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Provincial politics, DUNF, Thondaman and conversations with Colvin

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Thondaman with his people and grandson ‘Thamby

“Economy still suffering from estate takeover gerrymandering”

I was lucky enough to be elected on my very first foray into politics. Lalith and Gamini had offered me a position in the DUNF national list in the forthcoming general election but I was determined to enter politics by public acclamation. It was not a difficult decision because having served in Kandy district as a senior government official I was confident of winning both local government and national elections. I was proved right because I was returned in every election contested by me for 27 years consecutively. After I decided to retire undefeated, my nephew Dilum who assisted me in my election campaigns, succeeded me and has been returned on top of the list of winners in the Kandy district. His aggregate score of 171,000 votes in the 2019 election has not been bettered.

The second Provincial Council of the Central Province had a star studded cast which many compared favourably to the calibre of representatives in Parliament. Of the opposition group Gamini was the outstanding national figure though the SLFP leader Wijaya Wickremaratne was elected the leader of the Opposition in the council. “Pol Wikka”, my friend from Peradeniya University days, was a distinguished criminal lawyer in the country and we got on together like a house on fire. We trusted each other, without reservation and our DUNF group, though smaller in numbers, was well regarded by the Wickka led SLFP councillors.

He had the able assistance of another Peradeniya University colleague and leading lawyer Lal Wijenayake. All three of us Wikka, Lal and I had been earlier associated with the LSSP. This made it easy for us to adopt radical positions and thereby embarrass the UNP Chief Minister who was steeped in corruption and incompetence. We jointly planned to bring a vote of no confidence in him.

As expected our council had a fair number of members drawn from the estate Tamil community representing the workers of the “estate raj “in Kandy, Matale and Nuwara Eliya districts. Many of them like Putrasigamani, Sathasivam and Chandrasekeran later entered Parliament. The most interesting of these representatives was Chandrasekeran who broke away from Thondaman and formed his own party. Chandrasekeran’s party was growing in strength. He entered Parliament and became an important MP ensuring CBKs survival. He was made a Deputy Minister. However once in Colombo he began drinking heavily and died of cirrhosis of the liver at a young age.

He was the only leader with a mass following and the potential to challenge the Thondaman dynasty. The DUNF also had Monty Gopallawa and Keheliya Rambukwella who both later became senior ministers in national administrations. Among the UNP winners were Lucky Jayawardene and Sarath Kongahage who later entered Parliament. Mahindananda Aluthgamage entered politics as a SUP member in the CPC representing Nawalapitiya.

The vote of no confidence in the Chief Minister was not only a test of strength. On its success or failure the DUNF would have to assess its future strategy. In the event, the combined force of SLFP-DUNF and a fewTamil representatives could not overturn the UNP juggernaut. Ranil, Cooray and Choksy intervened forcefully to whip the UNP councillors into line and we suffered a heavy defeat. Partly because of this Gamini, now left with the burden of leading the party alone, began to rethink his strategy in the new circumstances of the absence of Premadasa and Lalith and the need of the UNP to have a charismatic leader of the front rank emerging from the JRJ era.

Amunugama with Fukuda and Devaraj

Gamini, Wickrema Weerasooria and I had many discussions regarding the DUNF and its future operations. At the same time Gamini talked to Premachandra, Monty Gopallawa and other DUNF leaders about his dilemma. Clearly an important decision had to be taken regarding the future of the DUNF.

A mixed bag

The Central Provincial Council was a good introduction to the realities of Sri Lankan politics. Of all the Provincial Councils, save perhaps the Western Provincial Council, it was the CPC which had a range of our national ethnic minorities represented within it. This was mostly because Nuwara Eliya district, which was one of the three districts represented in the CPC, had a large number of voters from the group previously known as Indian Tamils or estate Tamils. Similarly there were significant numbers of Muslims in the three districts, many of them domiciled from the time of Sinhala kings and referred to as Kandyan Muslims with Sinhala “Ge”names.

There were also many urban Tamils from the group known as Ceylon Tamils who were mainly engaged in business. Ceylon Tamils were also well represented in the professions in the Central Province. The Sinhalese though constituting the majority of the voters were also ranged in terms of upcountry Sinhala and low country Sinhala, with the latter having a disproportionate influence due to their economic dominance. Many of them were powerful behind the scenes and tended to support their favourites belonging to other communities.

Furthermore the Sinhalese and Tamils were subdivided on the basis of caste. Among the Sinhala the caste issue had raised its head as never before since the larger number of members represented in the Provincial Council, as distinct from Parliament, had opened up opportunities for the marginalized Kandyan castes to rally round and elect their own caste members. In fact a tally of the successful provincial councilors of the CPC resembled a “Who’s Who” of the Kandyan caste system. They tended to look on their power to render services through the CPC as a means of cementing their caste base.

One of the results of the introduction of Provincial Councils has been the exacerbation of communal and caste divisions which have thereafter influenced the election of members to Parliament as well. This is one of the reasons identified by commentators as to why the quality of MPs has steadily declined since the beginning of Provincial Councils.

Estate representation

On the positive side the CPC has enabled estate workers to find some type of representation. It will be recalled that this played a significant role in the first Parliamentary election group [1947]. At this time they enjoyed the franchise and returned a large number of members of the Tamil community as MPs. Virtually all the seats in the estate areas of Central and Uva provinces were won by the Ceylon Workers Congress, which was led by Savumiamoorthy Thondaman – a consummate politician and tactician. In fact it was the LSSP and the CP [N. Sanmugathasan’s Red Flag Organization] which first organized militant workers unions because they recognized estate workers as the nearest approximation to a “proletariat” in the country.

I remember discussing this issue with Colvin R de Silva late in his life. He had been a pioneer in organizing the estate workers which led to their “uprising” in Mooloya estate. The workers led by the LSSP had taken planters hostage and boycotted work for weeks. However the Planter Raj and the colonial administration had struck back. The Police fired on the strikers killing their leader Govindan and terrorizing them to get back to work.

In the court case launched by the Police, Colvin appeared for the militant workers and saved them. Inspite of that Colvin told me that with the disenfranchisement of the estate Tamils and the emergence of Thondaman as the saviour of their ethnic group, the LSSP was pushed out of contention in the estate sector. This was clearly seen in that the local LSSP leader Jack Kotelawela, who entered Parliament in 1947 as the LSSP MP for Badulla, was compelled to change colours and join the SLFP in order to stand a chance of winning in subsequent elections.

According to Colvin he and NM had to scour the estates to locate their former Tamil comrades who had by that time joined Thondaman on communal grounds. Some of them had disappeared with the party subscriptions collected from their workers. They ended up by failing in their search and giving up on what at one time seemed the most promising of their organizational targets. Since then they had no real working class base in terms of Karl Marx’s criteria. Instead they were compelled to follow the Parliamentary path which ended up in coalition politics and oblivion.

Colvin knew the nuts and bolts of planting as he was an owner of tea and coconut plantations. Clad in a tee shirt and blue shorts he enjoyed relaxing in his tea plantation in Uduwela, a few miles from Hantana in Kandy. I had the good fortune to meet him there occasionally and enjoy his conversation and hospitality. He was a fabulous conversationalist and his reminiscences about politics and his legal victories held me spellbound. He and Bernard Soysa had a practical approach to the tea trade and was dismayed when Hector Kobbekaduwa insisted on a full take over of the management of estates which finally ended up with his and Sirimavo’s relatives looting a national asset. Kobbekaduwa was led up the garden path by his left wing officials like Mahinda Silva. Our economy is still suffering due to their gerrymandering. After doing untold damage, Hector and his ilk were swept out of office in 1977. He lost his seat in the Kandy district and was also defeated in the Presidential election.

Thondaman

The key man in Indian Tamil politics in both upcountry and nationwide was Thondaman, the leader of the Ceylon Workers Congress. After he linked up with JRJ in 1977 and accepted Cabinet office, the left and SLFP in their May Day rallies coined a slogan “Kavuda Man-Thondaman” thereby confirming his significant role in the political landscape of the day as the only leader with a well organized working class under his command. I had a cordial relationship with “Thonda” and was often invited for his celebrated “thosai” breakfasts at his home in a spacious apartment facing Royal College in Colombo 7.

Many Ambassadors and senior politicians vied to get those invitations as they knew that their host carried a clout as a confidante of all the Presidents irrespective of their political affiliations. President D. B. Wijetunga was his classmate at St. Andrews College Gampola. They had to walk miles to get to school and acquire an English education which stood them in good stead later in life. Thonda had a privileged childhood because he was the son of an estate leader and unofficial money lender to the workers. He had done well and was the owner of Wavendon estate in the hill country.

Thonda took to politics early in his career which he started as a “progressive” supporting the left and the SLFP. He was then an associate of TB Ilangaratne and was credited with the latter’s victory in Hewaheta electorate in 1956 by getting his workers to vote “en masse” for the SLFP candidate. Ilangaratne became a powerful minister under Bandaranaike and later Mrs. B.

A turning point in Thondaman’s career was his alliance with JRJ and the UNP which helped in the latters landslide victory of 1977. JRJ solved the problem of “stateless” Tamils who had neither been repatriated to India nor given citizenship here. These people and their natural issue were given Sri Lankan citizenship by JRJ much to the satisfaction of the CWC as well as India which did not want another festering citizenship issue on its doorstep. This resolution of a major problem also gave Thonda unparalleled access to the Indian government which often expressed its wishes through him to our government.

Unknown to many he was “the voice of reason” in Indo-Sri Lankan affairs which was of great comfort to our leaders. Right throughout the Northern conflict he kept the estate Tamils out of the war which prevented the opening of a “second front” against the Sri Lankan forces. The LTTE tried desperately to foster anti-Sinhala militancy in the hill country but failed mainly due to Thonda and the conciliatory politics of his CWC. Thereby he helped to avoid a racial conflagration in the heartland of Sri Lanka.

(Excerpted from vol. 3 of the Sarath Amunugama autbiography)



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The NPP Government is more than a JVP offspring:

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Rohana Wijeweera

It is also different from all past governments as it faces new and different challenges

No one knows whether the already broken ceasefire between the US and Iran, with Israel as a reluctant adjunct, will last the full 10 days, or what will come thereafter. The world’s economic woes are not over and the markets are yo-yoing in response to Trump’s twitches and Iran’s gate keeping at the Strait of Hormuz. The gloomy expert foretelling is that full economic normalcy will not return until the year is over even if the war were to end with the ceasefire. That means continuing challenges for Sri Lanka and more of the tough learning in the art of governing for the NPP.

The NPP government has been doing what most governments in Asia have been doing to cope with the current global crisis, which is also an Asian crisis insofar as oil supplies and other supply chains are concerned. What the government can and must do additionally is to be totally candid with the people and keep them informed of everything that it is doing – from monitoring import prices to the timely arranging of supplies, all the details of tender, the tracking of arrivals, and keeping the distribution flow through the market without bottlenecks. That way the government can eliminate upstream tender rackets and downstream hoarding swindles. People do not expect miracles from their government, only honest, sincere and serious effort in difficult circumstances. Backed up by clear communication and constant public engagement.

But nothing is going to stop the flow of criticisms against the NPP government. That is a fact of Sri Lankan politics. Even though the opposition forces are weak and have little traction and even less credibility, there has not been any drought in the criticisms levelled against the still fledgling government. These criticisms can be categorized as ideological, institutional and oppositional criticisms, with each category having its own constituency and/or commentators. The three categories invariably overlap and there are instances of criticisms that excite only the pundits but have no political resonance.

April 5 anniversary nostalgia

There is also a new line of criticism that might be inspired by the April 5 anniversary nostalgia for the 1971 JVP insurrection. This new line traces the NPP government to the distant roots of the JVP – its April 1965 founding “in a working-class home in Akmeemana, Galle” by a 22-year old Rohana Wijeweera and seven others; the short lived 1971 insurrection that was easily defeated; and the much longer and more devastating second (1987 to 1989) insurrection that led to the elimination of the JVP’s frontline leaders including Wijeweera, and brought about a change in the JVP’s political direction with commitment to parliamentary democracy. So far, so good, as history goes.

But where the nostalgic narrative starts to bend is in attempting a straight line connection from the 1965 Akmeemana origins of the JVP to the national electoral victories of the NPP in 2024. And the bend gets broken in trying to bridge the gap between the “founding anti-imperialist economics” of the JVP and the practical imperatives of the NPP government in “governing a debt-laden small open economy.” Yet this line of criticism differs from the other lines of criticism that I have alluded to, but more so for its moral purpose than for its analytical clarity. The search for clarity could begin with question – why is the NPP government more than a JVP offspring? The answer is not so simple, but it is also not too complicated.

For starters, the JVP was a political response to the national and global conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, piggybacking socialism on the bandwagon of ethno-nationalism in a bi-polar world that was ideologically split between status quo capitalism and the alternative of socialism. The NPP government, on the other hand, is not only a response to, but is also a product of the conditions of the 2010s and 2020s. The twain cannot be more different. Nothing is the same between then and now, locally and globally.

A pragmatic way to look at the differences between the origins of the JVP and the circumstances of the NPP government is to look at the very range of criticisms that are levelled against the NPP government. What I categorize as ideological criticisms include criticisms of the government’s pro-IMF and allegedly neo-liberal economic policies, as well as the government’s foreign policy stances – on Israel, on the current US-Israel war against Iran, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, and the apparent closeness to the Modi government in India. These criticisms emanate from the non-JVP left and Sinhala Buddhist nationalists.

Strands of nationalism

To digress briefly, there are several strands in the overall bundle of Sri Lankan nationalism. There is the liberal inclusive strand, the left-progressive strand, the exclusive Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist (SBN) strand, and the defensive strands of minority nationalisms. Given Sri Lanka’s historical political formations and alliances, much overlapping goes on between the different strands. The overlapping gets selective on an issue by issue basis, which in itself is not unwelcome insofar as it promotes plurality in place of exclusivity.

Historically as well, and certainly after 1956, the SBN strand has been the dominant strand of nationalism in Sri Lanka and has had the most influential say in every government until now. Past versions of the JVP frequently straddled the dominant SBN space. Currently, however, the dominant SBN strand is in one of its more dormant phases and the NPP government could be a reason for the current dormancy. This is an obvious difference between the old JVP and the new NPP.

A second set of criticisms, or institutional criticisms, emanate from political liberals and human rights activists and these are about the NPP government’s actions or non-actions in regard to constitutional changes, the future of the elected executive presidency, the status of provincial devolution and the timing of provincial council elections, progress on human rights issues, the resolution of unfinished postwar businesses including the amnesia over mass graves. These criticisms and the issues they represent are also in varying ways the primary concerns of the island’s Tamils, Muslims and the Malaiyaka (planntationn) Tamils. As with the overlapping between the left and the non-minority nationalists, there is also overlapping between the liberal activists and minority representatives.

A third category includes what might be called oppositional criticisms and they counterpose the JVP’s past against the NPP’s present, call into question the JVP’s commitment to multi-party democracy and raise alarms about a creeping constitutional dictatorship. This category also includes criticisms of the NPP government’s lack of governmental experience and competence; alleged instances of abuse of power, mismanagement and even corruption; alleged harassment of past politicians; and the failure to find the alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter bombings. At a policy and implementational level, there have been criticisms of the government’s educational reforms and electricity reforms, the responses to cyclone Ditwah, and the current global oil and economic crises. The purveyors of oppositional criticisms are drawn from the general political class which includes political parties, current and past parliamentarians, as well as media pundits.

Criticisms as expectations

What is common to all three categories of criticisms is that they collectively represent what were understood to be promises by the NPP before the elections, and have become expectations of the NPP government after the elections. It is the range and nature of these criticisms and the corresponding expectations that make the NPP government a lot more than a mere JVP offspring, and significantly differentiate it from every previous government.

The deliverables that are expected of the NPP government were never a part of the vocabulary of the original JVP platform and programs. The very mode of parliamentary politics was ideologically anathema to the JVP of Akmeemana. And there was no mention of or concern for minority rights, or constitutional reforms. On foreign policy, it was all India phobia without Anglo mania – a halfway variation of Sri Lanka’s mainstream foreign policy of Anglo mania and India phobia. For a party of the rural proletariat, the JVP was virulently opposed to the plantation proletariat. The JVP’s version of anti-imperialist economics would hardly have excited the Sri Lankan electorate at any time, and certainly not at the present time.

At the same time, the NPP government is also the only government that has genealogical antecedents to a political movement or organization like the JVP. That in itself makes the NPP government unique among Sri Lanka’s other governments. The formation of the NPP is the culmination of the evolution of the JVP that began after the second insurrection with the shedding of political violence, acceptance of political plurality and commitment to electoral democracy.

But the evolution was not entirely a process of internal transformation. It was also a response to a rapidly and radically changing circumstances both within Sri Lanka and beyond. This evolution has not been a rejection of the founding socialist purposes of the JVP in 1968, but their adaptation in the endless political search, under constantly changing conditions, for a non-violent, socialist and democratic framework that would facilitate the full development of the human potential of all Sri Lankans.

The burden of expectations is unmistakable, but what is also remarkable is their comprehensiveness and the NPP’s formal commitment to all of them at the same time. No previous government shouldered such an extensive burden or showed such a willing commitment to each and every one of the expectations. In the brewing global economic crisis, the criticisms, expectations and the priorities of the government will invariably be focussed on keeping the economy alive and alleviating the day-to-day difficulties of millions of Sri Lankan families. While what the NPP government can and must do may not differ much from what other Asian governments – from Pakistan to Vietnam – are doing, it could and should do better than what any and all past Sri Lankan governments did when facing economic challenges.

by Rajan Philips

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A Fragile Ceasefire: Pakistan’s Glory and Israel’s Sabotage

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Smokes over Beirut: Israel’s Ceasefire Attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon

After threatening to annihilate one of the planet’s oldest civilizations, TACO* Trump chickened out again by grasping the ceasefire lifeline that Pakistan had assiduously prepared. Trump needed the ceasefire badly to stem the mounting opposition to the war in America. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted the war to continue because he needed it badly for his political survival. So, he contrived a fiction and convinced Trump that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire. Trump as usual may not have noticed that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff had clearly indicated Lebanon’s inclusion in his announcement of the ceasefire at 7:50 PM, Tuesday, on X. Ten minutes before Donald Trump’s fake deadline.

True to form on Wednesday, Israel unleashed the heaviest assault by far on Lebanon, reportedly killing over 300 people, the highest single-day death toll in the current war. Iran responded by re-closing the Strait of Hormuz and questioning the need for talks in Islamabad over the weekend. There were other incidents as well, with an oil refinery attacked in Iran, and Iranian drones and missiles slamming oil and gas infrastructure in UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

The US tried to insist that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire, with the argumentative US Vice President JD Vance, who was in Budapest, Hungary, campaigning for Viktor Orban, calling the whole thing a matter of “bad faith negotiation” as well as “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran, and warning Iran that “it would be dumb to jeopardise its ceasefire with Washington over Israel’s attacks in Lebanon.”

But as the attack in Lebanon drew international condemnation – from Pope Leo to UN Secretary General António Guterres, and several world leaders, and amidst fears of Lebanon becoming another Gaza with 1,500 people including 130 children killed and more than a million people displaced, Washington got Israel to stop its “lawn mowing” in southern Lebanon.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to “open direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible,”. Lebanese President Joeseph Aoun has also called for “a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them.” Israel’s involvement in Lebanon remains a wild card that threatens the ceasefire and could scuttle the talks between the US and Iran scheduled for Saturday in Islamabad.

Losers and Winners

After the ceasefire, both the Trump Administration and Iran have claimed total victories while the Israeli government wants the war to continue. The truth is that after more than a month into nonstop bombing of Iran, America and Israel have won nothing. Only Iran has won something it did not have when Trump and Netanyahu started their war. Iran now has not only a say over but control of the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire acknowledges this. Both Trump and Netanyahu are under fire in their respective countries and have no allies in the world except one another.

The real diplomatic winner is Pakistan. Salman Rushdie’s palimpsest-country has emerged as a key player in global politics and an influential mediator in a volatile region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Field Marshal Asim Munir have both been praised by President Trump and credited for achieving the current ceasefire. The Iranian regime has also been effusive in its praise of Pakistan’s efforts.

It is Pakistan that persisted with the effort after initial attempts at backdoor diplomacy by Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye started floundering. Sharing a 900 km border and deep cultural history with Iran, and having a skirmish of its own on the eastern front with Afghanistan, Pakistan has all the reason to contain and potentially resolve the current conflict in Iran. Although a majority Sunni Muslim country, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia Muslim population after Iran, and is the easterly terminus of the Shia Arc that stretches from Lebanon. The country also has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan’s nuclear cover for the Kingdom. An open conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have put Pakistan in a dangerously awkward position.

It is now known and Trump has acknowledged that China had a hand in helping Iran get to the diplomatic table. Pakistan used its connections well to get Chinese diplomatic reinforcement. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart and secured China’s public support for the diplomatic efforts. The visit produced a Five-Point Plan that became a sequel to America’s 15-point proposal and the eventual ten-point offer by Iran.

There is no consensus between parties as to which points are where and who is agreeing to what. The chaos is par for the course the way Donald Trumps conducts global affairs. So, all kudos to Pakistan for quietly persisting with old school toing and froing and producing a semblance of an agreement on a tweet without a parchment.

It is also noteworthy that Israel has been excluded from all the diplomatic efforts so far. And it is remarkable, but should not be surprising, the way Trump has sidelined Isreal from the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been enjoying overwhelming support of Israelis for starting the war of his life against Iran and getting the US to spearhead it. But now the country is getting confused and is exposed to Iranian missiles and drones far more than ever before. The Israeli opposition is finally coming alive realizing what little has Netanyahu’s wars have achieved and at what cost. Israel has alienated a majority of Americans and has no ally anywhere else.

It will be a busy Saturday in Islamabad, where the US and Iranian delegations are set to meet. Iran would seem to have insisted and secured the assurance that the US delegation will be led by Vice President Vance, while including Trump’s personal diplomats – Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. Iran has not announced its team but it is expected to be led, for protocol parity, by Iran’s Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and will likely include its suave Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Vice President Vance’s attendance will be the most senior US engagement with Iran since Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal under President Obama.

The physical arrangements for the talks are still not public although Islamabad has been turned into a security fortress given the stakes and risks involved. The talks are expected to be ‘indirect’, with the two delegations in separate rooms and Pakistani officials shuttling between them. The status of Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will be the major points of contention. After Netanyahu’s overreach on Wednesday, Lebanon is also on the short list

The 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) took months of negotiations and involved multiple parties besides the US and Iran, including China, France, Germany, UK, Russia and the EU. That served the cause of regional and world peace well until Trump tore up the deal to spite Obama. It would be too much to expect anything similar after a weekend encounter in Islamabad. But if the talks could lead to at least a permanent ceasefire and the return to diplomacy that would be a huge achievement.

(*As of 2025–2026, Donald Trump is nicknamed “TACO Trump” by Wall Street traders and investors as an acronym for “”. This term highlights a perceived pattern of him making strong tariff threats that cause market panic, only to later retreat or weaken them, causing a rebound.)

by Rajan Philips

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CIA’s hidden weapon in Iran

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We are passing through the ten-day interregnum called a ceasefire over the War on Iran. The world may breathe briefly, but this pause is not reassurance—it is a deliberate interlude, a vacuum in which every actor positions for the next escalation. Iran is far from secure. Behind the veneer of calm, external powers and local forces are preparing, arming, and coordinating. The United States is unlikely to deploy conventional ground troops; the next moves will be executed through proxies whose behaviour will defy expectation. These insurgents are shaped, guided, and amplified by intelligence and technology, capable of moving silently, striking precisely, and vanishing before retaliation. The ceasefire is not peace—it is the prelude to disruption.

The Kurds, historically instruments of Tehran against Baghdad, are now vectors for the next insurgency inside Iran. This movement is neither organic nor local. It is externally orchestrated, with the CIA as the principal architect. History provides the blueprint: under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurdish uprisings were manipulated, never supported out of sympathy. They were instruments of leverage against Iraq, a way to weaken a rival while projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders. Colonel Isa Pejman, Iranian military intelligence officer who played a role in Kurdish affairs, recalled proposing support for a military insurgency in Iraq, only for the Shah to respond coldly: “[Mustafa] Barzani killed my Army soldiers… please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely transformed.” The Kurds were pawns, but pawns with strategic weight. Pejman later noted: “When the Shah wrote on the back of the letter ‘Accepted’ to General Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement.” The seeds planted then are now being activated under new, technologically empowered auspices.

Iran’s geographic vulnerabilities make this possible. The Shah understood the trap: a vast territory with porous borders, squeezed by Soviet pressure from the north and radical Arab states from the west. “We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad surround us,” he warned Asadollah Alam. From Soviet support for the Mahabad Republic to Barzani’s dream of a unified Kurdistan, Tehran knew an autonomous Kurdish bloc could destabilize both Iraq and Iran. “Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic, the Shah had been considerably worried about the Kurdish threat,” a US assessment concluded.

Today, the Kurds’ significance is operational, not symbolic. The CIA’s recent rescue of a downed F-15 airman using Ghost Murmur, a quantum magnetometry system, demonstrated the reach of technology in intelligence operations. The airman survived two days on Iranian soil before extraction. This was not a simple rescue; it was proof that highly mobile, technologically augmented operations can penetrate Iranian territory with surgical precision. The same logic applies to insurgency preparation: when individuals can be tracked through electromagnetic signatures, AI-enhanced surveillance, and drones, proxy forces can be armed, guided, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. The Kurds are no longer pawns—they are a living network capable of fracturing Iranian cohesion while providing deniability to foreign powers.

Iran’s engagement with Iraqi Kurds was always containment, not empowerment. The Shah’s goal was never Kurdish independence. “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan,” he stated explicitly. Yet their utility as instruments of regional strategy was undeniable. The CIA’s revival of these networks continues a long-standing pattern: insurgent groups integrated into the wider calculus of international power. Israel, Iran, and the Kurds formed a triangular strategic relationship that terrified Baghdad. “For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish triangular alliance was an existential threat,” contemporary reports noted. This is the template for modern manipulation: a networked insurgency, externally supported, capable of destabilizing regimes from within while giving foreign powers plausible deniability.

Iran today faces fragility. Years of sanctions, repression, and targeted strikes have weakened educational and scientific hubs; Sharif University in Tehran, one of the country’s leading scientific centres, was bombed. Leaders, scholars, and innovators have been eliminated. Military readiness is compromised. Generations-long setbacks leave Iran exposed. Against this backdrop, a Kurdish insurgency armed with drones, AI-supported surveillance, and precision munitions could do more than disrupt—it could fracture the state internally. The current ten-day ceasefire is a mirage; the next wave of revolt is already being orchestrated.

CIA involvement is deliberate. Operations are coordinated with allied intelligence agencies, leveraging Kurdish grievances, mobility, and ethnolinguistic networks. The Kurds’ spread across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria provides operational depth—allowing insurgents to strike, vanish, and regroup with impunity. Barzani understood leverage decades ago: “We could be useful to the United States… Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East.” Today, the calculation is inverted: Kurds are no longer instruments against Baghdad; they are potential disruptors inside Tehran itself.

Technology is central. Ghost Murmur’s ability to detect a single heartbeat remotely exemplifies how intelligence can underpin insurgent networks. Drones, satellite communications, AI predictive modeling, and battlefield sensors create an infrastructure that can transform a dispersed Kurdish insurgency into a high-precision operation. Iran can no longer rely on fortifications or loyalty alone; the external environment has been recalibrated by technology.

History provides the roadmap. The Shah’s betrayal of Barzani after the 1975 Algiers Agreement demonstrated that external actors can manipulate both Iranian ambitions and Kurdish loyalties. “The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Yitzhak Rabin told Kissinger. “We could not station our troops there and keep fighting forever,” the Shah explained to Alam. The Kurds are a pivot, not a cause. Networks once acting under Tehran’s influence are now being repurposed against it.

The insurgency exploits societal fissures. Kurdish discontent in Iran, suppressed for decades, provides fertile ground. Historical betrayal fuels modern narratives: “Barzani claimed that ‘Isa Pejman sold us out to the Shah and the Shah sold us out to the US.’” Intelligence agencies weaponize these grievances, pairing them with training, technological augmentation, and covert support.

Geopolitically, the stakes are immense. The Shah’s defensive-offensive doctrine projected Iranian influence outward to neutralize threats. Today, the logic is inverted: the same networks used to contain Iraq are being readied to contain Iran. A technologically augmented Kurdish insurgency, covertly backed, could achieve in months what decades of sanctions, diplomacy, or repression have failed to accomplish.

The operation will be asymmetric, high-tech, and dispersed. UAVs, quantum-enhanced surveillance, encrypted communications, and AI-directed logistics will dominate. Conventional Iranian forces are vulnerable to this type of warfare. As Pejman reflected decades ago, “Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How could we keep such a place?” Today, the challenge is magnified by intelligence superiority on the insurgents’ side.

This is not a temporary flare-up. The CIA and its allies are constructing a generational network of influence. Experience from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon proves these networks endure once operationalised. The Shah recognized this: “Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a lasting legacy for the post-Revolution era.” Today, those instruments are being remade as vectors of foreign influence inside Iran.

The future is stark. Iran faces not simply external threats, but a carefully engineered insurgency exploiting historical grievances, technological superiority, and precise intelligence. The Kurds are central. History, technology, and geopolitical calculation converge to create a transformative threat. Tehran’s miscalculations, betrayals, and suppressed grievances now form the lattice for this insurgency. The Kurds are positioned not just as an ethnic minority, but as a vector of international strategy—Tehran may be powerless to stop it.

Iran’s containment strategies have been weaponized, fused with technology, and inverted against it. The ghosts of Barzani’s Peshmerga, the shadows of Algiers, and the Shah’s strategic vision now converge with Ghost Murmur, drones, and AI. Tehran faces a paradox: the instruments it once controlled are now calibrated to undermine its authority. The next Kurdish revolt will not only fight in the mountains but in the electromagnetic shadows where intelligence operates, consequences are lethal, and visibility is scarce.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa

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