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Midweek Review

Strengthening bilateral relations or opening doors for competition?

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President Dissanayake with Indian PM Modi in New Delhi (L) / President Dissanayake with Chinese President Jinping in Beijing (R)

President Dissanayake’s historic visits to India and China:

by Prof. Amarasiri de Silva

From December 15 to 17, 2024, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government took steps to ameliorate the geopolitical issues in the Indian Ocean region by paying diplomatic visits to India and China. The parliamentary election win by the NPP/JVP has raised suspicions that the new government might struggle to gain international confidence, partly due to the opposition’s portrayal of the NPP/JVP as stated by the president AKD at a rally in Maharagama recently. To move forward, one of the first steps the new government should take is to win over international confidence, especially from powerful neighbours like India and China. The visit made to India under invitation by the Indian government marked a significant advancement in this regard in the relationship between Sri Lanka and India. During his visit to India, President Dissanayake engaged in one-on-one discussions with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Droupadi Murmu, the first person from a tribal community and the second woman to hold this position. The conversations centred on enhancing collaboration in energy partnerships, regional security, trade, investment, and infrastructure development. Several agreements were signed, including a Memorandum of Understanding for the training and capacity-building of Sri Lankan civil servants and a Protocol to amend the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation.

Additionally, they released a joint statement titled ‘India-Sri Lanka Joint Statement-Fostering Partnerships for a Shared Future,’ which underscored their commitment to advancing the bilateral relationship. The Sri Lankan president gave an assurance that Sri Lanka would not allow any nation to engage in espionage against India within Sri Lankan Ocean waters.

Trip to China

Following his visit to India, Dissanayake’s trip to China is seen as a move to balance the influence of these two crucial regional powers, this journey reflects Sri Lanka’s strategic efforts to manage the influences of both China and India, which are critical for its economic revival. The Hambantota Port, leased to China Merchants Port Holdings in 2017 under a 99-year agreement, plays a key role in this context. The port’s strategic position along major shipping routes enhances China’s regional influence and illustrates the country’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Both leaders affirmed their commitment to a mutually beneficial comprehensive partnership in their Joint Statement. India will train 1,500 Sri Lankan civil servants over five years, and a new passenger ferry service will start between Rameshwaram (India) and Talaimannar (Sri Lanka), complementing the existing service between Nagapattinam (India) and Kankesanthurai (Sri Lanka). Additionally, the Kankesanthurai port in Sri Lanka will be redeveloped with grant assistance from the Government of India.

Regarding energy cooperation, the two countries will establish a high-capacity power grid interconnection, and India will supply liquified natural gas (LNG) to Sri Lanka. India, the United Arab Emirates, and Sri Lanka will jointly build a multiproduct pipeline from India to Sri Lanka to ensure safe and reliable energy. India will also support the Sampur solar power project in Sri Lanka and participate in the joint development of offshore wind power in the Palk Straits. Furthermore, the Trincomalee Tank Farms in Sri Lanka will be developed as a regional energy and industrial hub. A Joint Working Group will be set up to implement a Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) stack in Sri Lanka with Indian assistance, and another Joint Working Group will focus on agriculture. In terms of defence, India will train Sri Lankan defence forces, provide defence equipment, and conduct joint military exercises, maritime surveillance, and defence dialogue and exchanges with Sri Lanka. India will also help Sri Lanka develop disaster mitigation, relief, and rehabilitation capabilities and cooperate in hydrography. Both countries signed an agreement on the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) to boost investment in each other’s count. On the part of India this is a big undertaking.

‘Big Brother behaviour’    

       

The steps taken by India during the visit of President Dissanayake were an example of ‘big brother’ behaviour for some groups and politicians, meaning that India tried to lead and shape the policies of the newly elected president of Sri Lanka through its strategic interests. India has long been involved in Sri Lanka’s affairs as a dominant regional power. While some political analysts, including journalist Nirupama Subramaniam, claim that India’s influence over neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka has diminished over time, we believe the situation is quite different. The historical context indicates that India still plays a crucial role in shaping Sri Lanka’s policies and decisions. Some experts even argue that due to India’s significant economic assistance and support—especially during Sri Lanka’s recent financial crisis—the country has become increasingly reliant on India. This reliance gives India the ability to influence and guide Sri Lankan politics.

The substantial economic aid and backing from India have led to a scenario where Sri Lanka’s economic stability is closely linked to its relationship with India, further reinforcing India’s influence in the region. India has a rich history of engagement in Sri Lanka’s affairs as a leading regional power.

Some perceive these assurances—including the commitment to prevent Sri Lankan territory from being used against India’s interests—as indicative of President Dissanayake kowtowing to India’s position. This perception is rooted in the notion that such assurances are not merely diplomatic gestures but rather significant concessions aligning Sri Lanka’s strategic interests closely with India’s. Critics argue this alignment could undermine Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. They view these assurances as a reflection of President Dissanayake’s willingness to prioritise India’s concerns, possibly at the expense of Sri Lanka’s national interests. The dynamics of this relationship highlight the complex and often contentious nature of regional geopolitics, where smaller nations must navigate the pressures exerted by larger, more powerful neighbours. President Dissanayake’s stance, therefore, can be seen as a balancing act, attempting to maintain favourable relations with India while also managing domestic and international perceptions of sovereignty and independence. The view here holds that the actions of President Dissanayake represent a first in the region and a unique brand of diplomacy that is at variance with the policies pursued by all the other countries bordering India. These assurances are a strategic effort to maintain a positive relationship with India. However, they also raise concerns regarding Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and independence in foreign policy matters.

Power balance in SA

The consequences of these assurances could greatly influence regional dynamics and the power balance in South Asia. Some opposition groups and politicians in Sri Lanka have voiced their criticism of the agreements and policies stemming from the visit, claiming that they excessively favour India and compromise Sri Lanka’s autonomy. They argue that the new administration is too eager to meet India’s demands, which could jeopardize Sri Lanka’s national interests.

When reviewing the history of India’s diplomatic relations with Sri Lanka, India’s hostility and competitive stance over Sri Lanka becomes apparent. The year 1977 saw Sri Lanka take more extraordinary leaps toward a more market-oriented economy during the presidency of J.R. Jayewardene. This again made Sri Lanka the first among the South Asian countries to embark on broad-based economic liberalisation.

At the funeral of Ronnie de Mel, the then president Ranil Wickremesinghe said ‘Today, however, we witnessed a proliferation of shops, establishment of factories, and emergence of new urban centres—all thanks to the open economy policy. Moreover, following this economic liberalisation, Late President J.R. Jayawardena secured funding for major development projects. The construction of the Mahaweli scheme, large reservoirs, land development for agriculture, the Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte Parliament Complex, new infrastructure, roads, trade zones and housing programs all became possible due to his adept management of resources. He demonstrated remarkable skill in funding and overseeing these endeavors’

Economic transition

The regime of Jayewardene adopted a policy package that reconverted the country from a state-controlled economy to a market-oriented economy characterised by deregulation, privatisation, and foreign investment. This was contrary to the earlier socialist policies of state control and economic self-sufficiency. The government that preceded J.R. Jayewardene was headed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who led the country between 1970 and 1977. Her governance had been in the hands of a coalition set by the participation of leftist parties such as the Communist Party, and Lanka Sama Samaja party of Sri Lanka. The economic policy during the Bandaranaike regime focused on state-led development and self-sufficiency, primarily influenced by leftist politicians within the coalition government. The administration introduced measures to decrease reliance on imports, foster local industries, and nationalize essential sectors. However, these policies led to economic challenges, including high inflation and public dissatisfaction, and finally to an electoral defeat.

In opening the economy, Jayewardene sought to attract foreign investment, increase exports, and modernse sectors to align with Western economic principles of liberalisation, deregulation, and privatization, integrating Sri Lanka into the global economy. During the same period, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, India pursued a more diverse and multi-layered policy concerning Sri Lanka in response to Jayewardene’s open economic policy. Thus, Sri Lanka replaced its earlier socialism-oriented policies with one oriented toward modernisation and opening its economy to the global market. Such a policy led to geopolitical tensions. India was apprehensive about the consequences of Sri Lanka’s economic liberalisation, especially Jayewardene’s adherence to Western economic principles and his cozy relations with the United States. JR was nicknamed “Yanki Dickie”. India was not particularly pleased with this change. The Indian government under Indira Gandhi saw the growing Western influence in its neighbour as an ominous portent. Jayewardene’s foreign policy, like American policy, earned him the sobriquet “Yankie Dickie.” The pro-Western stance of Jayewardene was an eyesore for India, and it carried geopolitical implications. The open economic policy was in contrast with India’s. Colombo thus viewed it as an invitation to all who would be considered a potential competitor for its regional strategic interests. Therefore, Sri Lanka’s new economic orientation constituted a departure from the traditional non-aligned stance, which had earlier been the hallmark of Colombo’s foreign policy.

India’s suspicions

India’s suspicions led it to attempt to influence Sri Lanka through various methods, including backing Tamil separatist groups in the northern districts. This support for Tamil separatists was a strategic decision by India aimed at countering the perceived threat posed by Sri Lanka’s economic liberalization. India provided training and support to these groups to create instability in the northern province of Sri Lanka, which had concentrated Tamil populations. This included training camps for guerrilla warfare and other combat techniques in India. The trained militants were sent back to Sri Lanka for combat actions to have a separate Tamil state, thus extending violence and unrest in the region, which destabilized Sri Lanka for nearly 30 years.

This support formed part of India’s broader geopolitical strategy of maintaining its influence in South Asia and deterring any perceived threats to its strategic interests. In supporting Tamil separatist groups, India sought to exercise influence over the Sri Lankan government to ensure that Sri Lanka would not act as a conduit for extra-regional influences that could undermine India’s regional hegemony. However, this support came with a significant cost to Sri Lanka in terms of internal stability and economic development. The violence and unrest in this northern province drew away resources and attention from economic reforms and other development projects. They created an environment of uncertainty and instability that discouraged foreign investment and hindered growth.

In other words, India viewed the new open economic policy under the leadership of JR Jayewardene as a perceived threat to its influence in the region. It continued its support for the Tamil separatist groups in Sri Lanka as part of a broad geopolitical strategy to counter it. However, this came at the expense of significant internal costs for stability and economic development in Sri Lanka, which underlines the complex interaction of geopolitics and monetary policy in the region. India’s role in Sri Lanka’s civil conflict, had its own cost as well, primarily through the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight against the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), led to considerable tensions. The LTTE, feeling betrayed by India’s actions, grew increasingly hostile towards the country. This animosity reached a tragic peak with the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, carried out by a suicide bomber linked to the LTTE named Kalaivani Rajaratnam, alias Thenmozhi Rajaratnam, who was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Gandhi’s assassination was a direct result of India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, underscoring the complex and often perilous consequences of geopolitical involvement in regional disputes.

Sri Lanka and Singapore

The case of Sri Lanka is often compared with Singapore’s in economic development discussions because of their similarities in strategic location, population size, and historical context. Both island nations have the potential to emerge as economic powerhouses. It was in 1977 that the economy took a concrete turn towards market-oriented economic development under the open economic policy introduced by President J.R. Jayewardene. This considerable leap was intended to bring more foreign investment and higher exports by modernizing different sectors of the economy. If the subsequent governments had carried on with the open economic policy of JR, Sri Lanka might have achieved economic success comparable to Singapore’s.

One of the reasons for Singapore’s economic success has been its consistent liberalisation and openness to foreign investment. Had Sri Lanka not deviated from Jayewardene’s policies, it could have joined the rapid industrialisation and infrastructural modernization. The continuous inflow of foreign capital would have promoted technological advancements, improved public services, and enhanced the quality of life for many Sri Lankans.

Sri Lanka is well-placed in the Indian Ocean to perform the role of an international hub for trade. If it had continuously pursued open economy policies, the country could have emerged as a significant trading hub like Singapore. This would have brought substantial port facilities with free trade zones and efficient logistical networks that house companies from most parts of the world to boost their exporting capabilities and bring rapid economic growth.

In this regard, political stability is paramount for sustained economic development. Consistent and stable governance, in the form of well-defined policies and efficient institutions, would create an enabling environment wherein the business sector could flourish. This would encourage long-term investment and innovation, leading to a better distribution of economic benefits within the populace.  What is required is investment in education and enhancement of skills for a competitive workforce. With more substantial investment in education and vocational training, Sri Lanka could have developed a highly skilled labour force to support high-tech industries and services, thus developing its human capital to ease the transition into a productivity-driven and knowledge-based economy. The situation was very well studied by India, whose plans were to disrupt the process that would lead to financial leadership of Sri Lanka in the region.

Yet, the reality is considerably more complex. Political change combined with civil war and economic dynamics shaped the financial fortunes of Sri Lanka. The successive regimes failed to pursue Jayewardene’s open economic policy to its logical conclusion. Lack of political will, instability, and the protracted civil war siphoned resources and interest from economic development. The interplay of factors such as major trade union action initiated by leftist politicians and the then JVP has destroyed the country’s economic journey. The international outlook and local economic policies of the new Sri Lankan government indicate that they have reconstituted the policies where Jayewardene (JRJ) left.

This indicates a continuation and revitalization of the economic strategies and international relations initiated during JRJ’s tenure, with the goal of further integrating Sri Lanka into the global economy while addressing contemporary challenges and opportunities. It represents a significant shift from the former JVP stance on Indian expansion that Wijeweera advocated.

India and open economy

India adopted the open economic policy in 1991, popularly known as the New Economic Policy, during the Prime Ministership of P. V. Narasimha Rao and the Finance Ministership of Dr. Manmohan Singh. Narasimha Rao was the first person from South India and the second person from a non-Hindi-speaking background to be the prime minister. His open economic policy reforms rescued the country from going towards bankruptcy during the economic crisis of 1991. This policy opened the Indian economy to the world, boosting the importation of raw materials, deregulating markets, and attracting foreign investment. Unlike in Sri Lanka, this policy was pursued and developed by successive governments, which led to India’s robust economy. The 1991 reforms addressed the immediate balance of payments crisis by opting for market-oriented, globally integrated reform. This constituted a sharp turnaround from the protectionist policy stance of yesteryears and provided an opportunity for all-round future development.

J.R. Jayewardene’s Open Economic Policy engendered tremendous criticism from politicians and scholars inclined toward the Left. They said his policies facilitated the privatization and sale of state-owned enterprises to hinder the country’s economic sovereignty and its people’s well-being. They say such a liberalization policy favours foreign investors and local elites while the masses struggle because of economic stringencies and the withdrawal of public services.

 One of the most frequently cited remarks in discussions about President Jayewardene’s bold and sometimes controversial economic liberalization in Sri Lanka is his declaration: ‘Let the robber barons come!’ This statement represents the decision to open Sri Lanka’s economy to foreign investors and private enterprises, even at the risk of exploitation by large foreign business interests, particularly from the USA. The reforms initiated by Jayewardene marked a significant shift from the previous socialist orientation of the economy, specifically aimed at attracting foreign capital to drive rapid economic growth. The Accelerated Mahaweli program serves as a prime example of this initiative.

Geopolitical landscape

In today’s geopolitical landscape, where India is rising as a global power, Jayewardene’s quote becomes particularly relevant considering India’s assertive stance towards Sri Lanka. The parallels between Jayewardene’s era and the current situation under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake highlight the influence of powerful nations, especially India, on Sri Lanka’s economic and political strategies. The NPP government’s development initiatives, such as the oil refinery project supported by Chinese investment, which aims to sell or export surplus oil, could challenge India’s economic dominance, given that India refines and exports Russian crude oil. In this context, the NPP government must remain vigilant about potential threats from India, reminiscent of those faced during Jayewardene’s administration. India will likely hold Dissanayake accountable for strengthening ties with China, India’s most significant regional competitor, particularly regarding the oil refinery project. AKD’s government should cautiously approach the various overtures from India, as they often serve India’s interests rather than being motivated by genuine concern for Sri Lanka.



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Midweek Review

Daya Pathirana killing and transformation of the JVP

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JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Forty years after the killing of Daya Pathirana, the third head of the Independent Student Union (ISU) by the Socialist Students’ Union (SSU), affiliated with the JVP, one-time Divaina journalist Dharman Wickremaretne has dealt with the ISU’s connections with some Tamil terrorist groups. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) hadn’t been among them, according to Wickremaretne’s Daya Pathirana Ghathanaye Nodutu Peththa (The Unseen Side of Daya Pathirana Killing), the fifth of a series of books that discussed the two abortive insurgencies launched by the JVP in 1971 and the early ’80s.

Pathirana was killed on 15 December, 1986. His body was found at Hirana, Panadura. Pathirana’s associate, Punchiralalage Somasiri, also of the ISU, who had been abducted, along with Pathirana, was brutally attacked but, almost by a miracle, survived to tell the tale. Daya Pathirana was the second person killed after the formation of the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV), the macabre wing of the JVP, in early March 1986. The DJV’s first head had been JVP politburo member Saman Piyasiri Fernando.

Its first victim was H. Jayawickrema, Principal of Middeniya Gonahena Vidyalaya, killed on 05 December, 1986. The JVP found fault with him for suspending several students for putting up JVP posters.

Wickremaretne, who had been relentlessly searching for information, regarding the violent student movements for two decades, was lucky to receive obviously unconditional support of those who were involved with the SSU and ISU as well as other outfits. Somasiri was among them.

Deepthi Lamaheva had been ISU’s first leader. Warnakulasooriya succeeded Lamahewa and was replaced by Pathirana. After Pathirana’s killing K.L. Dharmasiri took over. Interestingly, the author justified Daya Pathirana’s killing on the basis that those who believed in violence died by it.

Wickremaretne’s latest book, the fifth of the series on the JVP, discussed hitherto largely untouched subject – the links between undergraduates in the South and northern terrorists, even before the July 1983 violence in the wake of the LTTE killing 12 soldiers, and an officer, while on a routine patrol at Thinnavely, Jaffna.

The LTTE emerged as the main terrorist group, after the Jaffna killings, while other groups plotted to cause mayhem. The emergence of the LTTE compelled the then JRJ government to transfer all available police and military resources to the North, due to the constant attacks that gradually weakened government authority there. In Colombo, ISU and Tamil groups, including the PLOTE (People’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) enhanced cooperation. Wickremaretne shed light on a disturbing ISU-PLOTE connection that hadn’t ever been examined or discussed or received sufficient public attention.

In fact, EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students), too, had been involved with the ISU. According to the author, the ISU had its first meeting on 10 April, 1980. In the following year, ISU established contact with the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front). The involvement of ISU with the PLOTE and Wickremaretne revealed how the SSU probed that link and went to the extent of secretly interrogating ISU members in a bid to ascertain the details of that connection. ISU activist Pradeep Udayakumara Thenuwara had been forcibly taken to Sri Jayewardenepura University where he was subjected to strenuous interrogation by SSU in a bid to identify those who were involved in a high profile PLOTE operation.

The author ascertained that the SSU suspected Pathirana’s direct involvement in the PLOTE attack on the Nikaweratiya Police Station, and the Nikaweratiya branch of the People’s Bank, on April 26, 1985. The SSU believed that out of a 16-member gang that carried out the twin attacks, two were ISU members, namely Pathirana, and another identified as Thalathu Oya Seneviratne, aka Captain Senevi.

The SSU received information regarding ISU’s direct involvement in the Nikaweratiya attacks from hardcore PLOTE cadre Nagalingam Manikkadasan, whose mother was a Sinhalese and closely related to JVP’s Upatissa Gamanayake. The LTTE killed Manikkadasan in a bomb attack on a PLOTE office, in Vavuniya, in September, 1999. The writer met Manikkadasan, at Bambapalitiya, in 1997, in the company of Dharmalingham Siddharthan. The PLOTE had been involved in operations in support of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s administration.

It was President Premadasa who first paved the way for Tamil groups to enter the political mainstream. In spite of some of his own advisors expressing concern over Premadasa’s handling of negotiations with the LTTE, he ordered the then Elections Commissioner Chandrananda de Silva to grant political recognition to the LTTE. The LTTE’s political wing PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) received recognition in early December, 1989, seven months before Eelam War II erupted.

Transformation of ISU

The author discussed the formation of the ISU, its key members, links with Tamil groups, and the murderous role in the overall counter insurgency campaign during JRJ and Ranasinghe Premadasa presidencies. Some of those who had been involved with the ISU may have ended up with various other groups, even civil society groups. Somasiri, who was abducted along with Pathirana at Thunmulla and attacked with the same specialised knife, but survived, is such a person.

Somasiri contested the 06 May Local Government elections, on the Jana Aragala Sandhanaya ticket. Jana Aragala Sandhanaya is a front organisation of the Frontline Socialist Party/ Peratugaami pakshaya, a breakaway faction of the JVP that also played a critical role in the violent protest campaign Aragalaya against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That break-up happened in April 2012, The wartime Defence Secretary, who secured the presidency at the 2019 presidential election, with 6.9 mn votes, was forced to give up office, in July 2022, and flee the country.

Somasiri and Jana Aragala Sandhanaya were unsuccessful; the group contested 154 Local Government bodies and only managed to secure only 16 seats whereas the ruling party JVP comfortably won the vast majority of Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas.

Let us get back to the period of terror when the ISU was an integral part of the UNP’s bloody response to the JVP challenge. The signing of the Indo-Lanka accord, in late July 1987, resulted in the intensification of violence by both parties. Wickremaretne disclosed secret talks between ISU leader K.L. Dharmasiri and the then Senior SSP (Colombo South) Abdul Cader Abdul Gafoor to plan a major operation to apprehend undergraduates likely to lead protests against the Indo-Lanka accord. Among those arrested were Gevindu Cumaratunga and Anupa Pasqual. Cumaratunga, in his capacity as the leader of civil society group Yuthukama, that contributed to the campaign against Yahapalanaya, was accommodated on the SLPP National List (2020 to 2024) whereas Pasqual, also of Yuthukama, entered Parliament on the SLPP ticket, having contested Kalutara. Pasqual switched his allegiance to Ranil Wickremesinghe after Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in July 2022.

SSU/JVP killed K.L. Dharmasiri on 19 August, 1989, in Colomba Kochchikade just a few months before the Army apprehended and killed JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera. Towards the end of the counter insurgency campaign, a section of the ISU was integrated with the military (National Guard). The UNP government had no qualms in granting them a monthly payment.

Referring to torture chambers operated at the Law Faculty of the Colombo University and Yataro operations centre, Havelock Town, author Wickremaretne underscored the direct involvement of the ISU in running them.

Maj. Tuan Nizam Muthaliff, who had been in charge of the Yataro ‘facility,’ located near State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne’s residence, is widely believed to have shot Wijeweera in November, 1989. Muthaliff earned the wrath of the LTTE for his ‘work’ and was shot dead on May 3, 2005, at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. At the time of Muthaliff’s assassination, he served in the Military Intelligence.

Premadasa-SSU/JVP link

Ex-lawmaker and Jathika Chinthanaya Kandayama stalwart Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his brief address to the gathering, at Wickremaretne’s book launch, in Colombo, compared Daya Pathirana’s killing with the recent death of Nandana Gunatilleke, one-time frontline JVPer.

Questioning the suspicious circumstances surrounding Gunatilleke’s demise, Cumaratunga strongly emphasised that assassinations shouldn’t be used as a political tool or a weapon to achieve objectives. The outspoken political activist discussed the Pathirana killing and Gunatilleke’s demise, recalling the false accusations directed at the then UNPer Gamini Lokuge regarding the high profile 1986 hit.

Cumaratunga alleged that the SSU/JVP having killed Daya Pathirana made a despicable bid to pass the blame to others. Turning towards the author, Cumaratunga heaped praise on Wickremaretne for naming the SSU/JVP hit team and for the print media coverage provided to the student movements, particularly those based at the Colombo University.

Cumaratunga didn’t hold back. He tore into SSU/JVP while questioning their current strategies. At one point a section of the audience interrupted Cumaratunga as he made references to JVP-led Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB) and JJB strategist Prof. Nirmal Dewasiri, who had been with the SSU during those dark days. Cumaratunga recalled him attending Daya Pathirana’s funeral in Matara though he felt that they could be targeted.

Perhaps the most controversial and contentious issue raised by Cumaratunga was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s alleged links with the SSU/JVP. The ex-lawmaker reminded the SSU/JVP continuing with anti-JRJ campaign even after the UNP named Ranasinghe Premadasa as their candidature for the December 1988 presidential election. His inference was clear. By the time Premadasa secured the presidential nomination he had already reached a consensus with the SSU/JVP as he feared JRJ would double cross him and give the nomination to one of his other favourites, like Gamini Dissanayake or Lalith Athulathmudali.

There had been intense discussions involving various factions, especially among the most powerful SSU cadre that led to putting up posters targeting Premadasa at the Colombo University. Premadasa had expressed surprise at the appearance of such posters amidst his high profile ‘Me Kawuda’ ‘Monawada Karanne’poster campaign. Having questioned the appearance of posters against him at the Colombo University, Premadasa told Parliament he would inquire into such claims and respond. Cumaratunga alleged that night UNP goons entered the Colombo University to clean up the place.

The speaker suggested that the SSU/JVP backed Premadasa’s presidential bid and the UNP leader may have failed to emerge victorious without their support. He seemed quite confident of his assertion. Did the SSU/JVP contribute to Premadasa’s victory at one of the bloodiest post-independence elections in our history.

Cumaratunga didn’t forget to comment on his erstwhile comrade Anupa Pasqual. Alleging that Pasqual betrayed Yuthukama when he switched allegiance to Wickremesinghe, Cumaratunga, however, paid a glowing tribute to him for being a courageous responder, as a student leader.

SSU accepts Eelam

One of the most interesting chapters was the one that dealt with the Viplawadi Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/Revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (RJVP), widely known as the Vikalpa Kandaya/Alternative Group and the ISU mount joint campaigns with Tamil groups. Both University groups received weapons training, courtesy PLOTE and EPRLF, both here, and in India, in the run-up to the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. In short, they accepted Tamils’ right to self-determination.

The author also claimed that the late Dharmeratnam Sivaram had been in touch with ISU and was directly involved in arranging weapons training for ISU. No less a person than PLOTE Chief Uma Maheswaran had told the author that PLOTE provided weapons training to ISU, free of charge ,and the JVP for a fee. Sivaram, later contributed to several English newspapers, under the pen name Taraki, beginning with The Island. By then, he propagated the LTTE line that the war couldn’t be brought to a successful conclusion through military means. Taraki was abducted near the Bambalapitiya Police Station on the night of 28 April, 2005, and his body was found the following day.

The LTTE conferred the “Maamanithar” title upon the journalist, the highest civilian honour of the movement.

In the run up to the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, India freely distributed weapons to Tamil terrorist groups here who in turn trained Sinhala youth.

Had it been part of the overall Indian destabilisation project, directed at Sri Lanka? PLOTE and EPRLF couldn’t have arranged weapons training in India as well as terrorist camps here without India’s knowledge. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka never sought to examine the origins of terrorism here and identified those who propagated and promoted separatist ideals.

Exactly a year before Daya Pathirana’s killing, arrangements had been made by ISU to dispatch a 15-member group to India. But, that move had been cancelled after law enforcement authorities apprehended some of those who received weapons training in India earlier. Wickremaretne’s narrative of the students’ movement, with the primary focus of the University of Colombo, is a must read. The author shed light on the despicable Indian destabilisation project that, if succeeded, could have caused and equally destructive war in the South. In a way, Daya Pathirana’s killing preempted possible wider conflict in the South.

Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his thought-provoking speech, commented on Daya Pathirana. At the time Cumaratunga entered Colombo University, he hadn’t been interested at all in politics. But, the way the ISU strongman promoted separatism, influenced Cumaratunga to counter those arguments. The ex-MP recollected how Daya Pathirana, a heavy smoker (almost always with a cigarette in his hand) warned of dire consequences if he persisted with his counter views.

In fact, Gevindu Cumaratunga ensured that the ’80s terror period was appropriately discussed at the book launch. Unfortunately, Wickremaretne’s book didn’t cause the anticipated response, and a dialogue involving various interested parties. It would be pertinent to mention that at the time the SSU/JVP decided to eliminate Daya Pathirana, it automatically received the tacit support of other student factions, affiliated to other political parties, including the UNP.

Soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake received the leadership of the JVP from Somawansa Amarasinghe, in December 2014, he, in an interview with Saroj Pathirana of BBC Sandeshaya, regretted their actions during the second insurgency. Responding to Pathirana’s query, Dissanayake not only regretted but asked for forgiveness for nearly 6,000 killings perpetrated by the party during that period. Author Wickremaretne cleverly used FSP leader Kumar Gunaratnam’s interview with Upul Shantha Sannasgala, aired on Rupavahini on 21 November, 2019, to remind the reader that he, too, had been with the JVP at the time the decision was taken to eliminate Daya Pathirana. Gunaratnam moved out of the JVP, in April 2012, after years of turmoil. It would be pertinent to mention that Wimal Weerawansa-Nandana Gunatilleke led a group that sided with President Mahinda Rajapaksa during his first term, too, and had been with the party by that time. Although the party split over the years, those who served the interests of the JVP, during the 1980-1990 period, cannot absolve themselves of the violence perpetrated by the party. This should apply to the JVPers now in the Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB), a political party formed in July 2019 to create a platform for Dissanayake to contest the 2019 presidential election. Dissanayake secured a distant third place (418,553 votes [3.16%])

However, the JVP terrorism cannot be examined without taking into JRJ’s overall political strategy meant to suppress political opposition. The utterly disgusting strategy led to the rigged December 1982 referendum that gave JRJ the opportunity to postpone the parliamentary elections, scheduled for August 1983. JRJ feared his party would lose the super majority in Parliament, hence the irresponsible violence marred referendum, the only referendum ever held here to put off the election. On 30 July, 1983, JRJ proscribed the JVP, along with the Nawa Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party, on the false pretext of carrying out attacks on the Tamil community, following the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna.

Under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP underwent total a overhaul but it was Somawansa Amarasinghe who paved the way. Under Somawansa’s leadership, the party took the most controversial decision to throw its weight behind warwinning Army Chief General (retd) Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. That decision, the writer feels, can be compared only with the decision to launch its second terror campaign in response to JRJ’s political strategy. How could we forget Somawansa Amarasinghe joining hands with the UNP and one-time LTTE ally, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), to field Fonseka? Although they failed in that US-backed vile scheme, in 2010, success was achieved at the 2015 presidential election when Maithripala Sirisena was elected.

Perhaps, the JVP took advantage of the developing situation (post-Indo-Lanka Peace Accord), particularly the induction of the Indian Army here, in July 1987, to intensify their campaign. In the aftermath of that, the JVP attacked the UNP parliamentary group with hand grenades in Parliament. The August 1987 attack killed Matara District MP Keerthi Abeywickrema and staffer Nobert Senadheera while 16 received injuries. Both President JRJ and Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time the two hand grenades were thrown at the group.

Had the JVP plot to assassinate JRJ and Premadasa succeeded in August 1987, what would have happened? Gevindu Cumaratunga, during his speech also raised a very interesting question. The nationalist asked where ISU Daya Pathirana would have been if he survived the murderous JVP.

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Midweek Review

Reaping a late harvest Musings of an Old Man

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I am an old man, having reached “four score and five” years, to describe my age in archaic terms. From a biological perspective, I have “grown old.” However, I believe that for those with sufficient inner resources, old age provides fertile ground to cultivate a new outlook and reap a late harvest before the sun sets on life.

Negative Characterisation of Old Age

My early medical education and training familiarised me with the concept of biological ageing: that every living organism inevitably undergoes progressive degeneration of its tissues over time. Old age is often associated with disease, disability, cognitive decline, and dependence. There is an inkling of futility, alienation, and despair as one approaches death. Losses accumulate. As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, “When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalions.” Doctors may experience difficulty in treating older people and sometimes adopt an attitude of therapeutic nihilism toward a life perceived to be in decline.

Categorical assignment of symptoms is essential in medical practice when arriving at a diagnosis. However, placing an individual into the box of a “geriatric” is another matter, often resulting in unintended age segregation and stigmatisation rather than liberation of the elderly. Such labelling may amount to ageism. It is interesting to note that etymologically, the English word geriatric and the Sanskrit word jara both stem from the Indo-European root geront, meaning old age and decay, leading to death (jara-marana).

Even Sigmund Freud (1875–1961), the doyen of psychoanalysis, who influenced my understanding of personality structure and development during my psychiatric training, focused primarily on early development and youth, giving comparatively little attention to the psychology of old age. He believed that instinctual drives lost their impetus with ageing and famously remarked that “ageing is the castration of youth,” implying infertility not only in the biological sense. It is perhaps not surprising that Freud began his career as a neurologist and studied cerebral palsy.

Potential for Growth in Old Age

The model of human development proposed by the psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994), which he termed the “eight stages of man,” is far more appealing to me. His theory spans the entire life cycle, with each stage presenting a developmental task involving the negotiation of opposing forces; success or failure influences the trajectory of later life. The task of old age is to reconcile the polarity between “ego integrity” and “ego despair,” determining the emotional life of the elderly.

Ego integrity, according to Erikson, is the sense of self developed through working through the crises (challenges) of earlier stages and accruing psychological assets through lived experience. Ego despair, in contrast, results from the cumulative impact of multiple physical and emotional losses, especially during the final stage of life. A major task of old age is to maintain dignity amidst such emotionally debilitating forces. Negotiating between these polarities offers the potential for continued growth in old age, leading to what might be called a “meaningful finish.”

I do not dispute the concept of biological ageing. However, I do not regard old age as a terminal phase in which growth ceases and one is simply destined to wither and die. Though shadowed by physical frailty, diminishing sensory capacities and an apparent waning of vitality, there persists a proactive human spirit that endures well into late life. There is a need in old age to rekindle that spirit. Ageing itself can provide creative opportunities and avenues for productivity. The aim is to bring life to a meaningful close.

To generate such change despite the obstacles of ageing — disability and stigmatisation — the elderly require a sense of agency, a gleam of hope, and a sustaining aspiration. This may sound illusory; yet if such illusions are benign and life-affirming, why not allow them?

Sharon Kaufman, in her book The Ageless Self: Sources of Meaning in Late Life, argues that “old age” is a social construct resisted by many elders. Rather than identifying with decline, they perceive identity as a lifelong process despite physical and social change. They find meaning in remaining authentically themselves, assimilating and reformulating diverse life experiences through family relationships, professional achievements, and personal values.

Creative Living in Old Age

We can think of many artists, writers, and thinkers who produced their most iconic, mature, or ground-breaking work in later years, demonstrating that creativity can deepen and flourish with age. I do not suggest that we should all aspire to become a Monet, Picasso, or Chomsky. Rather, I use the term “creativity” in a broader sense — to illuminate its relevance to ordinary, everyday living.

Endowed with wisdom accumulated through life’s experiences, the elderly have the opportunity for developmental self-transformation — to connect with new identities, perspectives, and aspirations, and to engage in a continuing quest for purpose and meaning. Such a quest serves an essential function in sustaining mental health and well-being.

Old age offers opportunities for psychological adaptation and renewal. Many elders use the additional time afforded by retirement to broaden their knowledge, pursue new goals, and cultivate creativity — an old age characterised by wholeness, purpose, and coherence that keeps the human spirit alive and growing even as one’s days draw to a close.

Creative living in old age requires remaining physically, cognitively, emotionally, and socially engaged, and experiencing life as meaningful. It is important to sustain an optimistic perception of health, while distancing oneself from excessive preoccupation with pain and trauma. Positive perceptions of oneself and of the future help sustain well-being. Engage in lifelong learning, maintain curiosity, challenge assumptions — for learning itself is a meaning-making process. Nurture meaningful relationships to avoid disengagement, and enter into respectful dialogue, not only with those who agree with you. Cultivate a spiritual orientation and come to terms with mortality.

The developmental task of old age is to continue growing even as one approaches death — to reap a late harvest. As Rabindranath Tagore expressed evocatively in Gitanjali [‘Song Offerings’], which won him the Nobel Prize:: “On the day when death will knock at thy door, what wilt thou offer to him?

Oh, I will set before my guest the full vessel of my life — I will never let him go with empty hands.”

by Dr Siri Galhenage
Psychiatrist (Retired)
[sirigalhenage@gmail.com]

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Midweek Review

Left’s Voice of Ethnic Peace

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Multi-gifted Prof. Tissa Vitarana in passing,

Leaves a glowing gem of a memory comforting,

Of him putting his best foot forward in public,

Alongside fellow peace-makers in the nineties,

In the name of a just peace in bloodied Sri Lanka,

Caring not for personal gain, barbs or brickbats,

And for such humanity he’ll be remembered….

Verily a standard bearer of value-based politics.

By Lynn Ockersz

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