Features

Japanese Digital Television Project: An informed choice?

Published

2 years ago

2024/11/28

Sahan Weerasooriya

Map of Digitisation of Television World wide

by Shanthilal Nanayakkara

Retired Principal Engineer, Digital Transition Division, Australian Communications and Media Authority

A Japanese delegation recently announced the resumption of the previously stalled digital television project in Sri Lanka following a meeting with the newly-elected President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The commencement of the digitisation project is now imminent.

Once terrestrial television transmissions are digitised in Sri Lanka, it will replace the old analogue terrestrial television forever. Therefore, it is critically important that the final outcome is better than the current analogue television, if not far superior. Setting such a goal prior to the implementation of the project is crucial for its fruitful completion.

To achieve this outcome, deficiencies in the current parameters in the Japanese Digital Plans need to be revisited and appropriately addressed for the benefit of all stakeholders. Otherwise, as it stands today, there is a high potential for rural and regional viewers in Sri Lanka to miss out on the digital coverage. (This is further illustrated below). Such an unwarranted outcome could become a highly ‘politically sensitive’ issue for the new government .

Why Digital

In analogue transmissions, radio waves encounter several problems. When radio waves are subjected to multipath, ghosting images appear on television screen. They are also subjected to cancellation of their own signals and interference.

Digital technology overcomes these analogue transmission weaknesses and, as a huge value addition, is able to carry more information than its analogue counterpart. As this capacity enhancement feature helps carry multiple programmes on one frequency or channel, digital television transmission technology is considered to be highly spectrum productive. Once analogue is switched off, the vacant spectrum that can be harnessed, commonly known as Digital Dividend (DD), becomes an income earner for the Government, as spare spectrum can be sold to Telcos for broadband internet use. Thus, this digitisation project is effectively a self-financing venture for the government and a win-win for all stakeholders.

Stakeholder benefits of digital

Many countries in the world have now moved or are in the process of moving to the digital domain.

Irrespective of the digital television transmission standard adopted in Sri Lanka, benefits of a conversion from analogue to digital television are many for the majority of stakeholders.

These are listed below against the various stakeholders:

* Government – a significant income from selling the vacant spare spectrum to Telcos, following full conversion to digital, provided appropriate modifications are made to the JICA plan;

* Broadcasters – increased television channels and scope for increase of advertising revenue;

* Viewers – increased number of television channels to facilitate a wider selection of content, with True High Definition (True HD) quality and potential 5.1 Surround Sound;

* Content providers – opportunity to produce a wide range of programmes that are in demand;

* Production houses – larger revenue from vastly increased niche productions;

* Creators of social media and other internet-based content – opportunities to develop novel visual and aural media content;

* Electronic Manufacturing/Testing – opportunities to manufacture digital television receivers and set up a receiver harmonisation/compatibility centre;

* Broadcast Towers (similar to Lotus Tower) – Opportunities to establish and operate consolidated broadcast towers in the country;

* Telcos- opportunity to purchase superior vacant spectrum for future fixed and mobile broadband applications.

Funding arrangements or self-financing

The current funding arrangement for digitisation of television in Sri Lanka is a ‘soft loan’ from the Japanese government, and it is tied up in ‘one bundle’ with loans for other projects. This loan is also based on the premise that the deployment of the Japanese digital television standard, Integrated Services Digital Broadcasting-Terrestrial (ISDB-T) is mandatory. As the vacant spectrum can be sold after Analogue Switch Off (ASO), the venture could also be a self-financing project, albeit with bridging finance.

Purpose of this essay

The main purpose of this article is to suggest ways of optimising the benefits of the digitisation project while retaining the support of the Japanese government. If the bulk of problems for viewers and broadcasters can be removed by making appropriate adjustments to the current plans at a minimal cost, with broadcasters becoming willing participants, the digitisation of television in Sri Lanka would no doubt be a success for all stakeholders, including the new government. Otherwise, there is an urgent need to review the bi-lateral agreement that was signed previously.

The broadcasting fraternity in Sri Lanka is fully aware that the Japanese system is not as efficient as the second generation European standard, Digital Video Broadcast-Terrestrial 2 (DVB-T2).

Understanding Digital

Simply put, digitisation of analogue vision and sound enables radio waves to carry more information within the same channel or bandwidth than in the analogue era. This allows producers of visual and aural content to be more creative than before. The technology also facilitates easy communication in both fixed and mobile environments and facilitates two-way communication more than in the analogue era. However, there are two main pitfalls that one needs to address in order to make the venture a success. They are as follows:

Cliff effect (sudden loss of signal): –

* to avoid the ‘cliff effect’ a robust signal (with higher reliability and availability at a receive location than in analogue era) is needed at the receiver to prevent momentary picture pixelation and/or sudden loss of signal; and

* it is also necessary to ensure that all television digital services reaching viewer locations are of the same signal strength to ensure equity of services and therefore must originate from ONE location such as the Lotus Tower.

* Absence of ‘graceful degradation’ and its effect on signal level – even with a degraded signal with ‘snowy pictures’, analogue signal is still watchable. It is not so with digital due to ‘cliff effect’. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that the digital coverage is the same or better than the existing watchable analogue coverage that is defined by a signal level of 43 dBuV/m in VHF Band III.

This limit was adopted for digitisation in Australia.

Deficiencies of the Japanese standard/plan

In planning to deploy the ISDB-T system in our country, everyone should aim for a cost-beneficial outcome as it is of paramount importance to all stakeholders. There are several issues in the Japanese documentation of 2014/2018, which should be addressed to suit the needs of the public/consumers, broadcasters and government. They range from policy issues at the outset, technical areas during planning and management issues during the proposed phases of ASO and Digital Switch On (DSO).

Spectrum for Digital: VHF/UHF issue

In particular, the proposal to use only a part of the available broadcast spectrum has an impact on the eventual DD income for the Government. The Japanese have deployed both VHF and UHF spectrum in Brazil, strangely not offered to Sri Lanka. In that context, it is not clear why the Japanese team has not proposed a VHF and UHF combined solution as deployed in Brazil. This was pointed out by the writer when a Japanese team, including a senior Embassy official Sato Takefumi, met him in 2017 in Colombo to discuss Lotus Tower issues (after his disclosure in an article in The Island about the Lotus tower) and digitisation in general. Their response was ‘no one asked for it’.

As it stands today in Sri Lanka, analogue television transmissions are based on frequencies using both VHF and UHF Bands, but the proposed Japanese digital conversion is not utilising the VHF Band. In particular, VHF Band III exhibits superior propagation characteristics, while contributing to lower the consumption of electricity by the transmitters. More importantly, VHF radio waves carry longer distances than UHF due to lower propagation losses, are able to travel around obstacles comparatively and therefore VHF is more suitable for wide coverage transmissions.

Currently, the VHF spectrum is occupied by three television broadcasting networks i.e. Rupavahini, ITN and TNL. These networks will lose their inherent wide coverage VHF Band advantage. They also have the additional burden of occupying a digital channel in the UHF spectrum, especially when the earmarked UHF channels for digital are almost at the bottom of the UHF Band V, where propagation losses are higher than in UHF Band IV.

ISDB-T New Coder H.265

It is a known fact that the Japanese ISDB-T standard, in payload capacity terms, is second to the second generation European Standard DVB-T2 that provides 45 Mb/s capacity. However, the Japanese standard can only carry about 1/2 of the European standard per channel at 23 Mb/s. But as the Japanese are now offering to change the content source coder to H.265, they will be able to provide HD at 1080P at a rate of 2-4 Mb/s. This change would now allow all HD TV ready broadcasters to provide True HD content at 1920 x 1080P and possibly can accommodate all television channels in Colombo. But the downside is that the receivers are going to be more complex with the new coder. This may then lead to more expensive ISDB-T receivers or STBs in Sri Lanka.

Vacant VHF Band III

The unused VHF Band III is likely to reduce the DD for the government though the Japanese strategy is to achieve some productivity by the use of single frequency networks in the UHF Band (SFNs-a technique to use the same frequency multiple times to improve spectrum productivity). However, in practice receiving of SFNs is not simplistic as the reception of SFN signals are subject to receiver complexities.

The Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) may be exclusively reserving the VHF band for future digital radio, but the same band could be co-shared with digital television without any problems. For example, Australia is co-sharing VHF Band III for both digital television and radio without any issues.

Once all analogue transmissions are switched off with the deployment of UHF band per se for digital, the unused VHF Band III spectrum, where 7 MHz bandwidth, 8 VHF Frequency channels exists, will become vacant.

This is clearly a waste of unused spectrum. Additionally, as Restacking [restack is the re-arrangement of frequencies ideally in the two bands of VHF and UHF, to maximise the spectrum productivity] is in the Japanese Plan, additional expenditure on broadcasting infrastructure is also on the cards. Where are the funds coming from?

There is no mention of new funding arrangements for Restacking of the spectrum, and it also raises questions about the STB/Receiver specifications as frequencies may need to change after Restacking.

If some broadcasters are not keen to use ISDB-T, they may canvass for the opportunity to use the vacant VHF Band for the potential deployment of DVB-T2 standard. This MUST be avoided at all costs! If this happens, there will be two digital systems in Sri Lanka. This issue, in particular, could become another potential headache for the government as it is likely to be under heavy pressure from commercial broadcasters to release the vacant VHF Band III for the more efficient DVB-T2. This issue, too, was pointed out by the writer when another Japanese team consisting of a Senior Engineer from Yacheo Engineering along with Sato Takefumi of the Japanese Embassy met him in 2017/2018.

Unless there are plans to use the vacant VHF Band III by Restacking the spectrum, this spectrum specifically allocated for broadcasting would go to waste.

Digital Signal Reliability & Availability

Unlike in the analogue domain, television signal reliability and its availability becomes crucial in digital reception. In the analogue era, television broadcasting service field strength was planned for 50% of the locations and 50% of the time at a receiving height of 10 m. But in digital this becomes 80%-95% of the locations and 90% of the time to ensure reliability and availability of the digital signal. Hence the planned field strength would need to be adjusted to ensure the required reliability and availability at a higher field strength. In Australia, field strength used was 50 dBuV/m for Band IV and 54 dBuV/m for Band V frequencies in a rural environment

However, it is not clear from the published documents of the Japanese plans 2014/2018 whether this issue had been addressed or otherwise. The signal level at 51 dBuV/m identified in the 2018 Japanese documentation is certainly not adequate for a rural grade of service in the UHF Band! It ought to be in the region of 54-74 dBuV/m in the UHF Band V. For example, the Australian Broadcasting Planning Handbook for Digital Television Broadcasting has clearly identified these requirements and provided information on how they were derived.

Duplication Parameter

The potential impact of the proposals for duplication of coverage is illustrated in the diagram. (See Figure 01)

The signal threshold of a planned analogue coverage is 50 dBuV/m for VHF Band III. However, some regional and rural viewers in Sri Lanka are currently receiving watchable analogue signals well below this value. If, as planned by the Japanese studies in 2014, the analogue coverage is converted at the planned cut-off level of 55 dBuV/m, then the majority of regional and rural viewers, who are currently watching the analogue television with no issues, will not be able to receive digital television coverage. This could potentially become a political nightmare for the new government. Therefore, the cut-off signal level, as illustrated above, should be lowered to 43 dBuV/m.

Though Single Frequency Networks (SFNs) are a solution to mitigate this difference in coverage, it is not easy to implement them at the receiver-end due to the variation in receiver profiles of Set-Top-Boxes (STBs) and complexities in receiver SFN signal detection.

The Japanese designers, while being aware of this issue, may have been heavily constrained due to the requirement for spectrum productivity. Most probably, given the limits of the available UHF spectrum for digital and the lower data efficacy of the Japanese ISDB-T standard, this higher limit of duplication may have been proposed by the designers in order to preserve some spectrum productivity.

One Network Operator for Digital

The advent of digital terrestrial television also signifies the end of individual transmission facilities for broadcasters, as several content feeds are carried on one frequency or the channel and the requirement to consolidate all transmissions at one site. A combined digital transmission service provider may, in the future, be an independent entity and the facilities may be offered to the broadcasters on a fee-levying basis, based on a pragmatic business plan. In a future digital broadcasting landscape, the broadcasters will essentially be ‘content’ providers. Perhaps, there ought to be some sort of protection provided to the existing broadcasters in the event new content providers also express a desire to use digital transmissions.

Cost to viewers and broadcasters

All consumer television sets require digital receivers to extract video and audio content from digital transmissions. Therefore, either in-built ISDB-T receivers or compatible STBs are required. For example, there are flat TVs that do not have in-built ISDB-T receivers. The cost of an STB for ISDB-T with H.265 decoders, is likely to be around US $ 50-100, depending on their complexity and economies of scale. If in the event, there is likely to be a Restack of frequencies including the VHF Band, two band STBs or receivers may be needed; one during the first phase and another after the Restack of channels with the ability to tune into the VHF Band. Additionally, at some household locations, there may also be a requirement for new receiver antenna installation to receive VHF/UHF channels. If so, this is also an additional cost to the viewer.

There is also a significant cost to the commercial television broadcasters to provide HD ready studios, Outside Broadcast (OB)/Electronic News Gathering (ENG) equipment, and content feeding arrangements. However, once the commercial television broadcasters elect to use consolidated broadcast towers, analogue era transmission costs would also disappear as their independent transmission networks are no longer needed, in a digital environment. It is noteworthy to highlight that the Japanese financial proposal for digitisation of television is primarily for Rupavahini, and limited to funding the analogue to digital transfer of Rupavahini facilities, including the provision of a True HD studio, OB unit, Transmission equipment and a Central Command centre for the proposed Digital Broadcast Network Operations (DBNO) at the Lotus Tower.

At this stage, there are no signs of any discussions with the broadcasters to develop a ‘road map’ to facilitate the smooth transition from analogue to digital of commercial channels. If Restack is to take place, there is likely to be additional costs but there is no mention of further Japanese funding for Restack of channels either.

As additional costs to the commercial television broadcasters are likely, strategic government policy initiatives to compensate for the additional capital expenditure in a highly competitive market are in order.

Way forward

It is heartening to note that the Japanese plan has now incorporated the more efficient coder in H.265 with an intention to maximise the use of limited payload capacity of an ISDB-T channel, which then will result in providing True HD transmission (1920 x 1080P) for ALL licensed television channels in Colombo.

If Japanese consultants can pay attention to the issues of using VHF Band III, changing receiving the field strength requirements to that of the ITU signal level requirements for UHF and address the duplication parameter issue, then ALL stakeholders including the government and broadcasters will no doubt look forward to the venture of digitisation of television in Sri Lanka.

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Features

Coercive laws recipe for future misrule

Published

16 hours ago

2026/10/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Jehan Perera

The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.

The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.

But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Proposed Laws

The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.

The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.

The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.

Civil Society

The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.

Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.

The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.

Features

Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA

Published

16 hours ago

2026/10/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

By Ramya Kumar

According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.

An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.

The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.

Top-down check-box activities

The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.

There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).

1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….

2: And with pictures and all…

1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”

2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..

1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…

2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!

1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.

2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…

Auditing everything but power

QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.

The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.

A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.

This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.

External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.

Rethinking university QA

Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.

QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.

(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)

. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

Features

Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!

Published

16 hours ago

2026/10/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

Down Memory Lane: Ready to sing again

Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.

Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.

The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.

Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.

The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor

Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!

This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.

Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.

Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!

For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.