Features

NABBED IN NAMIBIA

Published

2 years ago

2025/02/23

Thilina Walpola

(Excerpted from an anthology of memoirs by LC Arulpragasam)

Political Background

Some background is in order. Germany held the territory known as South West Africa from 1880 to 1914. Apart from massacres of the natives, their rule was accompanied by the establishment of very large German-owned farms in the cultivable parts of the country. After Germany’s loss in World War I (1914-18), it was forced to give up the territory to South Africa by the League of Nations in 1918, to be held in trust as a mandated territory. But South Africa annexed the territory and refused to give it up when the United Nations withdrew its mandate at the end of World War II.

Worse still, South Africa applied its oppressive apartheid policies to South West Africa too. Spurred by resistance movements in neighboring countries, such as Angola and Zimbabwe, armed resistance was started by the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO). In view of South Africa’s defiance of the UN’s termination of its mandate, the UN sponsored moves to nurse this territory and its people, now known as Namibia, towards independence. To this end, it set up a United Nations Council for Namibia in New York to orchestrate political efforts at the international level and a UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka (Zambia) to provide the needed technical and administrative training to Namibians, in order to prepare them for independence.

Meanwhile, given the turning tides of international opinion and the ongoing guerrilla war, the South African Government decided to seek a political solution (short of independence) in its conflict with SWAPO. To this end, it proposed the Turnhalle Agreement in 1977, which offered limited autonomy to Namibia, provided that SWAPO agreed to give up its armed struggle and accept territory-wide elections, which would determine the terms and conditions of the proposed autonomy. My first visit to the UN Institute in Lusaka, Zambia occurred at this time, when SWAPO, the Namibian independence movement, had to decide whether it would participate in the national elections to be held in 1978 in terms of the Turnhalle Agreement.

Agrarian Reform Options

Since Namibia was supposed to be on the verge of independence at this time (around 1977), there was a rush to prepare it for independence in terms of institutions and policies. This applied especially in the field of agrarian reform, since access to land was the primary demand of the SWAPO freedom-fighters. In this context, the Institute for Namibia (located in Lusaka, Zambia) convened a Symposium on Land Reform for Namibia (around 1977) to be attended by the top land reform scholars and authorities in the world. Since no one in FAO knew anything about land tenure in South West Africa, I was sent to fill the breach, although I too knew nothing about Namibia.

For the first two days of the meeting, I kept my mouth shut with the sole purpose of not displaying my ignorance. On the final day, I started questioning the line of reasoning and intended recommendations, thus contradicting most of what had been decided over the past three days. The Symposium had, therefore, to break up with no conclusions reached, except that I should brief the consultant who was to write the paper on ‘Land Reform Options for Namibia’! I was called upon later, to write a road map for agrarian reform for an independent Namibia.

As is well known, there was an enormous disparity in land ownership between the native Namibians, who constituted about 90 per cent of the population but controlled only 10 per cent of the cultivable/pasture land, as against the white population of German or South African origin, who comprised only five per cent of the population but controlled 90 per cent of the land. Briefly, there are three parts of the country, each requiring a different land reform solution. While there was agreement in the approaches for the north and central parts of the country, there was a conflict between my recommendation and that of the conference to the problems of the south, the area of most unequal land ownership. Ultimately, my views on agrarian reform options for Namibia were accepted by SWAPO, who of course preferred the socialist option (I had set out two options) due to their political preferences at that time.

My ‘Surrender’ to SWAPO

That night, at a party hosted by Dr. Hage Geingob, the Director of the UN Institute for Namibia, I joined in the drinking and dancing that was going on. During one of my pauses I happened to join a small group of young Namibians who were discussing the pros and cons of SWAPO’s participation in the proposed elections under the Turnhalle Agreement. Having had a couple of drinks, I opined that SWAPO would be foolish to accept the offered terms, since the entire election machinery was controlled by the South African Government. I even gratuitously predicted that SWAPO would lose the election, despite its wide support in the country.

I did not know much about elections, but among the blind, the one-eyed man was king! I pointed out that, first, the electoral register would be prepared by the South African Government with no input or monitoring from SWAPO, since they had no election machinery, Secondly, there were logistical difficulties. For instance, the ballots of the bushmen in the desert would be ‘obtained’ by officers of the South African Government and transported through the desert for two days by jeep. How would SWAPO ever know what happened to those ballot boxes during their journey? So I stressed again that unless SWAPO was able to closely monitor the preparation of the electoral registers as well as the entire electoral process, it would find itself cheated of victory, signifying also the end of their dream of independence.

After briefing the consultant well past midnight with my head heavy with drinks, I tried to make my way to my room at the end of a long, open walkway, with men standing on both sides, drinking. So I walked warily to my room and for safety, double-locked the door. Since it was past 01 a.m. and I had to leave for the airport by 05 a.m.to catch my flight, I started packing before I fell asleep.

But I was interrupted by sharp knocking on my door. After repeated knocks, I had to open the door, taking my best boxing stance, giving only the side of my body in case of a knife thrust. To my surprise, I found the Director of the Namibian Institute, Dr. Hage Geingob and five others who wanted to enter. The Director then ‘re-introduced’ himself and the others, stating that they were all members of the Central Committee of SWAPO. When they came into power, he himself would be the Foreign Minister (in fact, he became the first Prime Minister of Namibia), Comrade Chitzero here would be the Minister of Education and so on.

They had come to see me because they had heard of my contrary view regarding their participation in the elections under the Turnhalle Agreement. I had earlier ad-libbed after too many drinks; but now I had to speak with greater responsibility, since I was now speaking to the future government of Namibia! But my position was basically the same: if SWAPO could not control or closely monitor the electoral process, it would certainly lose the election – and its hope for independence.

The problem was that SWAPO had been advised by the UN Council for Namibia in New York (their only helper in international affairs) to accept the Turnhalle Agreement and the proposed elections. Further, they (SWAPO’s Central Committee) had already sent official instructions to their delegation in New York to accept the terms of the election and the rest of the Agreement. Quite worried now, they wanted more details of the nuts and bolts of the electoral process. Although most of these young men had high postgraduate qualifications from American and British Universities, they had never been allowed to advance beyond elementary school, nor even allowed access to lower clerical positions in their country. As a result, they had no knowledge, nor experience of election laws or of the procedures for their implementation. So although I had a short election experience in only one district in Sri Lanka, I had to give them a run-down of the critical points of control and possible points of manipulation and cheating at elections. From this I went on to the minimum points of organization, administrative checks and monitoring that would need to be established in order to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process.

They talked animatedly among themselves for some time. They then explained their problem. Their Central Committee had already instructed their delegation in New York to officially communicate to the UN Council that SWAPO had agreed to participate in the elections. The UN Council for Namibia was to meet in four days’ time to ratify this decision. In light of what I had told them, they (SWAPO’s Central Committee) had decided (in my room!) to reverse their position on the elections and on the Turnhalle Agreement. However, they did not know enough about election law and procedures to explain their reasons to their representative in New York. So they wanted me to fly to New York immediately as their special emissary to brief their delegation there, before the scheduled meeting of the UN Council. They said: ‘You are our brother, and you must help us!’

I was taken aback by this turn of events, but was equally afraid of being dragged into a political enterprise into which no international civil servant should venture. Besides, I knew that FAO would fire me if they knew that I had traipsed off to New York on a political expedition! Faced with my refusal, they changed their tack and said that if I would not go to New York, I should at least help them by writing a full brief, outlining all that I had explained to them, so that they could send it that morning by special emissary to New York. Despite my protests, their reply was simple: ‘Your plane will not be allowed to take off until you finish it!’ It was only then that I realized that I was a ‘captive’ of SWAPO. I also realized the political power that they wielded as a rebel movement in Zambia, even though it was not their own country – and that they did not have a country at all!

So I had to put my head under the shower (to keep awake) and start writing! I had already written 17 full pages when their car arrived to take me to the airport; but I had not yet finished. To which they matter-of-factly replied: ‘Don’t worry: we will not allow your plane to take off until you finish!’ True to that night’s decisions, SWAPO rejected the Turnhalle Agreement and refused to take part in the proposed elections, resulting in Namibia losing what seemed to be its best chance of ‘independence’. I naturally began to feel quite guilty that a few extra drinks of mine had rolled into events that had ultimately led to the postponement of Namibian independence by about 10 years!

I had nothing to do with Namibia for those nearly 10 years. By this time, the growing international opposition to South Africa’s apartheid policies, the burgeoning military strength of SWAPO, plus mounting UN pressure was making Namibian independence come closer to reality. Hence, around 1985, FAO received a request for my services from the UN Council for Namibia to write a new paper on ‘Agrarian Reform Options for an Independent Namibia’. So off I went again to Lusaka (Zambia), slinking into the UN Institute for Namibia, feeling quite guilty about my role that had resulted in the postponement of their Independence. But I was greeted by the Director of the Institute (later to be the first Prime Minister of Namibia) who thanked me for having saved them from the trap of a rigged election, through which they could have lost everything. Needless to say, I felt quite relieved and vindicated!

Now they wanted me not only to write their new position paper on agrarian reform, but they also wanted my participation in a symposium on ‘Election Law and Procedures’. I had to plead that I was no expert on elections and had never pretended to be one: But since the Director was insistent, I had to tell him that FAO would give me much trouble if the UN sought me out as an expert in election law, in which I was not qualified at all!

Agricultural Policy for Independent Namibia

A new UN Commissioner for Namibia had been appointed in the person of Mr. Marti Adhisaari to actively steer Namibia towards independence. Meanwhile the UN had started preparing policy papers in all development fields. FAO as the lead agency for agriculture was asked to mount a mission on agricultural policy and I was asked to lead this first agricultural policy mission to Namibia.

This afforded me my first opportunity to actually set foot on Namibian soil. Our needed technical and policy briefings were given by white South African officials, who had obviously not dealt with coloured persons of authority before. I was able through my experience in agricultural policy analysis in many countries, to pull together a fairly impressive agricultural policy paper for Namibia. In fact, my presentation so impressed Mr. Marti Adhisaari (the UN Commissioner for Namibia) that he insisted that I should fly in his personal plane to the following donors’ meeting in Oslo.

Conclusion

My biggest ‘problem’ on this last mission was my personal relationship with Dr. Hage Geingob, who had by this time resigned his post as Director of the UN Institute for Namibia to become the Secretary-General of SWAPO and its new Commissioner of Elections. He had probably intervened to ensure that FAO nominate me to lead this policy mission and would have fully expected me to call on him. To this day, I regret very much that I did not do so. Recently, I have been trying to analyze the reasons why I consciously avoided meeting him. My first ‘reason’ seems to have been a hark-back to my old ‘stiff-upper-lip’ colonial training, where I was taught to avoid all political contacts. I realize in retrospect how stupid this had been, because I owed it to my assignment to obtain all possible inputs – even from active politicians – for my study on agricultural policy. However, I also had to admit that my avoidance of this prize political contact (knowing that he was to become the Prime Minister of Namibia) was that I feared that he would commit me to work in Namibia for the next few years.

I had just retired from FAO, was just beginning to enjoy my life in Rome: I did not want to be consigned to a faraway country in Africa. My family was also scattered between America, Italy and Sri Lanka, and I could not contemplate going halfway around the world to the southern tip of Africa to spend the last years of my life there. Anyway, my action (or lack of it) must have seemed a gratuitous insult to Dr. Hage Geingob, who later became the first Prime Minister of independent Namibia. He has made no further attempt contact me – or I, him. So ended the Namibian chapter of my life.

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Features

Coercive laws recipe for future misrule

Published

24 hours ago

2026/10/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Jehan Perera

The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.

The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.

But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Proposed Laws

The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.

The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.

The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.

Civil Society

The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.

Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.

The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.

Features

Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA

Published

24 hours ago

2026/10/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

By Ramya Kumar

According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.

An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.

The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.

Top-down check-box activities

The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.

There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).

1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….

2: And with pictures and all…

1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”

2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..

1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…

2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!

1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.

2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…

Auditing everything but power

QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.

The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.

A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.

This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.

External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.

Rethinking university QA

Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.

QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.

(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)

. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

Features

Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!

Published

24 hours ago

2026/10/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

Down Memory Lane: Ready to sing again

Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.

Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.

The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.

Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.

The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor

Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!

This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.

Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.

Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!

For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.