South-East Asia at BRICS

By Uditha Devapriya

To me, the most important takeaway from the latest BRICS Summit, in Kazan, Russia, was not India signalling towards a new chapter in its ties with China. It was not even Türkiye’s application to join the group. Both these developments are important, in that they point to pivotal shifts in the global order – at least in the eyes of foreign policy analysts. India has made it clear that it prioritises relations with China. Türkiye’s move was unpredictable: if its application is approved, it will be the first NATO country to join BRICS. With the Western media itself abuzz with op-eds pondering whether Western predominance is under threat, these actions definitively reflect on a pivotal moment in our time.

Yet, for me, personally, the most important takeaway from the Summit was South-East Asia formally applying to become partner countries of the BRICS. Four countries from the region – Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand – are now in the group. Speaking to the press soon afterwards, Mohamad Hasan, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, contended that the country could now reap the benefits of trade with the bloc. Malaysia’s Minister of Economy Rafizi Ramli, in a nation-wide address, later noted that it sees “tremendous synergies between ASEAN and BRICS”, significant given that Malaysia is set to take up the chairmanship of ASEAN next year. “There is a commonality in our world-view,” he added.

The synergies between South-East Asia and BRICS are self-evident. BRICS itself is scattered everywhere: Latin America, East Asia, Eurasia, and South Asia. These are emerging markets, among the fastest growing. In December 2022, Goldman Sachs reported that the world’s peak years of economic growth were behind it, and that Asia, China and India in particular, would eventually overturn richer countries. Even though these regions are beset with problems hardly unique to their societies and economies – indebtedness and high inflation – they have made it clear that the old solutions will no longer work.

ASEAN has a history of engaging in multiple alliances and pursuing multiple partnerships. Though it was born in the bedrock of Cold War geopolitics – ASEAN’s spiritual predecessor, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), was conceived as a NATO-type alliance between US-allied countries in the region – it has since evolved into the most pragmatist multi-vector grouping in the world. With Western countries held virtually hostage by what I like to call its Atlanticist outlook – dominated by US foreign policy and economic interests, which none less than European Union (EU) officials have complained of being one-sided and biased against European interests – South-East Asia is looking to other regions.

True, these countries face enormous challenges. On the domestic front, political shifts and somersaults have become an order of the day. Indonesia recently elected its new President. Thailand is mired in a political crisis. Vietnam and China do not see eye to eye, though they have moved towards solidifying ties. Malaysia is still reeling from the shockwaves of the 1MDB scandal – the country’s Prime Minister at the time of the scam, Najib Razak, has just issued a public apology, though “without accepting full blame.” More than anything, the region faces the unenviable task of reconciling its collective aspirations for the future with the aspirations of a vocal Western-educated youth.

There is also the elephant in the room, which is Myanmar. For Thailand in particular, it has been difficult navigating its way around the crisis in its immediate neighbour. ASEAN has, to be sure, taken a definitive stance on Myanmar, but countries like Laos and Cambodia have complex relations which have somewhat undermined regional unity on the issue. While committed to a durable peace, ASEAN member states have had to grapple with the issue of reconciling regional policy with bilateral interests. Myanmar stretches from South-East to South Asia. This is bound to impact ASEAN – a grouping which, incidentally, has no military footing like NATO or Quad – for years to come.

Yet, despite these challenges, ASEAN has become something of a model to emulate. The reason for this may be the region’s prioritisation of economic ties. More than a quarter of ASEAN trade – that is, more than 25 cents for every dollar of trade – takes place within ASEAN itself. In South Asia, by contrast, that figure is around five cents to every dollar of trade. When economic ties become the basis for regional cooperation, when cooperation transcends competition, it becomes easier to withstand external shocks: a lesson that South Asia has yet to grasp. ASEAN’s model of regionalism, in that sense, points to the next stage in globalisation: one driven, not by the diffusion of a dominant world culture (“McWordlism”), but by the emergence of multiple blocs cooperating with each other.

There is another reason for why ASEAN has come out strongly. South-East and East Asia have a long history of disproving the economic orthodoxies of the Global North, which are still being imposed on the Global South today. Both South Korea and Malaysia are examples of interventionist states which enabled markets to flourish but also took decisions, even against the advice of multilateral agencies, when they felt they had to, in times of crisis. It goes without saying that almost all ASEAN countries – including the two heavyweights, Singapore and Malaysia – prioritised planning of some form in the short and medium term. While concerns have been raised about the implications of such planning on economic and political freedom, orthodox solutions have clearly not worked as expected.

To be sure, no model is ever perfect. Countries like Sri Lanka are on the brink: they cannot afford to experiment. The orthodox economic policies of the past may have to be followed, in full, for years to come. Yet the ASEAN-BRICS synergy signals a way forward for the Global South. Without being unduly optimistic, the world will have to take note of these shifts, especially as the West, held together by the US, is becoming increasingly fragmented – if not economically, then ideologically. The largely Western model of big fish eat small fish – the doctrine of relative power, strength, and influence – remains as ubiquitous as ever. Countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia – and by extension, India – have shown a commitment to a rather different approach: one which prioritises their interests while seeking ways of aligning with each other’s interests. This is something the Global North, with its insistence on a one-size-fits-all strategy, has yet to wake up to.