Features
National interest and its bearing on foreign policy thinking
India’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ruchira Khamboj, reports said, had not clarified any reasons for India’s shift in stance on the issues in question, just within a couple of months, but had drawn the attention of the UN community to several ‘dimensions’ to the crisis. One of these is the Gaza’s ‘humanitarian crisis and large scale loss of lives.’ Other ‘dimensions’ are the need for the world to observe international humanitarian law ‘in all circumstances’ and the importance of finding a lasting solution to the Middle East crisis, based on the ‘two state solution.’
It would be reasonable to take up the position that India’s assessment of what is in its best interests in relation to the Gaza carnage had changed within two months. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such shifting of stances.
While at the time of the explosive emergence of the Gaza violence India would have needed to make it clear to the world that it does not endorse terroristic violence emanating from any quarter, for whatever reason, two months later it would have been compelled to take into consideration the tragic fallout from the violence on the civilians on both sides of the divide and the paramount need for a country to endorse international humanitarian law. All such cardinal considerations, in other words, accord perfectly with what India considers as its national or best interest.
It stands to reason that a country’s best interests would determine its foreign policy thinking and the basic parameters of the latter. It comes as a welcome development that India, being a principal ‘Swing State’, has taken into consideration the need for it to be profoundly sensitive to the requirements international humanitarian law.
Thereby, India transmits to the world the crucial importance of the latter abiding by the main tenets of international humanitarian law, besides acting always in deference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
It is obligatory on the part of all major powers to evince deep sensitivity to international humanitarian law and its dictates. In this respect India has done right but the same could not be said of the US and Russia. The latter has shown least interest in the preservation of civilian lives in the Ukraine while the US, although voicing humanitarian concerns in the Gaza theatre, is yet to call unambiguously for a ceasefire in the latter conflagration.
Once again, each of the latter states’ national interest would need to be factored in when seeking reasons for their seeming indifference to the loss of civilian lives and other concerns in the relevant war zones. Russia sees the annexation of Ukraine, at whatever cost, to be integral to its national or best interests at present while the US considers it obligatory, given its national interest, to champion Israel’s security considerations. From the US viewpoint, a ceasefire right now, could undermine Israel’s security concerns and consequently, what the US considers as its best interests.
For the student and analyst of international relations these are thought-provoking matters of the first importance. India’s change of stance referred to above, while focusing on the central importance of a country’s national interest to its foreign policy thinking, demonstrates also that what a state sees as its national interest is not static but dynamic and subject to change, depending on the developments of the day.
The Russian and the US cases testify to the fact that a country’s national interest may not necessarily be consistent with international humanitarian law and its obligations always.
Meanwhile, in what may be seem as a curious development in South Asian inter-state politics, the Maldives has decided to introduce some substantial changes to its security policy. In terms of these changes, the new President of the Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu, is considering it advisable to order the removal of all foreign military personnel from his country. This would mean that a small contingent of Indian security forces personnel that has been hitherto stationed in the Maldives would have to leave it.
Muizzu is regarded as close to China and his moves on the Indian security contingent are seen as a boon to China but the Maldivian President is also on record that he means to pursue a balanced foreign policy, which would translate into the maintenance of amicability with all states. “I will keep friendship with foreign countries. There won’t be any enmity with countries close and far away, Muizzu is reported to have stated.
However, these substantial changes on the security front are a marked departure from the hitherto Malidivian policy of maintaining close security and foreign relations with India. Some past President of the Maldives, for instance, pursued an ‘India First’ policy. Critics cannot be faulted, therefore, for seeing Muizzu’s initiatives as a dilution of the Malidives’ traditional closeness to India.
As to whether these Maldivian initiatives would pay off in the medium and long terms is left to be seen, but considering that it would be in the best interests of India’s closest neighbours to maintain close and mutually-beneficial relations with her first, the advisability of the Maldives’ new foreign policy orientation could very well be questioned.
Nevertheless, the Muizzu administration would be compelled to do a tight rope walk in its ties with India and China. Past experience establishes the advisability of India’s close neighbours prioritizing good relations with India above all else in the foreign relations sphere. Good relations with China are advisable, considering the latter’s obvious strengths, but alienating India in the process could turn out to be hazardous for the small states in particular of South Asia.
Right now, therefore, it is open to question whether the Maldivian foreign and security policies are being crafted with the country’s best interests in mind. After all, such policies need to be anchored in the state’s national interest. However, these are issues that the Maldivian people need to deliberate on in the first instance.