SCAM OR INCOMPETENCE?

By Sanjeewa Jayaweera

The latest controversy to stoke much discussion in both the political arena and the public domain is the purported “sugar scam.” Politicians from both the JVP and SJB have been vociferous in their condemnation, claiming that reducing the Special Commodity Levy (SCL) on sugar was done to benefit a particular trader and that the loss to the state is more than Rs. 15 billion; indeed a substantial amount of money.

In the absence of verifiable data of the trader concerned reflecting his previous sugar import pattern, it is impossible to venture an opinion on the deal – whether it is a scam or a case of serious misjudgment by those vested with the authority to change the SCL on sugar.

What I do know is that politicians do not always tell the whole truth. It does not matter which party is in the opposition or government. In this day and age of electronic and social media, if you tell a lie often enough, it become the truth. Most people will not try to sift the rhetoric from the facts and arrive at a fact-based conclusion.

There is an absence of independent information in our country that the public can access to either confirm or reject a supposition propagated by interested parties. In certain countries, anybody could easily access or obtain records of the monthly quantity of sugar (or any other commodity) imported and by whom. I do not see any issue of confidentiality or trade secrets being compromised by making such information public. In such a scenario, a few independent individuals could confirm to the public whether the trader concerned had increased his import volumes substantially in anticipation of the decrease in the SCL. He could have stored the sugar in a bonded warehouse and cleared the stocks after the SCL was reduced. In that case, we can conclude that the trader had insider information and was a significant beneficiary of the cess reduction. That could indeed be deemed to be a fraud or a scam.

I find that in the last few months, there have been instances of opposition MP’s and others leading the public astray with their comments. The JVP was at the forefront of the campaign that forced the government to cancel the East Container Terminal (ECT) award at the Colombo Port to an Indian, Japanese and Sri Lankan consortium. They, together with trade unions and a section of the Buddhist clergy, claimed that the government was selling off national assets to foreigners.

Despite the investment proposal being a 35-year lease on a build operate transfer (BOT) basis, the ‘sell-off’ allegation was freely made. There is a significant difference between a sale and a lease. In a previous articles, captioned “Why the Government should have honoured the ECT agreement”, published in this newspaper, I set out why I believe the ECT campaign was disingenuous and counterproductive.

Just yesterday (Wednesday), I watched a clip of a JVP MP saying that the government claim that but for the reduction in the SCL to 25 cents, the current retail price of sugar would be about Rs. 170 per kg. This is absolute nonsense. He claimed that the landed cost of sugar in March 2021 was about Rs. 85 per kg and if the previous SCL at Rs. 50 per kg was maintained, then the maximum price should be Rs. 135 per kg and not Rs. 170 per kg. After a pause, he conceded that maybe the importer could keep five rupees per kg as his profit/cost and as such, the maximum price of sugar would be Rs. 140 per kg.

I do not doubt that the MP is unaware of the commercial aspects of a trading transaction. For the benefit of laymen, let me elaborate. Once the sugar is landed, the importer will incur additional costs such as storage, transport and working capital costs and, of course, then keep a profit. It is thereafter sold to a wholesaler who has his costs and profit margin, and after that the retailer who too has his own costs and profit. So, to assume only an additional five rupees per kg post the landed cost is incurred is not accurate and is misleading. Assuming a minimum margin of 5% is kept at each link in this chain, just five rupees per kg over the landed cost and SCL is totally inadequate.

A few weeks ago, the leading spokesman on Economic matters of the SJB, on a television talk show named a leading supermarket chain and claimed that despite the gazetted price of samba rice being Rs. 98 per kg, this particular chain was selling at Rs. 135 per kg. I saw the live program and was shocked. Having worked for the owners of this chain for over two decades, I knew they would not engage in such an act. I contacted some of my former colleagues and checked the claim. I was told the story was wholly untrue. They did not sell samba, and the price quoted by the MP was for keera samba. I encouraged my former colleagues to sue the MP because, in my view, their brand name was tarnished by a wild and incorrect statement. Usually politicians and scribes desist from naming names and say “a well-known supermarket chain etc..” But in this instance the chain was named for whatever reason And an MP who should known better, given his education and stature, made a baseless allegation that has been subsequently retracted.

Before my retirement, I worked as the Chief Financial Officer of a leading carbonated soft drinks manufacturer where sugar was the main raw material . Therefore, I was involved in the decision-making process of procurement and, though not an expert, have a fair idea of how the world sugar market works. We used to purchase a higher grade known as ICUMSA 45, whilst what is sold in the retail market is ICUMSA 150. We used to purchase our sugar primarily through international traders and the price was based on the London futures market. Our contracts were for several months to ensure price stability. However, even then, the SCL was the uncontrollable element.

As I remember, the SCL was reviewed every three months and was either increased, decreased, or maintained as before. The logic was that when the world price of sugar was increasing, the government would reduce the SCL, and when world prices were coming down, the government would increase the SCL. The intention was to maintain a stable retail price.

This policy has its disadvantages in that when world prices reduce, the consumer does not get the benefit. The other side of the coin is that when world prices increase, the consumer is part-protected – a case of “you can’t have your cake and eat it.” A former colleague maintained a 10-year record of SCL revisions and world prices at the time. In most instances, the logic I explained above was followed, but there are a few instances when the reverse did happen!

This same logic is applied to petroleum prices too. When the world oil prices plummeted during the initial wave of Covid-19, the consumer did not benefit. But he’s now being protected as prices rise. This, I think, is not a sound economic policy and is partly the reason why our country is in an economic and financial mess.

I understand that when the government decided to reduce or eliminate the SCL on sugar, the country’s sugar stocks were relatively high. It seems that most traders had purchased excess inventories sufficient for as many as three months from India, the primary supplier of sugar to Sri Lanka. This happened because India usually suspends its export quotas for about three months from the end of September for whatever reason.

So, when the government did decide to reduce the SCL to just 25 cents, the traders were unable to extend the benefit to the consumers immediately as they had significant stocks in hand on which SCL of Rs. 50 per kg had been paid. Obviously, we cannot expect traders to incur a loss by selling below cost. In this scenario, what happens is that there is a shortage in the market with importers, wholesalers and retailers holding stocks.

Sugar was sold at the retail price of Rs. 100 per kg in January 2020. The price increased after April 2020 and with sugar retailed between Rs 130 and Rs. 145 per kg just prior to the reduction of the SCL. In the immediate aftermath, the gazetted price of Rs. 85 per kg was held for a short time only by the privately-owned supermarkets and Sathosa. Supermarkets need to adhere to price controls as they are easily raided and need to avoid negative publicity. However, they will only sell a minimal quantity as losses cannot be borne indefinitely. Invariably, scarcity results and the authorities quietly allow retailers to sell at a higher price. This is when the opposition MP’s shout saying that sugar is not sold at the government mandated price.

I understand that various officials from the Department of Trade, Tariff and Investment Policy, Committee on Cost of Living and the Treasury are involved in the decision-making process when deciding on the merits or otherwise of the revised SCL. They are expected to consider factors such as movement in world prices, impact on government revenue, stocks in hand and cost of living.

In this instance, the authorities do not seem to have done their due diligence in ascertaining the availability of sugar stocks in the market. Had they done so, they would have realized that reducing the SCL on sugar would not benefit the consumer immediately. Substantial stocks cleared at SLC of Rs. 50 per kg was available in the country.

The question is whether the due process was followed, and if not, was it incompetence or ignored to benefit a few? In the absence of verifiable data, I cannot comment. Only an independent commission of inquiry can do so, although we know these are a dime a dozen and nothing much results.

A justifiable question to ask the authorities is why the SCL was not reduced to say Rs. 25 per kg? By reducing it to 25 cents the authorities have nothing to offer the consumer at present when the price of sugar in the world market is increasing. For the record, in July 2016 the Yahapalana government reduced the SCL to 25 cents from Rs. 30 per kg as the sugar prices in the world market increased significantly.

Having worked in the private sector for 25 years, I know successive governments advised by public servants have introduced various economic proposals without thinking through the consequences.