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MUSLIM – SINHALA RIOTS IN BERUWELA IN 1991

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DEALING WITH RACIST MOBS

EXCERPTED FROM SENIOR DIG (RETD) MERRIL GUNARATNE’S “COP IN THE CROSSFIRE”

I was Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) of the Greater Colombo Range in 1991 and overlooked the Kalutara Police Division. The Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) of the Division was Jagath Jayawardena who later retired as a DIG. Aluthgama, Paiyagala and Beruwela were also police stations within the Kalutara Division. These areas were inhabited by large numbers of Muslims.

In the latter half of 1991, a seemingly innocuous incident involving a Sinhalese and a Muslim in Beruwela gave rise to tension between the two communities. A Sinhalese was assaulted by a Muslim. There had not been any previous enmity between them. In a matter of hours, clashes between Sinhalese and Muslims began to erupt, first in Beruwela, and then in the adjoining towns, Aluthgama and Paiyagala.

Senior Superintendent of Police Kalutara called for additional manpower to handle the situation. They were sent by me from the adjoining Panadura Police Division as well as the Kelaniya Division which too came within my purview. The situation according to SSP Jayawardena as the weekend commenced had improved to a point where the regional police felt confident that normalcy could be restored within a matter of days. President Premadasa telephoned me over the weekend to clarify the situation and, based on the assessment of SSP Kalutara, I assured him that normalcy was within sight.

On Monday following the weekend when I was at work in police headquarters, Prime Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence D.B Wijetunge telephoned and said that he had received reports that the situation in Aluthgama – Beruwela was out of control and that he had decided to despatch army troops to restore order. When I telephoned SSP Kalutara for a clarification, he informed me that there had been a sudden renewal of clashes between the two communities following an abatement of violence over the weekend. I immediately left for Kalutara, realizing that prompt and effective intervention was necessary.

I reached the bungalow of SSP Kalutara by about 2 .00 pm. and proceeded from there to the Beruwela police station with the SSP. Having arrived at the police station, I called for books and documents which had records and summaries of incidents that had taken place over about five days to study them to form my impressions. Two murders, a number of cases of arson, serious acts of violence not amounting to murder, and several cases of mischief had been reported at the Beruwela police station alone.

Similar cases had also been reported at the Paiyagala and Aluthgama police stations as well. A total of over 280 complaints had been registered at the Beruwela police station alone. A matter of significance was that in respect of about 225 of these complaints, the victims had been Muslims. I was therefore able to conclude that Sinhala elements had gone on the rampage, and that the police on duty were turning a blind eye to the excesses as happened in the 1983 communal disturbances.

I did not however disclose my impressions to SSP Kalutara. We thereafter toured Maradana, a village in Beruwela, where several incidents had taken place. The first impression I had, when I saw police on duty along the way was that their numbers were more than adequate, that they were well armed, but that most of them were in clusters and groups, and appeared sluggish and indifferent. My assessment was confirmed when we turned onto the road leading to Maradana from Colombo – Matara highway, and observed a large number of armed policemen indifferently watching a car being set on fire near a Buddhist temple. On seeing our jeep, the miscreants took to their heels, passively watched by the police.

The police group in question was under the control of an ASP who appeared disinclined to act firmly. I realized that the first requirement was to wake the police from their slumber and to emphasize the importance of invoking the Emergency Regulations firmly to deal with the lawless and the violent. Fortified with such thought, I returned to the Beruwela police station and immediately converted it into an improvised Command Centre, with SSP Jagath Jayawardena and Superintendent of Police (SP) Edward as my assistants.

We decided to stay over at Beruwela police station till order was restored. I ordered the immediate transfer of selected senior officers from Kelaniya, Gampaha and Negombo Police Divisions to Beruwela on a temporary basis to offer strong leadership to the partisan police ranks. Sectors identified as bad areas where incidents continued to occur were placed under these officers. To emphasize the seriousness and urgency of the situation and the need for concerted steps, I scheduled a conference of senior officers for 5.00 am. the following morning.

At about 11.30 pm the same night, I received a call from President Premadasa seeking a clarification of the latest situation as well as how things had taken a turn for the worse. I did not want to let down the local police, but merely assured him that peace would be restored in a short space of time.

On the following morning, I was conferring with my senior officers about the strategy I had mapped out to quell unrest when I received a phone call to say that Prime Minister D.B. Wijetunge, General S.C. Ranatunge, Secretary of Defence, General Wanasinghe, the Army Commander, and Ernest Perera, IGP, would be arriving by helicopter at the Muslim Maha Vidyalaya grounds in Beruwela at 7.00 am.

We rushed to the school grounds where a large number of Muslims had assembled. As the Prime Minister alighted from the helicopter, they in unison called for the mobilization of the army in place of the police. All of us thereafter adjourned to a classroom in the school where the Prime Minister and Secretary of Defence addressed the Muslim people who had gathered. Secretary of Defence addressing the people said that Army, Navy and Air – Force troops would arrive shortly to assist the police, and that they will work under the command of the DIG.

On being called upon to address the assembly by General Ranatunge, I assured them that I will act firmly and restore normalcy within a very short span of time. After the meeting was adjourned, I assured the Prime Minister and Secretary of Defence that peace and normalcy will be restored within 24 hours.

Upon their departure, I returned to Beruwela police station and recommenced the conference I had earlier adjourned. Army, Navy and Air Force officers who had brought troops with them too attended the conference. I assigned them sectors as well. The sectors had by then to be extended since violence had spread to Dharga Town. I realized that unless firm measures were invoked, riots would spread to Galle. Addressing the officers,

I made them understand that the reason for the escalation of violence was because a certain degree of partiality had coloured the actions of the police on duty. I said that regardless of race and creed men on duty should act firmly, employing the powers vested in them by the Emergency Regulations. I requested the officers to go back to their sectors and inform their subordinates that once the uniform was worn, police knew only two types of communities, those who obeyed the law and those who flouted it; and that if any subordinate had mistaken racial bias for patriotism, he should shed his uniform and join the miscreants.

I emphasized the need for arrests, detections and confrontations where miscreants were identified committing serious acts of violence and arson. Sector officers were called upon to announce the enforcement of a local curfew from 12.00 pm, to be lifted only for 5 hours from 7.00 am. the following day in their sectors. A conference to review the progress of the security plan was scheduled for 6.00 pm. the same day. I also requested SSP Kalutara to inform the recognized elders of the Sinhala and Muslim communities to meet me in the course of the day.

The conference concluded with the sector officers informed that if they acted firmly and decisively, peace and normalcy could be restored before the lapse of 24 hours: also that I would stand by them in their endeavours. The elders of the two communities met me thereafter in the company of Minister Imtiaz Bakeer Markar, the political organiser of the United National Party for Beruwela. I explained to them my plan of action, and solicited their assistance to restrain the youth from resorting to violence.

Having inspired and goaded the sector officers to act positively, I did a few rounds in the area and observed that those posted on duty were alert and vigilant. On returning to my Command Centre, I gathered that a group of Sinhalese had stormed a Muslim village in Paiyagala, set fire to all the houses and inflicted injury on Muslims. The police had confronted them when they were engaged in the commission of serious acts of violence, and being unable to restrain them, had opened fire. Two of the injured had later succumbed to injury.

Reports were also received in the Command Centre that the army in their sector in Dharga Town had shot a Muslim dead in a confrontation when engaged in acts of violence. By nightfall, and as confirmed by the sector officers at the evening briefing, the situation had virtually returned to normal. On the following morning, I had the elders summoned for tea and refreshments in the church premises adjoining the Beruwela police station. Minister Imtiaz Bakeer Marker too was present.

I addressed them and explained that firm action as required by the law had been necessary because misguided youth of both communities were led by their heart, not the head, and that once they had realized that the police and the services would act firmly, sanity had returned to them. I thereafter requested the two communities to live in amity. Speakers from both communities and the Minister thanked the police and the security forces for restoring normalcy.

Thus communal unrest spread over five days and which had threatened to spread to Galle in the south and even the North Western Province, was brought under control in less than 24 hours.

POSTSCRIPT

I had opportunity to handle a few more similar experiences in my career. With the infamous racial riots in 1983, I was, as an SP, belatedly posted from police headquarters to Colombo about a week or two from the onset of riots. I was then lingering sans recognition in police headquarters, after my battles with politicos in Kelaniya and Kurunegala . The Colombo South area was assigned to me, with the rest of Colombo placed under Janaka Perera who was then a Colonel. Adopting a firm line, we restored sanity fairly quickly, despite our exertions being unfortunately required far too late.

My experience convinced me that police ranks were coloured by prejudice to a considerable extent, as was the case in Beruwela too in 1991. I think if we look at the sad saga of communal violence on our soil from about 1958, what is patently clear is that one of the reasons for delays in curbing violence was the strange inertia of the security forces, at least in the early stages. It is also my firm belief based on experience, that service and police ranks respond well to positive leadership.

Handling mobs has its own challenges. There has to be a strategy against them. I was convinced that when people gather to demonstrate and cause havoc with a communal mindset, speed and firmness are essentials to bring them to heel. The psychology of mobs has unusual characteristics. Crowds swell rapidly to transform into reckless numbers when mobs sense weakness in the security forces. The ‘heart’ then starts ruling the ‘head’. With the multiplication of numbers due to perceived weaknesses of the police, mobs become yet more violent, irrational, and reckless. When handling mobs, all efforts have therefore to concentrate on getting heads’ to think and react, rather than allow the ‘heart’ to trigger excessive emotions and violence. Speed and firmness have to characterise the response of the police.

A swift response to the emergence of racist mobs also calls for decisive political direction, good intelligence, and firm police responses. Dilatory tactics, indecision and too much of tolerance maybe fateful. All previous racial riots up to the aftermath of the Easter Sunday carnage were characterized by ineptitude on the part of the police and the security forces to act decisively in the early stages. It has to be acknowledged that governments of the time too have to be blamed for failing to offer bold and unambiguous directions. I must however offer a bouquet to my ‘bete noire’, former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, for being unique in making it clear to the country and the security forces in her time that she will not tolerate racist violence. I am certain that if there were such efforts, she would have nipped them in the bud without any hesitation.

There are times when negotiations work, but mostly with mobs not tainted with racism. Around 1994-5, the Voice of America (VOA) broadcasting station in Iranawila , was under perpetual siege from irate mobs, encouraged by radical Christian priests who feared that western influences would infiltrate the tranquil life of the villagers. The transports of Americans to and from the VOA were regularly stoned and attacked, causing fairly serious injuries.

DIG Gamini Randeni’s hasty response was to order the opening of fire, resulting in a miscreant being killed. He unfortunately chose to handle tension by pouring fuel to the flamess. I was then requested by the government to proceed and find a way of restoring normalcy. On my way to Chilaw, after a meeting with the American Ambassador, I pondered and made up my mind that amidst the intense hostility to the police, the only option available was negotiation and persuasion, so as to win the confidence of the ring leaders behind mobs.

I was successful in gaining the confidence of the Catholic Bishop of Chilaw, and through him, the young priests who supported the villagers. I also addressed the ringleaders of violence separately, and once confident that they were veering to my way of thinking, assembled the young priests and the community leaders together for a series of meetings and drove sense into them. Normalcy was thus restored, with the clergy and the village leaders agreeing to keep the peace. Strong arm tactics were not contemplated, but other methods were planned and held in readiness.

The lesson that emerges from these experiences is that racist mobs have to be handled differently to mobs which espouse other causes. The riots of racist mobs target life, limb and property. Police then have to confront them firmly and swiftly. But mobs which espouse popular grievances outside the pale of racism, and prefer agitations, have to be addressed differently. The adoption of negotiations would then be paramount, for in such instances, it is more important to address the grievances than use force.

Even during the tenure of office of President Premadasa, Negombo was volatile since villagers in the coastal town agitated on the streets against tourism and tourists, accusing foreigners of promoting child prostitution. I was despatched to win over the radical Catholic priests backing the agitation, and through dialogue, won them over and established a task force against vice, with the clergy and community leaders as components. Here too, the use of force would have been fatal.



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The NPP Government is more than a JVP offspring:

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Rohana Wijeweera

It is also different from all past governments as it faces new and different challenges

No one knows whether the already broken ceasefire between the US and Iran, with Israel as a reluctant adjunct, will last the full 10 days, or what will come thereafter. The world’s economic woes are not over and the markets are yo-yoing in response to Trump’s twitches and Iran’s gate keeping at the Strait of Hormuz. The gloomy expert foretelling is that full economic normalcy will not return until the year is over even if the war were to end with the ceasefire. That means continuing challenges for Sri Lanka and more of the tough learning in the art of governing for the NPP.

The NPP government has been doing what most governments in Asia have been doing to cope with the current global crisis, which is also an Asian crisis insofar as oil supplies and other supply chains are concerned. What the government can and must do additionally is to be totally candid with the people and keep them informed of everything that it is doing – from monitoring import prices to the timely arranging of supplies, all the details of tender, the tracking of arrivals, and keeping the distribution flow through the market without bottlenecks. That way the government can eliminate upstream tender rackets and downstream hoarding swindles. People do not expect miracles from their government, only honest, sincere and serious effort in difficult circumstances. Backed up by clear communication and constant public engagement.

But nothing is going to stop the flow of criticisms against the NPP government. That is a fact of Sri Lankan politics. Even though the opposition forces are weak and have little traction and even less credibility, there has not been any drought in the criticisms levelled against the still fledgling government. These criticisms can be categorized as ideological, institutional and oppositional criticisms, with each category having its own constituency and/or commentators. The three categories invariably overlap and there are instances of criticisms that excite only the pundits but have no political resonance.

April 5 anniversary nostalgia

There is also a new line of criticism that might be inspired by the April 5 anniversary nostalgia for the 1971 JVP insurrection. This new line traces the NPP government to the distant roots of the JVP – its April 1965 founding “in a working-class home in Akmeemana, Galle” by a 22-year old Rohana Wijeweera and seven others; the short lived 1971 insurrection that was easily defeated; and the much longer and more devastating second (1987 to 1989) insurrection that led to the elimination of the JVP’s frontline leaders including Wijeweera, and brought about a change in the JVP’s political direction with commitment to parliamentary democracy. So far, so good, as history goes.

But where the nostalgic narrative starts to bend is in attempting a straight line connection from the 1965 Akmeemana origins of the JVP to the national electoral victories of the NPP in 2024. And the bend gets broken in trying to bridge the gap between the “founding anti-imperialist economics” of the JVP and the practical imperatives of the NPP government in “governing a debt-laden small open economy.” Yet this line of criticism differs from the other lines of criticism that I have alluded to, but more so for its moral purpose than for its analytical clarity. The search for clarity could begin with question – why is the NPP government more than a JVP offspring? The answer is not so simple, but it is also not too complicated.

For starters, the JVP was a political response to the national and global conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, piggybacking socialism on the bandwagon of ethno-nationalism in a bi-polar world that was ideologically split between status quo capitalism and the alternative of socialism. The NPP government, on the other hand, is not only a response to, but is also a product of the conditions of the 2010s and 2020s. The twain cannot be more different. Nothing is the same between then and now, locally and globally.

A pragmatic way to look at the differences between the origins of the JVP and the circumstances of the NPP government is to look at the very range of criticisms that are levelled against the NPP government. What I categorize as ideological criticisms include criticisms of the government’s pro-IMF and allegedly neo-liberal economic policies, as well as the government’s foreign policy stances – on Israel, on the current US-Israel war against Iran, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, and the apparent closeness to the Modi government in India. These criticisms emanate from the non-JVP left and Sinhala Buddhist nationalists.

Strands of nationalism

To digress briefly, there are several strands in the overall bundle of Sri Lankan nationalism. There is the liberal inclusive strand, the left-progressive strand, the exclusive Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist (SBN) strand, and the defensive strands of minority nationalisms. Given Sri Lanka’s historical political formations and alliances, much overlapping goes on between the different strands. The overlapping gets selective on an issue by issue basis, which in itself is not unwelcome insofar as it promotes plurality in place of exclusivity.

Historically as well, and certainly after 1956, the SBN strand has been the dominant strand of nationalism in Sri Lanka and has had the most influential say in every government until now. Past versions of the JVP frequently straddled the dominant SBN space. Currently, however, the dominant SBN strand is in one of its more dormant phases and the NPP government could be a reason for the current dormancy. This is an obvious difference between the old JVP and the new NPP.

A second set of criticisms, or institutional criticisms, emanate from political liberals and human rights activists and these are about the NPP government’s actions or non-actions in regard to constitutional changes, the future of the elected executive presidency, the status of provincial devolution and the timing of provincial council elections, progress on human rights issues, the resolution of unfinished postwar businesses including the amnesia over mass graves. These criticisms and the issues they represent are also in varying ways the primary concerns of the island’s Tamils, Muslims and the Malaiyaka (planntationn) Tamils. As with the overlapping between the left and the non-minority nationalists, there is also overlapping between the liberal activists and minority representatives.

A third category includes what might be called oppositional criticisms and they counterpose the JVP’s past against the NPP’s present, call into question the JVP’s commitment to multi-party democracy and raise alarms about a creeping constitutional dictatorship. This category also includes criticisms of the NPP government’s lack of governmental experience and competence; alleged instances of abuse of power, mismanagement and even corruption; alleged harassment of past politicians; and the failure to find the alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter bombings. At a policy and implementational level, there have been criticisms of the government’s educational reforms and electricity reforms, the responses to cyclone Ditwah, and the current global oil and economic crises. The purveyors of oppositional criticisms are drawn from the general political class which includes political parties, current and past parliamentarians, as well as media pundits.

Criticisms as expectations

What is common to all three categories of criticisms is that they collectively represent what were understood to be promises by the NPP before the elections, and have become expectations of the NPP government after the elections. It is the range and nature of these criticisms and the corresponding expectations that make the NPP government a lot more than a mere JVP offspring, and significantly differentiate it from every previous government.

The deliverables that are expected of the NPP government were never a part of the vocabulary of the original JVP platform and programs. The very mode of parliamentary politics was ideologically anathema to the JVP of Akmeemana. And there was no mention of or concern for minority rights, or constitutional reforms. On foreign policy, it was all India phobia without Anglo mania – a halfway variation of Sri Lanka’s mainstream foreign policy of Anglo mania and India phobia. For a party of the rural proletariat, the JVP was virulently opposed to the plantation proletariat. The JVP’s version of anti-imperialist economics would hardly have excited the Sri Lankan electorate at any time, and certainly not at the present time.

At the same time, the NPP government is also the only government that has genealogical antecedents to a political movement or organization like the JVP. That in itself makes the NPP government unique among Sri Lanka’s other governments. The formation of the NPP is the culmination of the evolution of the JVP that began after the second insurrection with the shedding of political violence, acceptance of political plurality and commitment to electoral democracy.

But the evolution was not entirely a process of internal transformation. It was also a response to a rapidly and radically changing circumstances both within Sri Lanka and beyond. This evolution has not been a rejection of the founding socialist purposes of the JVP in 1968, but their adaptation in the endless political search, under constantly changing conditions, for a non-violent, socialist and democratic framework that would facilitate the full development of the human potential of all Sri Lankans.

The burden of expectations is unmistakable, but what is also remarkable is their comprehensiveness and the NPP’s formal commitment to all of them at the same time. No previous government shouldered such an extensive burden or showed such a willing commitment to each and every one of the expectations. In the brewing global economic crisis, the criticisms, expectations and the priorities of the government will invariably be focussed on keeping the economy alive and alleviating the day-to-day difficulties of millions of Sri Lankan families. While what the NPP government can and must do may not differ much from what other Asian governments – from Pakistan to Vietnam – are doing, it could and should do better than what any and all past Sri Lankan governments did when facing economic challenges.

by Rajan Philips

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A Fragile Ceasefire: Pakistan’s Glory and Israel’s Sabotage

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Smokes over Beirut: Israel’s Ceasefire Attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon

After threatening to annihilate one of the planet’s oldest civilizations, TACO* Trump chickened out again by grasping the ceasefire lifeline that Pakistan had assiduously prepared. Trump needed the ceasefire badly to stem the mounting opposition to the war in America. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted the war to continue because he needed it badly for his political survival. So, he contrived a fiction and convinced Trump that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire. Trump as usual may not have noticed that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff had clearly indicated Lebanon’s inclusion in his announcement of the ceasefire at 7:50 PM, Tuesday, on X. Ten minutes before Donald Trump’s fake deadline.

True to form on Wednesday, Israel unleashed the heaviest assault by far on Lebanon, reportedly killing over 300 people, the highest single-day death toll in the current war. Iran responded by re-closing the Strait of Hormuz and questioning the need for talks in Islamabad over the weekend. There were other incidents as well, with an oil refinery attacked in Iran, and Iranian drones and missiles slamming oil and gas infrastructure in UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

The US tried to insist that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire, with the argumentative US Vice President JD Vance, who was in Budapest, Hungary, campaigning for Viktor Orban, calling the whole thing a matter of “bad faith negotiation” as well as “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran, and warning Iran that “it would be dumb to jeopardise its ceasefire with Washington over Israel’s attacks in Lebanon.”

But as the attack in Lebanon drew international condemnation – from Pope Leo to UN Secretary General António Guterres, and several world leaders, and amidst fears of Lebanon becoming another Gaza with 1,500 people including 130 children killed and more than a million people displaced, Washington got Israel to stop its “lawn mowing” in southern Lebanon.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to “open direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible,”. Lebanese President Joeseph Aoun has also called for “a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them.” Israel’s involvement in Lebanon remains a wild card that threatens the ceasefire and could scuttle the talks between the US and Iran scheduled for Saturday in Islamabad.

Losers and Winners

After the ceasefire, both the Trump Administration and Iran have claimed total victories while the Israeli government wants the war to continue. The truth is that after more than a month into nonstop bombing of Iran, America and Israel have won nothing. Only Iran has won something it did not have when Trump and Netanyahu started their war. Iran now has not only a say over but control of the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire acknowledges this. Both Trump and Netanyahu are under fire in their respective countries and have no allies in the world except one another.

The real diplomatic winner is Pakistan. Salman Rushdie’s palimpsest-country has emerged as a key player in global politics and an influential mediator in a volatile region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Field Marshal Asim Munir have both been praised by President Trump and credited for achieving the current ceasefire. The Iranian regime has also been effusive in its praise of Pakistan’s efforts.

It is Pakistan that persisted with the effort after initial attempts at backdoor diplomacy by Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye started floundering. Sharing a 900 km border and deep cultural history with Iran, and having a skirmish of its own on the eastern front with Afghanistan, Pakistan has all the reason to contain and potentially resolve the current conflict in Iran. Although a majority Sunni Muslim country, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia Muslim population after Iran, and is the easterly terminus of the Shia Arc that stretches from Lebanon. The country also has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan’s nuclear cover for the Kingdom. An open conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have put Pakistan in a dangerously awkward position.

It is now known and Trump has acknowledged that China had a hand in helping Iran get to the diplomatic table. Pakistan used its connections well to get Chinese diplomatic reinforcement. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart and secured China’s public support for the diplomatic efforts. The visit produced a Five-Point Plan that became a sequel to America’s 15-point proposal and the eventual ten-point offer by Iran.

There is no consensus between parties as to which points are where and who is agreeing to what. The chaos is par for the course the way Donald Trumps conducts global affairs. So, all kudos to Pakistan for quietly persisting with old school toing and froing and producing a semblance of an agreement on a tweet without a parchment.

It is also noteworthy that Israel has been excluded from all the diplomatic efforts so far. And it is remarkable, but should not be surprising, the way Trump has sidelined Isreal from the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been enjoying overwhelming support of Israelis for starting the war of his life against Iran and getting the US to spearhead it. But now the country is getting confused and is exposed to Iranian missiles and drones far more than ever before. The Israeli opposition is finally coming alive realizing what little has Netanyahu’s wars have achieved and at what cost. Israel has alienated a majority of Americans and has no ally anywhere else.

It will be a busy Saturday in Islamabad, where the US and Iranian delegations are set to meet. Iran would seem to have insisted and secured the assurance that the US delegation will be led by Vice President Vance, while including Trump’s personal diplomats – Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. Iran has not announced its team but it is expected to be led, for protocol parity, by Iran’s Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and will likely include its suave Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Vice President Vance’s attendance will be the most senior US engagement with Iran since Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal under President Obama.

The physical arrangements for the talks are still not public although Islamabad has been turned into a security fortress given the stakes and risks involved. The talks are expected to be ‘indirect’, with the two delegations in separate rooms and Pakistani officials shuttling between them. The status of Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will be the major points of contention. After Netanyahu’s overreach on Wednesday, Lebanon is also on the short list

The 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) took months of negotiations and involved multiple parties besides the US and Iran, including China, France, Germany, UK, Russia and the EU. That served the cause of regional and world peace well until Trump tore up the deal to spite Obama. It would be too much to expect anything similar after a weekend encounter in Islamabad. But if the talks could lead to at least a permanent ceasefire and the return to diplomacy that would be a huge achievement.

(*As of 2025–2026, Donald Trump is nicknamed “TACO Trump” by Wall Street traders and investors as an acronym for “”. This term highlights a perceived pattern of him making strong tariff threats that cause market panic, only to later retreat or weaken them, causing a rebound.)

by Rajan Philips

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CIA’s hidden weapon in Iran

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We are passing through the ten-day interregnum called a ceasefire over the War on Iran. The world may breathe briefly, but this pause is not reassurance—it is a deliberate interlude, a vacuum in which every actor positions for the next escalation. Iran is far from secure. Behind the veneer of calm, external powers and local forces are preparing, arming, and coordinating. The United States is unlikely to deploy conventional ground troops; the next moves will be executed through proxies whose behaviour will defy expectation. These insurgents are shaped, guided, and amplified by intelligence and technology, capable of moving silently, striking precisely, and vanishing before retaliation. The ceasefire is not peace—it is the prelude to disruption.

The Kurds, historically instruments of Tehran against Baghdad, are now vectors for the next insurgency inside Iran. This movement is neither organic nor local. It is externally orchestrated, with the CIA as the principal architect. History provides the blueprint: under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurdish uprisings were manipulated, never supported out of sympathy. They were instruments of leverage against Iraq, a way to weaken a rival while projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders. Colonel Isa Pejman, Iranian military intelligence officer who played a role in Kurdish affairs, recalled proposing support for a military insurgency in Iraq, only for the Shah to respond coldly: “[Mustafa] Barzani killed my Army soldiers… please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely transformed.” The Kurds were pawns, but pawns with strategic weight. Pejman later noted: “When the Shah wrote on the back of the letter ‘Accepted’ to General Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement.” The seeds planted then are now being activated under new, technologically empowered auspices.

Iran’s geographic vulnerabilities make this possible. The Shah understood the trap: a vast territory with porous borders, squeezed by Soviet pressure from the north and radical Arab states from the west. “We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad surround us,” he warned Asadollah Alam. From Soviet support for the Mahabad Republic to Barzani’s dream of a unified Kurdistan, Tehran knew an autonomous Kurdish bloc could destabilize both Iraq and Iran. “Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic, the Shah had been considerably worried about the Kurdish threat,” a US assessment concluded.

Today, the Kurds’ significance is operational, not symbolic. The CIA’s recent rescue of a downed F-15 airman using Ghost Murmur, a quantum magnetometry system, demonstrated the reach of technology in intelligence operations. The airman survived two days on Iranian soil before extraction. This was not a simple rescue; it was proof that highly mobile, technologically augmented operations can penetrate Iranian territory with surgical precision. The same logic applies to insurgency preparation: when individuals can be tracked through electromagnetic signatures, AI-enhanced surveillance, and drones, proxy forces can be armed, guided, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. The Kurds are no longer pawns—they are a living network capable of fracturing Iranian cohesion while providing deniability to foreign powers.

Iran’s engagement with Iraqi Kurds was always containment, not empowerment. The Shah’s goal was never Kurdish independence. “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan,” he stated explicitly. Yet their utility as instruments of regional strategy was undeniable. The CIA’s revival of these networks continues a long-standing pattern: insurgent groups integrated into the wider calculus of international power. Israel, Iran, and the Kurds formed a triangular strategic relationship that terrified Baghdad. “For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish triangular alliance was an existential threat,” contemporary reports noted. This is the template for modern manipulation: a networked insurgency, externally supported, capable of destabilizing regimes from within while giving foreign powers plausible deniability.

Iran today faces fragility. Years of sanctions, repression, and targeted strikes have weakened educational and scientific hubs; Sharif University in Tehran, one of the country’s leading scientific centres, was bombed. Leaders, scholars, and innovators have been eliminated. Military readiness is compromised. Generations-long setbacks leave Iran exposed. Against this backdrop, a Kurdish insurgency armed with drones, AI-supported surveillance, and precision munitions could do more than disrupt—it could fracture the state internally. The current ten-day ceasefire is a mirage; the next wave of revolt is already being orchestrated.

CIA involvement is deliberate. Operations are coordinated with allied intelligence agencies, leveraging Kurdish grievances, mobility, and ethnolinguistic networks. The Kurds’ spread across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria provides operational depth—allowing insurgents to strike, vanish, and regroup with impunity. Barzani understood leverage decades ago: “We could be useful to the United States… Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East.” Today, the calculation is inverted: Kurds are no longer instruments against Baghdad; they are potential disruptors inside Tehran itself.

Technology is central. Ghost Murmur’s ability to detect a single heartbeat remotely exemplifies how intelligence can underpin insurgent networks. Drones, satellite communications, AI predictive modeling, and battlefield sensors create an infrastructure that can transform a dispersed Kurdish insurgency into a high-precision operation. Iran can no longer rely on fortifications or loyalty alone; the external environment has been recalibrated by technology.

History provides the roadmap. The Shah’s betrayal of Barzani after the 1975 Algiers Agreement demonstrated that external actors can manipulate both Iranian ambitions and Kurdish loyalties. “The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Yitzhak Rabin told Kissinger. “We could not station our troops there and keep fighting forever,” the Shah explained to Alam. The Kurds are a pivot, not a cause. Networks once acting under Tehran’s influence are now being repurposed against it.

The insurgency exploits societal fissures. Kurdish discontent in Iran, suppressed for decades, provides fertile ground. Historical betrayal fuels modern narratives: “Barzani claimed that ‘Isa Pejman sold us out to the Shah and the Shah sold us out to the US.’” Intelligence agencies weaponize these grievances, pairing them with training, technological augmentation, and covert support.

Geopolitically, the stakes are immense. The Shah’s defensive-offensive doctrine projected Iranian influence outward to neutralize threats. Today, the logic is inverted: the same networks used to contain Iraq are being readied to contain Iran. A technologically augmented Kurdish insurgency, covertly backed, could achieve in months what decades of sanctions, diplomacy, or repression have failed to accomplish.

The operation will be asymmetric, high-tech, and dispersed. UAVs, quantum-enhanced surveillance, encrypted communications, and AI-directed logistics will dominate. Conventional Iranian forces are vulnerable to this type of warfare. As Pejman reflected decades ago, “Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How could we keep such a place?” Today, the challenge is magnified by intelligence superiority on the insurgents’ side.

This is not a temporary flare-up. The CIA and its allies are constructing a generational network of influence. Experience from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon proves these networks endure once operationalised. The Shah recognized this: “Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a lasting legacy for the post-Revolution era.” Today, those instruments are being remade as vectors of foreign influence inside Iran.

The future is stark. Iran faces not simply external threats, but a carefully engineered insurgency exploiting historical grievances, technological superiority, and precise intelligence. The Kurds are central. History, technology, and geopolitical calculation converge to create a transformative threat. Tehran’s miscalculations, betrayals, and suppressed grievances now form the lattice for this insurgency. The Kurds are positioned not just as an ethnic minority, but as a vector of international strategy—Tehran may be powerless to stop it.

Iran’s containment strategies have been weaponized, fused with technology, and inverted against it. The ghosts of Barzani’s Peshmerga, the shadows of Algiers, and the Shah’s strategic vision now converge with Ghost Murmur, drones, and AI. Tehran faces a paradox: the instruments it once controlled are now calibrated to undermine its authority. The next Kurdish revolt will not only fight in the mountains but in the electromagnetic shadows where intelligence operates, consequences are lethal, and visibility is scarce.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa

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