Modi’s Sri Lanka Sojourn

Ravan Mandir in Uttar Pradesh, as I observed during my recent visit, a temple claiming to mark the birthplace of Ravana, the central character in the Ramayana, remains largely forgotten, drawing little attention from the masses. Situated in an area characterized by extreme poverty and surrounded by the harsh realities of modern Indian inequality—despite India’s projected rise as the third-largest global economy by 2030—the temple’s isolation reflects the broader disconnection between India and Sri Lanka.

While Ravana is demonized across India during the annual Dussehra festival, where effigies of the Lankan king are burnt in a symbolic ritual of good triumphing over evil, Sri Lanka holds him in high regard, revering him as a heroic, spiritual leader and a legitimate ruler of ancient Lanka. This contrasting portrayal of Ravana—as a villain in India and as a revered leader in Sri Lanka—highlights the profound contradictions at the heart of Indo-Sri Lankan relations, which remain largely absent from mainstream discourse.

This intertwined relationship—rooted in myth and cultural heritage but shaped by geopolitics—has been marked by moments of unity and tension. There have been times when the two nations worked together, fought side by side, and supported each other unconditionally. During Swami Vivekananda’s visit to the US, with a stopover in Colombo, his companion Anagarika Dharmapala generously offered some of his speaking time to Vivekananda, who had not been included on the speakers’ list. This is how Vivekananda’s iconic speech at the 1893 Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago, beginning with “Sisters and Brothers of America!”, became one of history’s most renowned orations.

Later, Vivekananda played a decisive role in the establishment of the Maha Bodhi Society. Furthermore, Mahatma Gandhi’s visit to Sri Lanka in 1927, during which he sought to rally support for India’s struggle against British colonialism, saw Sri Lankans offering both moral and financial support. Subhas Chandra Bose also visited Sri Lanka during World War II to garner support for the Indian National Army and his fight for Indian independence. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who converted to Buddhism in 1956—the same year Sri Lanka veered towards deceptive nationalist sentiments—visited the island in 1954 to explore the Buddhist social order.

However, tensions between India and Sri Lanka resurfaced dramatically during the 1970s when India became embroiled in Sri Lanka’s internal politics. As J.N. Dixit explained in his, Assignment Colombo, “Inter-state relations are not governed by the logic of morality. They were and they remain an amoral phenomenon.” In fact, India’s covert support for Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka dates back to the 1970s, well before the acknowledged intervention of the late 1980s.

Declassified CIA documents reveal that India provided clandestine aid to Tamil extremist groups, driven by regional ambitions and a desire to exert influence over the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. Dixit recounts a conversation with J.R. Jayewardene’s wife, during which she asked whether Rajiv Gandhi would ensure the President’s safety and his continuation in power if he faced the danger of being overthrown. Some reports suggest that Indira’s India, hoped that supporting the Tamils would counterbalance Sri Lanka’s alignment with Western powers. However, this strategy backfired as the situation in Sri Lanka escalated, forcing India to reassess its role.

In the midst of this turmoil, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s decision to send the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka in 1987 further complicated Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Intended to enforce peace under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, this move did little to resolve the Tamil issue and culminated in a disastrous confrontation between Indian forces and the LTTE, with the alleged crimes committed by peacekeepers disappearing without accountability. These events, often seen as mismanagement or poor judgment, were more a result of the power dynamics at play, with Sri Lanka caught between the conflicting interests of major regional powers—India on one side and the West on the other.

The strategic maneuvering that led to the signing of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was not an isolated event. The agreement itself was the product of years of behind-the-scenes negotiations and geopolitical calculations. The CIA, with its long-standing involvement in South Asia, is said to have played a role in shaping the Accord, seeking to curb India’s influence in Sri Lanka while keeping the island aligned with Western interests. The Accord, which mandated India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s internal conflict, was, in many ways, a forced compromise—a diplomatic solution designed to balance competing geopolitical interests while avoiding a full-blown conflict. But this decision came at a heavy cost. India’s intervention in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s remains a point of contention, particularly in light of the subsequent assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by the LTTE.

Sixteen years after the war ended in May 2009, Sri Lanka continues to face significant challenges, both domestically and internationally, with India playing a pivotal role. In this context, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka assumes even greater importance. Although not his first visit as Prime Minister, this trip is far more than a mere diplomatic gesture; it comes at a time when Sri Lanka is undergoing fundamental changes in its political landscape. As history has demonstrated, India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s future is far from incidental.

The island nation is grappling with multiple crises—economic instability, escalating debt, and regional security concerns. The economy has been hit hard in recent years, further exacerbated by the ISIS-inspired Easter Sunday attacks, the COVID-19 pandemic, natural disasters, and an increasing dependence on foreign debt. While Sri Lanka seeks economic recovery, the legacy of Indo-Sri Lanka relations heavily shapes its policies. Despite acknowledging India’s importance as a key neighbour and trade partner, Sri Lanka remains wary of excessive reliance on India, especially regarding sensitive issues like the Tamil question and northern sovereignty.

It is well known that Modi’s administration has sought to assert a more active role in South Asian geopolitics, and Sri Lanka is no exception. His government has focused on strengthening ties with Sri Lanka, especially in terms of economic cooperation and security partnerships. However, this strategy is not without its own challenges.

What is undeniable is that Sri Lanka’s future—whether its political leaders and citizens accept it or not—is inextricably linked to its relationship with India. As a small island nation, Sri Lanka has limited scope for independent economic and political manoeuvre. The opportunities for Sri Lankan businesses in India’s vast market are immense, but so too are the risks of becoming overly dependent on its powerful neighbour. Modi’s visit, then, presents a crucial moment for both nations to reassess their relationship, not through the lens of past grievances, but with an eye on future possibilities. Whether Sri Lanka can balance its autonomy with the growing necessity for regional partnerships remains uncertain, but the coming years will determine whether it continues to view India as a strategic partner or an imposing neighbour.

Having suffered enough, it’s time for Sri Lankans to break free from the fear-mongering grip and seize opportunities beyond their shores with bold strategies, before the market devours them.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa