Midweek Review

Playing politics with national security

Published

5 years ago

2020/09/30

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Security of a country did not depend on its Defence Secretary. There were various structures and it was a matter of collective action, one-time Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) on Saturday (26).

The P CoI, appointed by former President Maithripala Sirisena, is inquiring into the Easter Sunday attacks. Sirisena named the Commission several weeks before the end of his five-year term.

Fernando further said: “It is not mandatory for the Defence Secretary to have an intimate knowledge of the role played by the Ministry. If that is the case, a fisherman should be the Secretary to the Ministry of Fisheries, and the Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture should be a farmer.”

Let me examine Austin Fernando’s statement, taking into consideration the direct talks between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE, during the period 1989-1990 (the late General D.S. Attygalle served as the Defence Secretary from 15.08.1983 to 16.02.1990), outbreak of Eelam War II (General S.C Ranatunga served as the Secretary Defence from 16.02.1990 to 01.05.1993) and the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE entered into by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe (Austin Fernando functioned as the Secretary Defence from 21.12.2001 to 03.11.2003).

Hemasiri Fernando, who served as Secretary Defence in the run-up to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, is under investigation for criminal negligence. In all four above-mentioned instances, the government apparatus collectively failed, though the circumstances were different.

The only difference is in the case of the disastrous 2002 CFA. The then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga cannot be faulted as Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe blindly signed the catastrophic Oslo-drafted 2002 peace initiative, keeping even his cabinet in the dark.

Austin Fernando is absolutely right. Security of a country does not depend on its Defence Secretary. In fact, a single person cannot guarantee national security, regardless of political clout he or she wielded. However, one person can cause irreparable damage, through irrational and unilateral actions/decisions, as in the case of the CFA. The appointment of retired military officers certainly cannot guarantee national security. The late Gen. Attygalle and Gen. Ranatunga facilitated President Premadasa’s ill-fated strategies that weakened the military. Taking Fernando’s assertion into consideration, it would be pertinent to examine how President Premadasa (1989-1990), Premier Wickremesinghe (2002-2003) and President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe (2015-2019) jeopardized the national security. Those who served under them, too, equally contributed to the rapid deterioration of security by simply giving into political dictates, thereby providing tacit support to despicable political agendas.

Sri Lanka paid a huge price for political and military miscalculations. The political environment, created by Sirisena-Wickremesinghe, cannot be scrutinized without taking into consideration previous situations. In the absence of detailed study, the public tend to consider the Easter Sunday security failure as an isolated case. But, the extraordinary Easter Sunday terror project, perhaps, is part of an insidious political strategy to keep Sri Lanka in perpetual anarchy. Those who had perpetrated nearly simultaneous suicide attacks, in three administrative districts, certainly deliberated the political environment before going ahead with the operation. Who exploited the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) to deliver such a devastating message? Did NTJ succumb to external elements? When did India actually infiltrate the NTJ and what is the status of the Indian intelligence gathering operation in Sri Lanka? Why didn’t Indian intelligence share information on NTJ (Zahran Hashim’s gang) much earlier? And, most importantly, why were both Sinhala and Tamil communities targeted?

Defence Chiefs play ball with Ranasinghe Premadasa

Having secured the presidency, in January 1989, President Premadasa sought an agreement with the JVP. The UNP leader also made an attempt to reach a consensus with Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The President succeeded in reaching an understanding with all armed Tamil groups, except the LTTE. The presence of one-time militant Douglas Devananda, leader of the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party), in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s cabinet of ministers, is evidence of Premadasa’s successful political strategy. In addition to the EPDP, Premadasa brought the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) into the political mainstream. However, Premadasa’s bid to reach an understanding with the LTTE ended disastrously, in the second week of June 1990.

At the time, Premadasa initiated direct negotiations with the LTTE, the late Gen. Attygalle had been the Secretary, Ministry of Defence while Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe served as the Commander of the Army (16.09.1988- 15.11.91). Did the President consult the Defence Secretary and the Commander of the Army before initiating negotiations with the JVP and the LTTE? Did they approve of releasing from custody of over thousands of JVP suspects in early 1989? Their release resulted in an immediate stepping up of violence though the police, the military and the government-sponsored civilian death squads crushed the JVP, by the end of 1989.

Having captured JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera, at Ulapane, in the second week of Nov. 1989, he was brought to Colombo, interrogated and executed. Premadasa knew what befell Wijeweera, who led two insurrections, in 1971 and 1987-89.

However, Premadasa’s apparent unilateral decisions, in respect of the LTTE, caused immense harm. Believing in the possibility of successful conclusion of negotiations with the LTTE, Premadasa, hastily announced the hotly disputed decision to request New Delhi to terminate its military mission in the North-East Sri Lanka. Did Premadasa genuinely consult the Defence Secretary, Commander of the Army or at least his Prime Minister, the late D.B. Wijetunga, before demanding the pull-out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force? Premadasa, obviously didn’t believe in consultations. In his capacity as the leader of the UNP and the President, Premadasa largely believed in unilateral decisions. The catastrophic handling of direct negotiations with the LTTE paved the way for terrorists to launch devastating attacks on the Army after obtaining from the then naïve government military supplies, money, as well as building materials. Clearly, the Secretary Defence and the Commander of the Army played ball with Premadasa. In fact, all cooperated with Premadasa. Officials bent backwards to appease the all-powerful President. The then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, overnight recognized the PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) as a registered political party. The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Premadasa, or late Chandrananda de Silva, had no qualms in the PFLT receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.

Prez playing with fire

Did Premadasa consult the Defence Secretary and Commander of the Army before lifting restrictions imposed on the Northern Province, abandoned Point Pedro and Valvettiturai army detachments, pardoned convicted Maradana bomber Manouri Daniels, along with over a dozen other LTTE cadres, held under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), and provided weapons and funds to the LTTE. Premadasa did what he wanted to do. The UNP leader was not bothered about security implications. Obviously, his security chiefs remained mum. President felt confident in his political strategy. He was so confident, he ordered law enforcement personnel to surrender after the LTTE surrounded police stations in the East. Premadasa’s decision resulted in the deaths of over 400 officers and men. Did the President consult Gen. Attygalle’s successor Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and the Commander of the Army before the government reached an agreement with the LTTE?

The Army in the East averted a calamity by refusing to surrender, in spite of the senior leadership directing them to do so. General Gerry H. de Silva, who served as the Commander of the Army (1994-1996) in his memoirs titled ‘A most noble profession’ commented on Premadasa’s strategy/the government’s failure to recognize the threat posed by the LTTE. First published in 2011, two years after the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE, De Silva acknowledged: “We failed to see through the emerging trends and LTTE machinations. Despite constant threats and humiliation meted out to security forces and the police by the militants, the politico-military hierarchy preferred to put up with the ignominy in order not to ‘rock the boat.’

The LTTE capitalized on the situation. A rejuvenated LTTE ‘called the shots,’ and quickly moved into a position of strength, politically and militarily. They were riding the crest of a wave and must have felt that the time was opportune to achieve their goal of Eelam.”

The Gemunu Watch officer is the only Commander of the Army to author a book on his career.

Within a week after the resumption of hostilities, in the second week of June 1990, the ill-prepared Army lost the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula. Premadasa’s ‘honeymoon’ with Prabhakaran lasted 14 months. The Tiger Supremo resumed the war, at lightning speed, just two months after India terminated its military mission here. Sri Lanka was left high and dry after the series of follies by Premadasa, at peace making, and the military couldn’t regain the MSR, till January 2009. Premadasa’s Generals turned a blind eye to what was happening on the ground. When fighting erupted, the Army had just one battalion, plus troops in the Jaffna peninsula. In spite of continuing to build up, the top brass ignored the growing threat until it was too late. So, the mere appointing of a retired General as Secretary Defence cannot guarantee rationale thinking. Premadasa’s strategy was nothing but a massive and unprecedented collective failure that almost resulted in capitulation of the Northern forces. Premadasa turned a Nelsonian eye to the LTTE evicting the entire Muslim population from the Northern Province, in Oct 1990. At the behest of Premadasa, the then Army Commander facilitated coordinated LTTE attacks on rival Tamil groups. The LTTE massacred hundreds of people. The response of Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, to the LTTE threat, caused quite an embarrassment to the government, undermined the State and, basically, allowed the LTTE to transform itself to a conventional fighting force. The then Higher Education Minister Hameed never realized ground realities.

Retired General de Silva’s assessment can be applied to all Presidents. except war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had faith in his younger brother Gotabaya’s capacity to coordinate the war effort against the LTTE.

Generals Attygalle and Ranatunga certainly owed an explanation as regards their failure to prevent the catastrophe in the North. Obviously, no one dared to challenge Premadasa’s dangerous strategies. Having served as the Commander of the Army, for a decade, and Defence Secretary, General Attygalle received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London where he facilitated Kittu’s (Sathasivam Krishnakumar) arrival there. On the orders of Premadasa, the SLAF brought Kittu to Colombo where the British High Commission made arrangements to send the former LTTE Jaffna Commander to receive treatment for his amputated leg. The Generals had no say and Premadasa had his way.

Can you imagine a government facilitating a terrorist’s travel to London where he took over the LTTE’s International Secretariat responsible for running a massive extortion racket? The funds ultimately ended up with arms suppliers who provided the LTTE a range of weapons, T 56 assault rifles to shoulder fired missiles. General Ranatunga, too, received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Canberra and then London. Presidential nominees to top diplomatic posts always received parliamentary approval.

Security fiasco in 2002

Not having learnt from Premadasa’s stupidities, Ranil Wickremesinghe too plunged headlong into a similar folly with Austin Fernando et al in tow.

Ranil Wickremesinghe picked experienced administrative service officer Austin Fernando as Secretary Defence within days after winning the Dec 2001 parliamentary election. Wickremesinghe also brought in one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana on the National List as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Wickremesinghe adopted a simple strategy. The UNP leader advocated a policy of appeasement, thereby jeopardizing the entire security apparatus. The LTTE brazenly exploited the situation to its advantage. Prabhakaran stepped up training, recruitment of fresh cadres, as well as forcible conscription of children. The government did nothing. The LTTE intensified protests opposite security forces bases, restricted/interfered with police and military movements whereas the government repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the Oslo-led peace process like a mantra. Wickremesinghe dismissed intelligence assessment as regards the rapid LTTE built up. Wickremesinghe told a hastily arranged Temple Trees meeting, attended by senior officers responsible for intelligence services et al their assessment of the LTTE training 6,000 cadres at the onset of the CFA was wrong. The Premier contradicted his own intelligence apparatus on the basis of what the Indians told him. The then Defence Advisor Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who had been among those invited by the Premier, had the strength to stand by his report, based on information/analysis provided by all services. Obviously, Wickremesinghe hadn’t been in a mood to listen to anyone who questioned Prabhakaran’s motives though the continuing LTTE build up was evident.

Wickremesinghe followed his policy of appeasement. In his capacity as Secretary Defence Austin Fernando had no option but to go along with the Premier who authorized the finalization of CFA without proper consultations with the military top brass or the intelligence services.

The then Defence Secretary also provided some hilarious side shows like carrying a basket of fruits to a terrorist receiving treatment at a Colombo hospital.

Fernando himself claimed at the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in August 2010 that he hadn’t been involved in the process leading to the finalization of the document. However, top SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) Dr. John Gooneratne subsequently revealed before the LLRC how Norway rejected four proposals made by Sri Lanka. Had those proposals been accommodated in the CFA perhaps Eelam War IV could have been avoided, Gooneratne told the late C.R. de Silva’s Commission. The writer covered the entire LLRC proceedings. Gooneratne revealed the hitherto unknown proposals namely (a) CFA to pave the way for a negotiated settlement (b) prohibition of smuggling of arms, ammunition and equipment (c) freedom of movement for other political parties in areas under the LTTE control and finally (d) halt to forcible recruitment. Sri Lanka never received the backing of Peace Co-Chairs, the US, Norway, EU and Japan to get those just proposals included in the CFA.

The UNP never revealed rejection of its proposals until Gooneratne took advantage of the LLRC to set the record straight. Austin Fernando and SCOPP Chief Bernard Goonetilleke, who appeared before the LLRC could have revealed the truth. The UNP remained mum. Throughout the CFA period, Premier Wickremesinghe tried to suppress information that may have caused embarrassment to his government, the Norwegians and the LTTE. Obviously there hadn’t been any proper consultations among members of the cabinet, parliamentary group or the military top brass regarding the Oslo-led process.

Austin Fernando cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the UNP government’s actions during the CFA. The person who served as Secretary Defence cannot claim lack of knowledge of a particular situation. The same applies to the Defence Minister. During Marapana’s tenure as the Defence Minister Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)-run operation was exposed to the whole world with media scenes. In spite of strong protests by the Army, the UNP went ahead with its political project. The exposure of the operation led to the deaths of several operatives. The LTTE also hunted police officers engaged in anti-terrorist operations. When Defence Advisor Merril Gunaratne blamed the LTTE for the killing of Inspector Thabrew at the Dehiwela police station, Premier Wickremesinghe himself questioned the veteran law enforcement officer’s assessment.

The UNP allowed the LTTE to bring in undeclared cargo via the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). LTTE delegations returning from negotiations with Wickremesinghe’s delegations from various foreign venues and others brought large packages. The foolish government provided air transport. The LTTE brazenly used the opportunity to its advantage. The CFA provided the organization required protection. The LTTE exploited the Oslo arranged CFA, the same way it used direct talks with Premadasa to achieve its targets. High profile assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingham is a case in point. Prabhakaran moved a hit team in an SLAF chopper that brought LTTE delegates from the Vanni to Colombo in 1989.

Both political and military leaderships should accept responsibilities for lapses. During Austin Fernando’s tenure as the Defence Secretary, the military was ordered to stop issuing situation reports, suspended ‘Wanni Sevaya’ (special radio that catered to the military and the police), subjected military reports to civilian approval and basically succumbed to LTTE tactics. While closing down ‘Wanni Sevaya’, the government permitted the LTTE to import state-of-the-art radio equipment to upgrade its own propaganda and communication facilities.

If not for the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s intervention in late 2003, the UNP could have allowed the LTTE build up to continue until it was too late to take counter action. The UNP permitted the deterioration of the situation to such an extent, the LTTE by early 2003 felt confident enough to brazenly quit the negotiating table. The LTTE quit talks in late April 2003 to set the stage for an all-out war. By late 2005, the LTTE was confident it could overwhelm the Army in a large-scale conventional confrontation. The assassination of much-loved Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in early August 2005, indicated their readiness to take on the government. Had the LTTE succeeded in assassinating Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in late April and early Oct, 2006, the LTTE, perhaps could have achieved Eelam. There cannot be any dispute as regards the role played by the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. There had never been previous attempts on the lives of the Army Commander and Secretary Defence. The LTTE knew the government strategy could be aborted by assassinating the two most important men. Their failure brought the war to an end three years later with the LTTE militarily annihilated. If the LTTE succeeded, Sri Lanka’s unitary status could have been jeopardized by now. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition proved the danger in pulling in different directions, lack of vision and strategy as well as pursuing of political agendas inimical Sri Lanka State.

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Midweek Review

Opp. MP’s hasty stand on US air strikes in Nigeria and Sri Lanka’s foreign policy dilemma

Published

6 days ago

2026/01/14

Sahan Weerasooriya

Somaliland's President Abdirahman Abdullahi Mohamed (right), posing for a photograph with Israel's Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, at the Presidential Palace in Hargeisa (Pic released by the Somaliland Presidential Office on 06 January, 2026)

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on 26 December, 2025, couldn’t have taken place without US approval. The establishment of full diplomatic ties with Somaliland, a breakaway part of Somalia, and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar’s visit to that country, drew swift criticism from Somalia, as well as others. Among those who had been upset were Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the African Union.

The US-backed move in Africa didn’t receive public attention as did the raid on Venezuela. But, the Somaliland move is definitely part of the overall US global strategy to overwhelm, undermine and belittle Russia and China.

And on the other hand, the Somaliland move is a direct challenge to Türkiye, a NATO member that maintains a large military presence in Somalia, and to Yemen based Houthis who had disrupted Red Sea shipping, in support of Hamas, in the wake of Israeli retaliation over the 07 October, 2023, raid on the Jewish State, possibly out of sheer desperation of becoming a nonentity. The Israeli-US move in Africa should be examined taking into consideration the continuing onslaught on Gaza and attacks on Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Qatar.

Many an eyebrow was raised over Opposition MP Dr. Kavinda Jayawardana’s solo backing for the recent US air strikes in Nigeria.

The Gampaha District Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) lawmaker handed over a letter to the US Embassy here last week applauding US President Donald Trump’s order to bomb Nigeria on Christmas Day. The letter was addressed to President Trump

( https://island.lk/kavinda-lauds-us-president-trumps-actions-to-protect-christians-in-nigeria/)

The former UNPer who had been in the forefront of a high-profile campaign demanding justice for the 2019 Easter Sunday terror victims, in an obvious solo exercise praised Trump for defending the Nigerian Christian community. The US bombing targeted Islamic State Terrorists (ISIS) operating in that country’s northwest, where Muslims predominate.

The only son of the late UNP Minister Dr. Jayalath Jayawardana, he seemed to have conveniently forgotten that such military actions couldn’t be endorsed under any circumstances. Against the backdrop of Dr. Jayawardana’s commendation for US military action against Nigeria, close on the heels of the murderous 03 January US raid on oil rich Venezuela, perhaps it would be pertinent to seek the response of the Catholic Church in that regard.

President Trump, in a wide-ranging interview with the New York Times, has warned of further strikes in case Christians continued to be killed in the West African nation. International media have disputed President Trump’s claim of only the Christians being targeted.

Both Christians and Muslims – the two main religious groups in the country of more than 230 million people – have been victims of attacks by radical Islamists.

The US and the Nigerian government of President Bola Tinubu reached a consensus on Christmas Day attacks. Nigeria has roughly equal numbers of Christians – predominantly in the south – and Muslims, who are mainly concentrated in the north.

In spite of increasingly volatile global order, the Vatican maintained what can be comfortably described as the defence of the national sovereignty. The Vatican has been critical of the Venezuelan government but is very much unlikely to throw its weight behind US attacks on that country and abduction of its President and the First Lady.

Dr. Jayawardana’s stand on US intervention in Nigeria cannot definitely be the position of the main Opposition party, nor any other political party represented in Parliament here. The National People’s Power (NPP) government refrained from commenting on US attacks on Nigeria, though it opposed US action in Venezuela. Although the US and Nigeria have consensus on Christmas Day attacks and may agree on further attacks, but such interventions are very much unlikely to change the situation on the ground.

SL on US raid

Let me reproduce Sri Lanka’s statement on US attacks on Venezuela, verbatim:

“The Government of Sri Lanka is deeply concerned about the recent developments in Venezuela and is closely monitoring the situation.

Sri Lanka emphasises the need to respect principles of international law and the UN Charter, such as the prohibition of the use of force, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of international disputes and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

Sri Lanka attaches great importance to the safety and well-being of the people of Venezuela and the stability of the region and calls on all parties to prioritize peaceful resolution through de-escalation and dialogue.

At this crucial juncture, it is important that the United Nations and its organs such as the UN Security Council be seized of the matter and work towards a peaceful resolution taking into consideration the safety, well-being and the sovereign rights of the Venezuelan people.”

That statement, dated 05 January, was issued by the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism Ministry. Almost all political parties, represented in Parliament, except one-time darling of the LTTE, Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), condemned the US attacks on Venezuela and threats on Cuba, Colombia and Iran. The US is also targeting China, Russia and even the European Union.

Dr. Jayawardana requested coverage for his visit to the US Embassy here to hand over his letter, hence the publication of his ‘love’ letter to President Trump on page 2 of the 09 January edition of The Island.

There had never been a previous instance of a Sri Lankan lawmaker, or a political party, endorsing unilateral military action taken by the US or any other country. One-time Western Provincial Council member and member of Parliament since 2015, Jayawardana should have known better than to trust President Trump’s position on Nigeria. Perhaps the SJBer felt that an endorsement of US action, allegedly supportive of the Nigerian Catholic community, may facilitate his political agenda. Obviously, the Opposition MP endorsed US military action purely for domestic political advantage. The lawmaker appears to have simply disregarded the growing criticism of US actions in various parts of the world.

The German and French response to US actions, not only in Venezuela, but various other regions, as well, underscore the growing threat posed by President Trump’s agenda.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German leader Frank-Walter Steinmeier have sharply condemned US foreign policy under Donald Trump, declaring, respectively, that Washington was “breaking free from international rules” and the world risked turning into a “robber’s den”.

US threat to annex Greenland at the expense of Denmark, a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ,and the grouping itself, has undermined the post WWII world order to such an extent, the developing crisis seems irreversible.

Focus on UAE

Indian Army Chief Gen. Upendra Dwivedi visited the United Arab Emirates on 05 and 06 January. His visit took place amidst rising tension on the Arabian Peninsula, following the Saudi-led military coalition launching air attacks on Yemen based Southern Transitional Council (STC) whose leader Aidarous al-Zubaid was brought to Abu Dhabi.

In the aftermath of the Saudi led strikes on Yemen port, held by the STC, the UAE declared that it would withdraw troops deployed in Yemen. The move, on the part of UAE, seems to be meant to de-escalate the situation, but the clandestine operation, undertaken by that country to rescue a Saudi target, appeared to have caused further deterioration of Saudi-UAE relations. Further deterioration is likely as both parties seek to re-assert control over the developing situation.

From Abu Dhabi, General Dwivedi arrived in Colombo on a two-day visit. Like his predecessors, General Dwivedi visited the Indian Army memorial at Pelawatte, where he paid respects to those who paid the supreme sacrifice during deployment of the Indian Army here – 1987 July to 1990 March. That monument is nothing but a testament to the foolish and flawed Indian policy. Those who portray that particular Indian military mission as their first major peace keeping operation overseas must keep in mind that over half a dozen terrorist groups were sponsored by India.

Just over a year after the end of that mission, one of those groups – the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) -assassinated Congress leader Rajiv Gandhi, the former Premier who sent the military mission here.

India never accepted responsibility for the death and destruction caused by its intervention in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Indian action led to an unprecedented situation when another Sri Lankan terrorist group PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) mounted a raid on the Maldives in early Nov. 1988. Two trawler loads of PLOTE cadres were on a mission to depose Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom on a contract given by a disgruntled Maldivian businessman. India intervened swiftly and brought the situation under control. But, the fact that those who had been involved in the sea-borne raid on the Maldives were Indian trained and they left Sri Lanka’s northern province, which was then under Indian Army control, were conveniently ignored.

Except the LTTE, all other major Tamil terrorist groups, including the PLOTE, entered the political mainstream in 1990, and over the years, were represented in Parliament. It would be pertinent to mention that except the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party) all other Indian trained groups in 2001 formed the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), under the leadership of Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), to support the separatist agenda in Parliament. Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE, in May 2009, brought that despicable project to an end.

The Indian Army statement on General Dwivedi’s visit here, posted on X, seemed like a propaganda piece, especially against the backdrop of continuing controversy over the still secret Indo-Lanka Memorandum of Understanding on defence that was entered into in April last year. Within months after the signing of the defence MoU, India acquired controlling stake of the Colombo Dockyard Ltd., a move that has been shrouded in controversy.

Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha’s response to my colleague Sanath Nanayakkara’s query regarding the strategic dimension of the India–Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation Agreement following the Indian Army Chief’s recent visit, the former was cautious in his response. Jha asserted that there was “nothing beyond what is included” in the provisions of the pact, which was signed by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and has generated controversy in Sri Lanka due to the absence of public discourse on its contents.

Framing the agreement as a self-contained document focused purely on bilateral defence cooperation, Jha said this reflected India’s official position. By directing attention solely to the text of the agreement, the High Commissioner indicated that there were no unstated strategic calculations involved, aligning with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister’s recent clarification that the pact was not a military agreement but one that dealt with Indian support.

Nanayakkara had the opportunity to raise the issue at a special media briefing called by Jha at the IHC recently.

Julie Chung departs

The US attack on Venezuela, and the subsequent threats directed at other countries, including some of its longtime allies, should influence our political parties to examine US and Indian stealthy interventions here, leading to the overthrowing of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in July 2022.

The US Embassy in Colombo recently announced that Julie Chung, who oversaw the overthrowing of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, would end her near four-year term. Former Indian High Commissioner in Colombo Gopal Baglay, who, too, played a significant role in the regime change project, ended his term in December 2023 and took up position in Canberra as India’s top diplomat there.

Both Chung and Baglay have been accused of egging on the putsch directly by urging Aragalaya time Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena, on 13 July, 2022, to take over the presidency. Former Minister Wimal Weerawansa and top author Sena Thoradeniya, in their comments on Aragalaya accused Chung of unprecedented intervention, whereas Prof. Sunanada Maddumabanadara found fault with Baglay for the same.

The US Embassy, in a statement dated 07 January, 2026, quoted the outgoing US Ambassador as having said: “I have loved every moment of my time in Sri Lanka. From day one, my focus has been to advance America’s interests—strengthening our security partnerships, expanding trade and investment, and promoting education and democratic values that make both our nations stronger. Together, we’ve built a relationship that delivers results for the American people and supports a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific.”

The Embassy concluded that statement reiterating the US commitment to its partnership with Sri Lanka and to build on the strong foundation, established during Ambassador Chung’s nearly four-year tenure.

Sri Lanka can expect to increasingly come under both US and Indian pressure over Chinese investments here. It would be interesting to see how the NPP government solves the crisis caused by the moratorium on foreign research vessel visits, imposed in 2024 by the then President Ranil Wickremesinghe. The NPP is yet to reveal its position on that moratorium, over one year after the lapse of the ban on such vessels. Wickremesinghe gave into intense US and Indian pressure in the wake of Chinese ship visits.

In spite of US-India relations under strain due to belligerent US actions, they are likely to adopt a common approach here to undermine Sri Lanka’s relations with China. But, the situation is so dicey, India may be compelled to review its position. The US declaration that a much-anticipated trade deal with India collapsed because Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hasn’t heeded President Trump’s demand to call him.

This was revealed by US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in the ‘All-In Podcast’ aired on Thursday, 08 January. The media quoted Indian spokesman Randhir Jaiswal as having said on the following day: “The characterisation of these discussions in the reported remarks is not accurate.” Jaiswal added that India “remains interested in a mutually beneficial trade deal between two complementary economies and looks forward to concluding it.”

Sri Lanka in deepening dilemma

Sri Lanka, struggling to cope up with post-Aragalaya economic, political and social issues, is inundated with foreign policy issues.

The failure on the part of the government and the Opposition to reach consensus on foreign policy challenges/matters has further weakened the country’s position. If those political parties represented in Parliament at least discussed matters of importance at the relevant consultative committee or the sectoral oversight committee, lawmaker Jayawardana wouldn’t have endorsed the US bombing of Nigeria.

Sri Lanka and Nigeria enjoy close diplomatic relations and the SJB MP’s unexpected move must have caused quite a controversy, though the issue at hand didn’t receive public attention. Regardless of the US-Nigerian consensus on the Christmas Day bombing, perhaps it would be unwise on the part of Sri Lanka to support military action at any level for obvious reasons.

Sri Lanka taking a stand on external military interventions of any sort seems comical at a time our war-winning military had been hauled up before the Geneva Human Rights Council for defending the country against the LTTE that had a significant conventional military capacity in addition to being “the most ruthless terrorist organisation” as it was described by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. The group capitalised on experience gained in fighting the Indian Army during 1987 July-1990 March period and posed quite a threat. Within five months after the resumption of fighting, in June 1990, the LTTE ordered the entire Muslim population to leave the predominantly Tamil northern province.

No foreign power at least bothered to issue a statement condemning the LTTE. MP Jayawardana’s statement supporting US military action in support of Christian community should be examined in Sri Lanka’s difficult battle against terrorism that took a very heavy toll. Perhaps, political parties represented in Parliament, excluding those who still believe in a separatist project, should reexamine their stand on Sri Lanka’s unitary status.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

Buddhist Iconography

Published

6 days ago

2026/01/14

Sahan Weerasooriya

A Buddha statue from Mathura with a single curl, 2nd cent. CE

Seeing a new kind of head ornament on a recent reproduction of the iconic Avukana Buddha statue, made me ponder how the Enlightened One would have looked in real life, and what relationship that may or may not have with Buddhist iconography. Obviously, there is no record or evidence of any rendering of the Buddha made by an artist who saw him alive, but there are a few references to his appearance in the Pali Sutta Pitaka, that affirms, as he himself has said, Buddha was nothing other than a human being, albeit an extraordinarily intelligent one (Dhammika 2021).

Before enlightenment, Siduhath Gotama was described as having black hair and a beard. One account describes him as “handsome, of fine appearance, pleasant to see, with a good complexion and a beautiful form and countenance” (D.I,114). Venerable Ananda has said, “It is wonderful, truly marvelous how serene is the good Gotama’s presence, how clear and radiant is his complexion. Just as golden jujube fruit in the autumn is clear and radiant … so too is the good Gotama’s complexion” (A.I,181). If Venerable Ananda’s comparison is correct, Gotama must have been of what is called ‘Wheatish’ complexion common in present-day North India, which is described as typically falling between fair and dusky complexions, exhibiting a light brown hue with golden or olive undertones (Fitzpatrick scale Type III to VI).

The Buddha is also described as a slim tall person; slim, perhaps, as a result of practising asceticism before enlightenment and spartan life thereafter. As he aged, he also suffered from back pain and other ailments, according to Sutta Pitaka.

Artists’ imagination

We need not argue that the depictions of the Buddha we see across countries, in various media, are the imaginations of the artists influenced by their local cultures and traditions. The potentially controversial aspect regarding Buddhist iconography is the depiction of his hair, which is almost universal. There are several references in the Sutta Pitaka, where various Brahmin youths derogatorily referred to the Buddha as “bald-pated recluse” (MN 81). There is no reason to believe that he would have been any different from the rest of the Bhikkhus who had and have clean shaven heads. In fact, when King Ajatasattu visited the Buddha for the first time, he had trouble identifying the Buddha from the rest of the sangha, and an attendant had to help the king.

In early Buddhist art, the Buddha was represented by the wheel of dhamma, Bodhi tree, throne, lotus, the footprints, or a parasol. For example, in the carvings of Sanchi temple built in the third century BCE, the Buddha is depicted by some of these symbols, but never in human form. Depiction of the Buddha in human form has started around the first century CE in two places, Gandhara and Mathura. In both places, the Buddha is depicted with hair, and not as a “bald-pated recluse” the way the Sutta Pitaka depicts him.

Figure 1. Bimaran Casket

No scholarly agreeement

So, the question is who started this artistic trend, was it the Gandhara artists under the Greek influence or the Mathura artists following their own traditions? There is no scholarly agreement on this; Western scholars think it was the Greek influence that made presenting the Buddha in human form while Ananda Coomaraswamy presents another theory (Coomaraswamy 1972).

The earliest dateable representation of the Buddha in human form is found on the Bimaran casket found during the exploration of a stupa near Bimaran, Afghanistan in 1834. It has been dated to the first century CE using the coins found along with it, that also depict and refer to the Buddha by name in Greko-Bactrian. This reliquary, a gold cylinder embossed with figures and artwork, is on display at the British Museum (Figure 1). Under the Hellenistic influence, it must have been natural for the Gandhara artists to represent a revered or divine figure in human form; Greeks have been doing it for millennia. The standing Buddha figure is depicted wearing the hair in the form of a knot over the crown. In other carvings from the same period, most male figures are shown with the same hair style. Also, it appears that both Spartan men and women tied their hair in a knot over the crown of the head, known as the “Knidian hairstyle” (Wikipedia). The Gandhara sculpture is famous for the Hellenistic style of realism (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Gandhara statue from 1-2
century CE

Coomaraswamy’s reasoning

Coomaraswamy reasons that the Bhakti movement – the loving devotion of the followers towards the deities, is the reason for the emergence of Buddha figure in Mathura. We cannot say for sure if the Gandhara art induced the Mathura artists to break away from their tradition of aniconic symbolism. What is clear is that they have been influenced by the trend to elevate religious leaders to divinity, to impress the followers and compete or to outdo the practices of other religions. This tradition, which predates the Buddha, has introduced the concept of the thirty-two characteristics or marks of great personalities.

It is this trend that has introduced divine interventions and other mysticisms to Buddhism and culminated in famous poems as Asvagosha’s Buddhacharithaya and exegeses as Lalithavistara a few centuries later and continues to date. Instead of following realism as the Gandhara artists did, Mathura artists have followed this tradition and incorporated the thirty-two characteristics of a great person into their representation of the Buddha figure.

Some of these marks are described as “… there is a protuberance on the head, this is, for the great man, the venerable Gotama, a mark of a great man; the hair bristles, his bristling hair is blue or dark blue, the color of collyrium, turning in curls, turning to the right; the tuft of hair between the eyebrows on his forehead is very white like cotton; he is golden in color, has skin like gold; eyes very blue, like sapphires; under the soles of his feet there are wheels, with a thousand rims and naves, complete in every way…(DN 30, M 91). Thus, the tradition of adding the protuberance referred to as Usnisha to Buddha statues started.

Buddhist traditions in different forms

This practice has been adopted by all Buddhist traditions in different forms. The highly effective outcome of incorporating these great marks into the statuary is that it has created a globally recognisable symbol that is independent of the artist’s skills, cultural affiliation or the medium used. Without such distinct features, we would have difficulty in distinguishing the depictions of the Enlightened One from those of other monks or other religious leaders such as Mahaveera. Nevertheless, in addition to its spiritual aspect, Buddhist iconography has been a flourishing art form, which has allowed human talent and ingenuity to thrive over millennia.

Let us not forget that artistic expression is a fundamental right. Interestingly, the curly hair on the Buddha statues made the early European Indologists to think that the Buddha was an African deity (Allen 2002).

Sri Lankan Buddhist art

Sri Lankan Buddhist art is said to be related to Amaravathi style; all Sri Lankan statues are depicted with curling hair bristles turning to right. The presence and prominence of the usnisha on local statues vary depending on the period. Toluvila statue, prominently displayed at the National Museum, is considered the earliest dateable statue in Sri Lanka. It is dated to 3rd or 4th century CE, has a less prominent usnisha and lacks the elongated ear lobes; it is said to be influenced by the Mathura school.

Since Dambulla temple dates to third century BCE, one wonders if the magnificent reclining statue in Cave 1 could be earlier than the Toluvila statue. There are several bronze statues from Anuradhapura period without usnisha. Towards late Anuradhapura period, usnisha is beginning to be replaced with rudimentary Siraspatha, which represents a flame. This addition evolved over time and became a very prominent feature during the Kandyan period and replaced the traditional usnisha completely (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Kandyan era statue with
Siraspatha

Incomparable workmanship

Then the question is how does the Avukana statue, which belongs to the early Anuradhapura period, have a siraspatha that is not compatible with the style of the period or the incomparable workmanship of the statue itself? I have come across two explanations. According to the Sinhala Encyclopedia, the original siraspatha was destroyed and a cement replacement was installed in recent times, likely in the early 20th century.

The other version is that the statue never had a siraspatha like many other contemporary stone statues. For example, the Susseruwa (Ras Vehera) statue, which is identical in style, and likely a contemporary work, does not have a siraspatha. During the Buddhist revival, a group of devotees from a Southern town felt that the lack of a siraspatha on such a great statue as a major deficiency, and they ceremoniously installed the crude cement ornament seen today.

This raises the question: which is more valuable, preservation and protection of archeological treasures or reconstruction to meet modern expectations and standards? For example, what would have been more impressive, the Mirisavetiya Stupa as it was found before the failed reconstruction attempts, or the current version that is indistinguishable from modern concrete constructs? Even though, one can assume it was done in good faith. What if the Mihintale Kanthaka Chetiya were covered under brick and concrete to convert into a finished product? Would it increase or decrease its archeological value?

Differences between reality and iconography

None of that should matter in following the Buddha Dhamma. In theory. However, when the influence of Buddhist iconography is deeply rooted in devotee’s mind, it is impossible to imagine the Buddha as a normal human being, with or without a clean-shaven head and a brown complexion. The failure to see the difference between reality and iconography or art, poetry, and literature can be detrimental as it could distort the fact that Dhamma is the truth discovered by a human being, and it is accessible to any human, here and now. That is responsible, at least in part, for the introduction of mysticism, myths, and beliefs that are rapidly sidelining of Dhamma.

How often do we think of Enlightened One as a humble mendicant who roamed the Ganges Valley barefoot, in the beating sun, and resting at night on the folded outer robe spread under a tree. Sadly, iconography and other associated myths have driven us too far away from reality and Dhamma.

Up until I was six years old, we lived in a place up in the Balangoda hills that had a kaolin (kirimeti) deposit. The older students in the school used it for various handcrafts, but for the youngsters, it was playdough, even though we had never heard of that term. After witnessing an artist working on a Buddha statue at the local temple, my friend Bandara and I made Buddha statues of all types and sizes. If any of them were to survive for a few thousand years at the site where the schools stood, future archaeologists may wonder if a primitive tribe existed there (of course carbon dating will show otherwise). Like that, looking at some of the thousands of statues that pop up on every street corner, the purpose of which varies, sometimes I wonder if they were made by a civilisation that was yet to finesse the art of sculpture or by kids having access to kirimeti. No wonder birds take liberty to exercise their freedom of expression.

by Geewananda Gunawardana