LTTE Terrorism immediately prior to 1981

Excerpted from the memoirs of Senior DIG (Retd) Edward Gunawardena

Reference has already been made to the return of trained LTTE cadres who had fled to India in 1979. With their return after intensive training by PLO experts in Indian jungle camps, arms and explosives also had been smuggled into the country and stored in safe-houses. The Jaffna District Intelligence Bureau reported to the Intelligence Services Division that police patrols were under threat of attack by pistol gangs and that more and more youths were joining the rebels.

The Superintendent of Police Jaffna had reported to the DIG of the Northern Range that the Government Agent Yogendra Doraisamy had received anonymous telephone calls ordering him under threat of death not to (a) Carry out instructions of government when making appointments in government departments without a letter from one ‘Kanthan’ alias ‘Harry’ (b) not to carry out any requests of TULF leaders and (c) not to issue liquor licences unless recommended by ‘Kanthan’.

I met Yogendra Doraisamy for the first time in 1979. He was at the airport to receive Brig. Weeratunga and myself when we went to Jaffna for the Emergency operation. Yogendra Doraisamy, a former diplomat who had retired from the Sri Lanka Overseas Service, was a gentleman of the highest integrity. Hailing from a distinguished Hindu family of the Jaffna aristocracy he was a highly cultured, erudite and able administrator who had been nurtured in an atmosphere of high democratic and moral values. Such threats coming from people of his own ancestral Jaffna would have been truly heartbreaking.

The treatment that this much respected gentleman had to endure demonstrated in no uncertain terms the dramatic change that was taking place in the peninsula. Clearly it was a manifestation of the rejection of the hitherto respected values and the gross disregard for the lawfully established instruments of administration by the ‘Boys’ hellbent on destroying the establishment.

It is not clear whether the DIG Northern Range ‘Brute’ Mahendran reported this dangerous development to the President or the Defence Ministry. Mahendran, himself a Tamil with relatives and interests in Jaffna, naturally would have been apprehensive of repercussions. The tigers had proved that they had no mercy for

The Escalation of Violence and Political Intrigue

From the time the Jayewardene government decided to hand over the administration of Jaffna to the people of Jaffna, violence had begun to escalate. Policemen serving as well as retired were the targets. When the People’s Bank cash was robbed at the Neervely junction in March 1981, Constables Muthu Banda and Ariyaratna were shot dead with a Sub-machine gun.

Apart from the violence angle, the political intrigue that developed and the socio-political environment of the time in Jaffna also need to be looked at to properly understand the circumstances that prevailed in Jaffna during the DDC elections when there were several cases of arson including the burning of the library.

Intelligence reports suggested that if a District Development Council was formed with elected representatives the problems of the people could effectively be addressed and the influence of the militant youths would wane. President Jayewardene also believed that by the vigorous development of industries and fisheries more employment could be provided. He was also keen to develop the schools and promote sports.

The Tamil political parties naturally came to the conclusion that if the UNP or any other national political party won, it would be their death knell. The TULF and the Tamil Congress decided to enter the fray using their maximum resources. These parties expected the support of the militants. But the latter though overtly with them entertained fears that a political victory for the TULF would lead to their downfall. They also told the TULF in no uncertain terms that they could form a district administration with the militants for which a committee was to be formed under the chairmanship of a confidant of Prabahakaran.

I as the Director of Intelligence at the time kept the President and the Ministry of Defence informed of the above developments but the TULF was not in a position to offer any assistance or co-operate with the President. The TULF in fact refrained from accepting any office or responsibility for the administration of the District resulting in a UNPer becoming the District Minister.

The Role of Indian Intelligence

By the end of the seventies the relations between India and Sri Lanka were far from cordial. JR had even most undiplomatically made an insulting reference to the Congress Party symbol. As mentioned earlier, the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) had been given a distinct task —the disruption of the election.

A highly disturbing prospect for RAW was the emergence of a democratic Eelam with elected rulers. RAW was of the view that such a development would not only lead to dangerous separatist repercussions in Tamil Nadu but also be an obstacle to India’s avowed ambition to be the sole and undisputed power in the Indian Ocean. India was becoming more and more convinced that a state of Eelam would be a threat to the defence and stability of India.

Even in the seventies Indian defence analysts like K. Subramaniam, the Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies had expressed fears that an Eelam would not be strong enough to resist superpower influence and it would also link with the massive Tamil community of South India which could present India with a problem more serious than the Kashmir — Jammu, Assam or the Naxalites. It goes without saying that the LTTE by this time distrusted the UNP and the Tamil political parties and determined to disrupt the DDC elections to prevent the emergence of a democratic set-up. RAW would certainly have briefed the ‘Boys’ on what India desired.

At this point I cannot help but recall an incident that occurred on the day following the burning of the library. In the late seventies as Sri Lanka’s Director of Intelligence I had been able to make direct contact with RAW. On my visit to Delhi with President Jayewardene in 1979, I was taken by Mr. Gonzales the acting Indian Foreign Secretary to the South Block and introduced to Norshi Suncook, Director of RAW. Thereafter I was able to make a few good RAW contacts.