Features

Is Singapore a role model we must emulate?

Published

3 years ago

2022/04/29

Sahan Weerasooriya

By Susirith Mendis

(susmend2610@gmail.com)

I was prompted to write this post after I read the article in ‘The Island’ newspaper titled “The MPH Formula of Singapore” on 25th April 2022, by an anonymous author.

For the past few decades, especially since 1977, when JRJ said that he would make Sri Lanka a ‘Singapore’, this comparison between Sri Lanka and Singapore had been bandied about, ad nauseum. So many have been eulogising Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) and the ‘Singapore miracle’ that he created from next to nothing. Singapore is the role model that is being held up for us to emulate.

It was said in that article, that “the need of the hour for Sri Lanka” is the ‘MPH Formula’ – Meritocracy, Pragmatism and Honesty – of Singapore; that it is the magic formula that made Singapore what it is. Nobody will disagree that the ‘MPH Formula’ is necessary for good governance and economic development of any country. But do we need to take Singapore as a role model for such governance?

Is this formula a true representation of Singaporean governance? Or, is this a half-truth with a dark underbelly deliberately withheld in the uninformed enthusiasm (or desperation) to seek role models? Why not look closer for the real truth? Why not be both truthful and realistic and call Singapore’s magic formula MPHD or MPHA? Why not add the words dictatorship or autocracy to it?

Take an unblinkered closer look at the economic miracles of the ‘Four Asian Tigers’ – Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Between the early 1960s and 1990s, they underwent rapid industrialisation and maintained exceptionally high growth rates. They were called ‘The Asian Miracles’. If you wish, you can add the other Asian ‘miracles’ to this list – Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.

There is a common thread that runs through all these ‘miracles’ (perhaps with the exception of the then British-ruled Hong Kong) – political repression and authoritarianism. Since I do not wish to make this too lengthy an article, I will limit myself to who LKY really was, and how his ‘Singapore Miracle’ came into being.

1. Repression by LKY

Let us begin with a quote from the horse’s mouth:

“I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yes, if I did not, had I not done that, we wouldn’t be here today. And I say without the slightest remorse that we wouldn’t be here, we would not have made economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters – who your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide what is right. Never mind what the people think.”

(Lee Kuan Yew – The Straits Times, April 20, 1987)

LKY said the following to one of the “silver-tongued, but more principled member of the Opposition” in independent Singapore’s first parliament, J.B. Jeyaretnam:

“If you are a troublemaker … it’s our job to politically destroy you. Put it this way. As long as J.B. Jeyaretnam stands for what he stands for – a thoroughly destructive force – we will knock him. Everybody knows that in my bag I have a hatchet, and a very sharp one.”

The New York Times reported on Nov. 16, 1986, that Mr. J.B. Jeyaretnam, a Tamil of Sri Lankan descent, who was the leader of Singapore’s parliamentary opposition was sentenced to a token month in prison and stripped of his seat in the country’s legislature. At that time, LKY’s People’s Action Party (PAP) held 77 of the 79 seats in Parliament. The opposition, thereby, was reduced to just one MP. Has anybody wondered why the PAP has held power continuously since 1959 – even before Singapore’s independence from Malaya? If not, why not?

With incredibly petty vindictiveness, LKY’s government pursued Chee Soon Juan, who was fired in 1993 from his teaching job at the National University of Singapore after he had joined an Opposition party, and who was repeatedly imprisoned and bankrupted simply for joining an Opposition party and for holding small street demonstrations to air criticisms that state-controlled media wouldn’t publish. Since 2002, he had been repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for organising a rally to promote workers’ rights; he has regularly faced legal charges for speaking out about undemocratic practices in Singapore in the past and has twice been imprisoned for speaking in public without a permit; and fined S$20,000 (US$15,720) for “making an address in a public place without a license”.

Chee Soon Juan was the secretary-general of the Opposition Singapore Democratic Party (SDP). He has been convicted four times, in each case for speaking in a public area with street vendors for four to five minutes about upcoming elections ultimately held in May 2006. The courts convicted Chee of violating the Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (PEMA), which provides that “any person who provides … any public entertainment without a license under this Act, shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000.”

Thor Halvorssen, President of the Human Rights Foundation, published an open letter to LKY’s son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, noting that, “In the last 20 years he (Dr. Chee) has been jailed for more than 130 days on charges including contempt of Parliament, speaking in public without a permit, selling books improperly, and attempting to leave the country without a permit. Today, your government prevents Dr. Chee from leaving Singapore because of his bankrupt status … It is our considered judgment that having already persecuted, prosecuted, bankrupted and silenced Dr. Chee inside Singapore, you now wish to render him silent beyond your own borders.”

Another one-time founding father of Singapore, its former Solicitor General Francis Seow, had to flee the country after declaring that its Law Society, which he headed, could comment critically on government legislation. Seow was arrested and detained for 72 days under Singapore’s Internal Security Act on allegations that he had received funds from the United States to enter Opposition politics. Seow lives in exile in Massachusetts, where he has been a fellow at the East Asian Legal Studies Programme and the Human Rights Programme at Harvard Law School.

Here is the first two paragraphs of the foreword to the second edition of the Amnesty International Report on Singapore in 1978:

“The first edition of Amnesty International’s Briefing on Singapore was published in February 1976. Since then, the Singapore Government has taken a series of actions which have led to serious violations of human rights. More men and women whom the government claim are members of or sympathizers with some branch or satellite organia0stion of the illegal Communist Party of Malaya have been arrested.

However, no formal charges have been brought against them and there is no opportunity to test the government’s allegations in court. These people can be imprisoned indefinitely without charge or trial by government order under the Internal Security Act. Those arrested in 1976-77 include people who have been outspoken in their criticism of the Singapore Government.

Former political detainees, some of whom spent up to 10 years in prison without trial in the 1960s, have been arbitrarily re-arrested and once again face indefinite detention without trial.

An increasing number of political detainees have made “confessions” on the State-run television and in the government-supervised press. Such “confessions”, which are usually required as a pre-condition for release, contain claims relating to allegations that they have engaged in illegal and subversive activities, but their statements are not tested in open court according to generally accepted legal practce. The “confessions” often implicate friends and associates of the detainee and are used by the government as a pretext to arrest these people.

There is growing concern, both in Singapore and abroad, at the increasing use of public “confession” to justify the arrest and imprisonment of men and women without any involvement of judicial process.”

2. Racism of LKY

Too often, Singapore is held up as the epitome of racial equality and ethnic harmony. Let us just quote LKY himself to disabuse you of that notion about Singapore.

“Now if democracy will not work for the Russians, a white Christian people, can we assume that it will naturally work with Asians?” he asked on May 9, 1991, at a symposium sponsored by the large Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun.

Race riots among Chinese, Indian and Muslim Malay residents of Singapore in the 1950s had taught LKY to impose “harmony” through strict allocations of resources and services along race lines: All Singaporeans carry ethnic identity cards. A policeman or government official examining the ID of a Singaporean will immediately know the race/ethnicity of that person.

Here is more from LKY:

“The Bell curve is a fact of life. The blacks on average score 85 per cent on IQ and it is accurate, nothing to do with culture. The whites score on average 100. Asians score more … the Bell curve authors put it at least 10 points higher. These are realities that, if you do not accept, will lead to frustration because you will be spending money on wrong assumptions and the results cannot follow.” (LKY in 1997, in an interview for the book ‘Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas’).

“If I tell Singaporeans – we are all equal regardless of race, language, religion, culture, then they will say, ‘Look, I’m doing poorly. You are responsible.’ But I can show that from British times, certain groups have always done poorly, in mathematics and in science. But I’m not God, I can’t change you …” (in LKY’s book ‘Success Stories’ – 2002).

Was LKY endorsing or recommending eugenics?

“People get educated, the bright ones rise, they marry equally well-educated spouses. The result is their children are smarter than those who are gardeners. Not that all the children of gardeners are duds. Occasionally two grey horses produce a white horse but very few. If you have two white horses, the chances are you breed white horses. It’s seldom spoken publicly because those who are NOT white horses say, ‘You’re degrading me’. But it’s a fact of life. You get a good mare, you don’t want a dud stallion to breed with your good mare. You get a poor foal. Your mental capacity and your EQ and the rest of you, 70 to 80% is genetic.” (in LKY’s book ‘Hard Truths’(2011)

(For more, read Jim Sleeper’s article ‘Lee Kuan Yew’s hard truths’ in ‘Open Democracy’).

3. Singapore’s migrant underclass

“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” wrote George Orwell in ‘Animal Farm’. The father of Singapore and its present leaders obviously seem to agree with this jocular Orwellian understatement.

The horrible plight of the Singaporean migrant underclass was exposed to the whole world when Covid-19 hit Singapore.

As the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases skyrocketed in migrant worker dormitories—where men from India, Bangladesh, and China live in cramped rooms of about 12 to 20 persons, making social distancing impossible – the government adopted a racist strategy of treating the situation as one of “two separate infections,” one affecting migrant workers in dormitories and another circulating within “our own community” in Singapore, as relayed by National Development Minister Lawrence Wong. (FP, May 6th 2020)

Purpose-built and factory-converted dormitories that housed 323,000 migrant men were an epicentre of the pandemic. Singapore has 1,427,500 migrant workers comprising 38% of its labour force. The prejudices and negative attitudes against migrant workers are well-documented in ‘Research Brief’, a document by the UN WOMEN of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in December 2020. The public (Singaporean citizens) attitudes to, and perceptions of, migrant workers have deteriorated since the previous study done in 2010, they claim. A significant percentage of Singaporean citizens (36%) are of the view that migrant workers should not be given equal pay for equal work; should not receive same work; and should not be able to join unions.

An article published by the Asia Pacific Migration Network of the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand, notes that foreign workers in Singapore work long hours for low pay in frequently hazardous conditions and are often abused by employers and labour contractors and “many have to endure abuse, discrimination and violations of their rights but few can obtain legal redress.”

With a total population of approx. 5.82 million (2022), roughly 1.43 million people in Singapore are in the foreign work force. Non-citizens now comprise 36% of the population compared with 14% in 1990. Singapore, in too many ways is a “fiefdom”; raising concerns that the country is starting to resemble the oil-rich Gulf sheikhdoms in which low-paid overseas workers allow citizens to enjoy lives of ease.

In terms of undemocratic governance, inbuilt racism, enforced ethnic harmony and migrant forced-labour, Sri Lanka is comparatively still a haven compared with Singapore. The worst of our good governance parameters have not exceeded those that have been prevalent for decades of LKY rule. What we have instead is chronic economic underdevelopment – the scourge of many developing third world democracies.

When those who should know better, tell us that Singapore should be our ‘role model’, are they telling us to follow the despotism of LKY? Were we not shocked when an uninformed priest (Anunayake of the Asgiriya Chapter, Venduruwe Upali) asked Gotabhaya Rajapakse – Presidential candidate – to become a Hitler? It seems, from some ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ voices we have heard, that he seemed to have faulted on the name. Instead, if he had said “be like LKY” would our ‘Singapore-Model’ torch-bearers have said that anything was amiss? That we do not want the autocracy of LKY?

What we are being told by these same voices is that the final economic outcomes outweigh the democratic freedoms we treasure. A ‘miracle’ like Singapore (or South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia or Indonesia) is what counts and not its record of political repression. The oxymoronic expression ‘benevolent dictator’ is often in convenient usage and now part of the political lexicon. LKY is said to be one such rare national leader. The venerable Asgiriya Anunayake must have had a ‘benevolent dictator’ in mind when he made the unforgivable faux pas.

Or are we advocating what I mentioned at the outset – MPHD or MPHA? That dictatorship, autocracy and repression is OK if meritocracy, pragmatism and honesty is also practiced in governance? That what we need is development at any cost to individual freedoms? That democracy and civic freedoms can be sacrificed at the altar of the creation of an affluent state? That repression is OK if we are given adequate food and fuel?

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Features

The Great and Little Traditions and Sri Lankan Historiography

Published

4 hours ago

2025/04/2

Sahan Weerasooriya

Prof. Obeyesekere

Power, Culture, and Historical Memory:

History, broadly defined, is the study of the past. It is a crucial component of the production and reproduction of culture. Studying every past event is neither feasible nor useful. Therefore, it is necessary to be selective about what to study from the countless events in the past. Deciding what to study, what to ignore, how to study, and how deeply to go into the past is a conscious choices shaped by various forms of power and authority. If studying the past is a main element of the production and reproduction of culture and History is its product, can a socially and culturally divided society truly have a common/shared History? To what extent does ‘established’ or ‘authentic’ History reflect the experiences of those remained outside the political, economic, social, and cultural power structures? Do marginalized groups have their own histories, distinct from dominant narratives? If so, how do these histories relate to ‘established’ History? Historiography today cannot ignore these questions, as they challenge the very notion of truth in History. Due to methodological shifts driven by post-positivist critiques of previously accepted assumptions, the discipline of history—particularly historiography—has moved into a new epistemological terrain.

The post-structuralism and related philosophical discourses have necessitated a critical reexamination of the established epistemological core of various social science disciplines, including history. This intellectual shift has led to a blurring of traditional disciplinary boundaries among the social sciences and the humanities. Consequently, concepts, theories, and heuristic frames developed in one discipline are increasingly being incorporated into others, fostering a process of cross-fertilization that enriches and transforms scholarly inquiry

In recent decades, the discipline of History has broadened its scope and methodologies through interactions with perspectives from the Social Sciences and Humanities. Among the many analytical tools adopted from other disciplines, the Great Tradition and Little Tradition have had a significant impact on historical methodology. This article examines how these concepts, originally developed in social anthropology, have been integrated into Sri Lankan historiography and assesses their role in deepening our understanding of the past.

The heuristic construct of the Great and Little Traditions first emerged in the context of US Social Anthropology as a tool/framework for identifying and classifying cultures. In his seminal work Peasant society and culture: an anthropological approach to civilization, (1956), Robert Redfield introduced the idea of Great and Little Traditions to explain the dual structure of cultural expression in societies, particularly in peasant communities that exist within larger civilizations. His main arguments can be summarized as follows:

a) An agrarian society cannot exist as a fully autonomous entity; rather, it is just one dimension of the broader culture in which it is embedded. Therefore, studying an agrarian society in isolation from its surrounding cultural context is neither possible nor meaningful.

b) Agrarian society, when views in isolation, is a ‘half society’, representing a partial aspect/ one dimension of the broader civilization in which it exits. In that sense, agrarian civilization is a half civilization. To fully understand agrarian society—and by extension, agrarian civilization—it is essential to examine the other half that contribute to the whole.

c) Agrarian society was shaped by the interplay of two cultural traditions within a single framework: the Great Tradition and the Little Tradition. These traditions together provided the unity that defined the civilization embedded in agrarian society.

d) The social dimensions of these cultural traditions would be the Great Society and the Little Society.

e) The Great Culture encompasses the cultural framework of the Great Society, shaped by those who establish its norms. This group includes the educated elite, clergy, theologians, and literati, whose discourse is often regarded as erudite and whose language is considered classical.

f) The social groups excluded from the “Great Society”—referred to as the “Little Society”—have their own distinct traditions and culture. The “Great Tradition” represents those who appropriate society’s surplus production, and its cultural expressions reflect this dominance. In contrast, the “Little Tradition” belongs to those who generate surplus production. While the “Great Tradition” is inherently tied to power and authority, the “Little Tradition” is not directly connected to them.

g) According to Robert Redfield, the Great and Little Traditions are not contradictory but rather distinct cultural elements within a society. The cultural totality of peasant society encompasses both traditions. As Redfield describes, they are “two currents of thought and action, distinguishable, yet overflowing into and out of each other.” (Redfield, 1956).

At the time Redfield published his book Peasant Society and Culture: an Anthropological Approach to Civilization (1956), the dominant analytical framework for studying non-Western societies was modernization theory. This perspective, which gained prominence in the post-World War II era, was deeply influenced by the US geopolitical concerns. Modernization theory became a guiding paradigm shaping research agendas in anthropology, sociology, political science, and development studies in US institutions of higher learning,

Modernization theory viewed societies as existing along a continuum between “traditional” and “modern” stages, with Western industrialized nations positioned near the modern end. Scholars working within this framework argued that economic growth, technological advancement, urbanization, and the rationalization of social structures drive traditional societies toward modernization. The theory often emphasized Western-style education, democratic institutions, and capitalist economies as essential components of this transition.

While engaging with aspects of modernization theory, Redfield offered a more nuanced perspective on non-Western societies. His concept of the “folk-urban continuum” challenged rigid dichotomies between tradition and modernity, proposing that social change occurs through complex interactions between rural and urban ways of life rather than through the simple replacement of one by the other.

The concepts of the Great and Little Traditions gained prominence in Sri Lankan social science discourse through the works of Gananath Obeyesekere, the renowned sociologist who recently passed away. In his seminal research essay, The Great Tradition and the Little in the Perspective of Sinhalese Buddhism (Journal of Asian Studies, 22, 1963), Gananath Obeyesekere applied and adapted this framework to examine key aspects of Sinhalese Buddhism in Sri Lanka. While Robert Redfield originally developed the concept in the context of agrarian societies, Obeyesekere employed it specifically to analyze Sinhala Buddhist culture, highlighting significant distinctions between the two approaches.

He identifies a phenomenon called ‘Sinhala Buddhism’, which represents a unique fusion of religious and cultural traditions: the Great Tradition (Maha Sampradaya) and the Little Traditions (Chuula Sampradaya). To fully grasp the essence of Sinhala Buddhism, it is essential to understand both of these dimensions and their interplay within society.

The Great Tradition represents the formal, institutionalized aspect of Buddhism, centered on the Three Pitakas and other classical doctrinal texts and commentaries of Theravāda Buddhism. It embodies the orthodoxy of Sinhala Buddhism, emphasizing textual authority, philosophical depth, and ethical conduct. Alongside this exists another dimension of Sinhala Buddhism known as the Little (Chuula) Tradition. This tradition reflects the popular, localized, and ritualistic expressions of Buddhism practiced by laypeople. It encompasses folk beliefs, devotional practices (Bali, Thovil), deity veneration, astrology, and rituals (Hadi and Huunium) aimed at securing worldly benefits. Unlike the doctrinally rigid Great Tradition, the Little Tradition is fluid, adaptive, and shaped by indigenous customs, ancestral practices, and even elements of Hinduism. These Sinhala Buddhist cultural practices are identified as ‘Lay-Buddhism’. Gananath Obeyesekera’s concepts and perspectives on Buddhist culture and society contributed to fostering an active intellectual discourse in society. However, the discussion on the concept of Great and Little Traditions remained largely within the domain of social anthropology.

The scholarly discourse on the concepts of Great and Little Tradition gained new socio-political depth through the work of Newton Gunasinghe, a distinguished Sri Lankan sociologist. He applied these concepts to the study of culture and socio-economic structures in the Kandyan countryside, reframing them in terms of production relations. Through his extensive writings and public lectures, Gunasinghe reinterpreted the Great and Little Tradition framework to explore the interconnections between economy, society, and culture.

Blending conventional social anthropology approach with Marxist analyses of production relations and Gramscian perspectives on culture and politics, he offered a nuanced understanding of these dynamics. In the context of our discussion, his key insights on culture, society, and modes of production can be summarized as follows.

a. The social and economic relations of the central highlands under the Kandyan Kingdom, the immediate pre-colonial social and economic order, were his focus. His analysis did not cover to the hydraulic Civilization of Sri Lanka.

b. He explored the organic and dialectical relationship between culture, forces of production, and modes of production. Drawing on the concepts of Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser, he examined how culture, politics, and the economy interact, identifying the relationship between cultural formations and production relations

c. Newton Gunasinghe’s unique approach to the concepts of Great Culture and Little Culture lies in his connection of cultural formations to forces and relations of production. He argues that the relationship between a society’s structures and its superstructures is both dialectical and interpenetrative.

d. He observed that during the Kandyan period, the culture associated with the Little Tradition prevailed, rather than the culture linked to the Great Tradition.

e. The limitations of productive forces led to minimal surplus generation, with a significant portion allocated to defense. The constrained resources sustained only the Little Tradition. Consequently, the predominant cultural mode in the Kandyan Kingdom was, broadly speaking, the Little Tradition.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella

Features

Celebrating 25 Years of Excellence: The Silver Jubilee of SLIIT – II

Published

4 hours ago

2025/04/2

Sahan Weerasooriya

Founded in 1999, with its main campus in Malabe and multiple centres across the country—including Metro Campus (Colombo), Matara, Kurunegala, Kandy (Pallekele), and Jaffna (Northern Uni)—SLIIT provides state-of-the-art facilities for students, now celebrating 25 years of excellence in 2025.

Kandy Campus

SLIIT is a degree-awarding higher education institute authorised and approved by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and Ministry of Higher Education under the University Act of the Government of Sri Lanka. SLIIT is also the first Sri Lankan institute accredited by the Institution of Engineering & Technology, UK. Further, SLIIT is also a member of the Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU) and the International Association of Universities (IAU).

Since its inception, SLIIT has played a pivotal role in shaping the technological and educational landscape of Sri Lanka, producing graduates who have excelled in both local and global arenas. This milestone is a testament to the institution’s unwavering commitment to academic excellence, research, and industry collaboration.

Summary of SLIIT’s

History and Status

Sri Lanka Institute of Information Technology (SLIIT) operates as a company limited by guarantee, meaning it has no shareholders and reinvests all surpluses into academic and institutional development.

* Independence from Government: SLIIT was established in 1999 as an independent entity without government ownership or funding, apart from an initial industry promotion grant from the Board of Investment (BOI).

* Mahapola Trust Fund Involvement & Malabe Campus: In 2000, the Mahapola Trust Fund (MTF) agreed to support SLIIT with funding and land for the Malabe Campus. In 2015, SLIIT fully repaid MTF with interest, ending financial ties.

* True Independence (2017-Present): In 2017, SLIIT was officially delisted from any government ministry, reaffirming its status as a self-sustaining, non-state higher education institution.

Today, SLIIT is recognised for academic excellence, global collaborations, and its role in producing IT professionals in Sri Lanka

.A Journey of Growth and Innovation

SLIIT began as a pioneering institution dedicated to advancing information technology education in Sri Lanka. Over the past two and a half decades, it has expanded its academic offerings, establishing itself as a multidisciplinary university with programmess in engineering, business, architecture, and humanities, in addition to IT. The growth of SLIIT has been marked by continuous improvement in infrastructure, faculty development, and curriculum enhancement, ensuring that students receive world-class education aligned with industry needs.

Looking Ahead: The Next 25 Years

As SLIIT celebrates its Silver Jubilee, the institution looks forward to the future with a renewed commitment to excellence. With advancements in technology, the rise of artificial intelligence, and the increasing demand for skilled professionals, SLIIT aims to further expand its academic offerings, enhance research capabilities, and continue fostering a culture of innovation. The next 25 years promise to be even more transformative, as the university aspires to make greater contributions to national and global progress.

Sports Achievements:

A Legacy of Excellence

SLIIT has not only excelled in academics but has also built a strong reputation in sports. Over the years, the university has actively promoted athletics and competitive sports by organising inter-university and inter-school competitions, fostering a culture of teamwork, discipline, and resilience. SLIIT teams have secured victories in national and inter-university competitions across various sports, including cricket, basketball, badminton, rugby, football, swimming, and athletics. SLIIT’s sports achievements reflect its dedication to holistic student development, encouraging students to excel beyond the classroom.

Kings of the pool!

Once again, our swimmers have brought glory to SLIIT by emerging as champions at the Asia Pacific Institute of Information and Technology Extravaganza Swimming Championship 2024. They won the Men’s, Women’s, and Overall Championships. Congratulations to all swimmers for their dedication and hard work in the pool, bringing honour to SLIIT.

Winning International Competitions

SLIIT students have participated in and excelled in various international competitions, including Robofest, Codefest, and the University of Queensland – Design Solution for Impact Competition, showcasing their skills and talent on a global stage.

Here’s a more detailed look at SLIIT’s involvement in international competitions:

Robofest:

SLIIT’s Faculty of Engineering organises the annual Robofest competition, which aims to empower students with skills in electronics, robotics, critical thinking, and problem-solving, preparing them to compete internationally and bring recognition to Sri Lankan talent.

Codefest:

CODEFEST is a nationwide Software Competition organized by the Faculty of Computing of Sri Lanka Institute of Information Technology (SLIIT) geared towards exhibiting the software application design and developing talents of students island-wide. It is an effort of SLIIT to elevate the entire nation’s ICT knowledge to achieve its aspiration of being the knowledge hub in Asia. CODEFEST was first organised in 2012 and this year it will be held for the 8th consecutive time in parallel with the 20th anniversary celebrations of SLIIT.

University of Queensland – Design Solution for Impact Competition:

SLIIT hosted the first-ever University of Queensland – Design Solution for Impact Competition in Sri Lanka, with 16 school teams from across the country participating.

International Open Day:

SLIIT organises an International Open Day where students can connect with distinguished lecturers and university representatives from prestigious institutions like the University of Queensland, Liverpool John Moores University, and Manchester Metropolitan University.

Brain Busters:

SLIIT Brain Busters is a quiz competition organised by SLIIT. The competition is open to students of National, Private and International Schools Island wide. The programme is broadcast on TV1 television as a series.

Inter-University Dance Competition:

SLIIT Team Diamonds for being selected as finalists and advancing to the Grand Finale of Tantalize 2024, the inter-university dance competition organised by APIIT Sri Lanka. The 14 talented team members from various SLIIT faculties have showcased their skills in Team Diamonds and earned their spot as finalists, competing among over 30 teams from state universities, private universities, and higher education institutes.

Softskills+

For the 11th consecutive year, Softskills+ returns with an exciting lineup of events aimed at honing essential soft skills among students. The program encompasses an interschool quiz contest and a comprehensive workshop focused on developing teamwork, problem-solving abilities, leadership qualities, and fostering creative thinking.

Recently, the Faculty of Business at SLIIT organised its annual Inter-school Quiz Competition and Soft Skills Workshop, marking its fifth successive year. Targeting students in grades 11 to 13 from Commerce streams across State, Private, and International schools, the workshop sought to ignite a passion for soft skills development, emphasising teamwork, problem-solving, creativity, and innovative thinking. Recognising the increasing importance of these soft skills in today’s workforce, the programme aims to fill the gap often left unaddressed in the school curriculum.”

The winners of the soft skill competition with Professor Lakshman Rathnayake: Chairman/Chancellor, Vice Chancellor/MD Professor Lalith Gamage, Professor Nimal Rajapakse: Senior Deputy Vice – Chancellor & Provost, Deputy Vice Chancellor – Research and International Affairs Professor Samantha Thelijjagoda, and Veteran Film Director Somarathna Dissanayake.

VogueFest 2024:

SLIIT Business School organised VogueFest 2024, a platform for emerging fashion designers under 30 to showcase their work and win prizes.

T-shirt Design Competition with Sheffield Hallam University:

SLIIT and Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) UK collaborated on a T-shirt designing competition, with a voting procedure to select the best design.

SLIIT’s Got Talent

: The annual talent show, SLIIT’s Got Talent 2024, was held for the 10th consecutive year at the Nelum Pokuna Mahinda Rajapaksa Theatre on 27th September 2024. SLIIT’s Got Talent had the audience energised with amazing performances, showcasing mind-blowing talent by the orchestra and the talented undergraduates from all faculties.

Other events:

* SLIIT also participates in events like the EDUVision Exhibition organised by the Richmond College Old Boys’ Association.

* They hosted the first-ever University of Queensland – Design Solution for Impact Competition in Sri Lanka.

* SLIIT Business School also organised the Business Proposal Competition.

SLIIT Academy:

SLIIT Academy (Pvt.) Ltd. provides industrial-oriented learning experiences for students.

International Partnerships:

SLIIT has strong international partnerships with universities like Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU), The University of Queensland (UQ), Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU), and Curtin University Australia, providing opportunities for students to study and participate in international events.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT University, Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala).

Features

Inescapable need to deal with the past

Published

1 day ago

2025/04/1

Sahan Weerasooriya

The sudden reemergence of two major incidents from the past, that had become peripheral to the concerns of people today, has jolted the national polity and come to its centre stage. These are the interview by former president Ranil Wickremesinghe with the Al Jazeera television station that elicited the Batalanda issue and now the sanctioning of three former military commanders of the Sri Lankan armed forces and an LTTE commander, who switched sides and joined the government. The key lesson that these two incidents give is that allegations of mass crimes, whether they arise nationally or internationally, have to be dealt with at some time or the other. If they are not, they continue to fester beneath the surface until they rise again in a most unexpected way and when they may be more difficult to deal with.

In the case of the Batalanda interrogation site, the sudden reemergence of issues that seemed buried in the past has given rise to conjecture. The Batalanda issue, which goes back 37 years, was never totally off the radar. But after the last of the commission reports of the JVP period had been published over two decades ago, this matter was no longer at the forefront of public consciousness. Most of those in the younger generations who were too young to know what happened at that time, or born afterwards, would scarcely have any idea of what happened at Batalanda. But once the issue of human rights violations surfaced on Al Jazeera television they have come to occupy centre stage. From the day the former president gave his fateful interview there are commentaries on it both in the mainstream media and on social media.

There seems to be a sustained effort to keep the issue alive. The issues of Batalanda provide good fodder to politicians who are campaigning for election at the forthcoming Local Government elections on May 6. It is notable that the publicity on what transpired at Batalanda provides a way in which the outcome of the forthcoming local government elections in the worst affected parts of the country may be swayed. The problem is that the main contesting political parties are liable to be accused of participation in the JVP insurrection or its suppression or both. This may account for the widening of the scope of the allegations to include other sites such as Matale.

POLITICAL IMPERATIVES

The emergence at this time of the human rights violations and war crimes that took place during the LTTE war have their own political reasons, though these are external. The pursuit of truth and accountability must be universal and free from political motivations. Justice cannot be applied selectively. While human rights violations and war crimes call for universal standards that are applicable to all including those being committed at this time in Gaza and Ukraine, political imperatives influence what is surfaced. The sanctioning of the four military commanders by the UK government has been justified by the UK government minister concerned as being the fulfilment of an election pledge that he had made to his constituents. It is notable that the countries at the forefront of justice for Sri Lanka have large Tamil Diasporas that act as vote banks. It usually takes long time to prosecute human rights violations internationally whether it be in South America or East Timor and diasporas have the staying power and resources to keep going on.

In its response to the sanctions placed on the military commanders, the government’s position is that such unilateral decisions by foreign government are not helpful and complicate the task of national reconciliation. It has faced criticism for its restrained response, with some expecting a more forceful rebuttal against the international community. However, the NPP government is not the first to have had to face such problems. The sanctioning of military commanders and even of former presidents has taken place during the periods of previous governments. One of the former commanders who has been sanctioned by the UK government at this time was also sanctioned by the US government in 2020. This was followed by the Canadian government which sanctioned two former presidents in 2023. Neither of the two governments in power at that time took visibly stronger stands.

In addition, resolutions on Sri Lanka have been a regular occurrence and have been passed over the Sri Lankan government’s opposition since 2012. Apart from the very first vote that took place in 2009 when the government promised to take necessary action to deal with the human rights violations of the past, and won that vote, the government has lost every succeeding vote with the margins of defeat becoming bigger and bigger. This process has now culminated in an evidence gathering unit being set up in Geneva to collect evidence of human rights violations in Sri Lanka that is on offer to international governments to use. This is not a safe situation for Sri Lankan leaders to be in as they can be taken before international courts in foreign countries. It is important for Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and dignity as a country that this trend comes to an end.

COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION

A peaceful future for Sri Lanka requires a multi-dimensional approach that addresses the root causes of conflict while fostering reconciliation, justice, and inclusive development. So far the government’s response to the international pressures is to indicate that it will strengthen the internal mechanisms already in place like the Office on Missing Persons and in addition to set up a truth and reconciliation commission. The difficulty that the government will face is to obtain a national consensus behind this truth and reconciliation commission. Tamil parties and victims’ groups in particular have voiced scepticism about the value of this mechanism. They have seen commissions come and commissions go. Sinhalese nationalist parties are also highly critical of the need for such commissions. As the Nawaz Commission appointed to identify the recommendations of previous commissions observed, “Our island nation has had a surfeit of commissions. Many witnesses who testified before this commission narrated their disappointment of going before previous commissions and achieving nothing in return.”

Former minister Prof G L Peiris has written a detailed critique of the proposed truth and reconciliation law that the previous government prepared but did not present to parliament.

In his critique, Prof Peiris had drawn from the South African truth and reconciliation commission which is the best known and most thoroughly implemented one in the world. He points out that the South African commission had a mandate to cover the entire country and not only some parts of it like the Sri Lankan law proposes. The need for a Sri Lankan truth and reconciliation commission to cover the entire country and not only the north and east is clear in the reemergence of the Batalanda issue. Serious human rights violations have occurred in all parts of the country, and to those from all ethnic and religious communities, and not only in the north and east.

Dealing with the past can only be successful in the context of a “system change” in which there is mutual agreement about the future. The longer this is delayed, the more scepticism will grow among victims and the broader public about the government’s commitment to a solution. The important feature of the South African commission was that it was part of a larger political process aimed to build national consensus through a long and strenuous process of consultations. The ultimate goal of the South African reconciliation process was a comprehensive political settlement that included power-sharing between racial groups and accountability measures that facilitated healing for all sides. If Sri Lanka is to achieve genuine reconciliation, it is necessary to learn from these experiences and take decisive steps to address past injustices in a manner that fosters lasting national unity. A peaceful Sri Lanka is possible if the government, opposition and people commit to truth, justice and inclusivity.

by Jehan Perera