Features
More on Wilpattu, natural systems and exotic flora
Excerpted from the authorized biography of Thilo Hoffmann
by Douglas B. Ranasinghe
During the years that followed 1985, the Park was closed and abandoned. Animals in it were slaughtered, especially buffaloes, wild pig, sambhur and deer. All the visitors’ and staff bungalows were ransacked and largely destroyed by roaming poachers, criminals and timber thieves.
In 2005 the Park was reopened, with a hardworking Park Warden, Wasantha Pushpananda. At his request and the urging of Geepal Fernando, Thilo spent nearly two million rupees on the reconstruction of the Talawila bungalow, in memory of his wife.
Only two years later the Park was again abandoned with the re-emergence of incursions from surrounding areas. Warden Pushpananda was killed. Again wildlife was depleted, and the re-built bungalows ransacked. After the fall of the LTTE, the Park was opened for visitors again in 2010. Once more, Thilo restored the bungalow.But pressure to open the coastal tract for through-traffic to Mannar persists. An easy alternative from Nochchiyagama via Nikawewa and Tantirimalai to Cheddikulam is ignored.
While this was being written, certain authorities have illegally and arbitrarily cut a new road along the coast within Wilpattu, and developed and opened for public use the Army road, damaging the ecology of the National Park on an unprecedented scale. The matter is being contested in court. Several conservation bodies, including the WNPS and Ceylon Bird Club – Thilo’s roles in these are described later – have been battling to uphold the law and save the Park. At their initial meeting and first press conference Thilo, now retired and in Sri Lanka for an annual stay of several months, was an invited speaker.
Natural systems and exotic flora
A `patana’ (sometimes anglicized as ‘patna’) is a grassland of Sri Lanka in the hills or mountains without trees or shrubs but typically intersected by sholas, described below. A `talawa’ is a savanna-type grassland with trees or groups of trees spaced some distance apart; these are mostly fire-resistant species. (Both are traditional Sri Lankan terms).
The afforestation of patanas and talawas with the exotic Pinus caribaea trees was a major point of contention between Thilo, representing the WNPS, and the Forest Department (the ‘FD’).
The FD claims that both patanas and talawas are man made systems whose lands had originally been under forest. Thus they misname the establishment of sterile pinus or eucalyptus plantations as “re-afforestation”. One Conservator of Forests had even proposed the “re-afforestation” of the open plains in the National Parks of the Yala complex, on the same reasoning. Thilo observes:
“When the advocates of pinus claim that under it indigenous species can freely develop, they think of infillings and plantings in degraded wet zone forests, e.g. around Sinharaja. Consider the biological (floral and faunal) composition of ‘dry patanas’ and talawas, and the indisputable fact that in both systems plants and other living organisms have evolved which are confined to these systems as their exclusive habitat.
“One example is the daffodil orchid (Ipsea speciosa) which is endemic to the patanas. It takes a very long time for a species to evolve and establish itself, wherefore the presence of endemics in a system is a strong indication that it is natural and not man-made. The existence of sholas also tends to support this view. It can further be assumed that prehistoric man at the relevant time had neither the means nor the need to clear such large areas permanently.
“By establishing the alien monocultures the FD has practically destroyed climax-type natural systems which only 50 years ago and for at least one hundred thousand years before have characterized the hill country, especially the Uva Plateau and the adjoining foothills.”
Against strong majority opinion, Thilo thus maintains that patanas, typically with sholas (see below), are a natural system, considering other factors, too, such as climate, soil conditions, exposure and topography – not man-made, although during the last three centuries selected patanas were seasonally burnt by the few thinly-spread inhabitants of the area.
Today there are few remnants of typical patanas and none of any sizeable extent. During the last half century patanas have been degraded and destroyed not only by the Forest Department but also through systematic State-sponsored settlement and the subsequent opening for cultivation of even the steepest slopes. The State has failed to recognize and appreciate patanas as a national system of value and to protect at least one typical and sufficiently large extent of these original grasslands. Patanas covered about 160,000 acres or 250 square miles (650 square km) of land, mainly in Uva.
Thilo condemns the establishment of pinus plantations not only because these destroy such natural systems and diversity but also for aesthetic reasons. He explains:
“There are no conifers native to Sri Lanka. Any plant belonging to the family with needles instead of leaves is a ‘double alien’ also because of its utterly out-of-place appearance in our scenery and environment. Pinus plantations alter the landscape massively – dark, nearly black, brooding patches in an otherwise bright and pleasant world.
“These are alien monocultures which exterminate the rich fauna and flora of the patanas and talawas. They might well be characterized as ‘man-propagated invasive foreign flora’, a term which has recently been much talked and written about. [See below.]”
Another important fact was overlooked, and seems to be largely unknown. Thilo points out that healthy, natural Sri Lankan forests do not catch fire even under extreme conditions. In order to clear the land the vegetation consisting of trees and undergrowth has to be felled and at least partly dried before a fire can be started.
Decades ago when he was traveling at night in the dry zone during the annual drought, dozens of chena plots would be ablaze, the fire having being fanned by the strong kachan wind. But when it was over, and only white ash remained, the surrounding forest at the very edge of the clearing was hardly singed, the fire being unable to spread.
On the other hand, pinus plantations, which are supposed to “re-afforest” the patanas, burn out easily and completely due to their resinous nature. All too often this happens. Thilo remembers this unique region as it was in his early years:
“In the late forties and the fifties of the last century the Uva Basin was very thinly populated. Traditional ways of life prevailed in much of the Uva Province; pack bulls were yet a common sight in its remoter parts.
“In the Uva Basin, large tracts of open patana covered most of the undulating area, with villages and paddy lands confined to and hidden in the river valleys. These patanas were then the main habitat of the painted partridge which is now restricted to a small area near Bibile. The endemic daffodil orchid was present in most of the Uva patanas, including those at Chelsea Estate and along the road from Bandarawela to Welimada.
“There were no forests except the so-called sholas, which are narrow strips of forest along the small water courses that have cut their way into the hillsides. These sholas are rich systems with many plant species and animals. Muntjac, mouse deer, pangolin, porcupine, hare and a great variety of birds found suitable habitats in them. Where patana and forest meet the dividing line is sharp, clearly defined and permanent; there is no “creeping” of the forest or shola in to the patana grasslands.”
(‘Shola’ is a word of Indian origin. With regard to the Uva plateau see also Thilo’s description in W.W.A. Phillips’s Handbook of the Mammals of Ceylon, Second edition, 1980.)
Early in the last century Bella Sidney Woolf, sister of Leonard, in her book How to See Ceylon aptly describes the Uva Plateau as “one of the great open spaces of the world that gives one a sense of freedom”. G. M. Henry, the ornithologist, who was active in Ceylon up to the middle of the last century refers to “the great Uva patna basin” in his publications. Today it is as cluttered up as most parts of Sri Lanka. Thilo says:
“At that time sholas were also present in many tea estates and were protected by law as stream reservations. Plantation managements strictly maintained these reservations, not only ensuring a high biodiversity in the hillsides, but also a regular supply of clean water for the villages in the valleys below and for their paddy fields.
“Later, as the political situation in Colombo changed and the population increased, these very useful and progressive reservations were gradually encroached upon and cleared by villagers and eventually disappeared, many being finally ‘regularized’ i.e. officially given to the illegal occupants.
“The result in many cases was scarcity of water in the villages, and often landslides. In the mid 20th century there were practically no landslides in Uva; today they occur regularly. The state then did nothing at all to enforce the law on these stream reservations, which still exists as a ‘dead letter’.
“Soon the Government also decided to settle people in the large extents of patana State land in Uva, and the Forest Department began to establish on the grassy slopes monoculture plantations of eucalyptus and pinus species. First as a trial at Palugama (now Keppetipola), and then on a large scale on every hillside in the area, they planted these exotic trees on the basis that the grasslands had originally been forest. These activities radically changed the character of the Uva Plateau, and today it bears no comparison to what it was in the 1930s to 1950s and historically.”
As an agronomist Thilo had soon noted that the soils of patana lands are shallow, gravelly, excessively drained, and very erodable if cleared of the original vegetation, especially the steep hillsides. The continuing clearing of such land is the opposite of development, and it has caused untold harm to the areas concerned.
Similarly, Thilo and the WNPS were not happy about the establishment of extensive teak and eucalyptus plantations in the dry zone where large extents of indigenous forest were cleared for the purpose.
In the intermediate and wet zone Thilo advocated afforestation with mixed mahogany and jak trees. This had been done during the Second World War when State forest was given out to private enterprise for the growing of papaya. He explains:
“This was for the production of papain, then a valuable export commodity in worldwide short supply during the war. The planting of the other trees together with the commercial crop was a condition. These mixed plantations allow the development of indigenous species amongst the jak and mahogany. They have formed marvellous and majestic forests, and now yield valuable timber. They can be seen where the Kurunegala-Dambulla road passes through two of them, and also in many other locations.
The growing of teak in the right places is undoubtedly justified, but generally suitable indigenous trees should be preferred even for the commercial production of timber. The Forest Department seems to have a predilection for exotics, as in the Knuckles, which often are as easy to grow as weeds, like pinus, and thus preferred. Thilo observes:
“On the other hand, repeated efforts are being made to eradicate so-called invasive exotic species. Most such campaigns are not only futile but extremely costly, as in the case of the Lantana (gandapana or katu hinguru) plant. This was introduced to Ceylon nearly 200 years ago as an ornamental plant and is a weed only in neglected and waste lands, e.g. chenas. Lantana takes over where man has destroyed the natural vegetation, and under its protective cover and shade native trees can re-emerge over long periods.
“The most harmful invasive plants in Sri Lanka are aquatic species such as the water hyacinth and salvinia. Others become harmful only where the natural system and order have been disturbed. Some of the plants listed as invasive are indeed a threat to the existing ecosystems, such as the untidy Eurium odoratum (podisingho maram) and Prosopispato is julfliora, which is spreading like wildfire in the Bundala area and elsewhere.
“Others are long established and have found niches without causing harm, such as Opuntia stricta, Clusia rosea or even the pretty gorse which has existed in the Nuwara Eliya area for one-and a-quarter centuries. It found its way to the Horton Plains only in the wake of massive visitation. With minimal attention it could have been kept in check, which is also the case with black wattle (Acacia mollissima) that has spread in from neighbouring tea fields.”
Cloud forests
Cloud forest is tropical mountain forest shrouded in cloud for much of the year, with short trees, rich in epiphytes. In the last quarter of the last century Thilo Hoffmann and a few other observers noted and commented on a strange and disturbing phenomenon in the hill country. The cloud forests of Sri Lanka, it appeared, were dying.
It was Hoffmann who did most to draw attention to the matter, and to analyze it carefully. This he did mostly in reports and papers appearing in Loris’ and the Ceylon Bird Club Notes’. Diligent observations across half a century of the Horton Plains placed him in a unique position to discern the changes.
An article by him submitted in 2005 to Loris is reproduced as Appendix II. There, as before, he attributes the damage to air pollution, and also proposes a remedy in the form of a plan to control it. In the text, as published by Loris, certain critical remarks are omitted and there are some distortions, hence the original script is given here.
In November 2006 Hoffmann observed possible signs of recovery of the cloud forest, apparently the first time this was recorded. He confirmed the recovery during subsequent visits and reported on it in more detail in 2009′.
Shortly before the publication of the present book, according to a newspaper report, a research team of the University of Sabaragamuwa had also come to the conclusion that the decline of cloud forests was due to air pollution.
Features
Oil prices rise like rockets, fall like feathers (if you’re lucky)
Crude oil is the lifeblood of the global industrial economy, yet the journey from a subterranean reservoir to a litre of petrol at the forecourt involves a cascade of physical transformations, commercial transactions, and fiscal interventions that profoundly shape who bears the cost, and how much. A sudden shift in the world market price of crude, whether triggered by OPEC+ supply discipline, geopolitical disruption, or a demand shock, does not translate uniformly into consumer prices across the globe. The consequences are systematically different, depending on a country’s tax policy, exchange rate, efficiencies in refining processes, distribution processes and dependence on energy imports.
The Refining Process: From Crude to Finished Products
Crude oil is a naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons and its chemical composition varies by field: Heavy sour crudes from Venezuela, or Saudi Arabia, require additional processing, raising refining costs by USD 2–5 per barrel. One standard barrel contains approximately 159 litres.
Crude oil is preheated to approximately 370–400°C and the operating principle exploits differences in boiling points. The resulting fractions, collected from top to bottom, include: light petroleum gases (LPG) boiling below 40°C; naphtha and gasoline fractions in the 40–205°C range; kerosene and jet fuel between 175°C and 275°C; diesel and gas oil from 250°C to 350°C; and atmospheric residue above 350°C which is then processed in a vacuum distillation unit to recover further distillates, including lubricating oil base stocks.
Primary distillation alone is insufficient to meet market demand. Gasoline demand far exceeds the natural yield of the distillation cut. A modern complex refinery achieves the following approximate product yields from a light sweet crude: petrol/gasoline ~45%; diesel/gasoil ~25%; kerosene/jet fuel ~10%; LPG ~5%; heavy fuel oil ~10%; and other by-products ~5%. These ratios shift with crude quality and refinery configuration, and response differently to crude price changes.
The Crude Truth: How Oil Prices Punish the Poor Twice
An accounting perspective reveals a waterfall of costs, each layer added by a distinct economic actor and subject to a distinct set of market forces and regulatory interventions. A companion of the approximate cost structure for a litre of petrol at the retail level, assuming a crude oil price of USD 70 per barrel (approximately USD 0.44 per litre of crude equivalent), between advanced and emerging economies, can be explained in four layers:
Layer 1 — Crude Oil Cost (~51% of Retail Price)
The foundation of every fuel product is the crude oil acquisition cost. At USD 70/barrel, the raw material cost embedded in one litre of refined petrol is approximately USD 0.44. This figure includes wellhead lifting costs, field operating expenses, royalties, and sovereign resource taxes paid to the producing country, as well as freight and insurance for ocean tanker shipment.
For emerging economies, without domestic refining capacity, or with currencies that are not freely convertible, this layer is doubly exposed: a crude price increase is compounded by any simultaneous depreciation of the local currency.
Layer 2 — Refining Margin (~20% of Retail Price)
The gross refining margin, measured by the industry’s standard 3-2-1 crack spread;
Crack Spread (gross refining margin) = (2×Gasoline Price) + (1×Diesel Price) − (3×Crude Price)
Critically, this gross figure must not be confused with profit. A refinery typically uses 6–8% of its own crude input as process fuel, and significant variable operating costs. This gross refining margin, the difference between the value of products produced and the cost of crude, varies considerably with market conditions.
In advanced economies with large, integrated refinery systems, these margins are moderated by competition and long-term supply contracts. In emerging economies, dependent on a single import refinery or on product imports rather than crude, refining costs are effectively set by the international product market, leaving little domestic control over this cost layer.
Layer 3 — Distribution and Marketing (~11% of Retail Price)
Refined products must travel from the refinery gate to the consumer through a distribution network involving primary pipelines or product tankers, regional storage terminals, secondary truck distribution, and retail fuel stations. In advanced economies, this infrastructure is mature, privately operated, and highly efficient, contributing a relatively stable USD 0.05–0.10 per litre to the retail price. In many emerging economies, the distribution infrastructure is fragmented, underdeveloped, or state-controlled, introducing additional costs, quality inconsistencies, and opportunities for rent-seeking. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the state-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation has historically cross-subsidised distribution costs, masking the true economic cost until subsidy withdrawal forced rapid price adjustments in 2022.
Rent-Seeking is extracting value without creating value; essentially corruption and inefficiency
Licensing corruption:Limited fuel station licenses create artificial scarcity; Licenses sold/traded at premiums; Political connections needed to obtain licenses
Quality adulteration: Consumers pay for “petrol” but get lower-quality mix
Quota manipulation:Subsidised kerosene (meant for poor households) diverted to diesel mixing; Creates black markets during shortages
Phantom costs:
Layer 4 — Taxation (18–60% of Retail Price)
Taxation is the most variable, politically sensitive, and analytically important layer in the cost structure. In advanced economies a high tax bases serve a dual purpose: generating substantial fiscal revenue and acting as an automatic price stabiliser. When crude rises, the absolute tax component remains constant, so the percentage of the price attributable to crude increases less than proportionately at the retail level.
In contrast, emerging economies historically imposed low fuel taxes or active subsidies, particularly for diesel, LPG, and kerosene used by low-income households. Sri Lanka’s fuel tax component, prior to the 2022 crisis, was, they claim, effectively negative in real terms due to administered pricing below cost.
The Impact of a Crude Price Increase: Advanced vs. Emerging Economies
For example, if crude oil rises from USD 70 to USD 85 per barrel, an increase of approximately 21.4%. The mechanisms by which this shock is transmitted to consumers, and the capacity of economies to absorb or redistribute it, diverge dramatically along the advanced/emerging economy divide (Table 1).

Absorb shocks through tax relief
Advanced economies possess well-established fiscal frameworks that enable them to absorb temporary commodity shocks through tax relief, targeted transfers, or direct subsidies without compromising fiscal sustainability. Research by the Center for Global Development (2026) estimates the median fiscal cost of shielding consumers from the crude price increase of USD 15 scenario at approximately manageable cost of 0.4% of GDP for advanced economies.
Emerging economies face median fiscal costs of approximately 0.9% of GDP — effectively double. For Sri Lanka, entering the 2022 energy crisis with near-zero foreign reserves, even a temporary subsidy was fiscally impossible, forcing an immediate and politically destabilising pass-through of the full price increase to consumers. The lesson is stark: the ability to smooth out a commodity price shock across time is itself a function of prior fiscal strength, making the poor more vulnerable precisely because their governments are already under strain.
Inflation Pass-Through and Monetary Policy Credibility
The second transmission mechanism operates through the consumer price index and central bank behaviour. In advanced economies, fuel typically represents 3–5% of the CPI basket, and central banks enjoy high credibility in anchoring inflation expectations.
In emerging economies, fuel and food together often constitute 40–60% of CPI baskets, and central banks have historically struggled to maintain credible inflation targets. A 21% crude price increase translates into a far larger initial CPI shock. Worse, the loss of inflation credibility means that workers and businesses adjust wages and prices preemptively, generating persistent second-round inflation (> Double). To defend its inflation target, the emerging economy central bank must raise interest rates aggressively, simultaneously raising the cost of borrowing for businesses and governments, a painful policy dilemma in an economy already under stress.
Structural Current Account Vulnerability
The third and perhaps most structurally significant difference lies in the current account and foreign exchange dynamics. The advanced economies hold large reserve currencies and deep financial markets that allow them to finance import cost increases without immediate exchange rate pressure.
Sri Lanka, by contrast, allocated approximately 23% of its total import bill to petroleum products. A USD 15/barrel price increase instantly widens the current account deficit of these economies, depleting foreign exchange reserves. As reserves fall, currency markets anticipate further depreciation, precipitating speculative selling of the domestic currency. The resulting exchange rate depreciation, potentially 5–15% in a shock scenario, multiplies the cost of crude imports in local currency terms. A 21% USD price increase thus becomes a 28–39% local currency price increase at the refinery gate, before any refining, distribution, or tax component is added. This vicious cycle; crude price rise → reserve depletion → currency depreciation → amplified import cost → further reserve depletion, is a hallmark of emerging economy energy crises, and Sri Lanka’s 2022 experience illustrated it in extreme form.
Double bind when crude rises and subsidised
Countries that have historically subsidised fuel face a double bind when crude rises: the subsidy bill expands sharply (as the gap between subsidised price and market cost widens), while fiscal space contracts. The International Monetary Fund has consistently recommended subsidy reform, allowing fuel prices to reflect market cost while protecting the poor through direct cash transfers, as the fiscally sustainable path. Sri Lanka’s forced price liberalisation in 2022 (under IMF programme conditions) illustrate both the political difficulty and the macroeconomic necessity of this adjustment.
The Asymmetry of Oil Price Responses: Advanced vs. Emerging Economies
Advanced economies enjoy bidirectional flexibility in responding to oil price volatility; prices rise and fall with crude markets, leaving fiscal positions largely neutral. Emerging economies, by contrast, face a structural trap: when crude rises, subsidy bills explode, draining public finances; when crude falls, governments retain windfall savings to offset accumulated deficits rather than passing relief to consumers. Sri Lanka’s cycle from collapse to liberalisation to renewed subsidies illustrates this vividly. Underlying this is a political economy ratchet, price hikes are unavoidable, but reductions are politically captured, making permanent reform structurally elusive.
(The writer, a senior Chartered
Accountant and professional banker,
is a professor at SLIIT, Malabe. Views expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Eshan Malinga keeps getting them in the second half
Life keeps throwing hurdles in his way, but Eshan Malinga keeps vaulting over them. Take his February from hell. For several months, Malinga had been building up to his first ever World Cup, a dream for pretty much anyone who ever picks up a cricket ball. But a week before that World Cup, Malinga dislocated his non bowling shoulder while bowling, which the team’s medical staff have since described as a freak injury they had never seen before.
“I was devastated,” Malinga says. “On top of it being my first World Cup, it was also at home and I didn’t know when I would get that chance again. There were a few days there where I did absolutely nothing.”
And yet in mid-May, here he is grinning from atop a pile of 16 IPL wickets, having developed a serious reputation as a reverse-swing operator. Sunrisers Hyderabad’s explosive batters may have seized the spotlight in this frenetic IPL, but on the bowling front, no SRH bowler has neared Malinga’s wicket haul, which is fifth best in the season overall. In a year in which they have not had Pat Cummins for seven of their 11 matches, it is Malinga who has held down the fort, particularly in the second half of the innings.
But trading difficulty for success is just what Malinga does. What he has long been doing. Go back eight years and Malinga had never played a hard-ball cricket match. On top of which his home district of Ratnapura – at the base of Sri Lanka’s central hills – was better known for its gems and waterfalls than cricket, never having produced a men’s international. Malinga, additionally, was not even actively trying to be a cricketer. He had moved from his first school in a village called Opanayake to Ratnapura’s Sivali Central College due to strong academic results, and found, almost by accident, that his new school had a hard-ball cricket team.
But what Malinga knew at that point was that he could bowl fast. That much had been obvious growing up in Opanayaka, where despite his mother’s occasional misgivings, Malinga was highly sought after by the organisers of the village softball team (Sri Lanka has a thriving village-level softball cricket ecosystem). And as had been the case with the better-known Malinga, this one was also aware he possessed a killer yorker – a prized asset in every form of cricket, with any kind of ball.
If he’d been on track to be a softball legend, Malinga found his horizons began to expand at a spectacular rate the moment he got a hard ball in his hands. First, his yorker and his pace began to reap big wickets in the Division Three schools competition for Sivali Central, whose coach had immediately hoisted him into the team upon seeing Malinga bowl at practice one day. Then in mid-2019, about a year into playing hard-ball cricket, came the day he still reflects on as the one that changed his cricketing life. Having missed a fast-bowling competition in Ratnapura because he had been playing for his school that day, Malinga travelled to the hill town of Badulla to bowl in the competition there, and clocked 127kph on the gun, which was enough to win him first place.
This was when he first became a blip, however faint and distant, on Sri Lanka Cricket’s radar. Visions of a cricketing life began to appear as wisps of opportunity began to materialise. The next few years, Covid-riddled though they were, became a crash course into the sport for Malinga. There were coaching camps in Colombo in which the best of the rural talent was trained up and funnelled into a programme at the next level up. There were trials for first-class teams, and eventually a fledgling domestic career.
“I don’t know how many times I came to Colombo from Ratnapura during those times,” he laughs now. “It was a lot! I would leave home at about 3am, and the bus journey to Colombo took about three-and-a-half hours. Then I’d train or play the match, and the bus back home always took longer because of traffic. So every day, I was on the road for more than seven hours.”
The Malinga who made these exhausting daily commutes was, as far as the Sri Lankan cricket system was concerned, a bowler of decent rather than blinding promise. His pace had propelled him to the top of the regional pool, but at the first-class level he was still adapting his yorker and slower ball (another weapon he had developed in his softball days). If he needed another gear, Malinga found it – again almost by accident – sometime in 2022.
“I was playing an Under-23 three-day tournament, and I remember that being the first time I really started reverse-swinging the ball,” he says. “Coaches had anyway told me that with my action and my pace, it should be possible. But it started almost automatically. It’s not something I had to learn.
“But it wasn’t that easy, because it was a long process to learn how to control it. To get reverse swing, you have to release the ball at a different point than a straight ball, because you want it to still hit the stumps when it is swinging. So I scuffed up a lot of balls and trained hard to get that line right.”
And so, the Malinga that emerged at the end of 2022 had sharp enough pace, an excellent yorker, a developing slower ball, mountains of homespun tenacity, and had also discovered that he can naturally reverse-swing the ball earlier in an innings than most. You could have seen where this is going, right? All the ingredients of an ace white-ball bowler were there. And Malinga was already a master of turning wisps of opportunities into tangible advances. Over the next three years, he’d land a spot in the national fast-bowling academy, use that as a trampoline to impress in an Emerging Teams three-dayer against Bangladesh, and from there bounce into a stint at the MRF Pace Academy in 2024, before on the franchise side of things parlaying a trial at Rajasthan Royals at Kumar Sangakkara’s invitation into a decent run at the SA20 for Paarl Royals.
Having leapt up to the fringes of the Sri Lanka team over the past 18 months, Malinga has at this IPL now seized another unusual chance. The square at SRH’s home stadium is among the barest and most abrasive in the league, and Malinga’s reverse swing has prospered upon it. Of his 16 wickets this season, 11 have come at home. In the second half of the innings, when the ball is most likely to reverse, Malinga’s economy rate is 8.37 at a venue where runs have been scored at 9.38 in that period this season.
Malinga had put in a robust 2025 season for SRH as well, so there is a body of work emerging there. Perhaps this is why this year, SRH’s bowling plans have tended to follow the contours of Malinga’s own game.
“After six overs the ball gets damaged here, so we needed to make use of that. When I bowled at practice, the ball reversed, so I think a plan emerged where we were going to use the scuffed up ball and take advantage of that.
“In the first powerplay the ball comes on to the bat nicely here. After that we try to get the advantage of having an older ball. We’ve got bowlers who bowl 140kph-plus, and we have Pat Cummins, who also reverses the ball. So we make sure to look after the ball in a way that will give us reverse.”
At 25, eight years into a serious cricket career, Malinga sees himself as a work in progress. He wants to work on his powerplay bowling. His variations, he thinks, still need some work. He’d like to play Tests, where his reverse swing could really stretch its legs. And, oh, he is still waiting to play that first World Cup.
Even here, his keen nose for opportunity leads him. He points out through the course of our conversation that where the three previous World Cups had been played with a new ball at either end being used right through the innings, the next World Cup, in 2027, will feature rules that seem at least partially designed to enhance reverse swing, an older ball more suited to the craft now available towards the end of the innings.
He isn’t even a sure-fire pick in Sri Lanka’s ODI XI just yet, so this is just a flicker of an opportunity for now. But having made the journey from the village of Opanayaka to the most raucous cricketing showpiece on the planet, Malinga knows just what to do with those.
[Cricinfo]
Features
High Stakes in Pursuing corruption cases
The death of the most important suspect in the Sri Lankan Airlines Airbus deal has drawn intense public speculation. Kapila Chandrasena the former CEO of the heavily loss-making national airline was found dead under circumstances that the police are still investigating.
He had recently been arrested by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption in connection with the controversial Airbus aircraft purchase agreement signed in 2013. Police investigations are continuing into the cause of death and whether or not he committed suicide. The unresolved death brings to light the high stakes involved in accountability efforts of this nature.
The uncertainty surrounding Chandrasena’s death has revived public memories of other mysterious deaths linked to corruption investigations and public scandals. Among them is the death of Rajeewa Jayaweera, a former SriLankan Airlines executive and outspoken critic of the Airbus transaction. He was following in the tradition of his father, the late foreign service officer and public servant Stanley Jayaweera who mentored the younger generation in good governance practices and formed the group “Avadhi Lanka” along with icons such as Prof Siri Hettige. Rajeewa had written a series of articles exposing irregularities in the deal before he was found dead near Independence Square in Colombo in 2020. The CCTV cameras in that high security area were turned off. Questions raised at that time whether or not he had committed suicide were not satisfactorily resolved.
The controversy about the cause of Chandrasena’s death is diverting attention away from the massive damage done to the country by the SriLankan Airlines deal itself. The value of the aircraft agreement was close to the size of the International Monetary Fund bailout package that Sri Lanka desperately needed by 2023 in order to stabilise the economy after bankruptcy. Sri Lanka’s IMF Extended Fund Facility amounted to about USD 3 billion spread over four years. The comparison shows the scale of the losses and liabilities that irresponsible and corrupt decisions have imposed on the country and which must never happen again.
Wider Pattern
The corruption linked to the Airbus transaction came fully into the open only because of investigations conducted outside Sri Lanka. In 2020 Airbus agreed to pay record penalties of more than EUR 3.6 billion to authorities in Britain, France and the United States to settle global corruption investigations. Sri Lanka was identified as one of the countries where bribes had allegedly been paid in order to secure contracts. The Airbus deal involved the purchase of six A330 aircraft and four A350 aircraft valued at approximately USD 2.3 billion. Investigations showed that Airbus paid bribes amounting to nearly USD 16 million in order to secure the contract. According to court submissions, at least part of this money amounting to USD 2 million was transferred through a shell company registered in Brunei and routed through Singapore bank accounts linked to the late airline CEO and his wife.
The commissions involved in this deal may seem comparatively small compared to the overall value of the contracts but devastating in their consequences. But they also show that a few million dollars paid secretly to decision makers could lead to the country assuming liabilities worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars over decades. This is why corruption is not simply a moral issue. It is a direct economic assault on the living standards of ordinary people. Money lost through corruption is money unavailable for schools, hospitals, rural development and job creation. In the end the burden falls on ordinary citizens who are left to repay debts incurred in their name without receiving commensurate benefits in return.
The SriLankan Airlines transaction gives an indication of the wider pattern of corruption and misuse of national resources that has taken place over many years. This was not an isolated incident. There were numerous large scale infrastructure and procurement projects that imposed heavy debts on the country while enriching politically connected individuals and their associates. Other projects such as the Colombo Port City, Hambantota Harbour and highway construction reveal a similar pattern.
Less publicised but equally damaging scandals have involved fertiliser medicine and energy contracts. Investigations into medicine procurement in recent years uncovered allegations that substandard pharmaceuticals had been imported at inflated prices causing both financial losses and risks to public health.
Moral Renewal
The present government appears determined to investigate major corruption cases in a manner that no previous government has attempted. Those who ransacked and bankrupted the treasury need to be dealt with according to the law. There is considerable public support for efforts to recover stolen assets and ensure accountability.
In his May Day speech President Anura Kumara Dissanayake stated that around 14 corruption cases were nearing completion in the courts this very month and called upon the public to applaud when verdicts are delivered. Political opponents of the government claim that such comments could place pressure on the judiciary and blur the separation between political leadership and the courts. But the deeper public frustration that underlies the president’s remarks also needs to be understood.
The challenge facing Sri Lanka is twofold. The country must ensure that justice is done through due process and independent institutions. If anti corruption campaigns become politicised they can lose legitimacy. But if corruption and abuse of power continue without consequences the country will remain trapped in a cycle of economic decline and moral decay. Sri Lanka also needs to confront past abuses linked to the war period. There are allegations of kidnapping, extortion, disappearances and criminal activity in which members of the security forces have been implicated. Vulnerable sections of the population suffered greatly during those years. If political leaders turned a blind eye or actively connived in such crimes they too need to be held accountable under the law. Selective justice will not heal the country. Accountability must apply across the board regardless of political position, ethnicity or institutional power.
Sri Lanka has paid a very heavy price for corruption and impunity. The economic collapse of 2022 did not occur overnight. It was the result of years of bad governance, reckless decision making, abuse of power and the misuse of public wealth. If the country is to move forward the focus cannot be diverted by sensational speculation alone. Suspicious deaths and political intrigue may dominate headlines for a few days. But the larger issue is the system that enabled corruption to flourish without accountability for so long. The real national task is to end that system. Sri Lanka cannot build a prosperous future on a foundation of corruption and impunity. Unless those who looted public wealth are held accountable and the systems that enabled them are dismantled, the country risks repeating the same cycle again.
Jehan Perera
-
News7 days agoMIT expert warns of catastrophic consequences of USD 2.5 mn Treasury heist
-
News4 days agoLanka Port City officials to meet investors in Dubai
-
News22 hours agoEx-SriLankan CEO’s death: Controversy surrounds execution of bail bond
-
Editorial7 days agoClean Sri Lanka and dirty politics
-
News5 days agoSLPP expresses concern over death of former SriLankan CEO
-
Editorial6 days agoThe Vijay factor
-
News5 days agoPolice inform Fort Magistrate’s Court of finding ex-CEO of SriLankan dead under suspicious circumstances
-
Features2 days agoHigh Stakes in Pursuing corruption cases

