LTTE Terrorism immediately prior to 1981

Excerpted from the memoirs of Senior DIG (Retd) Edward Gunawardena

Continued from last week

On June 2, 1981, the day following the acts of arson in Jaffna when I was resting in the afternoon in the Residency an Army officer woke me and told me that one Shan had come to see me. He was dressed in Verti like most Jaffna gentlemen. For a moment I could not recognize him. I had met him last at a Madras hotel where I shared a beer with him. I had come to know him when the Indian Prime Minister Moraji Desai came to Sri Lanka and I was his Security Co-ordinator. Shan came in Moraji Desai’s advance security contingent; and I remember taking him and another officer Medhekar, who later became the IGP of Mumbai, to my brother’s home in Kandy for lunch one day.

Shan had a brief chat with me. He told me that he was in a hurry as he had to see the Indian High Commissioner in the evening. When I asked him what brought him to Jaffna his reply was, “our mission is to see that the government does not win the election”. Without my soliciting an opinion he also added, “This (meaning the burning of he library) will make Sri Lanka international pariahs”. Apparently RAW was aware of the advice received by the LTTE and what the latter was planning to do. My suspicions were confirmed. It became clear to me that there was a nexus between the disruption of the elections and the burning of the library.

Balasinghams active in Madras

Although it was too late for analysis and any meaningful conclusions, for nearly a week prior to June 1, 1981 the District Intelligence Bureau of Jaffna had been getting information regarding the activities of Anton Balasingham and his wife, Adele, from informants who had actually attended the lectures of the Balasinghams.

Although they were usually resident at 54, Kelvendon House, Guilford Road, London SW8, they had taken up residence at a state guest house in Madras with the help of a Tamil Nadu politician, a friend of Prabahakaran. Obviously Prabahakaran had wanted to have Balasingham close at hand for urgent advice. Apparently things had begun to move fast.

The main thrust of Balasingham’s lectures to the ‘Boys’ in Madras had been:

(a) The time was appropriate for as many Tamils as possible to seek asylum in the capitals of Europe, America, Canada and Australia. This should be to convince the foreign sympathizers that the Tamils are an oppressed race, they are being harassed by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the Police and the government of Sri Lanka is violating Human Rights.

(b) The need for some sensational act to attract the attention of the world to the cause of the Tamils and also provide adequate grist to the mills of the world media.

(C) The need for a steady flow of funds if the movement is to be sustained particularly if an armed struggle had to be launched. Balasingham had stressed that an armed struggle was inevitable.

(d) Adele Balasingham had specifically mentioned that she was in touch with the Australian immigration authorities and the latter welcomed asylum seekers from oppressed communities.

Balasingham had emphasized that something to galvanize world media attention had to be accomplished early. This ‘something’ was apparently known only to the Balasinghams, the LTTE high command and a selected section of the media.

How l happened to be in Jaffna at this crucial time

On May 24, 1981 Dr. Thiyagarajah the Chief UNP candidate for the DDC elections was shot at Moolai in the Chankani police area after an election meeting of the UNP. He was rushed to the Jaffna General Hospital and died the following day.

With his assassination the intensity of the police patrolling was increased. The Army and Navy were also called in to assist the police. All police officers were to be armed, Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors with revolvers and Sergeants and Constables with repeater shot guns. There were no assault rifles issued to the police at the time. Large numbers of police from different parts of the country were ordered to be sent to Jaffna.

At this time I was the Deputy Inspector General of Police in charge of the Colombo Metropolitan Range. This range covered the Police Divisions of Colombo, Peliyagoda, Negombo, Nugegoda and Mt. Lavinia. The superintendents in charge Douglas Ranmuthugala, Henry Silva, A.C.A. Gaffoor, Amarakoon, Serpanchy and M.D.A. Rajapakse were all excellent officers whose competence, initiative and integrity could be trusted.

On May 30, I was summoned to Ward Place by the President at about 6 p.m. When I went to ‘Braemar’ the Prime Minister and the IGP were also there. I was ordered to proceed to Jaffna, but I was not assigned any specific duties. P. Mahendran was the DIG of the Northern Range, but I was senior to him. When I asked the IGP what my role in Jaffna was going to be, he merely said, “you just be there”. As for the Metropolitan Range, the IGP undertook to overlook the work of the Superintendents.

The President and the Prime Minister were pleased that I had readily agreed to go to Jaffna at such short notice. They felt that my presence in Jaffna Would be a morale booster for the rank and file whose ‘chips were down’.

I reached Jaffna by helicopter at about 4 p.m. on May 31. My car with Inspector Sathiyan and driven by PCD Anthony had arrived from Colombo by then. I tried to contact ‘Brute’ Mahendran, the DIG but failed. At the Jaffna Headquarters station I met the S.P. Jaffna Tony Mahat and several other officers who had come on ‘Special duty’. I remember meeting SP Dennis Peter and ASPs D. Weerakoon, M.D. Perera, Edmund Karunanayake and Jinasena.

HQI Jaffna, Lalith Gunasekera, in about 15 — 20 minutes gave me a complete run down of all that had happened in Jaffna from the time the elections were announced. Lalith Gunasekera of whom I had only heard earlier — captured by JVP insurgents when he was a young SI in charge of the Rambukkana Police Station was a courageous officer who had escaped from JVP custody. He certainly had a total grasp of the situation in Jaffna. His main worry was that the government was panicking and the LTTE could take advantage of the confusion to advance their cause.

Having had a discussion with all the senior officers present, dressed in civvies I left in my car driven by PCD Anthony and accompanied by Inspector Sathiyan on a recce of the Jaffna town. At about 10 p.m. I overheard on Police radio that police on duty at the Nachiamman Kovil meeting had been shot and the injured officers taken to the Jaffna General Hospital.

I decided to go to the hospital. Although I was in civvies I was armed with a Webley 9 mm pistol. Inspector Sathiyan who was also in civvies had an Uzi automatic. As we walked in there were several police officers in uniform and many civilians. I raised my voice and ordered the police to clear the ward of all unwanted persons. I even spoke in the little Tamil I knew to disperse the crowd. It was only then that the police at the hospital realized that I was the DIG Metropolitan who had been specially assigned to Jaffna.

That was the manner in which I announced to the rank and file of the Jaffna police of my arrival as the specially sent DIG. Listening to the gossip that went through the police airwaves gave me the impression that they welcomed my presence in Jaffna. However, it was noticeably clear that the police were gripped by a sense of fear and insecurity particularly after the Nachiamman Kovil shooting resulting in the death of Sergeant Punchi Banda. This gruesome murder coming on top of a series of killings of police officers certainly had a chilling effect.

Influx of special—duty police

By this time about 400 policemen from different police divisions had arrived in Jaffna. Surprisingly the number of senior officers was quite disproportionate to the number of Sergeants and Constables. It had fallen upon the shoulders of HQI Lalith Gunasekera to arrange for their billeting and food. The situation had been so bad that the HQI had at one point pleaded with Col. Hamilton Wanasinghe and Major Denzil Kobbekaduwa for food for these large numbers of policemen. He had even spent his own money to purchase some dry fish and rice to be given to the Mess for cooking.

The complete lack of co-ordination between the DIG of the Northern Range and Police Headquarters had resulted in a chaotic situation which had to be tactfully sorted out by HQI Gunasekera and myself.

If I was to deviate from the sequence of the narrative, from the point of view of food for the hungry policemen and also many other officials who had come to Jaffna on duty, the arrival of Mr. Gamini Dissanayake on June 3 was indeed a blessing. As soon as I heard of his arrival I called on him at King’s House. When I went there he was having a chat with Mr. T.B. Werapitiya who was the Deputy Minister of Defence. The latter was in fact briefing him on what had happened in Jaffna on the May 31 and June 1. I too joined in the conversation and was able to convince both of them that the acts of arson, especially the burning of the library, could not have been committed by the police, the armed services or any unruly mob. They were certainly apprehensive of the possible consequences.

Mr. Gamini Dissanayake specifically asked me whether the police have had adequate food. Apparently he had heard of the difficulties the police were facing. When I told him that even I had not eaten anything other than a boiled potato with salt and pepper he laughed. Having thought for a while he telephoned Navaloka Mudalali who undertook to send 1,000 packets of bread, seeni sambol and hard boiled egg. Mr. Dissanayake made arrangements for these to be airlifted. This exercise was repeated on the following day too.