Midweek Review

Learning from India

Published

6 years ago

2020/10/14

By Austin Fernando
(Former High Commissioner of Sri Lanka in India)

There is an ongoing discussion on higher education ‘reforms’ in Sri Lanka. Our higher education issues are similar to those in India. We may learn from India though its issues are different in some respects.

Indian education approaches

In India, higher education is administered by the University Grants Commission of India, which enforces the standards, advises the government, and enables co-ordination between the centre and the States.

India’s emphasis is on science and technology in tertiary education. Indian education sector has many technology institutes, and distance learning and open education programmes. Some of the institutions like the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT), the Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology, are globally acclaimed. Their alumni have contributed to the growth of the Indian private and public sectors and some foreign organisations.

Indians also have the capacity to cooperate. Incidentally, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa could request PM Narendra Modi as he did the Chinese dignitary Yang Jiechi, to invest in a specialised university/ institutes of technology in Sri Lanka.

Institutional approaches

Even under the British, India remained focused on higher education. The Ministry of Human Resource Development has control over universities. The States also administer universities. The Central Universities are maintained by the Union government. As for access higher education opportunities in India, there is a triple-track approach involving the Union government, State governments, and the private sector. As for access to higher education in the Indian states, Sri Lanka could have done something similar under Item 4 of the Concurrent List- 13th Amendment, but it never happened.

Apart from the several hundred state universities, in India, there are research institutions providing opportunities for advanced learning and research in branches of science, technology, and agriculture. Several of these have won international recognition. The Swaminathan Institute in Chennai is an example Sri Lanka could emulate. Higher-level involvement with them could develop knowledge and research standards, especially to supplement our development efforts in the agricultural sector, etc.

In India, technical education has developed fast during recent years, and the enrolled numbers show that about 20% join the engineering field. There is also a corresponding increase in high-standard computer scientists.

There are 371 State Private Universities and 304 State Public Universities in India. Private sector involvement in higher education is satisfactory. Our education authorities can learn from India how this can be achieved. In Sri Lanka, pressure is brought to bear on governments whenever an attempt is made to open a private university. Governments cave in to pressure. Private sector higher education involvement is at a very satisfactory level in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh. Being a large country, this is not surprising. In our provinces, a few branches of private sector University Campuses have been established.

The Bangalore Urban District tops the list in the number of colleges numbering 880, followed by Jaipur with 566. Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh have about 88% private-unaided Colleges, and Tamil Nadu has 87% Private-unaided Colleges, whereas Assam has only 16.0%. Assam deserves more investment as it lacks facilities for gaining knowledge, skills, development, connectivity, proper attitudes, but it is ignored by investors. Sri Lankan investors have a similar attitude towards the underdeveloped districts. If the private sector is reluctant to invest, the State should contribute to the development of universities.

The Indian experience in private sector engagement in higher education could be a guide for us. Within a decade, different State Assemblies have passed statutes for private universities. Well-known business houses have invested in this field. The Birla Institute of Technology and Science and the Jindal Global University may serve as examples. Dealing with them will enhance business for them and local counterparts, and supplement the knowledge hub intentions of the President.

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, some of our educational arrangements with Australia, the US, and the west have been disturbed. Due to positive publicity for our COVID-19 management, opportunities may present themselves for Sri Lankan educational organisations. They could prepare students here for graduation at developed country universities. Sri Lankan authorities may approach these universities to conduct specific courses of study locally.

However, the government must create an environment for these interventions that have been opposed by some professional associations. This attitude could be a constraint, especially in the fields of Medicine, Engineering, and Information Technology. In all three sectors, the performance of Indians has been outstanding.

Graduate unemployment is an issue in both India and Sri Lanka. If our graduates are not attractive to the private sector, it could be they do not hold marketable, quality degrees. There could be other considerations (e. g. English knowledge, school connections, social standing, etc.), restricting ordinary persons’ entry to the private sector. In India, these social constraints are much heavier. However, if the need is to produce quality graduates attractive in the job market, university authorities and the government should work towards that goal.

Education and economic development

Strategising higher education through universities to reinforce emerging economies is an area that has attracted the attention of several countries, and we can learn about such developments from India. In this regard, we may pay attention to the United Nations Academic Initiatives (UNAI) guidance. The UNAI promotes ten basic principles and commitment to human rights, equal chances, sustainability, global citizenship, and intercultural dialogue, etc. Institutional cooperation extends to a scientific exchange of thoughts, and collaborative research that should exhibit collective higher education impact on society.

In poor societies, entrepreneurship is backward due to shortage of financial resources, knowledge, skills, and attitudinal factors. Issues like collaterals dissuade borrowings. The challenge for universities is to strategise avenues for resource mobilisation, entrepreneurship development and convince financiers, bureaucrats, and politicians to tag along with evolved strategies.

Potential focus areas and

higher education

Interventions to advance peace and conflict resolution through education are important. The expertise to inquire, advise and report to the UN on member country for ‘bad behavior’ as regards human rights, etc., is possessed mostly by the West, where it is developed in universities. Therefore, domestic universities could contribute to international conflict resolution as well. Commitment of universities in emerging economies to conducting courses on peace and conflict resolution, in keeping with the UNAI Principles, is less.

Right now, the world has evinced and interest in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Universities can contribute to achieving these goals by promoting SDGs through education, research and documentation. For example, health/education/agriculture/environment can be researched, and universities can share promotional and management inputs.

Since SDGs are about improving lives, they are essential to everyone. Therefore, any commitment or use of resource will serve the communities universally. This is how the global citizenship aspect of UNAI will work. The intellectual and international dialogues will be the modus operandi for universality. If citizen-serving universities’ final output is producing book worms, then they will fail. Appropriate research publications come out from many Indian universities, which is a good sign.

The commitment to promoting inter-cultural dialogue and understanding, and the ‘unlearning’ of intolerance through higher education bring solace. India’s culture, history, and civilisation are unique. Therefore, the Indian universities can have a cultural dialogue. It can be done through international students and scholars entering Indian universities to share knowledge. Sri Lankans can have a share of it. It will lead to the strengthening of political and economic ties created through these scholars.

One crucial issue is whether private schools/universities focus on peoples’ needs or on preparing affluent students for foreign education. If it is the latter, social responsibility expected of a university will be lacking. In Sri Lanka, international schools mostly cater to the rich and focus on foreign higher education. It is crucial that universities serve the common man in emerging economies through interventions and inventions to reach higher technology or knowledge hubs or connectivity to value chains. Operationalising those systems will be the responsibility of government/state functionaries, and related private educational institutions. Offering scholarships for the needy is one way to achieve this objective.

The provision of higher education in the underdeveloped Indian States is aimed at promoting equality. It is applicable to Sri Lanka too. College density, i. e., the number of colleges per 100,000 eligible persons (in the age-group 18-23 years) varies from seven in Bihar to 53 in Karnataka. The all-India average is 28. Does not Bihar deserve better facilities?

Wasn’t this the reason for coining the slogan, kolombata kiri, gamata kekiri (milk for Colombo and kekiri or melon for the village), in the late 1980s, in this country?

The latest from India in the field of education is most encouraging. India with international tech giants headed by Indians the world over is planning to bring some of the best universities to India. This will provide Indian students with world-class exposure. According to the latest reporting (https://piotv.com/news/India), “the Indian government is pushing to overhaul the nation’s heavily regulated education sector to attract nearly 750,000 students who spend about $15 billion each year pursuing degrees overseas.” Although there is a mismatch as regards “internationally acclaimed tech giants,” numbers, and the expense, are not we facing the same problem? Nevertheless, the solution is the same. Reports say that ‘it represents a change of heart on the part of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, which has for long resisted opening up the country’s education sector. India needs to boost its education sector to become more competitive and close the growing gap between college curriculum and market demands’. Every Sri Lankan government has sought this ‘boost’ for the same reasons but baulked due to protests. Now, we are waiting for President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to make a difference.

Some Indian universities have already set up partnerships, allowing students to complete the preliminary levels of their foreign degree programmes in India before going overseas for graduation. This happens in Sri Lanka as regards a few private sector Campuses/ Institutions, supported by some British, American, and Canadian universities. For us approaching Indians for appropriate higher education will be less costly.

The current Indian move encourages the overseas institutions to set up campuses without local partners. This approach will suit our needs too since the demand for and the supply of suitable graduates for employment, thirst for appropriate education, lack of finances for heavy infrastructure development required for higher education, etc. could thereby be met. It is the will to break away from the grip of conservatism that is needed. We will fail if we fear protests. Additionally, our Birlas, Jindhals also should volunteer to undertake this human resource development effort.

Another report on India in the public domain is worth paying attention to. It is from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). It states that India’s unemployment rate hit a three-year-high of 8.4% in August 2019. It notes that the unemployment rate has been the highest level since September 2016. If unemployment increases with the expansion of higher education, it is a challenge to India. Although I lack statistics, the situation is similar in Sri Lanka as well. I recall that some graduates who staged fasts, demanding jobs, in the East in 2017, told me as Governor that they had advised their brothers not to pursue higher education, and to join the state service as clerks instead.

Literature reviews show that unemployment levels in India increase with the rise in educational standards. It has also happened in Sri Lanka, which has a large numbers of arts graduates. Most of them lack knowledge of English, and the private sector businesses expect proficiency of English of graduates. The graduates stage demonstrations, demanding jobs, especially during election times. We have seen how the Kumaratunga, Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa governments succumbed to pressure from protesters and offered jobs, and how the Ranil Wickremesinghe government partially succumbed and totally failed politically!

In India, it is believed that unemployment is negligible among the uneducated. But it stands at 15%, roughly twice the national average of unemployment rate among graduates. Further, they say that unemployment is insignificant among those who have not gone beyond primary education, mainly because they cannot afford to be unemployed, if they want to survive.

According to CMIE, there are a little over ten crore graduates in India, and 6.3 are in the labour force waiting to be employed-willing and available for work. Of these, 5.35 crore have some employment, leaving 0.95 crore, mostly youth with a basic degree or even a higher degree, unemployed. The same survey says that while more women are getting some education, the unemployment rate among them is 17.6%, more than double the rate for men. Although it is not so severe in Sri Lanka if we do not handle it carefully, we will be reaching the same level, albeit with fewer numbers. This will counter to the UNAI’s gender disparity and poverty alleviation principles. Educationists should ask themselves whether universities address these disparities.

Solutions

Firstly, it is suggested that foundations for a successful career-oriented graduate preparation be laid at primary and post-primary schools. For instance, language competency, modern ‘machine use’ like computers, mathematical and scientific tools in education should commence there. Private schools in Sri Lanka do this, like in India. However, rural schools should follow suit. The State and Provincial Council budgets should provide resources.

Secondly, education to facilitate economic development should receive priority. In emerging economies, the agricultural and industrial potential has to be tapped fully. Curriculum development should focus on areas these sectors are interested in. Having many arts graduates is good for bloating statistics but not for development—it is 36% in India and high in Sri Lanka as well.

Thirdly, do we need a contented graduate population to develop the economy? Do the universities help the farmers, who need access to scientific and technical know-how, or the factory owners who want updated, efficient, and adequate technical/technological knowhow? Universities must give the society and the economy what the current and next generations require. Therefore, they say that ‘education is the passport to the future; for tomorrow belongs to those who prepare for it today’.

We must create cells for skill development and technological transformation in keeping with the production mechanisms and management milieu. University Senates and the Treasury may say this is expensive. If so we have to respond saying, “If you think education is expensive, marry ignorance.” Which would we prefer? Having a former Vice-Chancellor at the helm of Education we expect positive responses. These must be addressed to produce graduates needed by the emerging economies. Otherwise, our universities will continue to be only ‘graduate producing factories’.

Fourthly, it is necessary to prepare the educated for self-employment. The standard banking lending systems, demanding collaterals for borrowing, etc. from the poor, who are dispossessed, must be reconsidered. New lending tools must be formulated by the Central Bank and the commercial banks in tandem. Combining transfer of produce to markets, product integration, institutional upgrading, and supporting graduates to take to small and medium enterprises must receive priority.

Fifthly, university education cannot be a standalone function of static existence. The academics should be continuously trained in new methodologies, and they must keep abreast of international standards and developments.

Learning from Gandhi Ji

Finally, with great reverence to Gandhi Ji, I quote what he said about education” “True education must correspond to the surrounding circumstances, or it is not a healthy growth.” What surrounds us? It may be poverty, or lack of entrepreneurship or productivity, sharing knowledge or appropriate technology or business skills or product research, and marketing. There could be more.

These issues should be addressed by universities. Developed countries addressed them even before we dreamt of doing so because they understood that university education had to correspond to the surrounding circumstances. They apparently learned from Gandhi Ji before we did. We are late learners and learn from second-hand sources!

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

3 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

3 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya