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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part V

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Norwegian Ambassador to Sri Lanka Jon Westburg shaking hands with Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe after the signing of a CFA on Feb. 22, 2002.

Foreign Policy and Peace process under Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe

Soon after Ranil Wickremesinghe became the Prime Minister following the snap parliamentary elections in December 2001, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) unilaterally declared a ceasefire. The newly formed the United National Front (UNF) government under the leadership of the Prime Minister responded positively to this gesture of goodwill. On February 22, 2002, the government and the LTTE signed the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). As part of the agreement, an International Monitoring Mission was established to oversee and ensure the implementation of the ceasefire.

The shift in the international situation, particularly following 9/11, played a crucial role in compelling the LTTE to agree to a ceasefire and enter negotiations with the Sri Lankan Government. By this time, the LTTE had already been designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries. In this context, continuing the war posed significant risks, with potential consequences that the LTTE would likely be unable to withstand. The changing demographics of the North and East posed a significant challenge to the LTTE. The mass exodus of Tamils from these regions led to the migration of approximately 500,000 Tamils abroad, while an additional 200,000 relocated to the south of Sri Lanka. As a result, the Tamil population, which had constituted 12% of the total population at the onset of the conflict, was reduced to just 8% (Smith, 2003).  Another crucial factor was the rise of a pro-LTTE Tamil business community—comprising professionals and entrepreneurs operating internationally. These individuals were far more attuned to global political shifts and pressures, making them more responsive to international dynamics.

The hastily inked UNF-LTTE Ceasefire Agreement had several significant weaknesses. Many of these could have been avoided had the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) engaged in more careful pre-ceasefire agreement bargaining with the LTTE, instead of rushing to sign the agreement. It granted numerous concessions without receiving any reciprocation. Additionally, the agreement lacked a clear time frame and established an open-ended ceasefire without committing to a political settlement. These flaws hindered the progress of negotiations.

After six rounds of talks, the LTTE unilaterally withdrew from peace negotiation in April 2023. Despite repeated efforts by Norwegian facilitators, supported by Japan and other international stakeholders, to bring the LTTE back to the table, all attempts failed. The LTTE adamantly refused even to attend the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka (Tokyo Aid Confab) to be held in June 2003.

It was clear that the peace process with international facilitation was frozen on the brink. Meanwhile, the LTTE maneuvered the UNF government to present three sets of proposals for an interim arrangement one after another and rejected them all. At this point, the LTTE presented its own proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and insisted that any future peace discussions be based on it. The sharp political brinkmanship of LTTE in the face of naivety of the UNF Government was clearly evident by the way the ISGA was presented and made it to be a condition for any future peace talks.  In November 2023, when the peace process reached an impasse, President Kumaratunga exercised her executive power to dissolve Parliament, effectively ending the UNF-led peace process. The final attempt to revive the stalled peace talks by the Norwegian facilitators led to the Geneva talks in February 2006 to realize that both sides were no longer willing to politically invest in the negotiations.

Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under the UNF government, (December 2001- November 2013, largely shaped by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, was primarily focused on facilitating peace negotiations with the LTTE. The country’s international relations were predominantly framed around these negotiations, with diplomatic efforts concentrated on garnering both regional and global support for the peace process.

Eelam War-IV and Foreign Policy

Sri Lanka’s domestic political landscape underwent a profound transformation following the parliamentary elections on April 2, 2004, which saw the rise of Mahinda Rajapaksa to the position of Prime Minister. By now, the peace process initiated by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe with international mediation was stuck in limbo. The LTTE’s intransigence became apparent as efforts by international facilitators and other stakeholders to revive peace talks repeatedly faltered. Simultaneously, a tide of Sinhala nationalist forces, with some vocal Buddhist monks playing a prominent role, gained increasing prominence. This political wind in the South was particularly evident in the strong opposition to the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) presented by President Kumaratunga. The gulf between the LTTE and the Government was intensified following the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar by the LTTE. Against this backdrop of growing instability, Mahinda Rajapaksa, backed by Sinhala nationalist forces, won the presidential election on November 17, 2005, defeating Ranil Wickremesinghe.

When Mahinda Rajapaksa became President, the ceasefire was just limited to a paper, presenting no obstacle to military action between the parties. The violence had escalated to full-scale war, marking the beginning of Eelam War IV in August 2006. From the very beginning, the winds on the battlefield blew decisively in favour of the GOSL forces.  After acquiring the territory in the Eastern province controlled by the LTTE in September 2007, the GOSL forces embarked on the second phase of its military offensive against the LTTE in the Mannar District in the Northern Province. In the face of the advancing GOSL forces, the territory held by the LTTE in the Wanni area contracted rapidly confining it to a narrow strip of land in the Mullaitivu district.

During Eelam War IV, international opinion turned against the LTTE, largely due to the global backlash against terrorism following 9/11. The group’s designation as a terrorist organisation by multiple countries severely hindered its operations, particularly in fundraising, arms trafficking, and recruitment. Additionally, the second generation of the Tamil diaspora, more attuned to evolving social and political dynamics, became less willing to jeopardize their stability and future for the LTTE.

After the collapse of all LTTE military strongholds, the LTTE sought to create a humanitarian crisis that they believed would prompt international intervention. They hoped this would eventually lead to the establishment of a transitional authority under UN supervision, followed by a plebiscite within a specified timeframe. To set this scenario in motion, the LTTE took over 250,000 ordinary people, planning to hold them until the situation unfolded as expected. The LTTE was convinced until the last moment that these Tamil civilians would stay with them. However, once the GOSL forces broke the siege, the civilians abandoned the LTTE, leaving them vulnerable to attack. The total military defeat of the LTTE at the Nanthikadal lagoon marked the dramatic end of nearly three decades of armed conflict in May 2009.

Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during the Eelam War IV was primarily focused on managing international pressure and addressing India’s concerns. International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) regularly issued reports highlighting human rights violations committed by both sides of the conflict. In September 2008, there was an attempt to broker a ceasefire through the UN. However, the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) stood firm in its demand for the total surrender of the LTTE (Salter, 2015: 324). In response to mounting international pressure over civilian casualties, the government declared the establishment of a “No Fire Zone” on January 21, 2009. Five days later, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with Minister Basil Rajapaksa in New York, expressing deep concern over the humanitarian situation in the Wanni. He urged both parties to respect the No Fire Zone and facilitate the movement of civilians out of the conflict zone.

The Sri Lankan government failed to recognise that international concern extended beyond the LTTE to the plight of civilians trapped in conflict zones. It frequently accused international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) of being pro-LTTE, alleging they were influenced by the pro-LTTE Tamil Diaspora.  During the final stage of Eelam War IV, the co-chairs of the Sri Lankan peace process—the European Union, Japan, Norway, and the United States—issued a statement urging an end to shelling in the no-fire zone. They called on the LTTE to negotiate an end to hostilities, surrender arms, renounce violence, accept an amnesty, and participate in a political process for a lasting solution. However, the Sri Lankan government viewed this as an attempt to protect the LTTE and rejected the co-chairs’ ceasefire proposal. As a result, the Co-Chairs found themselves with few viable options—trapped between Scylla and Charybdis.

Another critical factor that emerged in the final stage of the war was India’s role. From the outset of the ethnic conflict, the LTTE maintained a strong presence in Tamil Nadu. However, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 dramatically altered the political landscape, leading both the DMK and AIADMK—the two major political parties in Tamil Nadu—to distance themselves from the LTTE. The situation shifted again with the onset of Eelam War IV. A key turning point was the Sri Lankan airstrike on the Sencholai orphanage on 14 August 2006, which triggered widespread public outcry in Tamil Nadu. As D.B.S. Jeyaraj (2008) observed, the public unrest during this period should not be mistaken for support for the LTTE. Rather, it reflected the deep concern of Tamil Nadu’s 70 million Tamils for their ethnic counterparts across the Palk Strait.

In late 2008, the situation in Sri Lanka significantly influenced Tamil Nadu politics. In response to mounting pressure from Tamil Nadu, the Indian National Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan, summoned the Sri Lankan Deputy High Commissioner to express India’s deep concern and dissatisfaction over the rising number of Tamil civilian casualties. Shortly thereafter, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa met with Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Alok Prasad, assuring him that Sri Lanka was doing everything possible to address India’s concerns.

Both the US and India continued to support Sri Lanka’s armed forces while urging all parties to minimise civilian casualties and adhere to International Humanitarian Law. Despite the suspension of direct US military aid in December 2008 due to human rights concerns, US-Sri Lanka military cooperation persisted, focusing on naval capabilities, including firepower, radar systems, and intelligence sharing. India’s assistance included intelligence sharing, air force training, radar systems, and anti-aircraft guns, with satellite communication via INSAT playing a crucial role in coordinating ground and air operations.

New Delhi appeared to prioritise strong Indo-Sri Lanka relations over Tamil Nadu’s demands from a regional and global political perspective. This was evident in India’s decision to vote against the 2009 UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka, underscoring Tamil Nadu’s peripheral role in shaping India’s Sri Lanka policy.

by Gamini Keerawella

(To be continued)



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The hollow recovery: A stagnant industry – Part I

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The headlines are seductive: 2.36 million tourists in 2025, a new “record.” Ministers queue for photo opportunities. SLTDA releases triumphant press statements. The narrative is simple: tourism is “back.”

But scratch beneath the surface and what emerges is not a success story but a cautionary tale of an industry that has mistaken survival for transformation, volume for value, and resilience for strategy.

Problem Diagnosis: The Mirage of Recovery

Yes, Sri Lanka welcomed 2.36 million tourists in 2025, marginally above the 2.33 million recorded in 2018. This marks a full recovery from the consecutive disasters of the Easter attacks (2019), COVID-19 (2020-21), and the economic collapse (2022). The year-on-year growth looks impressive: 15.1% above 2024’s 2.05 million arrivals.

But context matters. Between 2018 and 2023, arrivals collapsed by 36.3%, bottoming out at 1.49 million. The subsequent “rebound” is simply a return to where we were seven years ago, before COVID, before the economic crisis, even before the Easter attacks. We have spent six years clawing back to 2018 levels while competitors have leaped ahead.

Consider the monthly data. In 2023, January arrivals were just 102,545, down 57% from January 2018’s 238,924. By January 2025, arrivals reached 252,761, a dramatic 103% jump over 2023, but only 5.8% above the 2018 baseline. This is not growth; it is recovery from an artificially depressed base. Every month in 2025 shows the same pattern: strong percentage gains over the crisis years, but marginal or negative movement compared to 2018.

The problem is not just the numbers, but the narrative wrapped around them. SLTDA’s “Year in Review 2025” celebrates the 15.6% first-half increase without once acknowledging that this merely restores pre-crisis levels. The “Growth Scenarios 2025” report projects arrivals between 2.4 and 3.0 million but offers no analysis of what kind of tourism is being targeted, what yield is expected, or how market composition will shift. This is volume-chasing for its own sake, dressed up as strategic planning.

Comparative Analysis: Three Decades of Standing Still

The stagnation becomes stark when placed against Sri Lanka’s closest island competitors. In the mid-1990s, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, started from roughly the same base, around 300,000 annual arrivals each. Three decades later:

Sri Lanka: From 302,000 arrivals (1996) to 2.36 million (2025), with $3.2 billion

Maldives: From 315,000 arrivals (1995) to 2.25 million (2025), with $5.6 billion

The raw numbers obscure the qualitative difference. The Maldives deliberately crafted a luxury, high-yield model: one-island-one-resort zoning, strict environmental controls, integrated resorts layered with sustainability credentials. Today, Maldivian tourism generates approximately $5.6 billion from 2 million tourists, an average of $2,800 per visitor. The sector represents 21% of GDP and generates nearly half of government revenue.

Sri Lanka, by contrast, has oscillated between slogans, “Wonder of Asia,” “So Sri Lanka”, without embedding them in coherent policy. We have no settled model, no consensus on what kind of tourism we want, and no institutional memory because personnel and priorities change with every government. So, we match or slightly exceed competitors in arrivals, but dramatically underperform in revenue, yield, and structural resilience.

Root Causes: Governance Deficit and Policy Failure

The stagnation is not accidental; it is manufactured by systemic governance failures that successive governments have refused to confront.

1. Policy Inconsistency as Institutional Culture

Sri Lanka has rewritten its Tourism Act and produced multiple master plans since 2005. The problem is not the absence of strategy documents but their systematic non-implementation. The National Tourism Policy approved in February 2024 acknowledges that “policies and directions have not addressed several critical issues in the sector” and that there was “no commonly agreed and accepted tourism policy direction among diverse stakeholders.”

This is remarkable candor, and a damning indictment. After 58 years of organised tourism development, we still lack policy consensus. Why? Because tourism policy is treated as political property, not national infrastructure. Changes in government trigger wholesale personnel changes at SLTDA, Tourism Ministry, and SLTPB. Institutional knowledge evaporates. Priorities shift with ministerial whims. Therefore, operators cannot plan, investors cannot commit, and the industry lurches from crisis response to crisis response without building structural resilience.

2. Fragmented Institutional Architecture

Tourism responsibilities are scattered across the Ministry of Tourism, Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA), Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau (SLTPB), provincial authorities, and an ever-expanding roster of ad hoc committees. The ADB’s 2024 Tourism Sector Diagnostics bluntly notes that “governance and public infrastructure development of tourism in Sri Lanka is fragmented and hampered.”

No single institution owns yield. No one is accountable for net foreign exchange contribution after leakages. Quality standards are unenforced. The tourism development fund, 1% of the tourism levy plus embarkation taxes, is theoretically allocated 70% to SLTPB for global promotion, but “lengthy procurement and approval processes” render it ineffective.

Critically, the current government has reportedly scrapped sophisticated data analytics programmes that were finally giving SLTDA visibility into spending patterns, high-yield segments, and tourist movement. According to industry reports in late 2025, partnerships with entities like Mastercard and telecom data analytics have been halted, forcing the sector to fly blind precisely when data-driven decision-making is essential.

3. Infrastructure Deficit and Resource Misallocation

The Bandaranaike International Airport Development Project, essential for handling projected tourist volumes, has been repeatedly delayed. Originally scheduled for completion years ago, it is now re-tendered for 2027 delivery after debt restructuring. Meanwhile, tourists in late 2025 faced severe congestion at BIA, with reports of near-miss flights due to immigration and check-in bottlenecks.

At cultural sites, basic facilities are inadequate. Sigiriya, which generates approximately 25% of cultural tourist traffic and charges $36 per visitor, lacks adequate lighting, safety measures, and emergency infrastructure. Tourism associations report instances of tourists being attacked by wild elephants with no effective safety protocols.

SLTDA Chairman statements acknowledge “many restrictions placed on incurring capital expenditure” and “embargoes placed not only on tourism but all Government institutions.” The frank admission: we lack funds to maintain the assets that generate revenue. This is governance failure in its purest form, allowing revenue-generating infrastructure to decay while chasing arrival targets.

The Stop-Go Trap: Volatility as Business Model

What truly differentiates Sri Lanka from competitors is not arrival levels but the pattern: extreme stop-go volatility driven by crisis and short-term stimulus rather than steady, strategic growth.

After each shock, the industry is told to “bounce back” without being given the tools to build resilience. The rebound mechanism is consistent: currency depreciation makes Sri Lanka “affordable,” operators discount aggressively to fill rooms, and visa concessions attract price-sensitive segments. Arrivals recover, until the next shock.

This is not how a strategic export industry operates. It is how a shock-absorber behaves, used to plug forex and fiscal holes after each policy failure, then left exposed again.

The monthly 2023-2025 data illustrate the cycle perfectly. Between January 2018 and January 2023, arrivals fell 57%. The “recovery” to January 2025 shows a 103% jump over 2023, but this is bounce-back from an artificially depressed base, not structural transformation. By September 2025, growth rates normalize into the teens and twenties, catch-up to a benchmark set six years earlier.

Why the Boom Feels Like Stagnation

Industry operators report a disconnect between headline numbers and ground reality. Occupancy rates have improved to the high-60% range, but margins remain below 2018 levels. Why?

Because input costs, energy, food, debt servicing, have risen faster than room rates. The rupee’s collapse makes Sri Lanka look “affordable” to foreigners, but it quietly transfers value from domestic suppliers and workers to foreign visitors and lenders. Hotels fill rooms at prices that barely cover costs once translated into hard currency and adjusted for inflation.

Growth is fragile and concentrated. Europe and Asia-Pacific account for over 92% of arrivals. India alone provides 20.7% of visitors in H1 2025, and as later articles in this series will show, this is a low-yield, short-stay segment. We have built recovery on market concentration and price competition, not on product differentiation or yield optimization.

There is no credible long-term roadmap. SLTDA’s projections focus almost entirely on volumes. There is no public discussion of receipts-per-visitor targets, market composition strategies, or institutional reforms required to shift from volume to value.

The Way Forward: From Arrivals Theater to Strategic Transformation

The path out of stagnation requires uncomfortable honesty and political courage that has been systematically absent.

First, abandon arrivals as the primary success metric. Tourism contribution to economic recovery should be measured by net foreign exchange contribution after leakages, employment quality (wages, stability), and yield per visitor, not by how many planes land.

Second, establish institutional continuity. Depoliticize relevant leaderships. Implement fixed terms for key personnel insulated from political cycles. Tourism is a 30-year investment horizon; it cannot be managed on five-year electoral cycles.

Third, restore data infrastructure. Reinstate the analytics programs that track spending patterns and identify high-yield segments. Without data, we are flying blind, and no amount of ministerial optimism changes that.

Fourth, allocate resources to infrastructure. The tourism development fund exists, use it. Online promotions, BIA expansion, cultural site upgrades, last-mile connectivity cannot wait for “better fiscal conditions.” These assets generate the revenue that funds their own maintenance.

Resilience without strategy is stagnation with momentum. And stagnation, however energetically celebrated, remains stagnation.

If policymakers continue to mistake arrivals for achievement, Sri Lanka will remain trapped in a cycle: crash, discount, recover, repeat. Meanwhile, competitors will consolidate high-yield models, and we will wonder why our tourism “boom” generates less cash, less jobs, and less development than it should.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)

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The call for review of reforms in education: discussion continues …

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PM Harini Amarasuriya

The hype around educational reforms has abated slightly, but the scandal of the reforms persists. And in saying scandal, I don’t mean the error of judgement surrounding a misprinted link of an online dating site in a Grade 6 English language text book. While that fiasco took on a nasty, undeserved attack on the Minister of Education and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, fundamental concerns with the reforms have surfaced since then and need urgent discussion and a mechanism for further analysis and action. Members of Kuppi have been writing on the reforms the past few months, drawing attention to the deeply troubling aspects of the reforms. Just last week, a statement, initiated by Kuppi, and signed by 94 state university teachers, was released to the public, drawing attention to the fundamental problems underlining the reforms https://island.lk/general-educational-reforms-to-what-purpose-a-statement-by-state-university-teachers/. While the furore over the misspelled and misplaced reference and online link raged in the public domain, there were also many who welcomed the reforms, seeing in the package, a way out of the bottle neck that exists today in our educational system, as regards how achievement is measured and the way the highly competitive system has not helped to serve a population divided by social class, gendered functions and diversities in talent and inclinations. However, the reforms need to be scrutinised as to whether they truly address these concerns or move education in a progressive direction aimed at access and equity, as claimed by the state machinery and the Minister… And the answer is a resounding No.

The statement by 94 university teachers deplores the high handed manner in which the reforms were hastily formulated, and without public consultation. It underlines the problems with the substance of the reforms, particularly in the areas of the structure of education, and the content of the text books. The problem lies at the very outset of the reforms, with the conceptual framework. While the stated conceptualisation sounds fancifully democratic, inclusive, grounded and, simultaneously, sensitive, the detail of the reforms-structure itself shows up a scandalous disconnect between the concept and the structural features of the reforms. This disconnect is most glaring in the way the secondary school programme, in the main, the junior and senior secondary school Phase I, is structured; secondly, the disconnect is also apparent in the pedagogic areas, particularly in the content of the text books. The key players of the “Reforms” have weaponised certain seemingly progressive catch phrases like learner- or student-centred education, digital learning systems, and ideas like moving away from exams and text-heavy education, in popularising it in a bid to win the consent of the public. Launching the reforms at a school recently, Dr. Amarasuriya says, and I cite the state-owned broadside Daily News here, “The reforms focus on a student-centered, practical learning approach to replace the current heavily exam-oriented system, beginning with Grade One in 2026 (https://www.facebook.com/reel/1866339250940490). In an address to the public on September 29, 2025, Dr. Amarasuriya sings the praises of digital transformation and the use of AI-platforms in facilitating education (https://www.facebook.com/share/v/14UvTrkbkwW/), and more recently in a slightly modified tone (https://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking-news/PM-pledges-safe-tech-driven-digital-education-for-Sri-Lankan-children/108-331699).

The idea of learner- or student-centric education has been there for long. It comes from the thinking of Paulo Freire, Ivan Illyich and many other educational reformers, globally. Freire, in particular, talks of learner-centred education (he does not use the term), as transformative, transformative of the learner’s and teacher’s thinking: an active and situated learning process that transforms the relations inhering in the situation itself. Lev Vygotsky, the well-known linguist and educator, is a fore runner in promoting collaborative work. But in his thought, collaborative work, which he termed the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is processual and not goal-oriented, the way teamwork is understood in our pedagogical frameworks; marks, assignments and projects. In his pedagogy, a well-trained teacher, who has substantial knowledge of the subject, is a must. Good text books are important. But I have seen Vygotsky’s idea of ZPD being appropriated to mean teamwork where students sit around and carry out a task already determined for them in quantifying terms. For Vygotsky, the classroom is a transformative, collaborative place.

But in our neo liberal times, learner-centredness has become quick fix to address the ills of a (still existing) hierarchical classroom. What it has actually achieved is reduce teachers to the status of being mere cogs in a machine designed elsewhere: imitative, non-thinking followers of some empty words and guide lines. Over the years, this learner-centred approach has served to destroy teachers’ independence and agency in designing and trying out different pedagogical methods for themselves and their classrooms, make input in the formulation of the curriculum, and create a space for critical thinking in the classroom.

Thus, when Dr. Amarasuriya says that our system should not be over reliant on text books, I have to disagree with her (https://www.newsfirst.lk/2026/01/29/education-reform-to-end-textbook-tyranny ). The issue is not with over reliance, but with the inability to produce well formulated text books. And we are now privy to what this easy dismissal of text books has led us into – the rabbit hole of badly formulated, misinformed content. I quote from the statement of the 94 university teachers to illustrate my point.

“The textbooks for the Grade 6 modules . . . . contain rampant typographical errors and include (some undeclared) AI-generated content, including images that seem distant from the student experience. Some textbooks contain incorrect or misleading information. The Global Studies textbook associates specific facial features, hair colour, and skin colour, with particular countries and regions, and refers to Indigenous peoples in offensive terms long rejected by these communities (e.g. “Pygmies”, “Eskimos”). Nigerians are portrayed as poor/agricultural and with no electricity. The Entrepreneurship and Financial Literacy textbook introduces students to “world famous entrepreneurs”, mostly men, and equates success with business acumen. Such content contradicts the policy’s stated commitment to “values of equity, inclusivity and social justice” (p. 9). Is this the kind of content we want in our textbooks?”

Where structure is concerned, it is astounding to note that the number of subjects has increased from the previous number, while the duration of a single period has considerably reduced. This is markedly noticeable in the fact that only 30 hours are allocated for mathematics and first language at the junior secondary level, per term. The reduced emphasis on social sciences and humanities is another matter of grave concern. We have seen how TV channels and YouTube videos are churning out questionable and unsubstantiated material on the humanities. In my experience, when humanities and social sciences are not properly taught, and not taught by trained teachers, students, who will have no other recourse for related knowledge, will rely on material from controversial and substandard outlets. These will be their only source. So, instruction in history will be increasingly turned over to questionable YouTube channels and other internet sites. Popular media have an enormous influence on the public and shapes thinking, but a well formulated policy in humanities and social science teaching could counter that with researched material and critical thought. Another deplorable feature of the reforms lies in provisions encouraging students to move toward a career path too early in their student life.

The National Institute of Education has received quite a lot of flak in the fall out of the uproar over the controversial Grade 6 module. This is highlighted in a statement, different from the one already mentioned, released by influential members of the academic and activist public, which delivered a sharp critique of the NIE, even while welcoming the reforms (https://ceylontoday.lk/2026/01/16/academics-urge-govt-safeguard-integrity-of-education-reforms). The government itself suspended key players of the NIE in the reform process, following the mishap. The critique of NIE has been more or less uniform in our own discussions with interested members of the university community. It is interesting to note that both statements mentioned here have called for a review of the NIE and the setting up of a mechanism that will guide it in its activities at least in the interim period. The NIE is an educational arm of the state, and it is, ultimately, the responsibility of the government to oversee its function. It has to be equipped with qualified staff, provided with the capacity to initiate consultative mechanisms and involve panels of educators from various different fields and disciplines in policy and curriculum making.

In conclusion, I call upon the government to have courage and patience and to rethink some of the fundamental features of the reform. I reiterate the call for postponing the implementation of the reforms and, in the words of the statement of the 94 university teachers, “holistically review the new curriculum, including at primary level.”

(Sivamohan Sumathy was formerly attached to the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

By Sivamohan Sumathy

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Constitutional Council and the President’s Mandate

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A file photo of a Constitutional Council meeting

The Constitutional Council stands out as one of Sri Lanka’s most important governance mechanisms particularly at a time when even long‑established democracies are struggling with the dangers of executive overreach. Sri Lanka’s attempt to balance democratic mandate with independent oversight places it within a small but important group of constitutional arrangements that seek to protect the integrity of key state institutions without paralysing elected governments.  Democratic power must be exercised, but it must also be restrained by institutions that command broad confidence. In each case, performance has been uneven, but the underlying principle is shared.

 Comparable mechanisms exist in a number of democracies. In the United Kingdom, independent appointments commissions for the judiciary and civil service operate alongside ministerial authority, constraining but not eliminating political discretion. In Canada, parliamentary committees scrutinise appointments to oversight institutions such as the Auditor General, whose independence is regarded as essential to democratic accountability. In India, the collegium system for judicial appointments, in which senior judges of the Supreme Court play the decisive role in recommending appointments, emerged from a similar concern to insulate the judiciary from excessive political influence.

 The Constitutional Council in Sri Lanka  was developed to ensure that the highest level appointments to the most important institutions of the state would be the best possible under the circumstances. The objective was not to deny the executive its authority, but to ensure that those appointed would be independent, suitably qualified and not politically partisan. The Council is entrusted with oversight of appointments in seven critical areas of governance. These include the judiciary, through appointments to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, the independent commissions overseeing elections, public service, police, human rights, bribery and corruption, and the office of the Auditor General.

JVP Advocacy

 The most outstanding feature of the Constitutional Council is its composition. Its ten members are drawn from the ranks of the government, the main opposition party, smaller parties and civil society. This plural composition was designed to reflect the diversity of political opinion in Parliament while also bringing in voices that are not directly tied to electoral competition. It reflects a belief that legitimacy in sensitive appointments comes not only from legal authority but also from inclusion and balance.

 The idea of the Constitutional Council was strongly promoted around the year 2000, during a period of intense debate about the concentration of power in the executive presidency. Civil society organisations, professional bodies and sections of the legal community championed the position that unchecked executive authority had led to abuse of power and declining public trust. The JVP, which is today the core part of the NPP government, was among the political advocates in making the argument and joined the government of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on this platform.

 The first version of the Constitutional Council came into being in 2001 with the 17th Amendment to the Constitution during the presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The Constitutional Council functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness. There were moments of cooperation and also moments of tension. On several occasions President Kumaratunga disagreed with the views of the Constitutional Council, leading to deadlock and delays in appointments. These experiences revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the model.

 Since its inception in 2001, the Constitutional Council has had its ups and downs. Successive constitutional amendments have alternately weakened and strengthened it. The 18th Amendment significantly reduced its authority, restoring much of the appointment power to the executive. The 19th Amendment reversed this trend and re-established the Council with enhanced powers. The 20th Amendment again curtailed its role, while the 21st Amendment restored a measure of balance. At present, the Constitutional Council operates under the framework of the 21st Amendment, which reflects a renewed commitment to shared decision making in key appointments.

 Undermining Confidence

 The particular issue that has now come to the fore concerns the appointment of the Auditor General. This is a constitutionally protected position, reflecting the central role played by the Auditor General’s Department in monitoring public spending and safeguarding public resources. Without a credible and fearless audit institution, parliamentary oversight can become superficial and corruption flourishes unchecked. The role of the Auditor General’s Department is especially important in the present circumstances, when rooting out corruption is a stated priority of the government and a central element of the mandate it received from the electorate at the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2024.

 So far, the government has taken hitherto unprecedented actions to investigate past corruption involving former government leaders. These actions have caused considerable discomfort among politicians now in the opposition and out of power.  However, a serious lacuna in the government’s anti-corruption arsenal is that the post of Auditor General has been vacant for over six months. No agreement has been reached between the government and the Constitutional Council on the nominations made by the President. On each of the four previous occasions, the nominees of the President have failed to obtain its concurrence.

 The President has once again nominated a senior officer of the Auditor General’s Department whose appointment was earlier declined by the Constitutional Council. The key difference on this occasion is that the composition of the Constitutional Council has changed. The three representatives from civil society are new appointees and may take a different view from their predecessors. The person appointed needs to be someone who is not compromised by long years of association with entrenched interests in the public service and politics. The task ahead for the new Auditor General is formidable. What is required is professional competence combined with moral courage and institutional independence.

 New Opportunity

 By submitting the same nominee to the Constitutional Council, the President is signaling a clear preference and calling it to reconsider its earlier decision in the light of changed circumstances. If the President’s nominee possesses the required professional qualifications, relevant experience, and no substantiated allegations against her, the presumption should lean toward approving the appointment. The Constitutional Council is intended to moderate the President’s authority and not nullify it.

 A consensual, collegial decision would be the best outcome. Confrontational postures may yield temporary political advantage, but they harm public institutions and erode trust. The President and the government carry the democratic mandate of the people; this mandate brings both authority and responsibility. The Constitutional Council plays a vital oversight role, but it does not possess an independent democratic mandate of its own and its legitimacy lies in balanced, principled decision making.

 Sri Lanka’s experience, like that of many democracies, shows that institutions function best when guided by restraint, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to the public good. The erosion of these values elsewhere in the world demonstrates their importance. At this critical moment, reaching a consensus that respects both the President’s mandate and the Constitutional Council’s oversight role would send a powerful message that constitutional governance in Sri Lanka can work as intended.

by Jehan Perera

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