Midweek Review

Playing politics with national security

Published

4 years ago

2020/09/30

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Security of a country did not depend on its Defence Secretary. There were various structures and it was a matter of collective action, one-time Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) on Saturday (26).

The P CoI, appointed by former President Maithripala Sirisena, is inquiring into the Easter Sunday attacks. Sirisena named the Commission several weeks before the end of his five-year term.

Fernando further said: “It is not mandatory for the Defence Secretary to have an intimate knowledge of the role played by the Ministry. If that is the case, a fisherman should be the Secretary to the Ministry of Fisheries, and the Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture should be a farmer.”

Let me examine Austin Fernando’s statement, taking into consideration the direct talks between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE, during the period 1989-1990 (the late General D.S. Attygalle served as the Defence Secretary from 15.08.1983 to 16.02.1990), outbreak of Eelam War II (General S.C Ranatunga served as the Secretary Defence from 16.02.1990 to 01.05.1993) and the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE entered into by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe (Austin Fernando functioned as the Secretary Defence from 21.12.2001 to 03.11.2003).

Hemasiri Fernando, who served as Secretary Defence in the run-up to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, is under investigation for criminal negligence. In all four above-mentioned instances, the government apparatus collectively failed, though the circumstances were different.

The only difference is in the case of the disastrous 2002 CFA. The then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga cannot be faulted as Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe blindly signed the catastrophic Oslo-drafted 2002 peace initiative, keeping even his cabinet in the dark.

Austin Fernando is absolutely right. Security of a country does not depend on its Defence Secretary. In fact, a single person cannot guarantee national security, regardless of political clout he or she wielded. However, one person can cause irreparable damage, through irrational and unilateral actions/decisions, as in the case of the CFA. The appointment of retired military officers certainly cannot guarantee national security. The late Gen. Attygalle and Gen. Ranatunga facilitated President Premadasa’s ill-fated strategies that weakened the military. Taking Fernando’s assertion into consideration, it would be pertinent to examine how President Premadasa (1989-1990), Premier Wickremesinghe (2002-2003) and President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe (2015-2019) jeopardized the national security. Those who served under them, too, equally contributed to the rapid deterioration of security by simply giving into political dictates, thereby providing tacit support to despicable political agendas.

Sri Lanka paid a huge price for political and military miscalculations. The political environment, created by Sirisena-Wickremesinghe, cannot be scrutinized without taking into consideration previous situations. In the absence of detailed study, the public tend to consider the Easter Sunday security failure as an isolated case. But, the extraordinary Easter Sunday terror project, perhaps, is part of an insidious political strategy to keep Sri Lanka in perpetual anarchy. Those who had perpetrated nearly simultaneous suicide attacks, in three administrative districts, certainly deliberated the political environment before going ahead with the operation. Who exploited the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) to deliver such a devastating message? Did NTJ succumb to external elements? When did India actually infiltrate the NTJ and what is the status of the Indian intelligence gathering operation in Sri Lanka? Why didn’t Indian intelligence share information on NTJ (Zahran Hashim’s gang) much earlier? And, most importantly, why were both Sinhala and Tamil communities targeted?

Defence Chiefs play ball with Ranasinghe Premadasa

Having secured the presidency, in January 1989, President Premadasa sought an agreement with the JVP. The UNP leader also made an attempt to reach a consensus with Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The President succeeded in reaching an understanding with all armed Tamil groups, except the LTTE. The presence of one-time militant Douglas Devananda, leader of the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party), in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s cabinet of ministers, is evidence of Premadasa’s successful political strategy. In addition to the EPDP, Premadasa brought the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) into the political mainstream. However, Premadasa’s bid to reach an understanding with the LTTE ended disastrously, in the second week of June 1990.

At the time, Premadasa initiated direct negotiations with the LTTE, the late Gen. Attygalle had been the Secretary, Ministry of Defence while Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe served as the Commander of the Army (16.09.1988- 15.11.91). Did the President consult the Defence Secretary and the Commander of the Army before initiating negotiations with the JVP and the LTTE? Did they approve of releasing from custody of over thousands of JVP suspects in early 1989? Their release resulted in an immediate stepping up of violence though the police, the military and the government-sponsored civilian death squads crushed the JVP, by the end of 1989.

Having captured JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera, at Ulapane, in the second week of Nov. 1989, he was brought to Colombo, interrogated and executed. Premadasa knew what befell Wijeweera, who led two insurrections, in 1971 and 1987-89.

However, Premadasa’s apparent unilateral decisions, in respect of the LTTE, caused immense harm. Believing in the possibility of successful conclusion of negotiations with the LTTE, Premadasa, hastily announced the hotly disputed decision to request New Delhi to terminate its military mission in the North-East Sri Lanka. Did Premadasa genuinely consult the Defence Secretary, Commander of the Army or at least his Prime Minister, the late D.B. Wijetunga, before demanding the pull-out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force? Premadasa, obviously didn’t believe in consultations. In his capacity as the leader of the UNP and the President, Premadasa largely believed in unilateral decisions. The catastrophic handling of direct negotiations with the LTTE paved the way for terrorists to launch devastating attacks on the Army after obtaining from the then naïve government military supplies, money, as well as building materials. Clearly, the Secretary Defence and the Commander of the Army played ball with Premadasa. In fact, all cooperated with Premadasa. Officials bent backwards to appease the all-powerful President. The then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, overnight recognized the PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) as a registered political party. The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Premadasa, or late Chandrananda de Silva, had no qualms in the PFLT receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.

Prez playing with fire

Did Premadasa consult the Defence Secretary and Commander of the Army before lifting restrictions imposed on the Northern Province, abandoned Point Pedro and Valvettiturai army detachments, pardoned convicted Maradana bomber Manouri Daniels, along with over a dozen other LTTE cadres, held under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), and provided weapons and funds to the LTTE. Premadasa did what he wanted to do. The UNP leader was not bothered about security implications. Obviously, his security chiefs remained mum. President felt confident in his political strategy. He was so confident, he ordered law enforcement personnel to surrender after the LTTE surrounded police stations in the East. Premadasa’s decision resulted in the deaths of over 400 officers and men. Did the President consult Gen. Attygalle’s successor Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and the Commander of the Army before the government reached an agreement with the LTTE?

The Army in the East averted a calamity by refusing to surrender, in spite of the senior leadership directing them to do so. General Gerry H. de Silva, who served as the Commander of the Army (1994-1996) in his memoirs titled ‘A most noble profession’ commented on Premadasa’s strategy/the government’s failure to recognize the threat posed by the LTTE. First published in 2011, two years after the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE, De Silva acknowledged: “We failed to see through the emerging trends and LTTE machinations. Despite constant threats and humiliation meted out to security forces and the police by the militants, the politico-military hierarchy preferred to put up with the ignominy in order not to ‘rock the boat.’

The LTTE capitalized on the situation. A rejuvenated LTTE ‘called the shots,’ and quickly moved into a position of strength, politically and militarily. They were riding the crest of a wave and must have felt that the time was opportune to achieve their goal of Eelam.”

The Gemunu Watch officer is the only Commander of the Army to author a book on his career.

Within a week after the resumption of hostilities, in the second week of June 1990, the ill-prepared Army lost the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula. Premadasa’s ‘honeymoon’ with Prabhakaran lasted 14 months. The Tiger Supremo resumed the war, at lightning speed, just two months after India terminated its military mission here. Sri Lanka was left high and dry after the series of follies by Premadasa, at peace making, and the military couldn’t regain the MSR, till January 2009. Premadasa’s Generals turned a blind eye to what was happening on the ground. When fighting erupted, the Army had just one battalion, plus troops in the Jaffna peninsula. In spite of continuing to build up, the top brass ignored the growing threat until it was too late. So, the mere appointing of a retired General as Secretary Defence cannot guarantee rationale thinking. Premadasa’s strategy was nothing but a massive and unprecedented collective failure that almost resulted in capitulation of the Northern forces. Premadasa turned a Nelsonian eye to the LTTE evicting the entire Muslim population from the Northern Province, in Oct 1990. At the behest of Premadasa, the then Army Commander facilitated coordinated LTTE attacks on rival Tamil groups. The LTTE massacred hundreds of people. The response of Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, to the LTTE threat, caused quite an embarrassment to the government, undermined the State and, basically, allowed the LTTE to transform itself to a conventional fighting force. The then Higher Education Minister Hameed never realized ground realities.

Retired General de Silva’s assessment can be applied to all Presidents. except war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had faith in his younger brother Gotabaya’s capacity to coordinate the war effort against the LTTE.

Generals Attygalle and Ranatunga certainly owed an explanation as regards their failure to prevent the catastrophe in the North. Obviously, no one dared to challenge Premadasa’s dangerous strategies. Having served as the Commander of the Army, for a decade, and Defence Secretary, General Attygalle received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London where he facilitated Kittu’s (Sathasivam Krishnakumar) arrival there. On the orders of Premadasa, the SLAF brought Kittu to Colombo where the British High Commission made arrangements to send the former LTTE Jaffna Commander to receive treatment for his amputated leg. The Generals had no say and Premadasa had his way.

Can you imagine a government facilitating a terrorist’s travel to London where he took over the LTTE’s International Secretariat responsible for running a massive extortion racket? The funds ultimately ended up with arms suppliers who provided the LTTE a range of weapons, T 56 assault rifles to shoulder fired missiles. General Ranatunga, too, received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Canberra and then London. Presidential nominees to top diplomatic posts always received parliamentary approval.

Security fiasco in 2002

Not having learnt from Premadasa’s stupidities, Ranil Wickremesinghe too plunged headlong into a similar folly with Austin Fernando et al in tow.

Ranil Wickremesinghe picked experienced administrative service officer Austin Fernando as Secretary Defence within days after winning the Dec 2001 parliamentary election. Wickremesinghe also brought in one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana on the National List as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Wickremesinghe adopted a simple strategy. The UNP leader advocated a policy of appeasement, thereby jeopardizing the entire security apparatus. The LTTE brazenly exploited the situation to its advantage. Prabhakaran stepped up training, recruitment of fresh cadres, as well as forcible conscription of children. The government did nothing. The LTTE intensified protests opposite security forces bases, restricted/interfered with police and military movements whereas the government repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the Oslo-led peace process like a mantra. Wickremesinghe dismissed intelligence assessment as regards the rapid LTTE built up. Wickremesinghe told a hastily arranged Temple Trees meeting, attended by senior officers responsible for intelligence services et al their assessment of the LTTE training 6,000 cadres at the onset of the CFA was wrong. The Premier contradicted his own intelligence apparatus on the basis of what the Indians told him. The then Defence Advisor Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who had been among those invited by the Premier, had the strength to stand by his report, based on information/analysis provided by all services. Obviously, Wickremesinghe hadn’t been in a mood to listen to anyone who questioned Prabhakaran’s motives though the continuing LTTE build up was evident.

Wickremesinghe followed his policy of appeasement. In his capacity as Secretary Defence Austin Fernando had no option but to go along with the Premier who authorized the finalization of CFA without proper consultations with the military top brass or the intelligence services.

The then Defence Secretary also provided some hilarious side shows like carrying a basket of fruits to a terrorist receiving treatment at a Colombo hospital.

Fernando himself claimed at the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in August 2010 that he hadn’t been involved in the process leading to the finalization of the document. However, top SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) Dr. John Gooneratne subsequently revealed before the LLRC how Norway rejected four proposals made by Sri Lanka. Had those proposals been accommodated in the CFA perhaps Eelam War IV could have been avoided, Gooneratne told the late C.R. de Silva’s Commission. The writer covered the entire LLRC proceedings. Gooneratne revealed the hitherto unknown proposals namely (a) CFA to pave the way for a negotiated settlement (b) prohibition of smuggling of arms, ammunition and equipment (c) freedom of movement for other political parties in areas under the LTTE control and finally (d) halt to forcible recruitment. Sri Lanka never received the backing of Peace Co-Chairs, the US, Norway, EU and Japan to get those just proposals included in the CFA.

The UNP never revealed rejection of its proposals until Gooneratne took advantage of the LLRC to set the record straight. Austin Fernando and SCOPP Chief Bernard Goonetilleke, who appeared before the LLRC could have revealed the truth. The UNP remained mum. Throughout the CFA period, Premier Wickremesinghe tried to suppress information that may have caused embarrassment to his government, the Norwegians and the LTTE. Obviously there hadn’t been any proper consultations among members of the cabinet, parliamentary group or the military top brass regarding the Oslo-led process.

Austin Fernando cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the UNP government’s actions during the CFA. The person who served as Secretary Defence cannot claim lack of knowledge of a particular situation. The same applies to the Defence Minister. During Marapana’s tenure as the Defence Minister Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)-run operation was exposed to the whole world with media scenes. In spite of strong protests by the Army, the UNP went ahead with its political project. The exposure of the operation led to the deaths of several operatives. The LTTE also hunted police officers engaged in anti-terrorist operations. When Defence Advisor Merril Gunaratne blamed the LTTE for the killing of Inspector Thabrew at the Dehiwela police station, Premier Wickremesinghe himself questioned the veteran law enforcement officer’s assessment.

The UNP allowed the LTTE to bring in undeclared cargo via the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). LTTE delegations returning from negotiations with Wickremesinghe’s delegations from various foreign venues and others brought large packages. The foolish government provided air transport. The LTTE brazenly used the opportunity to its advantage. The CFA provided the organization required protection. The LTTE exploited the Oslo arranged CFA, the same way it used direct talks with Premadasa to achieve its targets. High profile assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingham is a case in point. Prabhakaran moved a hit team in an SLAF chopper that brought LTTE delegates from the Vanni to Colombo in 1989.

Both political and military leaderships should accept responsibilities for lapses. During Austin Fernando’s tenure as the Defence Secretary, the military was ordered to stop issuing situation reports, suspended ‘Wanni Sevaya’ (special radio that catered to the military and the police), subjected military reports to civilian approval and basically succumbed to LTTE tactics. While closing down ‘Wanni Sevaya’, the government permitted the LTTE to import state-of-the-art radio equipment to upgrade its own propaganda and communication facilities.

If not for the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s intervention in late 2003, the UNP could have allowed the LTTE build up to continue until it was too late to take counter action. The UNP permitted the deterioration of the situation to such an extent, the LTTE by early 2003 felt confident enough to brazenly quit the negotiating table. The LTTE quit talks in late April 2003 to set the stage for an all-out war. By late 2005, the LTTE was confident it could overwhelm the Army in a large-scale conventional confrontation. The assassination of much-loved Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in early August 2005, indicated their readiness to take on the government. Had the LTTE succeeded in assassinating Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in late April and early Oct, 2006, the LTTE, perhaps could have achieved Eelam. There cannot be any dispute as regards the role played by the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. There had never been previous attempts on the lives of the Army Commander and Secretary Defence. The LTTE knew the government strategy could be aborted by assassinating the two most important men. Their failure brought the war to an end three years later with the LTTE militarily annihilated. If the LTTE succeeded, Sri Lanka’s unitary status could have been jeopardized by now. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition proved the danger in pulling in different directions, lack of vision and strategy as well as pursuing of political agendas inimical Sri Lanka State.

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Midweek Review

North: A change in status ahead of Maaveerar Naal

Published

2 days ago

2024/11/20

Sahan Weerasooriya

Premier Dr. Harini Amarasuriya receives her letter of appointment from President Dissanayake. The NPP government’s success will largely depend on the duo: AKD, who entered Parliament in 2000 and new entrant HA (pic courtesy PMD).

* One-time LTTE mouthpiece TNA is no more

* N & E Tamil speaking representation enhanced

* Fresh look at Sarath Fonseka’s performance at 2010 Prez poll in North required

The new government’s main challenge is ensuring the full implementation of the IMF-led post-Aragalaya economic recovery in line with the Economic Transformation Bill approved by the previous government without a vote. Whatever the side-shows, the focus not only of the government but the Parliament should be on preparing the country to resume debt repayment in 2028 or be ready to face the consequences.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

In a way it was a great thing for the country that the National People’s Power (NPP) scored an emphatic victory at the Nov. 14 general election. Now the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led NPPers can have no excuses for not being able to fulfill their promises as would have been the case if the preceding September Presidential election outcome was repeated with the combined Opposition having the lion’s share of the vote, which would have left the country with a virtual hung Parliament of no benefit to anyone other than creating a parliamentary stalemate, leading to fresh political chaos.

We will, however, grant the fact they have a very tall order to fulfill after the previous governments having virtually signed away our sovereignty with the deals they had inked during their tenures.

But we do have a nagging suspicion about someone working in not so mysterious ways against us behind the scene, after what the former US Secretary of State, John Kerry, publicly stated not too long after the defeat of President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the 2015 presidential election when he crowed to the whole world how they had spent several hundred million dollars for regime change operations at the time in several countries, including Sri Lanka. Then we also know since then how a US engineered coup ousted the popularly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan by way of parliamentary and military shenanigans, and then the more publicised way they ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh and then virtually ruined that country as was the case during the Aragalaya here in 2022 to oust the legally elected President, with a wide mandate, Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

The NPP has accomplished the impossible, even in the North, in the form of securing the Jaffna electoral district at the recently concluded parliamentary election. The NPP obtained three seats, nothing but a historic watershed.

The ruling party also won the Vanni electoral district, the scene of some of the bloodiest fighting during the Eelam War IV (Aug 2006-May 2009). Securing Jaffna and Vanni consisting of Vavuniya, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu administrative districts, is as difficult as eradicating the conventional fighting capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The NPP won two seats in the Vanni.

The final phase of the ground offensive was conducted in a corner of the Vanni electorate where LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran met his maker.

The NPP secured two seats in Trincomalee and one in the Batticaloa districts, whereas Digamadulla gave President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s party four more seats. Altogether 12 out of 29 parliamentary seats available in the five above-mentioned electoral districts ended up with the NPP.

The NPP delivered the stunning blow to those who still pursued separatist agenda, regardless of the LTTE’s demise over 15 years ago. The combined armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009.

The Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)-led Tamil National Alliance (TNA) that dominated the Northern and Eastern provinces since 2001 hadn’t been in the fray at the 2024 general election. The TNA that had been in the grip of the LTTE, during 2004-2009, disintegrated 15 years after the end of war, with the ITAK unceremoniously ending the partnership. Ex-TNA members, EPRLF, TELO and PLOTE contested the general election under the ticket of Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA).

The ITAK obtained seven seats (Batticaloa three, Jaffna one, Vanni one, Digamadulla one, Trincomalee one) whereas DTNA won just one (Vanni one). It would be pertinent to mention that ITAK and DTNA fielded a common list for the Trincomalee district to ensure a split in the Tamil vote wouldn’t cost the community much valued representation therein. ITAK Trincomalee leader Kathiravelu Shanmugam Kugathasan, who replaced R. Sampanthan in Parliament at the last Parliament, won that seat.

In addition to the seven elected, the ITAK that contested under the ‘House’ symbol won one National List slot. Ahila Ilankai Tamil Congress (AITC) was the only other party to secure a seat (Jaffna/ Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam) while Independent Group 17 (Jaffna/ Ramanathan Archuna) won one. Altogether Tamil political parties obtained 11 seats, one less than the NPP.

M.A. Sumanthiran (ITAK/Jaffna), Dharmalingham Siddharthan (DTNA/Jaffna) and Sashikala Nadarajah (DTNA/Jaffna), widow of slain ITAK MP Nadarajah Raviraj were some of the big losers. In the east, one-time Chief Minister of the Eastern Province Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, formerly of the LTTE, failed to retain his Batticaloa district seat. Former LTTE field commander and ex-lawmaker Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan aka Karuna Amman made an unsuccessful bid to re-enter Parliament also from the Batticaloa district.

In the previous Parliament, there had been 16 MPs representing five Tamil political parties (ITAK, AITC Eelam People’s Democratic Party [EPDP], Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal [TMVP] and Tamil Makkal Thesiya Kuttani [TMTK]. Last week’s poll eliminated EPDP, TMVP and TMTK while new entrant NPP created political history by winning 11 seats.

In spite of the humiliating setback suffered by those who had been previously in Parliament, the NPP tally has increased the total strength of the Tamil-speaking group representing N & E in Parliament. Perhaps, the successful formation of NPP’s Tamil-speaking wing may influence other political parties to re-examine their overall political strategy. They may not have any other alternative as failure to do so can further weaken their position at the forthcoming Provincial Council and Local Government polls. PC and LG polls are expected to be held next year.

Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, who re-entered Parliament with a convincing win in Batticaloa, consolidated his position, within the party and the district, due to ITAK’s admirable performance there. If not for three Batticaloa seats, ITAK aka Federal Party would have been in an utterly embarrassing position. Batticaloa electoral district is the only one that the NPP couldn’t win. Therefore, the outspoken Rasamanickam can be really happy to have thwarted the NPP in the eastern district.

Now to bury the hatchet between the two or, more correctly, the three literally warring communities here, NPP will have to think out of the box to find a solution that may be by way of sharing power at the centre rather than the periphery, as was successfully done under the Donoughmore Constitution.

Accountability issues

At the presidential election held in Sept. the NPP couldn’t win at least one electorate in the North but did so well several weeks later, it could win Jaffna and Vanni electorates. If not for that sterling performance, the NPP couldn’t have secured an unprecedented 2/3 majority. President AKD should be ever grateful to the northern and eastern electorates for facilitating a 2/3 majority.

Since the introduction of the proportional representation at the 1989 Parliamentary election, no party succeeded in securing a 2/3 though many alleged the Rajapaksas abused such huge mandates. They were, of course, referring to the UPFA securing 144 seats and 145 seats at the 2010 and 2020 general elections, respectively. For a simple majority, the winning party needs 113 seats while 2/3 means 150 seats.

Against the backdrop of NPP’s victory in the N & E, the new Parliament should review Sri Lanka’s response to post-war accountability issues. Since the eradication of the LTTE, the TNA propagated politically motivated unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, both here and abroad. Finally, the treacherous Yahapalana government (2015-2019) betrayed the war-winning armed forces at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Oct 2015. The accountability resolution that had been co-sponsored by the US-led grouping and Sri Lanka was meant to pave the way for a new Constitution aimed at doing away with the country’s unitary status.

Interestingly, the war-winning Army Commander, Sarath Fonseka, who had been promoted to the rank of Field Marshal, in March 2015, served in that Yahapalana Cabinet, chaired by President Maithripala Sirisena. The role played by the then Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe and the late Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera in that despicable act is in the public domain. The failure on the part of Fonseka, who served President Sirisena’s Cabinet to vigorously oppose the government move is still a mystery.

The writer repeatedly discussed the failure on the part of Parliament and urged concerned political parties to raise the Yahapalana-TNA Geneva operation after the same lot fielded Fonseka as the common presidential candidate in 2010. Although Fonseka lost the contest by a massive 1.8 mn votes to war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa, he handsomely won the Jaffna, Vanni, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Digamadulla electoral districts at the same election.

The NPP’s excellent showing in the N & E at the recently concluded general election should be examined taking Fonseka winning the former war zones 14 years ago.

Having alleged Fonseka’s Army of war crimes throughout the northern campaign, the TNA had no qualms in backing the Sinha Regiment veteran. Unfortunately, political parties represented in Parliament never bothered to raise TNA’s duplicity. Instead, all of them shamelessly and brazenly played politics with the issue, seeking petty political advantage at the expense of the armed forces. There hadn’t been a single instance of a war-winning country betraying its armed forces hitherto anywhere in the world. It was only the Maithripala Sirisena/Ranil Wickremesinghe govt. that achieved that dastardly act.

The JVP, though being not part of the Yahapalana Cabinet, never opposed the government’s move against the armed forces. However, the NPP’s victory in the North, perhaps would give an opportunity for President AKD, who is also the Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, to address the issue at hand afresh. President AKD retained the Defence portfolio when the new Cabinet of Ministers was sworn in last Monday.

The developing situation in the North may help post-war national reconciliation efforts. Successive governments deliberately allowed further deterioration of relations between the two communities by not taking apt remedial measures. Those who propagated lies were allowed to do so much to the disappointment of the armed forces. Parliament turned a blind eye even when the US and Australia et al denied visas to retired and serving officers and US imposed travel ban on the then Army Commander Gen. Shavendra Silva, the incumbent Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Maj. General Chagie Gallage, now retired, is another victim of external reprisals.

Maaveerar Naal (Great Heroes’ day)

The Tamil Diaspora must have been quite surprised by the outcome of the general election. Some interested parties played down the importance of NPP victory in the North on the basis of low turnout of voters. It would be interesting to observe how the Diaspora and political parties here mark this year’s Maaveerar Naal. Commencing 1991, the LTTE used to celebrate Nov. 21-27 week as Great Heroes Week. During the period the group wielded power, the weeklong celebrations and activities received even international media attention.

This year, Maaveerar week is scheduled to commence on Nov 21 (tomorrow), the day the 10th Parliament meets. What would those elected from the NPP, ITAK and other parties do this year? Would interested parties seek to cause some unnecessary commotion in a bid to embarrass the government. Let us hope the government would handle the situation cautiously as opportunistic elements on both sides seek to exploit the developments. ITAK’s Sivagnanam Shritharan paid tribute to fallen Maaveerar at Kanagapuram, Kilinochchi.

The NPP’s unexpected victory in the north may compel not only Tamil Diaspora but Western countries, particularly Canada, to review their position.

Canada declared May 18 as Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day as Premier Justin Trudeau’s government sought to appease Canadian voters of Sri Lankan origin. Canada cannot under any circumstances ignore the Tamil vote received by the NPP as people discarded unsubstantiated war crimes allegations directed at the government, for the second time. Had the northern electorate believed the Army wantonly killed civilians on the Vanni east front in 2009, as alleged by the UN, they wouldn’t have voted for Fonseka. Perhaps, the people wanted the government to bring the war to an end at any cost. Having waged two terror campaigns in 1971 and 1987-1990, the JVP should be able to comprehend the need and the responsibility on the part of the government of the day to take whatever measures necessary to deal with the challenge.

The NPP was formed in 2019 just months ahead of the presidential election as the JVP realized it couldn’t push ahead on its own but needed wider public support. The NPP achieved that with ease within six years.

In August 2006, the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa went ahead with an-all-out campaign against the LTTE after failing to convince them to negotiate for a final settlement. President Rajapaksa had no option but to go on the offensive after the failed LTTE assassination attempts on the then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Fonseka (April 2006) and then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa (Oct. 2006). The TNA remained committed to the LTTE’s murderous cause until the very end.

A matter for serious concern

An unbelievably large number of voters skipped the general election. All political parties, including the NPP, should be concerned over the unprecedented deterioration of voter interest, especially after a thrilling presidential election brought AKD to power just six weeks ago. A substantial increase for the NPP from 5,634,915 votes (42.31 %) at the presidential to 6,863,186 (61.56%) at the general election just weeks later shouldn’t be allowed to divert attention to the massive drop in public interest. Well over half a million rejected votes, too, must worry all.

The NPP won 159 seats, including 18 National List slots, nine more than required for a 2/3 majority. At the presidential election 3,520,438 voters refrained from exercising their franchise. But that figure increased to 5,325,108 at the general election while the number of rejected votes, too, recorded a significant increase. According to the Election Commission, at the presidential poll, the number of rejected votes was 300,300 while the general election recorded 667,240 rejected votes.

What really caused such an increase in the number of rejected votes was when the number of polled votes dropped from 13,619,916 votes (79.46%) to 11,815,246 (68.93%)? In other words of the 17,140,354 people eligible to vote, a staggering percentage decided not to. Voter apathy is not healthy. Not healthy at all.

A rethinking on the part of the SJB and New Democratic Front (NDF/consisted of former SLPP lawmakers and UNP) is necessary as they couldn’t at least retain the number of votes received at the presidential election. SJB that polled 4,363,035 votes (32.76 %) at the presidential poll could muster only 1,968,716 (17.66%) at the general election, while NDF could secure 500,835 (4.49%) having polled 2,299,767 (17.27%) just weeks ago. The SJB and NDF ended up with 40 seats (including five NL slots) and five seats (including 2two NL slots) while the SLPP that won 145 seats at the 2020 general election had to be satisfied with three seats, including one NL slot.

Both Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe should seek remedial measures before the EC announced PC and LG polls. Perhaps, divided groups have to unite under one banner either under SJB or UNP or face annihilation at the PC and LG polls. For Premadasa and Wickremesinghe time seemed to have run out.

The SLPP obtained 350,429 votes (3.14%) at the general election up from 342,781 (2.57 %) at the presidential election. For the SLPP a rapid recovery process will never be possible as its only NL member and leader of the minute group Namal Rajapaksa is likely to be the target of corruption investigations. The SLPP group consists of Namal Rajapaksa, newcomer Chanaka Sampath (Galle) and D.V. Chanaka (Hambantota).

Fifteen political parties represented the last Parliament. They were SLPP (145), SJB (54), ITAK (10), NPP (03), EPDP (02), AITC (02), TMVP (01), SLFP (01), MNA (01), TMTK (01) TMTK, ACMC (01), NC (01), SLMC (01), UNP (01) and OPPP (01). The new Parliament will be represented by 13 political parties and one independent group – namely NPP 159, SJB 40, ITAK 08, NDF 05, SLPP 03, SLMC 03, Sarvajana Balaya (NL), UNP (01), DTNA (01), ACTC (01), ACMC (01), Jaffna Ind. Group 157 (01) and SLLP (01).

Midweek Review

‘Ramayanizing’ Sri Lanka by Courtesy of SriLankan Airlines

Published

2 days ago

2024/11/20

Sahan Weerasooriya

Srilankan advertisement

(The author is on X as @sasmester)

SriLankan Airlines’ five-minute commercial promoting the so-called ‘Ramayana Trail’ in Sri Lanka is being accepted very naively as an enticing and heartwarming advertisement by Sri Lankan and Indian viewers across social media. Predictably, the video has also gone viral. It shows a young child being educated about aspects of the Ramayana legend by his grandmother, while zooming in on locations in Sri Lanka where local mythology has made associations with some narratives of the Ramayana. Beyond the rave reviews of the commercial in Sri Lanka and India, an astute observer would in fact see it as a very problematic rendition for one simple reason. That is, when viewed from the perspective that it is paid for by SriLankan Airlines, a government entity funded by local taxpayers, what is said and promoted, in effect, would be through the voice of the state and the government. Therefore, for instance, when the granny tells the child, “all the places in Ramayana are real. Today, we know Lanka as Sri Lanka”, in one careless and ill-thought-out fell swoop, SriLankan Airlines has given credence to belief as evidence, myth as history, fiction as fact, asserting Ramayana’s Lanka as present-day Sri Lanka when numerous Indian renditions of the story locate parts of Ravana’s Lanka well within contemporary India.

Admittedly, the commercial will certainly attract Indian tourists and pilgrims, particularly from the northern parts of the country. The question that comes to mind however is whether this is the only way to promote the trail? Many of my friends have already made the trip without the nudging of the new advert. The advert also begs the question, whether local sensitivities and cultural meanings linked to the Sanskrit epic were ever considered when it was conceptualised, or at any point even after in the process. More importantly, who gave the final seal of approval?

The hegemonic narrative in the commercial is what one might call a ‘North Indian Brahminic’ approach to the Ramayana, which erases other versions of the epic including the Ravana-centric myths in Sri Lanka itself. Unfortunately, it is this hegemonic narrative that has been making the rounds for some time in India with Rama as its protagonist and Ravana as the absolute villain, the all-evil-encompassing antagonist. In this rendition, it is no longer simply an ancient epic or a story of innocence and faith, but a contemporary political narrative with considerable cultural power, authority and reach, performed and used by the state itself. This narrative feeds directly and indirectly into the somewhat imperialist designs of certain contemporary Indian political forces so aptly encapsulated in the hegemonic political concept of Akhand Bharat. However, in real life, understandings of the Ramayana have never been this simple or linear.

The title of Prof A.K. Ramanujan’s seminal essay, ‘Three Hundred Ramayanas: Five Examples and Three Thoughts on Translation’ offers a clear indication into the many versions of the Ramayana and the complex narrative traditions of both India and lands beyond where aspects of the epic have become part of local myths, folktales or performance traditions. Interestingly, Prof Ramanujan’s essay was dropped from the Bachelor of Arts in History (Honours) degree programme at Delhi University in 2011 amidst considerable agitations lead by Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, a right-wing students’ organization, precisely because its contents complicate the way in which the political narrative that is the Ramayana today is presented.

It is truly unfortunate that the narrative given prominence in the Sri Lankan Airlines advert stems from this dominant, parochialized and utterly politicized version of the Ramayana which sweepingly demonizes Ravana. This broad-brush demonization reaches its peak in India during Dussehra, the festival during which effigies of Ravana are burnt to symbolize the vanquishing of evil (Ravana) by good (Rama). However, interestingly, in many of India’s tribal areas, the narrative is closer to that in Sri Lanka, where Ravana is seen as a hero, and importantly as a source of knowledge and ethics. In 2017, in the Katol area in the State of Maharashtra, tribal people forced the local administration to stop the burning of Ravana effigies during Dussehra. In Nashik, also in Maharashtra, tribal folklore suggests that the area was part of Ravana’s kingdom and was governed by his sister Surpanakha along with her husband. This understanding of Ravana’s kingdom is nowhere near Sri Lanka as promoted by SriLankan Airlines. In some tribal Gond villages in Maharashtra, Ravana is worshiped as a god, clearly evident during Dussehra. He is also worshiped in many other locations including, Mandsaur and Ravangram in Madhya Pradesh; Bisrakh in Uttar Pradesh; Kangra in Himachal Pradesh; Mandya and Kolar in Karnataka, and Jodhpur in Rajasthan. Similar practices are seen in the tribal areas of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and West Bengal as well.

In Tamil Nadu in India’s south, there are many people who align themselves with ‘Dravidian’ ideologies, promoting Ravana as a politico-cultural icon. One source of motivation for this stems from the manner in which Ravana is eulogised for his valour in Kambaramayanam – the Tamil version of the Ramayana – even though here, too, the main premise of the hegemonic account is maintained. The more obvious source for this reverence is Ravana Kaaviyam written by Pulavar Kuzhandhai and published in 1946. It is a 20th century attempt to deconstruct the Ramayana based on the argument that the mainstream Ramayana was an attempt to establish the supremacy of the ‘Aryan race’ who lived in northern India, over the ‘Dravidians’ in the south. Here, Ravana is seen as a ‘Dravidian’ king, and in essence very similar to the Sinhala renditions of Ravana. In both these popular Sinhala and Tamil versions, he is presented as a noble king, epitomising justice, courage and compassion, and also a wise person and scholar. While categories such as ‘Dravidian’ and ‘Aryan’ as ethno-cultural references as opposed to linguistic references are not part of my academic vocabulary, the attempted deconstruction is nevertheless interesting as it also offers a glimpse into the manner in which 20th and 21st century hegemonic North Indian politics are understood by some sections in the country’s south.

What is evident is that a counterculture movement is currently mobilising tribal and Dalit communities in several Indian states such as the above to vindicate Ravana and ‘rescue’ him from the negative light in which he has been portrayed in the current dominant version of the Ramayana, the one SriLankan Airlines has blindly based their commercial on. Due to this blindness, these interesting and telling complexities and intriguing political and cultural references have no resonance whatsoever in the SriLankan Airlines advert.

I come again to the question posed at the beginning of this essay: is this the only way to do such a promotion funded by the Sri Lankan government? Cannot the state-funded national carrier attract Indian tourists and pilgrims by presenting the places the local tourism industry and Indian tour and pilgrimage operators want these travellers to visit by offering the local interpretation? After all, Sri Lanka does not have a performance tradition of the Ramayana and hardly any concrete memories of the epic and its numerous episodes as a specific text. Instead, fragments of these exist scattered on the landscape throughout the island as places where specific incidents related to the Ramayana had supposedly happened. These manifest through several local folk tales and myths where Ravana is ever present as a local hero and Rama is virtually absent except when contextually required. Moreover, some of these places refer to many other stories too, which have been historically more prominent locally than the Ramayana-related narratives. However, right now, the Ramayana ‘stories’ are given considerable local and national prominence as a rational economic decision taken by people in these areas in the interest of tourism which translates into simple commercial gain. This is understandable.

The question is, what prevented SriLankan Airlines from beginning its advert with the famed flying machine of Ravana known in Sinhala as dandu monaraya (and in India as Pushpaka Viman), often referred to in influential local interpretations as the first of its kind, and predating the Wright Brothers’ invention? Is it a lamentable lack of imagination and creativity, or sheer ignorance? After all, the logo of Air Lanka, the predecessor to SriLankan Airlines, found its genesis in this story, which continues to date in a different form. This way, potential tourists could have been shown the same locations referred to in the current advert, but viewed from the sky, as if one were flying in the dandu monaraya like Ravana may have done in mythical times. This would also be very similar to the way ancient Sri Lankan poets of the sandesha tradition described local landscapes and built environments from the point of view of a bird in flight taking a message to a king, a Buddhist monk or some other such personality. Salalihini Sandeshaya and Hansa Sandeshaya written in the 15th century during the Kotte Period come to mind.

In this manner, the core places in the ‘Ramayana Trail’ could have been flagged for tourist and pilgrim interest while maintaining a distinct sense of local culture and identity that SriLankan Airlines should ideally be marketing. This is not to make Indian tourists and pilgrims cast aside their own beliefs, narratives and interpretations when visiting Sri Lanka. That is their right and not in any doubt. The crux of the matter is, why would SriLankan Airlines be so north Indian and Brahminic, and willingly succumb to the dominant and exclusivist version of the Ramayana promoted by the Indian state and many ordinary people to the exclusion of all other narratives in India itself? By doing so, SriLankan Airlines is taking itself, the government, the state and by extension all of us Sri Lankans, right into the bosom of the Indian state’s cultural and political colonialism typified by the concept of ‘Akhand Bharat’ as noted earlier. If picked up by opposition forces in the politically polarised Sri Lankan society, the advertisement can become a political statement, which has the potential to create needless rifts within Sri Lanka itself.

But then again, one cannot expect these complexities to be understood by the decision makers at SriLankan Airlines who obviously are far removed from the local cultural terrain as well as existing cultural hegemonism emanating from across the Palk Strait. The national carrier, in its haste to soar, as well as absence of foresight and lack of enlightenment of local culture has imprisoned Sri Lanka in a hegemonic North Indian politico-cultural narrative. This is also a sign of lacking national pride despite constant and oftentimes annoying rhetoric. One can only hope, the Sri Lankan government will revisit how this was done in the first place and ensure this kind of culturally crude reductionism of our own traditions and folklore does not take place in the future in state-sponsored activities carried out with public funds.

I cannot but be reminded of a quote by Voltaire when reflecting on the manner in which politics of this kind flow, emerge, and reemerge in Sri Lanka while nothing is ever learned: “It is difficult to free fools from the chains they revere.”