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Strengthening bilateral relations or opening doors for competition?

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President Dissanayake with Indian PM Modi in New Delhi (L) / President Dissanayake with Chinese President Jinping in Beijing (R)

President Dissanayake’s historic visits to India and China:

by Prof. Amarasiri de Silva

From December 15 to 17, 2024, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government took steps to ameliorate the geopolitical issues in the Indian Ocean region by paying diplomatic visits to India and China. The parliamentary election win by the NPP/JVP has raised suspicions that the new government might struggle to gain international confidence, partly due to the opposition’s portrayal of the NPP/JVP as stated by the president AKD at a rally in Maharagama recently. To move forward, one of the first steps the new government should take is to win over international confidence, especially from powerful neighbours like India and China. The visit made to India under invitation by the Indian government marked a significant advancement in this regard in the relationship between Sri Lanka and India. During his visit to India, President Dissanayake engaged in one-on-one discussions with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Droupadi Murmu, the first person from a tribal community and the second woman to hold this position. The conversations centred on enhancing collaboration in energy partnerships, regional security, trade, investment, and infrastructure development. Several agreements were signed, including a Memorandum of Understanding for the training and capacity-building of Sri Lankan civil servants and a Protocol to amend the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation.

Additionally, they released a joint statement titled ‘India-Sri Lanka Joint Statement-Fostering Partnerships for a Shared Future,’ which underscored their commitment to advancing the bilateral relationship. The Sri Lankan president gave an assurance that Sri Lanka would not allow any nation to engage in espionage against India within Sri Lankan Ocean waters.

Trip to China

Following his visit to India, Dissanayake’s trip to China is seen as a move to balance the influence of these two crucial regional powers, this journey reflects Sri Lanka’s strategic efforts to manage the influences of both China and India, which are critical for its economic revival. The Hambantota Port, leased to China Merchants Port Holdings in 2017 under a 99-year agreement, plays a key role in this context. The port’s strategic position along major shipping routes enhances China’s regional influence and illustrates the country’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Both leaders affirmed their commitment to a mutually beneficial comprehensive partnership in their Joint Statement. India will train 1,500 Sri Lankan civil servants over five years, and a new passenger ferry service will start between Rameshwaram (India) and Talaimannar (Sri Lanka), complementing the existing service between Nagapattinam (India) and Kankesanthurai (Sri Lanka). Additionally, the Kankesanthurai port in Sri Lanka will be redeveloped with grant assistance from the Government of India.

Regarding energy cooperation, the two countries will establish a high-capacity power grid interconnection, and India will supply liquified natural gas (LNG) to Sri Lanka. India, the United Arab Emirates, and Sri Lanka will jointly build a multiproduct pipeline from India to Sri Lanka to ensure safe and reliable energy. India will also support the Sampur solar power project in Sri Lanka and participate in the joint development of offshore wind power in the Palk Straits. Furthermore, the Trincomalee Tank Farms in Sri Lanka will be developed as a regional energy and industrial hub. A Joint Working Group will be set up to implement a Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) stack in Sri Lanka with Indian assistance, and another Joint Working Group will focus on agriculture. In terms of defence, India will train Sri Lankan defence forces, provide defence equipment, and conduct joint military exercises, maritime surveillance, and defence dialogue and exchanges with Sri Lanka. India will also help Sri Lanka develop disaster mitigation, relief, and rehabilitation capabilities and cooperate in hydrography. Both countries signed an agreement on the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) to boost investment in each other’s count. On the part of India this is a big undertaking.

‘Big Brother behaviour’    

       

The steps taken by India during the visit of President Dissanayake were an example of ‘big brother’ behaviour for some groups and politicians, meaning that India tried to lead and shape the policies of the newly elected president of Sri Lanka through its strategic interests. India has long been involved in Sri Lanka’s affairs as a dominant regional power. While some political analysts, including journalist Nirupama Subramaniam, claim that India’s influence over neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka has diminished over time, we believe the situation is quite different. The historical context indicates that India still plays a crucial role in shaping Sri Lanka’s policies and decisions. Some experts even argue that due to India’s significant economic assistance and support—especially during Sri Lanka’s recent financial crisis—the country has become increasingly reliant on India. This reliance gives India the ability to influence and guide Sri Lankan politics.

The substantial economic aid and backing from India have led to a scenario where Sri Lanka’s economic stability is closely linked to its relationship with India, further reinforcing India’s influence in the region. India has a rich history of engagement in Sri Lanka’s affairs as a leading regional power.

Some perceive these assurances—including the commitment to prevent Sri Lankan territory from being used against India’s interests—as indicative of President Dissanayake kowtowing to India’s position. This perception is rooted in the notion that such assurances are not merely diplomatic gestures but rather significant concessions aligning Sri Lanka’s strategic interests closely with India’s. Critics argue this alignment could undermine Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. They view these assurances as a reflection of President Dissanayake’s willingness to prioritise India’s concerns, possibly at the expense of Sri Lanka’s national interests. The dynamics of this relationship highlight the complex and often contentious nature of regional geopolitics, where smaller nations must navigate the pressures exerted by larger, more powerful neighbours. President Dissanayake’s stance, therefore, can be seen as a balancing act, attempting to maintain favourable relations with India while also managing domestic and international perceptions of sovereignty and independence. The view here holds that the actions of President Dissanayake represent a first in the region and a unique brand of diplomacy that is at variance with the policies pursued by all the other countries bordering India. These assurances are a strategic effort to maintain a positive relationship with India. However, they also raise concerns regarding Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and independence in foreign policy matters.

Power balance in SA

The consequences of these assurances could greatly influence regional dynamics and the power balance in South Asia. Some opposition groups and politicians in Sri Lanka have voiced their criticism of the agreements and policies stemming from the visit, claiming that they excessively favour India and compromise Sri Lanka’s autonomy. They argue that the new administration is too eager to meet India’s demands, which could jeopardize Sri Lanka’s national interests.

When reviewing the history of India’s diplomatic relations with Sri Lanka, India’s hostility and competitive stance over Sri Lanka becomes apparent. The year 1977 saw Sri Lanka take more extraordinary leaps toward a more market-oriented economy during the presidency of J.R. Jayewardene. This again made Sri Lanka the first among the South Asian countries to embark on broad-based economic liberalisation.

At the funeral of Ronnie de Mel, the then president Ranil Wickremesinghe said ‘Today, however, we witnessed a proliferation of shops, establishment of factories, and emergence of new urban centres—all thanks to the open economy policy. Moreover, following this economic liberalisation, Late President J.R. Jayawardena secured funding for major development projects. The construction of the Mahaweli scheme, large reservoirs, land development for agriculture, the Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte Parliament Complex, new infrastructure, roads, trade zones and housing programs all became possible due to his adept management of resources. He demonstrated remarkable skill in funding and overseeing these endeavors’

Economic transition

The regime of Jayewardene adopted a policy package that reconverted the country from a state-controlled economy to a market-oriented economy characterised by deregulation, privatisation, and foreign investment. This was contrary to the earlier socialist policies of state control and economic self-sufficiency. The government that preceded J.R. Jayewardene was headed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who led the country between 1970 and 1977. Her governance had been in the hands of a coalition set by the participation of leftist parties such as the Communist Party, and Lanka Sama Samaja party of Sri Lanka. The economic policy during the Bandaranaike regime focused on state-led development and self-sufficiency, primarily influenced by leftist politicians within the coalition government. The administration introduced measures to decrease reliance on imports, foster local industries, and nationalize essential sectors. However, these policies led to economic challenges, including high inflation and public dissatisfaction, and finally to an electoral defeat.

In opening the economy, Jayewardene sought to attract foreign investment, increase exports, and modernse sectors to align with Western economic principles of liberalisation, deregulation, and privatization, integrating Sri Lanka into the global economy. During the same period, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, India pursued a more diverse and multi-layered policy concerning Sri Lanka in response to Jayewardene’s open economic policy. Thus, Sri Lanka replaced its earlier socialism-oriented policies with one oriented toward modernisation and opening its economy to the global market. Such a policy led to geopolitical tensions. India was apprehensive about the consequences of Sri Lanka’s economic liberalisation, especially Jayewardene’s adherence to Western economic principles and his cozy relations with the United States. JR was nicknamed “Yanki Dickie”. India was not particularly pleased with this change. The Indian government under Indira Gandhi saw the growing Western influence in its neighbour as an ominous portent. Jayewardene’s foreign policy, like American policy, earned him the sobriquet “Yankie Dickie.” The pro-Western stance of Jayewardene was an eyesore for India, and it carried geopolitical implications. The open economic policy was in contrast with India’s. Colombo thus viewed it as an invitation to all who would be considered a potential competitor for its regional strategic interests. Therefore, Sri Lanka’s new economic orientation constituted a departure from the traditional non-aligned stance, which had earlier been the hallmark of Colombo’s foreign policy.

India’s suspicions

India’s suspicions led it to attempt to influence Sri Lanka through various methods, including backing Tamil separatist groups in the northern districts. This support for Tamil separatists was a strategic decision by India aimed at countering the perceived threat posed by Sri Lanka’s economic liberalization. India provided training and support to these groups to create instability in the northern province of Sri Lanka, which had concentrated Tamil populations. This included training camps for guerrilla warfare and other combat techniques in India. The trained militants were sent back to Sri Lanka for combat actions to have a separate Tamil state, thus extending violence and unrest in the region, which destabilized Sri Lanka for nearly 30 years.

This support formed part of India’s broader geopolitical strategy of maintaining its influence in South Asia and deterring any perceived threats to its strategic interests. In supporting Tamil separatist groups, India sought to exercise influence over the Sri Lankan government to ensure that Sri Lanka would not act as a conduit for extra-regional influences that could undermine India’s regional hegemony. However, this support came with a significant cost to Sri Lanka in terms of internal stability and economic development. The violence and unrest in this northern province drew away resources and attention from economic reforms and other development projects. They created an environment of uncertainty and instability that discouraged foreign investment and hindered growth.

In other words, India viewed the new open economic policy under the leadership of JR Jayewardene as a perceived threat to its influence in the region. It continued its support for the Tamil separatist groups in Sri Lanka as part of a broad geopolitical strategy to counter it. However, this came at the expense of significant internal costs for stability and economic development in Sri Lanka, which underlines the complex interaction of geopolitics and monetary policy in the region. India’s role in Sri Lanka’s civil conflict, had its own cost as well, primarily through the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight against the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), led to considerable tensions. The LTTE, feeling betrayed by India’s actions, grew increasingly hostile towards the country. This animosity reached a tragic peak with the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, carried out by a suicide bomber linked to the LTTE named Kalaivani Rajaratnam, alias Thenmozhi Rajaratnam, who was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Gandhi’s assassination was a direct result of India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, underscoring the complex and often perilous consequences of geopolitical involvement in regional disputes.

Sri Lanka and Singapore

The case of Sri Lanka is often compared with Singapore’s in economic development discussions because of their similarities in strategic location, population size, and historical context. Both island nations have the potential to emerge as economic powerhouses. It was in 1977 that the economy took a concrete turn towards market-oriented economic development under the open economic policy introduced by President J.R. Jayewardene. This considerable leap was intended to bring more foreign investment and higher exports by modernizing different sectors of the economy. If the subsequent governments had carried on with the open economic policy of JR, Sri Lanka might have achieved economic success comparable to Singapore’s.

One of the reasons for Singapore’s economic success has been its consistent liberalisation and openness to foreign investment. Had Sri Lanka not deviated from Jayewardene’s policies, it could have joined the rapid industrialisation and infrastructural modernization. The continuous inflow of foreign capital would have promoted technological advancements, improved public services, and enhanced the quality of life for many Sri Lankans.

Sri Lanka is well-placed in the Indian Ocean to perform the role of an international hub for trade. If it had continuously pursued open economy policies, the country could have emerged as a significant trading hub like Singapore. This would have brought substantial port facilities with free trade zones and efficient logistical networks that house companies from most parts of the world to boost their exporting capabilities and bring rapid economic growth.

In this regard, political stability is paramount for sustained economic development. Consistent and stable governance, in the form of well-defined policies and efficient institutions, would create an enabling environment wherein the business sector could flourish. This would encourage long-term investment and innovation, leading to a better distribution of economic benefits within the populace.  What is required is investment in education and enhancement of skills for a competitive workforce. With more substantial investment in education and vocational training, Sri Lanka could have developed a highly skilled labour force to support high-tech industries and services, thus developing its human capital to ease the transition into a productivity-driven and knowledge-based economy. The situation was very well studied by India, whose plans were to disrupt the process that would lead to financial leadership of Sri Lanka in the region.

Yet, the reality is considerably more complex. Political change combined with civil war and economic dynamics shaped the financial fortunes of Sri Lanka. The successive regimes failed to pursue Jayewardene’s open economic policy to its logical conclusion. Lack of political will, instability, and the protracted civil war siphoned resources and interest from economic development. The interplay of factors such as major trade union action initiated by leftist politicians and the then JVP has destroyed the country’s economic journey. The international outlook and local economic policies of the new Sri Lankan government indicate that they have reconstituted the policies where Jayewardene (JRJ) left.

This indicates a continuation and revitalization of the economic strategies and international relations initiated during JRJ’s tenure, with the goal of further integrating Sri Lanka into the global economy while addressing contemporary challenges and opportunities. It represents a significant shift from the former JVP stance on Indian expansion that Wijeweera advocated.

India and open economy

India adopted the open economic policy in 1991, popularly known as the New Economic Policy, during the Prime Ministership of P. V. Narasimha Rao and the Finance Ministership of Dr. Manmohan Singh. Narasimha Rao was the first person from South India and the second person from a non-Hindi-speaking background to be the prime minister. His open economic policy reforms rescued the country from going towards bankruptcy during the economic crisis of 1991. This policy opened the Indian economy to the world, boosting the importation of raw materials, deregulating markets, and attracting foreign investment. Unlike in Sri Lanka, this policy was pursued and developed by successive governments, which led to India’s robust economy. The 1991 reforms addressed the immediate balance of payments crisis by opting for market-oriented, globally integrated reform. This constituted a sharp turnaround from the protectionist policy stance of yesteryears and provided an opportunity for all-round future development.

J.R. Jayewardene’s Open Economic Policy engendered tremendous criticism from politicians and scholars inclined toward the Left. They said his policies facilitated the privatization and sale of state-owned enterprises to hinder the country’s economic sovereignty and its people’s well-being. They say such a liberalization policy favours foreign investors and local elites while the masses struggle because of economic stringencies and the withdrawal of public services.

 One of the most frequently cited remarks in discussions about President Jayewardene’s bold and sometimes controversial economic liberalization in Sri Lanka is his declaration: ‘Let the robber barons come!’ This statement represents the decision to open Sri Lanka’s economy to foreign investors and private enterprises, even at the risk of exploitation by large foreign business interests, particularly from the USA. The reforms initiated by Jayewardene marked a significant shift from the previous socialist orientation of the economy, specifically aimed at attracting foreign capital to drive rapid economic growth. The Accelerated Mahaweli program serves as a prime example of this initiative.

Geopolitical landscape

In today’s geopolitical landscape, where India is rising as a global power, Jayewardene’s quote becomes particularly relevant considering India’s assertive stance towards Sri Lanka. The parallels between Jayewardene’s era and the current situation under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake highlight the influence of powerful nations, especially India, on Sri Lanka’s economic and political strategies. The NPP government’s development initiatives, such as the oil refinery project supported by Chinese investment, which aims to sell or export surplus oil, could challenge India’s economic dominance, given that India refines and exports Russian crude oil. In this context, the NPP government must remain vigilant about potential threats from India, reminiscent of those faced during Jayewardene’s administration. India will likely hold Dissanayake accountable for strengthening ties with China, India’s most significant regional competitor, particularly regarding the oil refinery project. AKD’s government should cautiously approach the various overtures from India, as they often serve India’s interests rather than being motivated by genuine concern for Sri Lanka.



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Midweek Review

BASL fears next set of civil society representatives might be rubber stamps of NPP

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A group of officials from National Audit Office of Sri Lanka attend a capacity building programme in India

CC in dilemma over filling impending vacancies

Sajith Premadasa

Amidst a simmering row over the controversial move to have Deshabandu Tennakoon as the IGP at the time of crucial presidential election, Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa alleged: “The Speaker sent a letter to the President, recommending the appointment of Deshabandu Tennakoon as IGP. He distorted the Constitutional Council ruling by interpreting the two abstaining votes of civil society members as votes against Deshabandu and used his casting vote to recommend Deshabandu as the Constitutional Council decision. It is on the basis of the Speaker’s letter that the President made the appointment. The Speaker has blatantly violated the Constitution

.”

Speculation is rife about a possible attempt by the ruling National People’s Power (NPP) to take control of the 10-member Constitutional Council (CC). The only way to take command of the CC is to appoint those willing to pursue the NPP agenda as civil society representatives.

Against the backdrop of the NPP’s failure to obtain CC’s approval to finalise the appointment of the Auditor General, the government seems hell-bent on taking control of it. Civil society representatives, namely Dr. Prathap Ramanujam, Dr. (Mrs.) Dilkushi Anula Wijesundere and Dr. (Mrs.) Weligama Vidana Arachchige Dinesha Samararatne, whose tenure is coming to an end in January, blocked President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s nominee receiving the AG’s position. They took a courageous stand in the greater interest of the nation.

Chulantha Wickramaratne, who served as AG for a period of six years, retired in April 2025. Following his retirement, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake first nominated H.T.P. Chandana, an audit officer at the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. The CC rejected the nomination. Subsequently, President Dissanayake appointed the next senior-most official at the National Audit Office (NAO) Dharmapala Gammanpila, as Acting Auditor General for six months. Then, the President nominated Senior Deputy Auditor General L.S.I. Jayarathne to serve in an acting capacity, but her nomination, too, was also rejected.

Many an eyebrow was raised when the President nominated O.R. Rajasinghe, the Internal Audit Director of the Sri Lanka Army, for the top post. As a result, the vital position remains vacant since 07 December. Obviously the overzealous President does not take ‘No’ for an answer when filling key independent positions with his minions

The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) in a letter dated 22 December, addressed to President Dissanayake, who is the leader of the NPP and the JVP, Prime Minister Dr. Harini Amarasuriya, Speaker Dr. Jagath Wickremaratne and Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa emphasised their collective responsibility in ensuring transparency in the appointment of civil society representatives.

Cabinet spokesperson and Health and Media Minister, Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa, is on record as having emphasised the urgent need to finalise the appointment. Minister Jayatissa alleged, at the post-Cabinet media briefing, that the President’s nominations had been rejected without giving explanation by certain members, including three representatives of civil society.

Parliament, on 18 January, 2023, approved the former Ministry Secretary Dr. Ramanujam, former Chairperson of the Sri Lanka Medical Association Dr. Wijesundere, and Dr. Samararatne of the University of Colombo as civil society representatives to the CC.

They were the first post-Aragalaya civil society members of the CC. The current CC was introduced by the 21 Amendment to the Constitution which was endorsed on 31st of October, 2022, during a time of grave uncertainty. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who had been elected by the SLPP to complete the remainder of ousted President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s five-year term, sought to manipulate the CC. Wickremesinghe received the SLPP’s backing though they fell out later.

During Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the President, civil society representatives earned the wrath of the then Rajapaksa-Wickremesinghe government by refusing to back Deshabandu Tennakoon’s appointment as the IGP. The then Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena was accused of manipulating CC’s ruling in respect of Deshabandu Tennakoon to suit Wickremesinghe’s agenda.

Amidst a simmering row over the controversial move to have Deshabandu Tennakoon as the IGP, at the time of crucial presidential election, Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa alleged: “The Speaker sent a letter to the President, recommending the appointment of Deshabandu Tennakoon as IGP. He distorted the Constitutional Council ruling by interpreting the two abstaining votes of civil society members as votes against Deshabandu and used his casting vote to recommend Deshabandu as the Constitutional Council decision. It is on the basis of the Speaker’s letter that the President made the appointment. The Speaker has blatantly violated the Constitution.”

The NPP realises the urgent need to neutralise the CC. The composition of the CC does not give the Opposition an opportunity to challenge the government if the next three civil society representatives succumb to political pressure. The Speaker is the Chairman of the CC. The present composition of the Constitutional Council is as follows: Speaker (Dr) Jagath Wickramaratne, ex-officio, PM (Dr) Harini Amarasuriya, ex-officio, Leader of the Opposition Sajith Premadasa, ex-officio, Bimal Rathnayake, Aboobucker Athambawa, Ajith P. Perera, Sivagnanam Shritharan, Dr Prathap Ramanujam, Dr Dilkushi Anula Wijesundere and Dr Dinesha Samararatne.

In terms of Article 41E of the Constitution, the CC meets at least twice every month, and may meet as often as may be necessary.

The failure on the part of the NPP to take over Office of the AG must have compelled them to explore ways and means of somehow bringing CC under its influence. The end of the current civil society members’ term, has given the government a chance to fill the vacancies with henchmen.

BASL’s letters that dealt with the appointment of civil society representatives to the CC and the failure to appoint AG, both dated 22 December, paint a bleak picture of the NPP that throughout the presidential and parliamentary polls last year assured the country of a system change. The NPP’s strategy in respect of filling the AG’s vacancy and possible bid to manipulate the CC through the appointment of civil society representatives reminds us of the despicable manipulations undertaken by previous governments.

An appeal to goverment

BASL seems convinced that the NPP would make an attempt to appoint its own to the CC. BASL has urged the government to consult civil society and professional bodies, including them, regarding the forthcoming vacancies in the CC. It would be interesting to examine the NPP’s strategy as civil society, too, would face daunting challenges in choosing representatives.

Civil society representatives are nominated by the Speaker by agreement of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.

If consensus cannot be reached swiftly, it would cause further political turmoil at a time the country is experiencing an unexpected burden of dealing with the post-Cyclone Ditwah recovery process.

The term of non-ex-officio members of the Council is three years from the date of appointment. In terms of the Constitution, the civil society representatives should be persons of eminence and integrity who have distinguished themselves in public or professional life and who are not members of any political party. Their nominations should be approved by Parliament.

In spite of the NPP having an absolute 2/3 majority in Parliament, the ruling party is under pressure. The composition of the CC is a big headache for NPP leaders struggling to cope up with rising dissent over a spate of wrongdoings and a plethora of broken promises. The furore over the inordinate delay in finalising AG’s appointment has made matters worse, particularly against the backdrop of the BASL, Transparency International Sri Lanka Chapter and Committee on Public Finance, taking a common stand.

Having been part of the clandestine regime change project in 2022; Western powers and India cannot turn a blind eye to what is going on. Some Colombo-based foreign envoys believe that there is no alternative to the NPP and the government should be given the opportunity to proceed with its action plan. The uncompromising stand taken by the NPP with regard to the appointment of permanent AG has exposed the ruling party.

In the wake of ongoing controversy over the appointment of the AG, the NPP’s integrity and its much-touted vow to tackle waste, corruption, irregularities and mismanagement seems hollow.

The government bigwigs must realise that appointment of those who campaigned for the party at the presidential and parliamentary polls caused deterioration of public confidence. The appointment of ex-top cops Sharnie Abeysekera and Ravi Seneviratne with black marks as Director, CID and Secretary to the Ministry of Public Security and Parliamentary Affairs, eroded public confidence in the NPP administration.

A vital role for CC

The SLPP, reduced to just three lawmakers in the current Parliament, resented the CC. Having secured a near 2/3 majority in the House at the 2020 Parliamentary election, the SLPP made its move against the CC, in a strategy that was meant to strengthen President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s hands at the expense of Parliament. Introduced in 2001 during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s presidency, the 17th Amendment paved the way for the establishment of the CC. Those who wielded political power subjected the CC to critical changes through 18th, 19th and 20th amendments. Of them, perhaps, the 20th Amendment to the Constitution that had been passed in October 2020 is the worst. The SLPP replaced the CC with a Parliamentary Council. That project was meant to consolidate power in the Executive President, thereby allowing the appointment of key officials, like judges, the Attorney General, and heads of independent commissions.

People may have now forgotten the 20th Amendment removed civil society representatives from the so-called Parliamentary Council consisting of lawmakers who represented the interests of the government and the main Opposition. But such manipulations failed to neutralise the challenge (read Aragalaya) backed by external powers. The role played by the US and India in that project has been established and there cannot be any dispute over their intervention that forced Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country.

Interestingly, Ranil Wickremesinghe, who had been picked by the SLPP to complete the remainder of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s term, restored the CC through the passage of 21 Amendment on 31 October, 2022. Unfortunately, the NPP now wants to manipulate the CC by packing it with those willing to abide by its agenda.

It would be pertinent to mention that the 20th Amendment was aimed at neutralising dissent at any level. Those who formulated that piece of legislation went to the extent of proposing that the President could sack members appointed to the Parliamentary Council by the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader without consulting anyone.

If not for the Aragalaya, the Parliamentary Council that didn’t serve any meaningful purpose could have paved the way for the President to fill all key positions with his nominees.

Recommendation of nominations to the President for the appointment of Chairpersons and Members of Commissions specified in the Schedule to Article 41B of the Constitution.

Commissions specified in the Schedule to Article 41B: The Election Commission, the Public Service Commission, the National Police Commission, the Audit Service Commission, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, the Finance Commission, the Delimitation Commission and the National Procurement Commission.

Approval/ Disapproval of recommendations by the President for the appointment to the Offices specified in the Schedule to Article 41C of the Constitution.

Offices specified in the Schedule to Article 41C: The Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court, the President and the Judges of the Court of Appeal, the Members of the Judicial Service Commission, other than the Chairman, the Attorney-General, the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the Auditor-General, the Inspector-General of Police, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman) and the Secretary-General of Parliament.

NPP under pressure

In spite of having the executive presidency, a 2/3 majority in the legislature, and the bulk of Local Government authorities under its control, the NPP is under pressure. Their failure to muster sufficient support among the members of the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) to pass its 2026 Budget underscored the gravity of the developing situation. The unexpected loss suffered at the CMC shook the ruling party.

But, the NPP faces a far bigger challenge in filling the AG’s vacancy as well as the new composition of the CC. If the NPP succeeds with its efforts to replace the current civil society representatives with rubber stamps, the ruling party may feel vindicated but such feelings are likely to be short-lived.

Having criticised the government over both contentious matters, the BASL may be forced to step up pressure on the government unless they can reach a consensus. It would be really interesting to know whether the government accepted the BASL’s request for consultations with the stakeholders. Unless consensus can be reached between the warring parties there is possibility of opening of a new front with the BASL and civil society being compelled to take a common stand against the government.

The developing scenario should be examined taking into consideration political parties and civil society confronting the government over the proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA). Having promised to do away with the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in the run up to the presidential election, the NPP is trying to explain that it cannot do without anti-terrorism law. The civil society is deeply unhappy over the NPP’s change of heart.

The National Peace Council (NPP) that has been generally supportive and appreciative of the NPP’s efforts probably with the blessings of its benefactors in the West, too, has now found fault with the proposed PSTA. Dr. Jehan Perera, NPP’s Executive Director commented: “A preliminary review of the draft PSTA indicates that it retains core features of the PTA that have enabled serious abuse over decades. These include provisions permitting detention for up to two years without a person being charged before a court of law. In addition, the broad definition of terrorism under the draft law allows acts of dissent and civil disobedience to be labelled as terrorism, thereby permitting disproportionate and excessive responses by the state. Such provisions replicate the logic of the PTA rather than mark a clear break from it.”

Except the BASL, other professional bodies and political parties haven’t commented on the developing situation at the CC while taking into consideration the delay in appointing an AG. The issue at hand is whether the government intends to hold up AG’s appointment till the change of the CC’s composition in its favour. Whatever the specific reasons, a country that has suffered for want of accountability and transparency, enters 2026 without such an important person to guard against all types of financial shenanigans in the state.

All previous governments sought to influence the Office of the AG. The proposed establishment of NAO prompted the powers that be to undermine the effort. The Yahapalana administration diluted the National Audit Bill and what had been endorsed as National Audit Act, Nov. 19 of 2018 was definitely not the anti-corruption grouping originally proposed. That Act was amended this year but the Office of the AG remains vacant.

The NPP has caused itself immense harm by failing to reach consensus with the CC on filling the AG’s post. Unfortunately, the ruling party seems to be uninterested in addressing the issue expeditiously but is exploring the possibility of taking over control of the CC by stuffing it with civil society members favourable to the current ruling clique.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

Towards Decolonizing Social Sciences and Humanities

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‘Can Asians Think?’

I want to initiate this essay with several questions. That is, are we, in Sri Lanka and in our region, intellectually subservient to what is often referred to as the ‘West’? Specifically, can knowledge production in broad disciplinary areas such as social sciences and humanities be more creative, original and generated in response to local conditions and histories, particularly when it comes to practices such as formulating philosophy and theory as well as concepts and approaches? Why have we so far imported these from Western Europe and North America as has been the undisputed norm?

In exploring the responses and delving into this discussion, I will seek reference from the politics of the recently published book, Decolonial Keywords: South Asian Thoughts and Attitudes edited by Renny Thomas from the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of Science Education and Research – Bhopal and me. The book was brought out by Delhi-based Tulika Publishers in December 2025.

Let me first unpack my anxiety over theory and philosophy, which I have talked about many times previously too. Any social science or humanities text we read here or elsewhere in South Asia invariably borrows concepts, theories and philosophical input generated mostly in Western Europe and North America. It almost appears as if our region is incapable of serious and abstract thinking.  It is in this same context, but specifically with reference to India that Prathama Banerjee, Aditya Nigam and Rakesh Pandey have observed in their critical essay, ‘The Work of Theory Thinking across Traditions’ (2016), that for many “theory appears as a ready-made body of philosophical thought, produced in the West …” They argue, “the more theory-inclined among us simply pick the latest theory off-the-shelf and ‘apply’ it to our context, notwithstanding its provincial European origin, for we believe that ‘theory’ is by definition universal.”

Here, Banerjee et al make two important points. That is, there is an almost universal acceptability in the region that ‘theory’ is a kind of philosophical work that is exclusively produced in the West, followed by an almost blind and unreflective readiness among many of us to simply apply these ideas to local contexts. In doing so, they fail to take into serious consideration the initial temporal and historical contexts in which these bodies of knowledge were generated.  However, theory or philosophy is not universal.

This knowledge is contextually linked to very specific social, political and historical conditions that allowed such knowledge to emanate in the first place. It therefore stands to reason that such knowledge cannot be applied haphazardly/ willy-nilly anywhere in the world without grave consequences.  Of course, some ideas can be of universal validity as long as they are carefully placed in context. But to perceive theory or philosophy as all-weather universals is patently false even though this is the way they are often understood from universities to segments within society in general.  This naiveté is part of the legacy of colonialism from which these disciplines as well as much of their theoretical and philosophical structures have been bequeathed to us.

It is in this context that I would like to discuss the politics our book, Decolonial Keywords: South Asian Thoughts and Attitudes entail. Here, thirty South Asian scholars from across disciplines in social sciences and humanities have come together to “discuss words and ideas from a variety of regional languages, ranging from Sinhala to Hebrew Malayalam” encapsulating “the region’s languages and its vast cultural landscape, crossing national borders.” To be more specific, these languages include Assamese,  Arabic-Malayalam, Bengali, Hebrew Malayalam, Hindi, Nepali, Sanskrit, Sinhala, South Asian uses of English, Tamil-Arabic, Tamil, Urdu and concepts from indigenous languages of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh.

Each chapter, focuses on a selected word and “reiterates specific attitudes, ways of seeing and methods of doing that are embedded in the historical and contemporary experiences of the region” keeping in mind “the contexts of their production and how their meanings might have changed at different historical moments.”

In this exploration, the volume attempts to understand “if these words and concepts can infuse a certain intellectual rigour into reinventing social sciences and humanities in the region and beyond.” In short, what we have attempted is to offer a point of departure to a comprehensive and culturally, linguistically and politically inclusive effort at theory-building and conceptual fine-tuning based on South Asian experiences and histories.  We assume these concepts from our region might be able to speak to the world in the same way schools of thought in politically dominant regions of the world have done so far to us. This is a matter of decolonizing our disciplines. But it is still not a claim for universality. After all, our main focus is to come up with a body of conceptual categories that might be useful in reading the region.

When Sri Lankan social sciences and humanities as well as the same disciplines elsewhere in the region thoughtlessly embrace knowledges imported in conditions of unequal power relations, it can never produce forums for discourse from which we can speak to the world with authority.  In this book, Thomas and I have attempted, as an initial and self-conscious effort, to flip the script on theory-building and conceptualization in social sciences and humanities in South Asia in the region’s favour.

We are however mindful that this effort has its risks, intellectually speaking.  That is, we are conscious this effort must be undertaken without succumbing to crude and parochial forms of nativism that are also politically powerful in the region including in Sri Lanka and India. This book presents an array of possibilities if we are serious about decolonizing our social sciences and humanities to infuse power into the discourses we generate and take them to the world instead of celebrating our parochiality like the proverbial frog in the well. Unfortunately, more often than not, we are trained to be intellectually subservient, and mere followers, not innovators and leaders bringing to mind the polemical title of Kishore Mahbubani’s 2002 book, Can Asians Think?

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Midweek Review

The ever-changing river: Chandana Ruwan Jayanetti’s evolving poetic voice

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Poems from Galle , by Chandana Ruwan Jayanetti, was launched on December 20 at Dakshinapaya, the auditorium of the Chief Ministry of the Southern Provincial Council, Labuduwa, Galle. Head table at the launch (from left): author Jayanetti; Minister of Buddhasasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs Dr. Hiniduma Sunil Senevi; Emeritus Professor Rajiva Wijesinha; and renowned poet, lyricist, and literary figure Dr. Rathna Sri Wijesinghe.

It is said that no man steps into the same river twice, for it is not the same river, and he is not the same man. These words came to mind upon reading Chandana Ruwan Jayanetti’s latest poetry collection, Poems from Galle, which inevitably invites comparison with his earlier work, particularly his first volume of poetry and prose, Reflections in Loneliness: A Collection of Poems and Prose (2015).

In this new collection, Jayanetti is demonstrably not the same poet he was a decade ago. His horizons have widened. his subject matter has diversified, and his thematic range has deepened. The earlier hallmarks of his work, including his empathetic attention to human experience, sensitivity to the natural world, and intimate, reflective tone, remain present. Yet they are now complemented by a stronger defiance, a more deliberate engagement with the political and the cosmic, and a broader mosaic of local and universal concerns. His poetic voice has evolved in scope, tonal range, and thematic ambition.

My own acquaintance with Jayanetti’s poetry dates back to our undergraduate days at Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka, where we were classmates pursuing a BA in Languages (English Special). Even then, his work revealed precise observational skill coupled with profound sympathy for individuals. This early sensibility found fuller articulation in Reflections in Loneliness, a collection spanning nearly two decades of creative endeavor.

That inaugural volume traversed a wide thematic landscape: childhood memories; tender compassion toward humans and animals; tributes to the deserving; the joys and sorrows of young love; and reflections on Sri Lanka’s three-decade Northeast conflict, which concluded in 2009. Jayanetti’s verse, written with sincerity and empathy, moves fluidly from deeply personal to universally human. Moments of striking poignancy include the loss of his wife’s mother, the death of a young friend who marched unflinchingly to the warfront, and the bittersweet parting from a lover.

The prose section of Reflections in Loneliness offered a return to the rural simplicity of the 1970s and ’80s through the perspective of a schoolboy. Essays such as We Buy a Bicycle, Television Descends, The Village Goes to the Fair, Bathing Excursions and Hingurakanda evoke a bygone era with unvarnished authenticity. As literary critic Kamala Wijeratne noted, Jayanetti’s prose merited commendation for its perceptive and affectionate portrayal of rural life, written with the authority of lived experience. His meticulous attention to minute details revealed not only the flaws and frailties of human nature but also its loyalties and quiet virtues, articulated with unforced sympathy.

Consisting of 31 poems and five prose pieces, Reflections in Loneliness established Jayanetti as a writer of elegance, precision, and emotional depth. The current collection, however, confirms the Heraclitean and Buddhist insights: both the poet and his poetry have changed. The new work reflects an expansion from the personal to the cosmic, from the intimately local to the globally resonant, a testament to an artist in motion, carried forward by the ever-changing current of his creative life.

Jayanetti’s poetic corpus in the new book Poems from Galle, spanning thirty-five evocative works from They Heard the Cock Crow to A Birthday Celebration, reveals a profound and consistent artistic signature rooted in themes of humanity, nature, history, and social consciousness. Throughout these poems, Jayanetti demonstrates a distinctive voice that is simultaneously empathetic, contemplative, and alert to the complexities of his Sri Lankan heritage and the broader human condition. While maintaining a core of thematic and tonal consistency, each poem enriches this foundation by expanding into new dimensions of experience, whether personal, ecological, political, or historical.

A foundational element of Jayanetti’s poetry is the intimate relationship between humans and nature, frequently underscored by a deep ethical awareness. In poems like From a Herdman’s Life and My Neighbor, he gives voice to the quiet dignity of rural existence and animal companionship, portraying a symbiotic bond imbued with mutual care and respect. Similarly, Fallen Elephant and Inhumanity lament the cruelty inflicted upon majestic creatures, indicting human greed and violence. These poems articulate not only empathy for the natural world but also an implicit call for stewardship, threading a moral sensibility throughout the collection.

This concern extends to the socio-political sphere, as Jayanetti often situates his poems within the fraught realities of Sri Lanka’s history and struggles. Homage to Sir Henry Pedris honors a national martyr, while Confession of a Sri Lankan Cop exposes institutional corruption and personal integrity in tension. Hanuma Wannama and Gone Are They tackle political violence and social upheaval, reflecting the poet’s engagement with national trauma and collective memory. These works enrich the thematic landscape by connecting personal narrative to larger historical forces.

Jayanetti’s choice of subjects is remarkably diverse yet unified by a focus on lived experience—ranging from the intimate (To a Puppy That Departed, Benji) to the grand (Mekong, A Voyage). The poet’s attention to place, whether the Sri Lankan cityscape in City Morning and Evening from the College Terrace or the historic Ode to Galle Fort, anchors his work in locality while evoking universal themes of time, change, and belonging. Even poems centered on seemingly mundane moments, such as Staff Meeting or A Game, are elevated by the poet’s keen observational eye and capacity to find meaning in everyday rituals.

Moreover, Jayanetti often draws from historical and cultural memory, as seen in Ludowyk Remembered, Let Ho Chi Minh Guide You, and Rathna Sri Remembered, positioning his poetry as a dialogue between past and present. This choice expands his thematic range to include legacy, identity, and the power of remembrance, linking the individual to the collective consciousness.

Across the collection, Jayanetti’s tone is marked by a blend of gentle empathy and quiet strength. Poems such as A Companion Departed and To a Puppy That Departed convey tenderness and mourning with understated poignancy. His voice is intimate and accessible, inviting readers into personal reflections suffused with emotional depth.

Yet, this empathy is balanced by moments of stark realism and defiance.

In Corona and Hanuma Wannama, the tone shifts to urgent and accusatory, critiquing social injustice and political decay. A Ship Weeps mourns environmental devastation with an elegiac voice that is both sorrowful and admonitory. This tonal range reveals a poet capable of both consolation and confrontation, who embraces complexity rather than sentimentality.

While many poems explore specific moments or relationships, others invite contemplation on broader existential and cosmic themes. For instance, A Voyage and Mekong traverse spatial and temporal boundaries, evoking the interplay between human journeys and natural cycles. A Birthday Celebration reflects on legacy, learning, and the continuum of knowledge, blending personal homage with universal insight.

Even poems like A Bond and A Game gesture toward symbolic resonance, the former exploring interspecies loyalty as a metaphor for fidelity and duty, the latter invoking sport as a microcosm of life’s challenges and hopes. These works demonstrate Jayanetti’s ability to expand familiar motifs into metaphoric and philosophical territory, enriching his poetic landscape.

Jayanetti’s thirty-five poems in Poems from Galle collectively reveal a consistent and compelling artistic signature that intertwines compassionate engagement with nature and society, a profound sense of place, and an acute awareness of history and memory. His voice navigates seamlessly between moments of intimate reflection and urgent social commentary, creating a poetic landscape that resonates with both specificity and universality.

Each poem adds a distinct dimension to this mosaic. Historical and political awareness emerges strongly in poems like Let Ho Chi Minh Guide You and Homage to Sir Henry Pedris, where the sacrifices of national heroes and struggles for justice are evoked with reverence and clarity. Meanwhile, environmental consciousness is vividly articulated in works such as Abandoned Chena, Kottawa Forest, and Fallen Elephant, where the fragility of ecosystems and the human impact on nature are poignantly explored.

Jayanetti also delves deeply into themes of personal loss and companionship in poems like Benji, A Companion Departed, and In Memory of Brownie, tenderly capturing the bond between humans and animals. Poems like Confession of a Sri Lankan Cop and Hanuma Wannama offer raw social critique, revealing layers of political and moral complexity.

Through this interplay of historical, environmental, personal, and political themes, Jayanetti constructs a body of work that is distinctly Sri Lankan in its cultural and geographical grounding yet profoundly universal in its exploration of human experience. His poetry invites readers to reflect on the interconnected fates of humans, animals, and the natural world, urging a deeper awareness of our shared existence and responsibilities.

by Saman Indrajith

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