by Shelton Dharmaratne

Sri Lanka has reached an important constitutional moment.

The proposed 22nd Amendment has moved beyond political debate and into the constitutional process through which its validity will be examined. That development should change the character of the national discussion.

That is understandable in a politically contested environment. But Sri Lanka should now resist reducing a question of constitutional design to a contest over political positions.

The deeper issue concerns the relationship between constitutional reform, judicial independence and public confidence in the institutions of the State.

The Supreme Court will determine the constitutional questions before it. Public commentators should therefore exercise restraint in predicting, interpreting or seeking to influence that determination. But restraint does not require silence. It requires a more rigorous discussion of the institutional principles at stake.

A narrower constitutional question than the political debate suggests

The proposed amendment principally concerns the retirement ages of judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, together with an increase in the maximum number of judges permitted on the Court of Appeal.

Under the proposal, the retirement age of Supreme Court judges would rise from 65 to 67 and that of Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65. The maximum number of Court of Appeal judges would also increase from 19 to 24.

Other proposed changes concerning the retirement ages of judges in the lower courts arise under separate legislation. This distinction matters because the public debate has sometimes treated the wider package of judicial reform as though it formed a single constitutional proposal.

Nor should the central issue be reduced to whether retaining experienced judges is inherently good or inherently dangerous. Both propositions are too simplistic.

Sri Lanka faces a substantial burden of pending litigation, and delays in the administration of justice impose significant costs on citizens, businesses and the State. Experienced judges represent an institutional resource. Continuity, accumulated knowledge and familiarity with complex areas of law cannot always be replaced immediately.

Those are legitimate policy considerations.

But the opposing concern is equally important: judicial tenure is not merely an employment condition. It is a structural component of judicial independence.

The real question is institutional

The critical question is not whether an individual judge is capable of acting impartially. It is whether the constitutional structure provides adequate protection against circumstances in which judicial tenure could become connected, directly or indirectly, with political authority.

That is an institutional question, not an accusation against individual judges.

A judge may be entirely conscientious and independent while the institutional arrangements surrounding the judiciary nevertheless create public doubts about independence. Constitutional democracies therefore cannot depend solely on the personal integrity of office-holders. They must construct institutions capable of preserving independence even when governments, individuals and political circumstances change.

This is particularly relevant when constitutional reform concerns the tenure of serving members of the superior judiciary.

The institutional sensitivity of such a proposal should neither be exaggerated into an allegation of improper motive nor dismissed as irrelevant. The appropriate response is transparency, procedural fairness and confidence in constitutional safeguards.

Legitimate objectives do not settle constitutional questions

The government has stated that its objectives include strengthening the administration of justice, addressing delays, retaining judicial experience and increasing institutional capacity.

Those objectives deserve serious consideration. Sri Lanka needs judicial reform. Citizens waiting years for their cases to be concluded experience the justice system very differently from those discussing it in Parliament, courtrooms or universities.

A government is therefore entitled to propose reforms designed to improve judicial efficiency.

But legitimate objectives do not automatically resolve constitutional objections. The relevant question is whether the means chosen are compatible with the constitutional structure and whether sufficient safeguards exist against unintended institutional consequences.

That is precisely why constitutional scrutiny matters.

The concerns of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) should likewise be examined without political labelling. Opposition to the proposed changes should not automatically be characterised as opposition to judicial reform or an attempt to obstruct the government. At the same time, invoking judicial independence does not place any argument beyond scrutiny.

The appropriate questions are straightforward:

Does extending judicial tenure strengthen the administration of justice?

What risks, if any, could it create for judicial independence?

Are adequate institutional safeguards in place?

Does the proposal operate prospectively, or does it affect judges already serving?

Could the same objectives be achieved by filling vacancies, increasing judicial capacity, improving court administration and strengthening case management?

These questions can be examined rationally without attributing improper motives to either side.

Judicial vacancies and institutional confidence

Recent concerns raised by the BASL regarding judicial vacancies add another dimension to the debate. The BASL has argued that vacancies in the Supreme Court contributed to the retirement of a senior Court of Appeal judge without promotion to the Supreme Court, despite vacancies having existed. It has also raised concerns regarding forthcoming judicial retirements and the need for timely consideration of appointments.

Such matters should not be treated as evidence of the motives behind the proposed amendment. They do, however, illustrate a broader principle.

Judicial independence is shaped not only by the retirement age written into the Constitution. It is also influenced by how vacancies are filled, how promotions are determined, how seniority and merit are assessed, and whether judicial officers and the public believe that institutional decisions are made according to transparent and defensible criteria.

The government has an opportunity to address these concerns constructively.

Prompt appointments based on publicly defensible principles would strengthen confidence in the judiciary irrespective of the eventual outcome of the constitutional debate.

Seniority, merit and transparent criteria

The controversy also exposes a longstanding question concerning judicial appointments.

Seniority has traditionally carried considerable weight in judicial advancement. Yet seniority alone need not be the sole measure of merit. Conversely, replacing established practices with undefined assessments of “merit” could create another institutional problem.

If governments or appointing authorities can determine which judges are sufficiently meritorious without clear and objective criteria, uncertainty itself may become a source of institutional anxiety.

Sri Lanka would therefore benefit from clearer, objective and defensible standards governing judicial appointments and promotions.

Such standards would protect judges as well as appointing authorities. They would reduce opportunities for favouritism, strengthen institutional confidence and make it harder for political actors to portray every appointment as politically motivated.

Institutional rules are stronger safeguards than assurances of good intentions.

The State is larger than any government

One principle deserves particular emphasis: a government is not the State.

Governments are temporary. The constitutional State is continuing. Political parties change, parliamentary majorities change and political priorities change. The judiciary, however, must continue to function independently of whoever occupies the government benches.

The judiciary is neither a government institution in the political sense nor an Opposition institution. It is an institution of the State whose legitimacy depends upon its independence from both.

For that reason, governments should exercise particular caution when proposing constitutional changes affecting the judiciary, even where the policy objectives are legitimate.

The stronger a government is politically, the greater its responsibility to demonstrate institutional restraint.

That is not political weakness. It is constitutional maturity.

Public confidence is a constitutional asset

The most consequential issue may ultimately be neither retirement age nor judicial capacity, but public confidence.

Courts do not possess political power in the conventional sense. Their authority rests substantially on the acceptance of their decisions as legitimate.

Citizens will sometimes disagree with judicial decisions. But where the judiciary is perceived as independent, even unpopular decisions can command respect. If judicial institutions are perceived as being shaped by political convenience, even legally sound decisions may become vulnerable to suspicion.

Constitutional reform affecting judicial tenure must therefore be evaluated not only by its immediate administrative benefits but also by its effect on institutional credibility.

A reform that produces short-term efficiency while weakening confidence in judicial independence could impose a greater long-term cost. Conversely, reform that improves efficiency while preserving independence can strengthen both justice and public trust.

The challenge is not to choose between judicial efficiency and judicial independence. It is to achieve both.

If a referendum arises …

If the constitutional process ultimately requires approval by the people at a referendum, the debate should rise above the conventional government versus Opposition contest.

The electorate should be given a clear constitutional question and sufficient information to assess it.

Citizens should understand what problem the amendment seeks to address, why the proposed mechanism is considered necessary, what institutional risks have been identified, what safeguards exist and whether alternative measures could achieve the same objectives.

A constitutional referendum deserves a higher standard of public discussion than an ordinary election campaign.

The people would not merely be choosing a political side. They would be deciding the institutional framework within which political power and judicial authority operate.

Beyond who wins

The most important question arising from the proposed Twenty-Second Amendment is therefore not simply whether the government succeeds or whether the Opposition and BASL prevail.

Nor is it ultimately whether judicial retirement ages become 67 and 65 or remain unchanged.

Those are immediate constitutional questions. The deeper issue is what Sri Lanka learns from the controversy.

If the government seeks to modernise and strengthen the justice system, that objective deserves serious consideration. If the BASL and others warn that particular reforms may affect judicial independence, those concerns deserve equally serious examination.

Neither side strengthens the country by assuming that the other is acting in bad faith.

The constitutional system is strongest when legitimate disagreements are resolved through institutions rather than political pressure.

Whatever the eventual constitutional outcome, Sri Lanka will still face the underlying challenges of judicial vacancies, case delays, institutional capacity, judicial appointments and public confidence. Those problems will not disappear with a judicial determination, nor should the national conversation end there.

Sri Lanka should instead seek a broader consensus around a fundamental proposition:

Judicial reform and judicial independence are not competing objectives.

The real challenge is to pursue reform in a manner that strengthens the judiciary without placing its independence under suspicion.

That requires sound legislation, transparent appointments, adequate resources, efficient court administration, responsible political conduct and safeguards capable of surviving changes of government.

The present controversy will eventually pass. Political arguments surrounding it will fade.

But constitutional arrangements can endure for decades.

That is why Sri Lanka must look beyond the immediate political contest.

The ultimate test is not who wins today’s constitutional argument. It is whether, when the political moment has passed, Sri Lanka has a judiciary that is more efficient, more accessible and more trusted—while remaining sufficiently independent to hold every government, including future governments, within the boundaries of the Constitution.