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Is India a ‘swing state’? A response

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In an article titled “India shaping-up as model ‘swing state” (The Island 29.01.2026) Lynn Ockersz says, “Besides, this columnist would go so far as to describe India as a principal ‘Swing State.’ To clarify the latter concept in its essentials, it could be stated that the typical ‘Swing State’ wields considerable influence and power regionally and globally. Besides they are thriving democracies and occupy a strategic geographical location which enhances their appeal for other states of the region and enables them to relate to the latter with a degree of equableness. Their strategic location makes it possible for ‘Swing States’ to even mediate in resolving conflicts among states”.

A ‘swing state’, as in elections, should be able to decisively influence the final outcome. In the context in which India is recognised as a ‘swing state’ the final outcome should first be regional and then, if possible, extend to the rest of the world. And the desirable outcome must entail regional peace, cordial relations and economic stability which would constitute the most vital needs for any part of today’s world. Military power should not feature in the equation, for more often than not, such power is used to brow beat into submission the weak and the poor.

India no doubt is growing fast to be a global economic power and militarily also it is way ahead of the region. Its democracy, in the sense that democracies are measured in today’s world, also may be as the columnist says “thriving”. However, periodical elections, however fair they could be, should not be the sole criterion to judge democracy. If democracy cannot solve the problem of inequality it may lose its credibility as a mode of good governance. As a means of finding who rules, the system may be satisfactory but the other vital components of democracy, such as equitable wealth distribution, if lacking, the system may not serve its purpose.

Inequality in India is among the highest globally, with the top 1% owning nearly 40% of national wealth and the top 10% holding roughly 65% of total wealth and 58% of income. While the economy grows, the bottom 50% receives only 15% of the income. This disparity, driven by wealth concentration and low female labour participation, persists across class, caste, and gender. The income gap between the top 10% and the bottom 50% remained stable, with no significant reduction in inequality over the last decade.

India ranks very low in gender parity (127 out of 146 countries in the Global Gender Gap Report 2023). Female labour force participation is very low, at 15.7% (though government data suggests 41.7% by including agriculture and unpaid work). Women earn significantly less than men, working 53 hours per week compared to 43 for men. Inequality is intensified by existing social divides based on caste, religion, region, and gender. Access to healthcare is limited for many, with 63 million people pushed into poverty annually due to costs. Approximately 74% of India’s population could not afford a healthy diet in 2023. Roughly 64% of the total Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India comes from the bottom 50% of the population, whereas only 4% comes from the top 10% (Global Inequality Report 2024).

This sad state may not be the fault of democracy but the economic system of all so called democratic countries. The other three countries, Indonesia, South Africa and South Korea, that the columnist has named as suitable to be ‘swing states’ are no better. Neoliberalism and democracy are increasingly viewed by critics as an “evil nexus” or a destructive pairing, where the logic of the free market—privatisation, deregulation, and austerity—subverts the principles of democratic self-governance and social equality.

However, my main argument concerns the more important qualities that a country must possess to qualify as a ‘swing state’; the capacity to lead from the front in campaigning for peace and cordiality in the region. In this regard India fails miserably. The past with regards to good neighbourliness, where mighty India is concerned, tells a sad story. How it tried to solve the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka may be etched in the minds of those who lived in that era. The “parippu-drop” followed by gun-boat diplomacy saved the LTTE enabling it to continue with its murderous terrorism aimed at dividing the country. It was India who provided the initial “infra-structure” for training of terrorists who waged a thirty year war in Sri Lanka, committing brutal genocide against the Sinhalese and Muslims and not sparing the Tamils as well. India did not lift a finger to stop the bloodletting. Then it rammed the 13th A down our throats as a solution to the problem but did not keep to its terms and conditions which required it to disarm the LTTE. 13th A hangs over our head like the Sword of Damocles and India doesn’t fail to remind us about it from time to time. And we are burdened with the white elephant of provincial councils. Moreover, evidently India continues to interfere in our internal affairs, apparently colluding with the US, it may have had a hand in the regime change in Sri Lanka in 2022 (Shamindra Ferdinando, The Island, 04.02.2026). Another matter that appears to be perniciously secretive is that the Indian government doesn’t want the Sri Lankan government to reveal to its people the contents of the defence agreement it has entered into with the latter, as if people didn’t matter !

Now that tiny Sri Lanka is weakened and pliable after suffering multiple crises, India comes to its aid at the slightest mishap, very much like the hero who comes to the rescue of the damsel in distress, seemingly competing with other suitors. It doesn’t want the damsel to fall into the arms of China, given its geopolitical beauty.

Take the case of the other neighbours of India, does it have the capacity to swing, for instance, Pakistan into at least a position of less animosity. And what about its eastern neighbour, Bangladesh? They can’t even play cricket. Relations between India and Bangladesh, are currently under severe strain as of early 2026, driven by the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who has been given asylum in India to the chagrin of Bangladesh. Tensions are high due to attacks on diplomats, stalled visa services, water disputes, and alleged interference. The unresolved sharing of the Teesta River and other transboundary rivers remains a major contention, with Bangladesh accusing India of managing these to its detriment. Concerns exist in New Delhi regarding Bangladesh strengthening ties with other nations like Pakistan, seen as a shift away from Indian influence (Altaf Moti, 2026).

Coming back to the conflict with its western neighbour Pakistan, since the 1947 partition, both countries have claimed Kashmir, a region inhabited by a majority Muslim population but initially ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, leading to wars in 1947, 1965, and 1999. India accuses Pakistan of supporting militant groups in Kashmir, a claim Pakistan denies, which has frequently led to military escalations, such as the 2019 Pulwama incident and 2025 strikes. The Indus Waters Treaty is under strain, with potential for conflict over control of water resources. Both nations are nuclear-armed, raising international concerns about regional stability. Recent tensions included increased cross-border firing, drone warfare, and suspected militant attacks in Kashmir, leading to retaliatory missile strikes. The conflict remains a major geopolitical issue, with tensions frequently escalating due to nationalist sentiment and a lack of diplomatic progress (Britanica, 2026).

Another matter of relevance is that India-Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are defined by a complex, triangular, and competitive dynamic. Following the 2021 Taliban takeover, India has adopted a pragmatic, security-focused approach, delivering humanitarian aid to Afghanistan via Iran to circumvent Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan-Afghanistan ties have deteriorated over border disputes, prompting Kabul to seek warmer relations with India as a counterweight to Islamabad. Without formally recognising the Taliban, India has re-established a technical mission in Kabul to secure its interests, monitor anti-India groups, and maintain developmental influence, which directly challenges Pakistan’s historical influence in the region. Is such manoeuvring of regional relations a virtue of a ‘swing state’!

Paradoxically, India is developing a special friendship with the murderous regime of Netanyahu in Israel focussing on defence and anti-terrorism. Indian prime minister is planning to visit Israel towards the end of this month which would obviously boost the image and credibility of a ruler who has committed genocide of the Palestinians. The barb no doubt is intended to prick Pakistan. Could such a country bring peace to the region, which it must if it is to qualify as a ‘swing state’.

India seems to have good relations with its northern neighbour, little Nepal, though minor but persistent issues remain. Disputes, notably regarding the Kalapani-Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh area, have caused tensions. Nepal has, from time to time, requested, a revision of the 1950 Treaty, viewing it as unbalanced. Growing influence of other foreign powers (particularly China) in Nepal poses a strategic challenge for India.

The other northern neighbour, the giant, is a different kettle of fish. India has fought several wars with China and there are frequent border skirmishes. The rivalry between these two giants is second only to that between the US and China. The war for markets, influence and hegemony between these countries may one day tear the world apart.

India seems to be having border disputes with most of its neighbours. Fortunately, we have no common border with it but there is Katchatheevu, on which they have recently made a claim.

India being the big brother must take the initiative to resolve the disputes it has with its neighbours and work towards lasting peace in the region. The inability to do so reflects, more than the external factor, the internal depravity that plagues its politics. One has only to listen to its political leaders during election times to gauge the depth of racism they descend to in order to swing the votes. This phenomenon is more evident in their own ‘swing states’. This racism cannot be confined to its borders, it has to cross the borders and be projected to the neighbourhood, if the politicians are to appear to be truly patriotic. Thus, the border disputes and acrimony continue.

If peace, cordiality and economic stability are the desirable goals for the region – one cannot think of anything more important than these – India may not be the ‘swing state’ that could give leadership to the struggle that would finally bring these qualities to the region.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga



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Opinion

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – II

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A US airstrike on Iran

Broader Strategic Consequences

One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.

Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.

The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.

A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system

The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.

The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.

The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.

Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.

Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.

However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.

Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon

History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.

European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.

by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)

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Opinion

University admission crisis: Academics must lead the way

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130,000 students are left out each year—academics hold the key

Each year, Sri Lanka’s G.C.E. Advanced Level examination produces a wave of hope—this year, nearly 175,000 students qualified for university entrance. Yet only 45,000 will be admitted to state universities. That leaves more than 130,000 young people stranded—qualified, ambitious, but excluded. This is not just a statistic; it is a national crisis. And while policymakers debate infrastructure and funding, the country’s academics must step forward as catalysts of change.

Beyond the Numbers: A National Responsibility

Education is the backbone of Sri Lanka’s development. Denying access to tens of thousands of qualified students risks wasting talent, fueling inequality, and undermining national progress. The gap is not simply about seats in lecture halls—it is about the future of a generation. Academics, as custodians of knowledge, cannot remain passive observers. They must reimagine the delivery of higher education to ensure opportunity is not a privilege for the few.

Expanding Pathways, Not Just Campuses

The traditional model of four-year degrees in brick-and-mortar universities cannot absorb the demand. Academics can design short-term diplomas and certificate programmes that provide immediate access to learning. These programmes, focused on employable skills, would allow thousands to continue their education while easing pressure on degree programmes. Equally important is the digital transformation of education. Online and blended learning modules can extend access to rural students, breaking the monopoly of physical campuses. With academic leadership, Sri Lanka can build a reliable system of credit transfers, enabling students to begin their studies at affiliated institutions and later transfer to state universities.

Partnerships That Protect Quality

Private universities and vocational institutes already absorb many students who miss out on state admissions. But concerns about quality and recognition persist. Academics can bridge this divide by providing quality assurance and standardised curricula, supervising joint degree programmes, and expanding the Open University system. These partnerships would ensure that students outside the state system receive affordable, credible, and internationally recognised education.

Research and Advocacy: Shaping Policy

Academics are not only teachers—they are researchers and thought leaders. By conducting labour market studies, they can align higher education expansion with employability. Evidence-based recommendations to the University Grants Commission (UGC) can guide strategic intake increases, regional university expansion, and government investment in digital infrastructure. In this way, academics can ensure reforms are not reactive, but visionary.

Industry Engagement: Learning Beyond the Classroom

Sri Lanka’s universities must become entrepreneurship hubs and innovation labs. Academics can design programmes that connect students directly with industries, offering internship-based learning and applied research opportunities. This approach reduces reliance on classroom capacity while equipping students with practical skills. It also reframes education as a partnership between universities and the economy, rather than a closed system.

Making the Most of What We Have

Even within existing constraints, academics can expand capacity. Training junior lecturers and adjunct faculty, sharing facilities across universities, and building international collaborations for joint programmes and scholarships are practical steps. These measures maximise resources while opening new avenues for students.

A Call to Action

Sri Lanka’s university admission crisis is not just about numbers—it is about fairness, opportunity, and national development. Academics must lead the way in transforming exclusion into empowerment. By expanding pathways, strengthening partnerships, advocating for policy reform, engaging with industry, and optimizing resources, they can ensure that qualified students are not left behind.

“Education for all, not just the fortunate few.”

Dr. Arosh Bandula (Ph.D. Nottingham), Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna

by Dr. Arosh Bandula

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Opinion

Post-Easter Sri Lanka: Between memory, narrative, and National security

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As Sri Lanka approaches the seventh commemoration of the Easter Sunday attacks, the national mood is once again marked by grief, reflection, and an enduring sense of incompleteness. Nearly seven years later, the tragedy continues to cast a long shadow not only over the victims and their families, but over the institutions and narratives that have since emerged.

Commemoration, however, must go beyond ritual. It must be anchored in clarity, accountability, and restraint. What is increasingly evident in the post-Easter landscape is not merely a search for truth, but a contest over how that truth is framed, interpreted, and presented to the public.

In recent times, public discourse has been shaped by book launches, panel discussions, and media interventions that claim to offer new insights into the attacks. While such contributions are not inherently problematic, the manner in which certain narratives are advanced raises legitimate concerns. The selective disclosure of information particularly when it touches on intelligence operations demands careful scrutiny.

Sri Lanka’s legal and institutional framework is clear on the sensitivity of such matters. The Official Secrets Act (No. 32 of 1955) places strict obligations on the handling of information related to national security. Similarly, the Police Ordinance and internal administrative regulations governing intelligence units emphasize confidentiality, chain of command, and the responsible use of information. These are not mere formalities; they exist to safeguard both operational integrity and national interest.

When individual particularly those with prior access to intelligence structures enter the public domain with claims that are not subject to verification, it raises critical questions. Are these disclosures contributing to justice and accountability, or are they inadvertently compromising institutional credibility and future operational capacity?

The challenge lies in distinguishing between constructive transparency and selective exposure.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks provided one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the attacks. Its findings highlighted a complex web of failures: lapses in intelligence sharing, breakdowns in inter-agency coordination, and serious deficiencies in political oversight. Importantly, it underscored that the attacks were not the result of a single point of failure, but a systemic collapse across multiple levels of governance.

Yet, despite the existence of such detailed institutional findings, public discourse often gravitates toward simplified narratives. There is a tendency to identify singular “masterminds” or to attribute responsibility in ways that align with prevailing political or ideological positions. While such narratives may be compelling, they risk obscuring the deeper structural issues that enabled the attacks to occur.

Equally significant is the broader socio-political context in which these narratives are unfolding. Sri Lanka today remains a society marked by fragile intercommunal relations. The aftermath of the Easter attacks saw heightened suspicion, polarisation, and, in some instances, collective blame directed at entire communities. Although there have been efforts toward reconciliation, these fault lines have not entirely disappeared.

In this environment, the language and tone of public discourse carry immense weight. The framing of terrorism whether as a localized phenomenon or as part of a broader ideological construct must be handled with precision and responsibility. Overgeneralization or the uncritical use of labels can have far-reaching consequences, including the marginalization of communities and the erosion of social cohesion.

At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that the global discourse on terrorism is itself contested. Competing narratives, geopolitical interests, and selective historiography often shape how events are interpreted. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is to avoid becoming a passive recipient of external frameworks that may not fully reflect its own realities.

A professional and unbiased approach requires a commitment to evidence-based analysis. This includes:

· Engaging with primary sources, including official reports and judicial findings
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· Cross-referencing claims with verifiable data
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· Recognizing the limits of publicly available information, particularly in intelligence matters

It also requires intellectual discipline the willingness to question assumptions, to resist convenient conclusions, and to remain open to complexity.

The role of former officials and subject-matter experts in this discourse is particularly important. Their experience can provide valuable insights, but it also carries a responsibility. Public interventions must be guided by professional ethics, respect for institutional boundaries, and an awareness of the potential impact on national security.

There is a fine balance to be maintained. On one hand, democratic societies require transparency and accountability. On the other, the premature or uncontextualized release of sensitive information can undermine the very systems that are meant to protect the public.

As Sri Lanka reflects on the events of April 2019, it must resist the temptation to reduce a national tragedy into competing narratives or political instruments. The pursuit of truth must be methodical, inclusive, and grounded in law.

Easter is not only a moment of remembrance. It is a test of institutional maturity and societal resilience.

The real question is not whether new narratives will emerge they inevitably will. The question is whether Sri Lanka has the capacity to engage with them critically, responsibly, and in a manner that strengthens, rather than weakens, the foundations of its national security and social harmony.

In the end, justice is not served by noise or conjecture. It is served by patience, rigor, and an unwavering commitment to truth.

Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.

by Mahil Dole
Former Senior Law Enforcement Officer National Security Analyst; Former Head of Counter-Intelligence, State Intelligence Service)

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