Features
Return of ‘Prachanda’ and lessons from Nepalese peace effort
Conservative opinion locally and internationally would consider Dahal a ‘terrorist’. However, the war conducted by him and his party against the then Nepalese monarchical administration witnessed the unleashing of atrocities by both sides to the conflict and one could be accused of simplistic thinking if one slaps the label of ‘terrorist’ on Dahal only.
As in the case of the majority of conflicts of this kind, ‘state terror’ too emerges as a factor to contend with in any assessment of who did right or wrong at the time of war. The observer comes up against the threadbare but relevant conundrum: One man’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter’ and vice versa. Needless to say, given the notoriously unresolvable nature of this conundrum, apportioning blame in such potentially nation-breaking warfare is a well-nigh impossible and tortuous task.
Moreover, it is relevant to remember that ‘people’s power’ too played a significant role in bringing about a resolution to the long-running Nepalese conflict. In April 2006 when millions of ordinary Nepalese got on to the streets to decry the Nepalese monarchy which was seen as repressive, King Gyanendra, the then ruler, had no choice but to step down from power. In other words, the sovereignty of the people was honoured in Nepal. The present regime in Sri Lanka would need to take a hard look at this Nepalese triumph and draw the relevant inferences from it if it is to resolve the country’s present crises.
However, though the long and unrelenting war waged by the Maoists under ‘Prachanda’ did play an important role in altering the domestic power balance more in favour of the rebels, peace in Nepal was finally clinched through a political solution to which the state and relevant non-state actors acceded. What is more, the UN too played a crucial role in the final resolution.
The political solution that was thus clinched has, generally speaking, endured in Nepal to date and peace in the latter could also be described as a notable victory for the UN. Those sections in Sri Lanka in particular that habitually accuse the UN system of being partial and not even-handed in the relevant contexts need to take careful stock of the developments that led to peace in Nepal.
From the viewpoint of human and material costs, the Nepalese conflict was as devastating as the one in Sri Lanka. Political polarities and divisions were considerably daunting. Yet, the parties to the Nepalese conflict considered the UN suitable enough to help in evolving a political solution that was acceptable to them. However, although Sri Lanka is yet to work out a political solution to its conflict, many Sri Lankans regard the UN system as untrustworthy. Hence the persistence of the ethnic problem.
An important element in the 2007 Nepalese political solution was an agreement by the Maoists to confine their fighters to 28 cantonments or camps under the supervision of the United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN). They also agreed to store away their weapons in containers, thereby ensuring the fool-proof nature of the accord. The responsibility for registering and verifying these arms and former fighters devolved on UNMIN. Thus, the role of the UN in the peace effort was substantial, constructive and positive.
Moreover, the ending of monarchical rule in Nepal and the ushering of a fully-fledged parliamentary system of government in the country enabled the Maoists to enter the political process and be a party to democratic politics. They have remained in parliamentary politics since then and have acceded to power sharing with other democratic parties, thus ensuring a degree of vibrancy in participatory, people-centred politics.
Herein we have the proof that solutions to internal political conflicts that feature power-sharing among the state and relevant rebel organizations could go a considerable distance in ensuring the effective management of crises of this kind.
In the case of Sri Lanka, it could be argued that the LTTE was given a few opportunities to enter the political process, which were bluntly spurned by them, thus making the evolution of a political solution difficult in the country. This may be so, but the Lankan state did not go any notable distance to bring about a political solution to the conflict by honestly, constructively and enduringly engaging democratically-oriented Tamil political parties. Nor are the latter receiving any assurances from the centre that such engagement would be worthwhile from the ordinary people’s viewpoint.
For example, power devolution in full to the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka is to date remaining unfulfilled. Building substantial trust between the political representatives of the Tamil people and the government is thus rendered difficult. Hopefully, the current regime would prove this columnist wrong on this score.
It could be presumed that peace would hold in Nepal as long as the former rebels partake of power in the central administration of the country. However, the Maoists and other formerly disaffected sections that are currently in power would need to work earnestly towards the wellbeing of the people if they are to keep the trust of the people and thereby remain in office.
The Nepalese experience and other exercises in power sharing, such as the one that is in place in Northern Ireland, for instance, demonstrate that a spirit of mutual accommodation and a willingness to give-and-take among key stakeholders hold the key to managing divisive internal political conflicts that threaten to tear countries apart. All that it takes, in fact, is a measure of magnanimity.
Those crisis-hit states that could measure-up to these standards are likely to resolve their problems with a degree of consensus and remain intact. Those that cannot do so will remain strife-torn indefinitely and be a happy hunting ground for interventionist powers.