Midweek Review
Opportunity for deployment under UN command as STF celebrates 40th anniversary
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Having received its baptism of fire, within months of formation, in early 1983, the police para-military arm, the elite Special Task Force (STF), is now ready to serve under the UN command, in the near future.
The UN deployment is a much desired achievement in the wake of it celebrating 40 years of dedicated service to the nation having sacrificed much by its heroic members.
Well over a decade after the successful conclusion of the war, the STF is now engaged in peacetime duties. Incumbent STF Commandant, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Waruna Jayasundara, says they are ready for deployment in any part of the world.
Jayasundara, who had served the STF for many years, received the top post, in June 2020, several months after the last presidential election.
Established on March 01, 1983, with a group of 60 personnel, the STF received the leadership of late Senior DIG Bodhi Liyanage, the first Commandant, and was followed by DIG Dharmasiri Weerakoon, Senior DIG Zerney Wijesuriya, late DIG Lionel Karunasena, late DIG Nimal Gunathilleke, SDIG Nimal Lewke, DIG K.M.L. Sarathchandra, DIG R.W.M.C. Ranawana, DIG J.K.R.A. Perera, Senior DIG M.R. Latiff and DIG Lionel Gunathilleke.
Having played a low-key role, during the unprecedented political-economic-social crisis that forced Gotabaya Rajapaksa out of the office of executive president, the STF now faces the unenviable challenging task of countering organized political groups pushing for political reforms.
With trade unions affiliated to various political parties, as well as professional bodies, such as the Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA), threatening to cripple the government over the new tax regime, law enforcement authorities are certain to come under pressure. The STF will have to throw its weight behind the police, pressed into tackling the Opposition challenge.
Tackling political dissent is a challenging task, especially at a time restrictions cannot be imposed on the media. Privately owned print and electronic, as well as uncontrollable social media, pose quite a challenge as the slightest excesses,on the part of law enforcers, are certain to reach the public.
The formation of the STF, originally called Special Striking Force, during the JRJ administration, was meant to meet the growing threat, posed by Indian trained terrorists. JRJ gave the go ahead, following recommendations made by a committee, headed by one-time Minister J.W. Subasinghe, and the late President’s son, Ravi Jayewardene, an ex-military man, too, played a major, but an unassuming role, mostly behind the scene, in its infancy, as the then National Security Advisor. It would be pertinent to mention that in spite of the JVP-led 1971 insurgency, those responsible for national security didn’t form a specialized unit, within the police, to meet any eventuality.
The formation of the STF took place four months before the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) triggered the first Eelam War, with the killing of 13 soldiers at Thinnaveli, Jaffna. In Sept. 1984, the STF suffered a demoralizing setback when the LTTE planted landmine claimed the lives of four police commandos. The blast on the Point Pedro –Valvettiturai road also wounded nine other STF men.
Those who volunteered to join the SSF/STF were, initially, trained at Katukurunda and at the Army Combat Training School, Ampara, by instructors, led by the then Maj. Ananda Weerasekera, elder brother of parliamentarian Sarath Weerasekera, who served the Navy during a turbulent period, before retirement in the rank of Rear Admiral, and Maj. S. Manawadu. Ananda Weerasekera retired from the Army after rising to the rank of Major General and later ordained as Ven. Buddhangala Ananda Thera. The Ven. Thera passed away in late Dec 2021.
Tikkam blast
Their initial deployment covered Point Pedro, Velvettiturai and Kankesanturai and the gradual expansion cannot be discussed without deliberating the role played by the then National Security Advisor, Ravi Jayewardene.
Sri Lanka obtained ex-Special Air Services (SAS) personnel via Keenie Meenie Services (KMS), one of the first British mercenary companies to prepare the STF for the battles ahead. In the wake of the Tikkam blast, the STF was re-deployed in the Eastern Province.
SSF personnel initially used SLR rifles, though they gradually acquired a range of new weapons to meet the ever increasing threat. Among the weapons were US manufactured M 16 and German Heckler and Koch. They also acquired a range of mortars, including 120 mm used by the SLA.
The British personnel imparted their knowledge and expertise on a range of subjects, including tactics adopted by anti-riot squads, weapons training, firing practices, counter terrorism search, handling explosives, mapping, use of compass and first aid.
During the Eelam War I (the period before the deployment of the Indian Army in the Northern and Eastern regions), the STF dominated theEastern Batticaloa and Ampara districts. In terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, that had been forced on Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan military, the police and its para-military arm were confined to barracks. By the time, India quit Sri Lanka mission, in March 1990, the LTTE was prepared to launch Eelam War II. Fighting re-erupted in the second week of June 1990. During the IPKF deployment, the STF joined the other services, and the police, in fighting the second JVP-led insurrection.
The STF went flat out against the JVP and the reports of excesses during that period hadn’t been denied.
The Bolgoda Lake killings during the Kumaratunga presidency were nothing but a black mark on the STF.
‘Bolgoda killings’ caused irreparable damage to the STF’s reputation in the mid-1990s, when some officers and men were found guilty of extra-judicial killings in the city and its suburbs. During Eelam War IV, an ‘STF operation’ in Trincomalee, too, brought disrepute to the force, though overall it has been a well-disciplined unit.
In response to the LTTE threat, at the onset of Eelam War II, the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s government launched military operations. In line with the overall counter-terrorist strategy, the STF was tasked with regaining the Ampara and Batticaloa districts. The STF achieved the challenging task, within months. In the post-IPKF era, the military and the STF faced the battle hardened LTTE that received tremendous boost, by way of experience gained by confronting the mighty Indian Army and the free flow of weapons from abroad. By then, all other Indian trained groups, including the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), responsible for Nov. 1988 abortive bid to oust the then Maldivian President, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, had given up terrorism. Only the LTTE remained committed to the macabre Eelam project. By 1993, the military and the STF cleared the East to enable the conduct of the Local Government polls.
The LTTE, on May Day 1993, delivered a stunning blow to the STF by mounting suicide attack on President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The LTTE cleverly infiltrated Premadasa’s security contingent and the STF cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the unprecedented security lapse, whatever the political environment security chiefs had to work in. During Premadasa’s honeymoon (May 1989-June 1990) with the LTTE, the STF provided security to members of the LTTE delegation. The writer, during this period, met the late Anton Balasingham at the Hilton. There were STF personnel outside Balasingham’s room.
When Eelam War II erupted in the second week of June, 1990, the STF had to escort a small group of LTTE personnel, from the Colombo Hilton to the Ratmalana air base. They were then airlifted to Palaly and allowed to leave the base safely as Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, made a desperate bid to bring the LTTE back to the negotiating table.
With emergence of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, as the Prime Minister, and then President, in late 1994, the government entered into fresh round of negotiations. Following a 100-day truce, fighting erupted in late April 1995 with the sinking of two Navy gunboats, at the Trincomalee harbour, and shooting down of Avro aircraft, with heat-seeking missiles, as they were approaching the Palaly airbase. The LTTE made some rapid progress in the Eelam War II, though it couldn’t sustain the tempo. In the East, the LTTE stepped up pressure on STF detachments at Tikkodai, Porativu, and Ambalanturai. In Dec. 1996, the LTTE forced the STF out of its Pulukunawa detachment. In one of the fiercest attacks, faced by the STF, the combined STF-Army contingent, deployed at Pulukunawa, failed to thwart the multi-pronged attack. The LTTE captured some arms and ammunition, including artillery pieces. However, those who vacated the base, with the arrival of reinforcements, fought back to regain the Pulukunawa detachment, within 24 hours.
In 1997, the STF expanded its deployment to the Vanni region. That year, the Army, engaged in Operation ‘Jayasikurui’, suffered devastating losses in the Vanni theatre after making vast advances. After a series of heavy defeats, in the Northern Province, and an abortive bid to assassinate Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, by the terrorists, the UNP regained power, at the parliamentary polls, conducted in Dec. 2001. The stage was set for another round of talks with the LTTE, with the signing of the virtually one-sided Ceasefire Agreement, drawn up by the Norwegians.
When Eelam War IV erupted, in June 2006, the STF was asked to launch operations in support of the overall combined security forces campaign in the East. The STF played a critically important role, during Eelam War IV.
During the 40 years of service to the nation, the STF lost 464 officers and men in the line of duty, while 774 were wounded. Six of its civilian employees also died during this period.
The number of dead and wounded, suffered by the STF, when compared with the SLA, may seem insignificant, though the contribution made by the unit to defeating terrorism was DEFINITELY NOT. The SLA lost 6,000 officers and men during Eelam War IV alone, while some 27,000 received injuries.
Post-war responsibilities
Following the successful conclusion of the conflict, the elite unit received greater responsibility in fighting illicit narcotic trade and organized crime, regular law enforcement, high profile/high risk arrests, protection of radioactive materials deployed across the country, responses to crisis, VVIP Security, search and bomb disposal, fire and rescue in expressways and enforcement of the law with regard to the offenses related to the environment.
The STF faces daunting challenge in preserving the experience gained in counter-insurgency operations in the South (1987-1990) and combat operations in the Eastern Province. With the government recently declaring its intention to gradually cut the strength of the Army to 100,000 by 2030, after reducing the numbers to 135,000 by next year, an assessment is also likely as regards the STF. Currently, the STF consists of nearly 8,000 officers, and men, deployed across the country, including Jaffna.
It would be the responsibility of both political and military leadership to maintain the overall capabilities of the armed forces and the police. There cannot be any dispute over the need to reduce the number of men, under arms, as Sri Lanka struggles to cope up in an extremely rough economic crisis. The peacetime political-economic-social crisis has placed the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government, with pressure being exerted on all sectors, to cut down on expenditure. However, it would be a grave mistake, on the part of the incumbent administration, to deprive the armed forces and law enforcement the wherewithal to maintain peace and, particularly, the strength to face future challenges.
The continuing debate over the granting of police and land powers to the provinces, in terms of 13th Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in late 1987, has not so far touched the fate of the STF, in case full implementation of the controversial piece of legislation, which Sri Lanka was forced to adopt, becomes a reality. As the STF, too, comes under the Inspector General of Police what would be the destiny of the para-military armm, in the event the police deployment, in the provinces, come under respective Chief Ministers.
STF Commandant DIG Waruna Jayasundara
Subsequent to the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), in late Feb. 2002, the LTTE launched a series of protests, targeting security forces bases, and police stations, in the then temporarily merged Northern and Eastern Province.
Close on the heels of the attack on the Valaichenai police station, the LTTE targeted an isolated base, held by the elite Special Task Force (STF), at Kanjirankudah, south of Batticaloa. Several hundred civilians launched a protest campaign, on Oct. 9, 2002, shortly after an incident involving STF personne, and two LTTE cadres, M. Visuvanathan, in charge of Pottuvil, and Christy Rajah. The LTTE exploited the situation to launch the protest. The LTTE used civilians as a human shield to move into the detachment, though the STF fired warning shots into the air. But, once the STF realized the LTTE’s strategy, the commandos opened fire, killing several persons. Protesters fled carrying the dead and the wounded. The STF recovered seven bodies. Of them, two were identified as Vijayaprakash and Nagarasa. To the surprise of many, Vijayaprakash was identified as one of those held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), but released consequent to the CFA.
At the behest of the LTTE, students and their parents stormed the Point Pedro Brigade headquarters, on Sept. 2, 2002, and the Valaichenai police station, on Oct. 1, 2002, inflicting considerable damage on those facilities. The LTTE obviously felt that a sustained protest campaign, directed at the troops and the police, deployed therein, in the wake of Pongu Thamil rallies, would undermine the government’s authority. Instead of taking effective counter measures to control the situation, the then government brought pressure to bear on the media not to highlight the deteriorating situation.
The government restricted the issuing of daily situation reports, and went to the extent of censoring situation reports, issued by the military. The government’s response should be examined, taking into consideration the circumstances under which the police raided the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) safe house, at Aturugiriya, on the ridiculous allegation the Army, with the involvement of ex-LTTE cadres, planned to assassinate Prime Minister Ranil Wckremesinghe, during the 2001 general election campaign.
Although the STF’s response to the LTTE threat to its camp, at Kanjirankudah, it helped the government to stabilize the situation. Tamil civilians resisted LTTE attempts to use children in protests. The government gave an interesting twist to the Kanjirankudah incident. It alleged that the Presidential Security Division (PSD) had been involved in the attack, prompting both the President’s Office and the PSD to issue statements.
The then PSD head, DIG N. K. Illangakoon, a former Deputy Commandant of the STF (he later served as IGP) said that his officers hadn’t even visited the base, ahead of the incident. Shortly after the incident, the government appointed the then SSP Nimal Lewke, the Deputy Commandant of the STF as the senior officer in charge of its personnel deployed in the Ampara-Batticaloa.
Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s recent combative ‘Head-to-Head’ interview with British-American Mehdi Hasan on Al Jazeera has opened a can of worms. As to why Hasan raised the Batalanda Presidential Commission report, during a 49-minute interview conducted at the London’s Conway Hall, with a clearly pro LTTE audience, remains a mystery. This must be yet another notorious way to show how even-handed they are as in the case of its coverage of Russia, China, Palestine or Ukraine for their gullible viewers.
Recorded in February and aired in March 2025, the interview is definitely the most controversial the UNP leader, who is also an Attorney-at-Law, ever faced during his political career; always used to getting kid glove treatment, especially after taking over the party in 1994.
The continuing public discourse on Batalanda should provoke a wider discussion on Sri Lanka’s response to separatist Tamil terrorism, since the cold blooded murder of Jaffna SLFP Mayor Alfred Duriappah, which signalled the beginning of the LTTE terror campaign that ended in May 2009 with the crushing military defeat of the Tigers on the banks of the Nathikadal lagoon, as well as two southern insurgencies in 1971 and 1987-1990.
As Nandana Gunatilleke (one time JVP General Secretary and ex-MP), Dr. Wasantha Bandara (ex-JVPer and close associate of the slain JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera), Indrananda de Silva (ex-JVPer, incumbent Central Committee member of Frontline Socialist Party [FSP] and ex-military photographer) and Uvindu Wijeweera (Rohana Wijeweera’s son and leader of Dewana Parapura) agreed during the recent Hiru ‘Balaya’ discussion, conducted by Madushan de Silva, the Batalanda operation was in line with the overall counter-terrorist/insurgency strategy of the then government.
The issues at hand cannot be discussed at all without taking into consideration the JVP terrorism that, at one-time, almost overwhelmed the UNP’s unbroken rule, since 1977, carried out while openly brushing aside most of the universally accepted genuine parliamentary norms. The country’s second Republican constitution, promulgated by the UNP regime with a 5/6 majority in Parliament, in 1978, had been amended no less than 13 times by the time they were finally ousted in 1995. This was mainly to facilitate their continuous rule. Unfortunately, all stakeholders have sought to take advantage of Batalanda, thereby preventing a proper dialogue. Quite surprisingly, none of the guests, nor the interviewer, bothered, at least, to make a reference to the JVP bid on President J.R. Jayewardene’s life in Parliament on the morning of July 18, 1987. At the time, JVPer Ajith Kumara, working in the House as a minor employee, hurled two hand grenades towards JRJ, with the then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa seated next to JRJ. While one government MP lost his life, several others suffered injuries, including then National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, whose spleen had to be removed.
At one point, Gunatilleke declared that they assassinated UNP MP for Tangalle Jinadasa Weerasinghe on July 3, 1987, in response to the government killing well over 100 people, in Colombo, protesting against the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord on July 29, 1987. The parliamentarian was killed near the Barawakumbuka-Welangahawela bridge on the Colombo-Rathnapura-Embilipitiya Road. The UNPer was killed on his way home after having declined Premier Premadasa’s offer to make an SLAF chopper available for him to reach home safely.
Against the backdrop of MP Weerasinghe’s assassination and the grenade attack on the UNP parliamentary group that claimed the life of Keethi Abeywickrema (MP for Deniyaya), the government had no option but to respond likewise. The operation, established at the Batalanda Housing scheme of the State Fertiliser Corporation, constituted part of the counter-insurgency strategy pursued by the UNP.
Those who called Batalanda complex Batalanda torture camp/ wadakagaraya conveniently forgot during the second JVP inspired insurgency, the military had to utilize many public buildings, including schools, as makeshift accommodation for troops. Of course the UNP established Batalanda under different circumstances with the then Industries Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe providing political authority. Batalanda had been an exclusive police operation though the Army had access to it whenever a requirement arose.
Those who had been suddenly withdrawn from the Northern and Eastern Provinces, to meet the rapidly evolving security threat in the South, required accommodation. FSP CC member Indrananada de Silva had received unhindered access to Batalanda in his capacity as a military photographer and the rest is history.
As to why Indrananda de Silva switched his allegiance to the FSP should be examined, taking into consideration his previous role as a trusted military photographer, formerly a Lance Corporal of the Military Police. An influential section of the JVP, led by Kumar Gunaratnam, formed the FSP in April 2012 though it didn’t receive the much anticipated public support. Both Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke, who aligned himself with the UNP, found fault with the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) over its handling of the Batalanada issue.
Paramilitary operations
Paramilitary operations had been an integral part of the overall counter-insurgency campaign, directed at the JVP responsible for approximately 6,600 killings. Among those death squads were PRRA primarily drawn from the SLMP (Sri Lanka Mahajana Party) and SRRA (the socialist Revolutionary Red Army). PRRA had close links with the Independent Student Union (ISU) whose leader Daya Pathirana was slain by the JVP. The vast majority of people do not remember that Daya Pathirana, who led the ISU during the turbulent 1985-1986 period, was killed mid-Dec. 1989. The second insurgency hadn’t started at that time though the JVP propagated the lie that they took up arms against the UNP government following the signing of the Indo-Lanka peace accord on July 29, 1987.
In addition to PRRA and SRRA, the government made use of paramilitary groups, namely Kalu balallu, Ukkusso, Rajaliyo, Kaha balallu, Kola koti, Rathu Makaru, Mapila, Gonussa, Nee, Keshara Sinhayo, Le-mappillu and Kalu koti.
The UNP also involved some elements of Indian trained Tamil groups (not of the LTTE) in paramilitary operations. Such operations, that had been backed by respective Cabinet Ministers, were supervised by local law enforcement authorities. Paramilitary operations had been in line with psychological warfare that was meant to cause fear among the JVP, as well as the general population. Military operations that had been combined with paramilitary actions received the blessings of the political leadership at the highest level. In the case of Batalanda (1988-1990) President J.R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa knew of its existence.
Even after the eradication of the top JVP leadership, by Nov. 1989, police, military and paramilitary operations continued unabated. Former JVPers appearing on ‘Balaya’ agreed that counter-insurgency operations were actually brought to an end only after D.B. Wijetunga succeeded President Ranasinghe Premadasa after the latter’s assassination on May Day 1993.
After the LTTE resumed war in June 1990, just a couple of months after the withdrawal of the Indian Army (July 1987-March1990), the UNP authorized paramilitary operations in the northern and eastern areas. Members of TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF as well as EPDP were made part of the overall government security strategy. They operated in large groups. Some paramilitary units were deployed in the Jaffna islands as well. And these groups were represented in Parliament. They enjoyed privileged status not only in the northern and eastern regions but Colombo as well. The government allowed them to carry weapons in the city and its suburbs.
These groups operated armed units in Colombo. The writer had the opportunity to visit EPDP and PLOTE safe houses in Colombo and its suburbs soon after they reached an understanding with President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Overnight at the behest of President Premadasa, the Election Department granted these Tamil groups political recognition. In other words, armed groups were made political parties. The Premadasa government accepted their right to carry weapons while being represented in Parliament.
It would be pertinent to mention that thousands of Tamil paramilitary personnel served the government during that period. There had been many confrontations between them and the LTTE over the years and the latter sought to eliminate key paramilitary personnel. Let me remind you of the circumstances, the EPRLF’s number 02 Thambirajah Subathiran alias Robert was sniped to death in June 2003. Robert was engaged in routine morning exercises on the top floor of the two-storeyed EPRLF office, on the hospital road, Jaffna, when an LTTE sniper took him out from the nearby Vembadi Girls’ high school. The operation of the Norway managed Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) made no difference as the LTTE removed Robert who led the party here in the absence of leader Varatharaja Perumal, the first and the only Chief Minister of the North-Eastern Province.
In terms of the CFA that had been signed by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, in Feb. 2002, the government agreed to disarm all paramilitary personnel. Many wouldn’t remember now that during Premadasa’s honeymoon with the LTTE, the Army facilitated the LTTE onslaught on paramilitary groups in selected areas.
Muthaliff’s role
During the ‘Balaya’ discussion, the contentious issue of who shot JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera came up. Nandana Gunatilleke, who contested the 1999 Dec. presidential election. as the JVP candidate, pointing to an article carried in the party organ that dealt with Wijeweera’s assassination said that he wrongly named Gaffoor as one of the persons who shot their leader whereas the actual shooter was Muthaliff. The headline named Thoradeniya and Gaffoor as the perpetrators.
Declaring that he personally wrote that article on the basis of information provided by Indrananda de Silva, Gunatilleke named Asoka Thoradeniya and Tuan Nizam Muthaliff of the Army as the perpetrators of the crime. Thoradeniya served as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in the Maldives during the Yahapalana administration, while Muthaliff was killed by the LTTE in Colombo in late May 2005. The shooting took place at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. Muthaliff was on his way from Manning town, Narahenpita, to the Kotelawala Defence University.
The programme was told that the JVP had over the years developed close relationship with Thoradeniya while Indrananda de Silva accused Dr. Wasantha Bandara of duplicity regarding Muthaliff. How could you recognize Muthaliff, slain by the LTTE, as a war hero as he was actually one of the persons who shot Rohana Wijeweera, the latter asked.
At the time of his assassination, Muthaliff served as the Commanding Officer, 1 st Regiment Sri Lanka Military Intelligence Corps. The then parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa was among those who paid last respects to Maj. Muthaliff.
At the time of Rohana Wijeweera’s arrest, Muthaliff served as Lieutenant while Thoradeniya was a Major. Indrananda de Silva strongly stressed that atrocities perpetrated by the police and military in the South or in the northern and eastern regions must be dealt with regardless of whom they were conducting operations against. The former JVPer recalled the Army massacre in the east in retaliation for the landmine blast that claimed the lives of Northern Commander Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and a group of senior officers, including Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne, in early Aug. 1990 in Kayts.
Dr. Wasantha Bandara warned of the Western powers taking advantage of what he called false narrative to push for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
It would be pertinent to mention that the LTTE also used the underworld as well as some corrupt Army personnel in planning high profile assassinations. Investigations into the assassination of Muthaliff, as well as Maj. Gen. Parami Kulatunga, killed in a suicide attack at Pannipitiya, in June 2006, revealed the direct involvement of military personnel with the LTTE.
Indrananda de Silva disclosed that soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake won the presidential election last September, the FSP, in writing, requested the JVP leader to inquire into killings during that period, including that of Rohana Wijeweera. The FSPer alleged that President Dissanayake refrained from even acknowledging their letter. Indrananda de Silva emphasized that Al Jazeera never disclosed anything new as regards Batalanda as he exposed the truth years ago. The former JVPer ridiculed the ruling party tabling the Batalanda Commission report in the wake of Wickremesinghe’s Al Jazeera interview whereas the matter was in the public domain for quite some time.
Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke exchanged words over the latter’s declaration that the JVP, too, was subjected to investigation for violence unleashed during the 1987-1990 period. While the FSPer repeatedly declared that those who carried out directives issued by the party were arrested and in some cases killed, Nandana Gunatilleke took up the position that the party should be held accountable for crimes perpetrated during that period.
The interviewer posed Nandana Gunatilleke the question whether he was betraying his former comrades after joining the UNP. Nandana Gunatilleke shot back that he joined the UNP in 2015 whereas the JVP joined UNP as far back as 2009 to promote retired Army Chef Sarath Fonseka’s presidential ambition even though he wiped out the JVP presence in Trincomalee region during the second insurgency.
JVP’s accountability
Nandana Gunatilleke is adamant that the party should accept responsibility for the killings carried out at that time. The former JVPer declared that Vijaya Kumaratunga (Feb. 16, 1988), first Vice Chancellor of the Colombo University (March 08, 1989) Dr. Stanley Wijesundera, Ven. Kotikawatte Saddhatissa thera (Aug. 03, 1988) and Chairperson of the State Pharmaceutical Corporation Gladys Jayewardene (Sept. 12, 1989) were among those assassinated by the JVP. SPC Chairperson was killed for importing medicine from India, the former Marxist aligned with the UNP said, while actor-turned-politician Kumaratunga’s assassination was attributed to his dealings with President J.R. Jayewardene.
According to Nandana Gunatilleke, except for a few killings such as General Secretaries of the UNP Harsha Abeywickrema (Dec 23, 1987) and Nandalal Fernando (May 20, 1988), the vast majority of others were ordinary people like grama sevakas killed on mere accusation of being informants. The deaths were ordered on the basis of hearsay, Nandana Gunatilleke said, much to the embarrassment of others who represented the interest of the JVP at that time.
One quite extraordinary moment during the ‘Balaya’ programme was when Nandana Gunatilleke revealed their (JVP’s) direct contact with the Indian High Commission at a time the JVP publicly took an extremely anti-Indian stance. In fact, the JVP propagated a strong anti-Indian line during the insurgency. Turning towards Dr. Wasantha Bandara, Gunatilleke disclosed that both of them had been part of the dialogue with the Indian High Commission.
It reminds me of the late Somawansa Amarasinghe’s first public address delivered at a JVP rally in late Nov. 2001 after returning home from 12 years of self-imposed exile. Of the top JVP leadership, Somawansa Amarasinghe, who had been married to a close relative of powerful UNP Minister Sirisena Cooray, was the only one to survive combined police/military/paramilitary operations.
Amarasinghe didn’t mince his words when he declared at a Kalutara rally that his life was saved by Indian Premier V.P. Singh. Soft spoken Amarasinghe profusely thanked India for saving his life. Unfortunately, those who discuss issues at hand conveniently forget crucial information in the public domain. Such lapses can be both deliberate and due to negligence.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
You may think sloth comes very easy,
To your kingly monitor of the shrinking marsh,
As he lies basking smugly in the morn sun,
But he is organized and alert all the while,
As he awaits his prey with patience infinite,
Free of malice, a professional of a kind,
His cumbrous body not slowing his sprite….
But note, he’s no conspirator spitting guile,
And doesn’t turn nasty unless crossed,
Nor by vengeful plans is he constantly dogged,
Unlike those animals of a more rational kind,
Whose ways have left behind a state so sorry.
By Lynn Ockersz
Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s recent interview with Mehdi Hasan on Al Jazeera’s ‘Head-to-Head’ series has caused controversy, both in and outside Parliament, over the role played by Wickremesinghe in the counter-insurgency campaign in the late’80s.
The National People’s Power (NPP) seeking to exploit the developing story to its advantage has ended up with egg on its face as the ruling party couldn’t disassociate from the violent past of the JVP. The debate on the damning Presidential Commission report on Batalanda, on April 10, will remind the country of the atrocities perpetrated not only by the UNP, but as well as by the JVP.
The Island sought the views of former outspoken parliamentarian and one-time head of the Government Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha on a range of issues, with the focus on Batalanda and the failure on the part of the war-winning country to counter unsubstantiated war crimes accusations.
Q:
The former President and UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s interview with Al Jazeera exposed the pathetic failure on the part of Sri Lanka to address war crimes accusations and accountability issues. In the face of aggressive interviewer Mehdi Hasan on ‘Head-to-Head,’ Wickremesinghe struggled pathetically to counter unsubstantiated accusations. Six-time Premier Wickremesinghe who also served as President (July 2022-Sept. 2024) seemed incapable of defending the war-winning armed forces. However, the situation wouldn’t have deteriorated to such an extent if President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who gave resolute political leadership during that war, ensured a proper defence of our armed forces in its aftermath as well-choreographed LTTE supporters were well in place, with Western backing, to distort and tarnish that victory completely. As wartime Secretary General of the Government’s Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (since June 2007 till the successful conclusion of the war) and Secretary to the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (since Jun 2008) what do you think of Wickremesinghe’s performance?
A:
It made him look very foolish, but this is not surprising since he has no proper answers for most of the questions put to him. Least surprising was his performance with regard to the forces, since for years he was part of the assault forces on the successful Army, and expecting him to defend them is like asking a fox to stand guard on chickens.
Q:
In spite of trying to overwhelm Wickremesinghe before a definitely pro-LTTE audience at London’s Conway Hall, Hasan further exposed the hatchet job he was doing by never referring to the fact that the UNP leader, in his capacity as the Yahapalana Premier, co-sponsored the treacherous Geneva Resolution in Oc., 2015, against one’s own victorious armed forces. Hasan, Wickremesinghe and three panelists, namely Frances Harrison, former BBC-Sri Lanka correspondent, Director of International Truth and Justice Project and author of ‘Still Counting the Dead: Survivors of Sri Lanka’s Hidden War,’ Dr. Madura Rasaratnam, Executive Director of PEARL (People for Equality and Relief in Lanka) and former UK and EU MP and Wickremesinghe’s presidential envoy, Niranjan Joseph de Silva Deva Aditya, never even once referred to India’s accountability during the programme recorded in late February but released in March. As a UPFA MP (2010-2015) in addition to have served as Peace Secretariat Chief and Secretary to the Disaster Management and Human Rights Ministry, could we discuss the issues at hand leaving India out?
A:
I would not call the interview a hatchet job since Hasan was basically concerned about Wickremesinghe’s woeful record with regard to human rights. In raising his despicable conduct under Jayewardene, Hasan clearly saw continuity, and Wickremesinghe laid himself open to this in that he nailed his colours to the Rajapaksa mast in order to become President, thus making it impossible for him to revert to his previous stance. Sadly, given how incompetent both Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa were about defending the forces, one cannot expect foreigners to distinguish between them.
Q:
You are one of the many UPFA MPs who backed Maithripala Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential election. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo perpetrated the despicable act of backing the Geneva Resolution against our armed forces and they should be held responsible for that. Having thrown your weight behind the campaign to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa’s bid to secure a third term, did you feel betrayed by the Geneva Resolution? And if so, what should have the Yahapalana administration done?
A:
By 2014, given the total failure of the Rajapaksas to deal firmly with critiques of our forces, resolutions against us had started and were getting stronger every year. Mahinda Rajapaksa laid us open by sacking Dayan Jayatilleke who had built up a large majority to support our victory against the Tigers, and appointed someone who intrigued with the Americans. He failed to fulfil his commitments with regard to reforms and reconciliation, and allowed for wholesale plundering, so that I have no regrets about working against him at the 2015 election. But I did not expect Wickremesinghe and his cohorts to plunder, too, and ignore the Sirisena manifesto, which is why I parted company with the Yahapalanaya administration, within a couple of months.
I had expected a Sirisena administration to pursue some of the policies associated with the SLFP, but he was a fool and his mentor Chandrika was concerned only with revenge on the Rajapaksas. You cannot talk about betrayal when there was no faith in the first place. But I also blame the Rajapaksas for messing up the August election by attacking Sirisena and driving him further into Ranil’s arms, so that he was a pawn in his hands.
Q:
Have you advised President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government how to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations propagated by various interested parties, particularly the UN, on the basis of the Panel of Experts (PoE) report released in March 2011? Did the government accept your suggestions/recommendations?
A:
Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha
I kept trying, but Mahinda was not interested at all, and had no idea about how to conduct international relations. Sadly, his Foreign Minister was hanging around behind Namal, and proved incapable of independent thought, in his anxiety to gain further promotion. And given that I was about the only person the international community, that was not prejudiced, took seriously – I refer to the ICRC and the Japanese with whom I continued to work, and, indeed, the Americans, until the Ambassador was bullied by her doctrinaire political affairs officer into active undermining of the Rajapaksas – there was much jealousy, so I was shut out from any influence.
But even the admirable effort, headed by Godfrey Gunatilleke, was not properly used. Mahinda Rajapaksa seemed to me more concerned with providing joy rides for people rather than serious counter measures, and representation in Geneva turned into a joke, with him even undermining Tamara Kunanayagam, who, when he supported her, scored a significant victory against the Americans, in September 2011. The Ambassador, who had been intriguing with her predecessor, then told her they would get us in March, and with a little help from their friends here, they succeeded.
Q:
As the writer pointed out in his comment on Wickremesinghe’s controversial Al Jazeera interview, the former Commander-in-Chief failed to mention critically important matters that could have countered Hasan’ s line of questioning meant to humiliate Sri Lanka?
A:
How could you have expected that, since his primary concern has always been himself, not the country, let alone the armed forces?
Q:
Do you agree that Western powers and an influential section of the international media cannot stomach Sri Lanka’s triumph over separatist Tamil terrorism?
A:
There was opposition to our victory from the start, but this was strengthened by the failure to move on reconciliation, creating the impression that the victory against the Tigers was seen by the government as a victory against Tamils. The failure of the Foreign Ministry to work with journalists was lamentable, and the few exceptions – for instance the admirable Vadivel Krishnamoorthy in Chennai or Sashikala Premawardhane in Canberra – received no support at all from the Ministry establishment.
Q:
A couple of months after the 2019 presidential election, Gotabaya Rajapaksa declared his intention to withdraw from the Geneva process. On behalf of Sri Lanka that announcement was made in Geneva by the then Foreign Minister Dinesh Gunawardena, who became the Premier during Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the President. That declaration was meant to hoodwink the Sinhala community and didn’t alter the Geneva process and even today the project is continuing. As a person who had been closely involved in the overall government response to terrorism and related matters, how do you view the measures taken during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s short presidency to counter Geneva?
A:
What measures? I am reminded of the idiocy of the responses to the Darusman report by Basil and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who went on ego trips and produced unreadable volumes trying to get credit for themselves as to issues of little interest to the world. They were planned in response to Darusman, but when I told Gotabaya that his effort was just a narrative of action, he said that responding to Darusman was not his intention. When I said that was necessary, he told me he had asked Chief-of-Staff Roshan Goonetilleke to do that, but Roshan said he had not been asked and had not been given any resources.
My own two short booklets which took the Darusman allegations to pieces were completely ignored by the Foreign Ministry.
Q:
Against the backdrop of the Geneva betrayal in 2015 that involved the late Minister Mangala Samaraweera, how do you view President Wickremesinghe’s response to the Geneva threat?
A: Wickremesinghe did not see Geneva as a threat at all. Who exactly is to blame for the hardening of the resolution, after our Ambassador’s efforts to moderate it, will require a straightforward narrative from the Ambassador, Ravinatha Ariyasinha, who felt badly let down by his superiors. Geneva should not be seen as a threat, since as we have seen follow through is minimal, but we should rather see it as an opportunity to put our own house in order.
Q:
President Anura Kumara Dissanayake recently questioned both the loyalty and professionalism of our armed forces credited with defeating Northern and Southern terrorism. There hadn’t been a previous occasion, a President or a Premier, under any circumstances, questioned the armed forces’ loyalty or professionalism. We cannot also forget the fact that President Dissanayake is the leader of the once proscribed JVP responsible for death and destruction during 1971 and 1987-1990 terror campaigns. Let us know of your opinion on President Dissanayake’s contentious comments on the armed forces?
A: I do not see them as contentious, I think what is seen as generalizations was critiques of elements in the forces. There have been problems, as we saw from the very different approach of Sarath Fonseka and Daya Ratnayake, with regard to civilian casualties, the latter having planned a campaign in the East which led to hardly any civilian deaths. But having monitored every day, while I headed the Peace Secretariat, all allegations, and obtained explanations of what happened from the forces, I could have proved that they were more disciplined than other forces in similar circumstances.
The violence of the JVP and the LTTE and other such groups was met with violence, but the forces observed some rules which I believe the police, much more ruthlessly politicized by Jayewardene, failed to do. The difference in behaviour between the squads led for instance by Gamini Hettiarachchi and Ronnie Goonesinghe makes this clear.
Q:
Mehdi Hasan also strenuously questioned Wickremesinghe on his role in the UNP’s counter-terror campaign during the 1987-1990 period. The British-American journalists of Indian origins attacked Wickremesinghe over the Batalanda Commission report that had dealt with extra-judicial operations carried out by police, acting on the political leadership given by Wickremesinghe. What is your position?
A:
Wickremesinghe’s use of thugs’ right through his political career is well known. I still recall my disappointment, having thought better of him, when a senior member of the UNP, who disapproved thoroughly of what Jayewardene had done to his party, told me that Wickremesinghe was not honest because he used thugs. In ‘My Fair Lady,’ the heroine talks about someone to whom gin was mother’s milk, and for Wickremesinghe violence is mother’s milk, as can be seen by the horrors he associated with.
The latest revelations about Deshabandu Tennakoon, whom he appointed IGP despite his record, makes clear his approval for extra-judicial operations.
Q:
Finally, will you explain how to counter war crimes accusations as well as allegations with regard to the counter-terror campaign in the’80s?
A:
I do not think it is possible to counter allegations about the counter-terror campaign of the eighties, since many of those allegations, starting with the Welikada Prison massacre, which Wickremesinghe’s father admitted to me the government had engendered, are quite accurate. And I should stress that the worst excesses, such as the torture and murder of Wijeyedasa Liyanaarachchi, happened under Jayewardene, since there is a tendency amongst the elite to blame Premadasa. He, to give him his due, was genuine about a ceasefire, which the JVP ignored, foolishly in my view though they may have had doubts about Ranjan Wijeratne’s bona fides.
With regard to war crimes accusations, I have shown how, in my ‘Hard Talk’ interview, which you failed to mention in describing Wickeremesinghe’s failure to respond coherently to Hasan. The speeches Dayan Jayatilleke and I made in Geneva make clear what needed and still needs to be done, but clear sighted arguments based on a moral perspective that is more focused than the meanderings, and the frequent hypocrisy, of critics will not now be easy for the country to furnish.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
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