies but also robust structures for execution and adaptation to ensure policies translate effectively into real-world implementation.  By the same token, even a highly skilled implementation mechanism would become impotent without clearly prioritised objectives and a well-defined implementation strategy.  During this period, Sri Lanka struggled, to varying degrees, across all three key aspects of policy-making: setting clear objectives, developing effective strategies, and ensuring successful implementation.

The core element of foreign affairs is a state’s interaction with other states within the international system. While the scope and agency of foreign policy have expanded to include other actors and factors, the state still remains the dominant player.  According to Barry Buzan’s categorization (Buzan, 1991) of weak and strong states, Sri Lanka exemplifies a weak state–not due to its military capability or size, but because of its internal structural weaknesses, particularly a lack of socio-political cohesion.  Weak states are characterized by poor governance, low political cohesion, a legitimacy deficit, and ideological instability. When a state is structurally weak and insecure—especially a small state in the Global South—this insecurity is reflected in its foreign policy. In Sri Lanka’s case, its domestic vulnerabilities directly shape its foreign policy approaches. A weak state and politically threatened regimes can hardly adopt strong foreign policy stances.

Ethno-political vulnerability has been the primary factor consuming the energy and focus of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. It remains the central weakness of the state. There were several attempts to build an inclusive state by introducing structural changes to the system Sri Lanka inherited in 1948. However, many of these efforts were abandoned midway due to a lack of political courage and will, especially in the face of opposition. The new constitution proposed in1996, which included provisions for genuine power devolution to the regions, was delayed in an attempt to gain opposition support. Ultimately, it was effectively rejected in parliament. Meanwhile, the steady erosion of democracy and the politicisation of administrative institutions gradually undermined the legitimacy of the state. Economic mismanagement and corruption further weakened the economy. As a result, three key domestic vulnerabilities became defining features of Sri Lankan polity—ethnic, economic, and political.

The hard-fought military victory and the end of the war in 2009 presented a historic opportunity to transform negative peace into a positive peace by laying the foundation for an inclusive and stable state. However, Sri Lanka failed to seize this moment. As a result, new challenges relating to ethnic reconciliation emerged with new vigor in the post-war context and state’s ethnic vulnerabilities played a crucial role in shaping foreign policy, as issues such as transitional justice, accountability, and the full implementation of the 19th Amendment shifted from being purely domestic matters to central foreign policy issues. When different political leaders within the same government express contradictory views—or when the same leaders take inconsistent positions over time—Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomats struggle to justify the country’s stance before the international community. As a small state that is both economically and politically fragile, Sri Lanka cannot pursue a strong foreign policy without effectively addressing these domestic vulnerabilities.

Sri Lanka’s economic vulnerability stems from both structural weaknesses and internal mismanagement of the economy. As a developing economy in the Global South, the country has faced deep-rooted structural weaknesses that have left it dependent on external forces for economic stability. Sri Lanka’s economy has long faced structural deficiencies, relying heavily on key sources such as tourism, export-oriented garments, and remittances. Additionally, high levels of debt—primarily due to excessive borrowing from international creditors—have created a cycle of dependency on foreign aid and international financial institutions. Clearly demarcating the internal policy sphere from the external one is difficult, as structural economic vulnerabilities both influenced policy priorities and constrained the pursuit of a strong foreign policy.

Even more pressing issue is the mismanagement of the economy and widespread corruption, both of which have severely undermined Sri Lanka’s economic stability. Especially, the post-war governments have pursued unsustainable fiscal policies, excessive borrowing, and poor allocation of public resources. Corruption has further deepened the crisis, marked by allegations of fund misappropriation using political power, a lack of financial transparency, and nepotism in economic decision-making. These issues have eroded investor confidence, discouraged foreign direct investment, and contributed to capital flight. Given Sri Lanka’s reliance on foreign assistance and international financial institutions, its ability to take strong, independent stances on economic and political matters is significantly constrained. Economic survival often depends on complying with the conditions set by lenders. Economic vulnerabilities, stemming from the governments’ economic practices, significantly impact Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, often constraining its ability to act independently.

Ultimately, these vulnerabilities are directly linked to the modus operandi of governing regimes. But why did political leadership behave in this manner? The lack of vision cannot be solely attributed to the subjective traits of individual leaders. Rather, systemic and institutional factors play a crucial role in shaping decision-making. However, this does not absolve political leaders of responsibility for foreign policy failures. Too often, they prioritize personal political interests over national priorities, leading to governance and diplomatic shortcomings.

Even after the decisive military victory over the LTTE, the regime in power remained threatened and insecure. The deployment of armed squads—both in uniform and plainclothes—and the use of force against civilians engaged in legitimate, non-violent protests are not characteristics of a stable and confident regime. Instead, such actions reflect the behaviour of a weak state and a threatened leadership. Even before the Aragalaya, successive regimes repeatedly used military force against peaceful protesters, as seen in Katunayake (June 2011), Chilaw (February 2012), and Rathupaswala (August 2013). A state that feels threatened and insecure cannot pursue a strong foreign policy.

The insecurity of regimes arises from their weak and fragile social and economic foundations. A dependent and weak economy has failed to give birth to strong, independent, and self-sustaining economic elites. Instead, these elites rely heavily on the state for their economic survival. A defining feature of Sri Lankan politics is the emergence and dominance of a political class that alternates in power. This political class coincided with the expansion of the public sector. This paved the way for the political class to siphon on state resources using political power. As a result, economic decisions have often been driven by personal interests rather than national priorities— a dynamic that is also reflected in the country’s foreign policy.

After years of war, the Sri Lankan people, regardless of ethnic divisions, are yearning for political reforms to strengthen democracy and good governance. However, successive politically insecure regimes continue to falter in implementing democratic reforms, often prioritising their own survival over long-term institutional change. This is evident in the constant vacillation of political leaders and their contradictory statements to the international community. This insecurity is evident in the constant vacillation of political leaders regarding reform efforts, as well as their contradictory statements to the international community. What we are witnessing is a steady backsliding of democracy and the rise of authoritarian tendencies, which are characteristic of a weak regime.

The Aragalaya highlighted a crucial truth: economic crises are often the result of deep-seated political failures. Sri Lanka’s financial collapse was not merely a product of mismanaged economic policies but a consequence of prolonged corruption, governance deficit, and unchecked power. The economic collapse exposed how unchecked power, lack of transparency and poor decision-making can destabilise an entire economy, underscoring the urgent need for political accountability and structural reforms.

In the short term, urgent economic measures are necessary to mitigate the impact of bankruptcy and restore some level of financial stability. Debt restructuring, securing international assistance, promoting exports, and implementing fiscal discipline are critical steps in this process. A sustainable solution requires addressing the underlying political crisis that initially triggered economic turmoil. Without political reforms—such as strengthening democratic institutions, ensuring accountability, curbing corruption, and promoting inclusive governance—economic policies will not succeed. Economic stability, investor confidence, and sustainable growth all hinge on these reforms. Political reform is the sine qua non of a strong foreign policy.

One of the key responsibilities and challenges facing the new NPP government is pursuing a strong foreign policy with a strategic perspective. This is a formidable task that requires accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies appropriate for a small island state, and advancing them prudently while carefully assessing critical developments in regional and global political spheres. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a crucial instrument for implementing foreign policy, is currently in a state of disarray and confusion. Restoring stability through the de-politicisation of its administration and strengthening the professional development of its staff through targeted programmes remain urgent priorities.

Foreign policy is a key aspect of statecraft. Given its linkages to the policy spheres, foreign policy cannot be isolated from state’s broader policy directions. A comprehensive approach with well- defined policy orientation is essential.  The significance of a coordinated foreign policy with a strategic vision aligned with national interests has grown even more critical due to pivotal developments in Sri Lanka’s external geopolitical environment, making it no longer possible to continue responding in an ad-hoc manner.  How to pursue relative autonomy vis-à-vis India while getting benefits from India’s economic and scientific advancements is decided with a clear policy direction with realistic

understanding with our strengths and weaknesses.  Our role amid the emerging power competition between great powers in the Indian Ocean needs to be decided with a clear perception of our national interests. At the global level, the global shift of power balance that made 21st century an Asian century is critically important to a strategically located small state. Navigating Sri Lanka’s position in the highly volatile Indian Ocean where the direction of global power is decided requires a proper evaluation of our national priorities, rather than advancing the narrow self-interests of the ruling class.

A strong foreign policy depends on an objective evaluation of Sri Lanka’s national interests, which in turn requires a strong state. In the Buzanian sense, a strong state—marked by institutional stability, legitimacy, and internal cohesion—enables the pursuit of a coherent and independent foreign policy. Hence, the necessity of a strong foreign policy underscores the critical importance of comprehensive state reforms.  Political reforms aimed at dismantling entrenched political authority and economic power linked to it is essential for building a strong foreign policy. In the post-war years, political reforms have been held hostage by military victory and war triumphalism. However, critical state reforms can no longer be postponed.

State reforms are integral to democratic political reform. The link between democratic governance and a strong foreign policy is undeniable. A capable, depoliticized foreign policy workforce that provides informed policy input is essential for a healthy foreign policy. However, corruption, nepotism, and governance deficits—often tied to the dominance of the political class—undermine these efforts. This same class has also been a driving force behind democratic backsliding. Institutionalizing good governance and the rule of law requires comprehensive democratic reforms in both institutions and processes.

The thrust of the National People’s Power (NPP) government’s mandate centers on implementing long-overdue democratic reforms. These reforms are essential not only for strengthening internal governance but also for shaping a credible and effective foreign policy. In the long run, the success of the NPP’s foreign policy will depend on its ability to fulfill its domestic commitments to political and institutional reforms, one that aligns with both the aspirations of its people and international democratic standards. However, achieving comprehensive democratic reform is a gradual process that requires political will, courage and strategic planning. (Concluded)

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by Gamini Keerawella