Features
Inherent inadequacies

Excerpted from the autobiography of Merrill J. Fernando
One of the glaring weaknesses in both the above Boards (Tea Board, Tea Propaganda Board etc.) was the Board members were mainly ex-officio, representing the Chamber Commerce, CTTA, TRI, and the smallholders. None of these people possessed a coherent concept of the tea trade, be it in marketing, branding, or advertising. As a result, the administration of the Secretariat was able to do exactly as it pleased.
The only exception to this distressing generality was Victor Santiapillai, who was then the Director of the Export Development Board (EDB), having relinquished his position as Director, International Trade Centre, Geneva, at the invitation of Dr. Sivali Ratwatte, then Chairman of the EDB, in order to serve the EDB for a three-year period. Santiapillai understood and supported many of the reforms I proposed, but implementation was stifled by the bureaucrats of the SLTB (Sri Lanka Tea Board).
When the Sri Lanka Tea Board Act was prepared, I was requested by the then Minister of Plantations, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, and his Ministry Secretary, Doric de Souza, to go through the draft of the Act, in discussion with Dr. Jayantha Kelegama, Director of Commerce, and to submit my views. The Minister instructed Dr. Kelegama to incorporate in the Act any proposal I submitted, which he considered worthwhile, without, of course, attributing them to me.
I first met Dr. Kelegama at the Ceylinco Akase Kade and over three meetings thereafter, provided him with many issues to consider. One of my proposals was that ex-officio appointments to such boards, nominated by the Chamber mostly, should not be permitted and that the Minister should have the sole authority, to appoint people with the requisite experience and knowledge. Though this suggestion was accepted and incorporated in the constitution of the SLTB, the Government fell soon afterwards, and the proposals were not implemented.
The Director General of the Tea Board at that time was Dr. R. L. de Silva, from the Tea Research Institute, undoubtedly a competent tea scientist but on account of his ignorance of the important aspects of the international tea trade, a misfit as DG of the Tea Board. The key members of his team, such as Lalith Agalawatte and Sambasivam, were not impressive either.
Conspiracies within
Lalith Agalawatte was, initially, an Assistant Commissioner at the London Tea Centre on Regent Street. Notwithstanding his modest title, I got the clear impression that he wielded a great deal of influence, not only in the centre but at the Tea Board Colombo office as well. He seemed to be well in with TGA Advertising, the France-based agency working for the Ceylon Tea Centre in London, for promotional activities of the Tea Board in Europe.
The ‘The 1868’ project was proposed by the London Tea Centre, to develop a Pure Ceylon Tea bag in France. I participated in this project by supplying the finished product, but with no financial involvement in the project itself. The owners of TGA were introduced to me and on a subsequent visit to Sri Lanka, I advised them on an appropriate blend and, through Printcare, developed high quality packaging for the product. I also advised Agalawatte, in good faith, that this project would eventually fail as a promotional initiative for Ceylon Tea, as, if the brand were to succeed, it would become one more foreign label to compete against genuine Ceylon Tea brands.
Shortly thereafter, a TGA representative arrived in Sri Lanka without my knowledge. I was not surprised when I discovered that Agalawatte, who had by then been transferred to Sri Lanka and appointed to the position of Assistant Director of the CTPB, had invited the TGA representative to Sri Lanka to meet another exporter, who would supply the tea cheaper! We did not receive any more orders. The project was eventually abandoned after 30 tonnes of tea had been exported, with the London Centre spending around Sterling Pounds 150,000 in promotional expenses.
Another instance of this individual’s duplicity was when he obtained my support to pack a brand of tea for a Sri Lanka businessman operating in Japan, whose substantive business interests lay elsewhere. The tea was shipped to Australia. At the same time, I participated in a TV tea commercial at a Commonwealth event in Melbourne, in which, prior to the event, I was made to understand that Dilmah tea was to be featured. When the event got going I discovered that Agalawatte had engineered for the brand supported by him, to be featured at the launch, instead of Dilmah.
Prior to this incident he manipulated to withhold a sum of USD 119,00 approved by the Tea Board as its contribution to the advertising and promotional costs of Dilmah, in Australia. Despite verbal assurances given to me by Agalawatte, that the funding disbursement request had been presented to the Chairman for approval, when I contacted Oliver Fernando, then Chairman of the Tea Board, I found that the request had not been submitted to him.
Ironically, this man, who for some time had been currying favour with the then Minister of Plantations, Major Montague Jayawickrema, was able to persuade the Minister to appoint him as the Head of the newly-opened Ceylon Tea Centre in New York. When the proposal to open the centre came up for discussion, I opposed it vehemently, but in the vote that the Minister called from the chair, mine was the only dissenting voice. The proposal was approved and I was so distressed that I refused to speak to the Minister for the next three months.
Agalawatte spent two years in New York, incurring huge expenditure to no purpose, and when there was a call to investigate his activities, the Secretariat sent Agalawatte’s equally-wily colleague, Sambasivam, as the investigator. He returned with the verdict that Agalawatte was doing a fine job and that he was in the process of negotiating a contract with McDonalds for the supply of tea. I cautioned the Board, that it must be a blatant lie as McDonalds would not entertain offshore suppliers for the US. Predictably, that contract never saw the light of day and, soon afterwards, Agalawatte obtained his Green Card and disappeared in the US!
Costly white elephants
In one instance, I proposed that the Ceylon Tea Centres around the world (UK -London and Manchester – Denmark, Italy and so on) be closed down, as they served no useful purpose. As Tony Peries has observed pithily in his writing, the “… UK centre did minimal service to the cause of Ceylon Tea but was better known as a good lunchtime curry house…” (a very accurate evaluation of the contribution that the UK centre made, to the furtherance of the cause of Ceylon Tea!).
My proposal was accepted and the decision was made to close down these centres. However, one year later, when the renewal of the leases on the centre in Japan came up for review, the Board was compelled to renew it on the grounds that there had been a delay in conveying the decision to close down! That centre in particular had been spectacularly unsuccessful in the promotion of Ceylon Tea, with Japanese consumption of coffee increasing in the previous decade by about 400%, whilst tea consumption remained static.
Our overseas Tea Centres had been established during a period when the UK, Australia, and New Zealand consumption of tea was almost 100% Ceylon Tea. Therefore, those centres performed a largely public relations function in a market basically saturated with Ceylon Tea, in which promotion was not a requirement. Ironically, despite the presence of the Tea Centres in those countries, Ceylon Tea gradually lost almost total market share!
The Head of the Ceylon Tea Centre in Regent Street, London was Ernest Jesudasan, a British national, with minimal links to Ceylon; a nice, well-meaning gentleman with, in my view, little practical knowledge of tea or tea marketing, despite having served earlier as Director of the CTPB. The Head of the Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board then was Clarence Cooray, who, owing to the lack of Ceylonese with sound overseas tea marketing knowledge, was entirely dependent on British tea interests in Ceylon for advice on the promotion of the cause of Ceylon Tea!
The Sri Lanka Tea Board had more teeth than the CTPB, but it was equally impotent in the promotion of Sri Lankan interests via trademarks. However, after intense lobbying by the trade, the Sri Lankan Government of the day was made aware of the need for establishing Sri Lankan-owned brands and, in August 1980, appointed an Advisory Committee on the promotion and marketing of Ceylon Tea.
The remit of the Advisory Committee, appointed under the guidance of the then Minister, Major Jayawickrema, was, briefly, “to review and report on the existing strategies for marketing of Ceylon Tea and to recommend a comprehensive package of proposals to ensure the effective development of Ceylon Tea in the international market”.
This group comprised I. O. K. G. Fernando (Chairman, SLTB), C. Chanmugam (Deputy Secretary, Treasury), W. L. P. de Mel (Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Shipping), G. Cumaranatunga (Add. Sec., Ministry of Trade and Shipping), the writer (then Managing Director, M.J.F. Exports), V. Santiapillai (Chairman, EDB), and Dr. R. L. de Silva (Director-General, SLTB). The committee co-opted S. Nanayakkara (Director, Commerce), S. Kulatunga (Director-General, EDB), T. Sambasivam (Dep. Director, SLTB), and L. Agalawatte (Actg. Director, SLTB).
At that time the Tea Promotion Bureau, the division of the SLTB responsible for promotion, operated offices in London, Cairo, Dubai, Sydney, Tokyo, Auckland, and Johannesburg. In addition, some of these centres also operated restaurants or catering services, as ancillaries to the promotional work. The committee recommendation was that these catering services should be phased out, subject to the terms of the respective leases.
The committee also made wide-ranging recommendations in regard to State promotional support for Ceylon Tea in the world market (subject to minimum quality standards and conformity of the product), with highest priority given to tea packed and bagged in Sri Lanka and, secondly, to Pure Ceylon Tea packed overseas in Joint Venture operations.
The proposals also covered issues of generic promotion, government incentives for processing and export marketing of value-added tea, fixing of export duties for tea bags and packets, duty rebates on imported packaging materials, concessionary export duties for packeted tea within specified weight ranges, rebates for tea bag exporters to encourage that aspect of the trade, maintenance of minimum quality standards of product, and the use of symbols for promotional work. The use of the Lion logo was discussed exhaustively.
Futile exercises, the Lion logo controversy
One of the most contentious issues before the tea trade then was the use of the Lion logo. The Secretariat was relentless in its efforts to mandate the use of the Lion logo on all tea packets intended for export, on the premise that the Lion symbol identified Ceylon, the origin, only. I completely opposed this notion, instead taking up the position, that the Lion symbol should represent only good quality Ceylon Tea, and not be symbolic of any and every tea originating from Ceylon, irrespective of quality.
Here too, as (Tony) Peries has observed in his writing, “…the major packers were in the excellent position of benefiting from tea (not Ceylon) advertising, at no cost to themselves…, through our promotion under the ‘Lion’ logo”.
Theoretically, the launching of the ‘Lion’ logo was a masterful marketing strategy. It would have been the eloquent voice of the cause of quality Pure Ceylon Tea, had the pack bearing the logo consisted of the genuine product. However, the reality of the marketplace was quite different.
There was absolutely no reliable method to determine the proportion of genuine Ceylon Tea in a pack carrying the Lion logo. It could be either as high as 90%, or as low as 10%. Therefore, irrespective of the Ceylon Tea content, Lion logo packs prospered from the identification with Ceylon Tea. At one point, there were as many as 355 brands carrying the Lion logo, though Ceylon Tea imports to the UK had dwindled rapidly.
Whilst the diminishing UK imports of Ceylon Tea over the years reflected the ineffectiveness of the Lion logo campaign, absolutely no action had been taken to change the strategy, nor was there any indication, that this serious market erosion was receiving any attention from the SLTPB. Had the Lion logo been leveraged judiciously to promote the interests of Pure Ceylon Tea, the British market would probably still represent the highest consumption of Ceylon Tea in the world, as it did in the days of Thomas Lipton!
Though it had been developed and sustained at considerable expense, the Lion logo was not associated with a genuine quality standard. As a result of a combination of unfavourable and conflicting factors, the development and promotional strategy purported to be the saviour of Ceylon Tea, eventually became its nemesis, because of the indiscriminate use of the logo. The committee recommendation was that. gradually, the Lion logo should be phased out.
Features
Challenges to addressing allegations during Sri Lanka’s armed conflict

A political commentator has attributed the UK sanctions against four individuals, three of whom were top ranking Army and Navy Officers associated with Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, to the failure of successive governments to address human rights allegations, which he describes as a self-inflicted crisis. The reason for such international action is the consistent failure of governments to conduct independent and credible inquiries into allegations of war crimes; no ‘effective investigative mechanism’ has been established to examine the conduct of either the Sri Lankan military or the LTTE.
He has not elaborated on what constitutes an “effective investigative mechanism. He has an obligation and responsibility to present the framework of such a mechanism. The hard reality however is that no country, not even South Africa, has crafted an effective investigative mechanism to address post conflict issues.
INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISMS
The hallmark of a credible investigative mechanism should be unravelling the TRUTH. No country has ventured to propose how such a Mechanism should be structured and what its mandate should be. Furthermore, despite the fact that no country has succeeded in setting up a credible truth-seeking mechanism, the incumbent government continues to be committed to explore “the contours of a strong truth and reconciliation framework” undaunted by the failed experiences of others, the most prominent being South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is often cited as the gold standard for post conflict Mechanisms. Consequently, most titles incorporate the word “Truth” notwithstanding the fact that establishing the “Truth” was a failure not only in South Africa but also in most countries that attempted such exercises.
Citing the South African experience, Prof. G. L. Peiris states: “pride of place was given to sincere truth-telling which would overcome hatred and the primordial instinct for revenge. The vehicle for this was amnesty…… Despite the personal intervention of Mandela, former State President P. W. Botha was adamant in his refusal to appear before the Commission, which he deemed as ‘a fierce unforgiving assault’ on Afrikaaners” (The Island, 01 April, 2025). In the case of Sri Lanka too, disclosures to find the “Truth” would be all about the other party to the conflict, thus making Truth seeking an accusatory process, instead of a commitment to finding the Truth. The reluctance to engage in frank disclosure is compounded by the fear of recrimination by those affected by the Truth.
Continuing Prof. Peiris cites experiences in other countries. “Argentina, the power to grant amnesty was withheld from the Commission. In Columbia, disclosure resulted not in total exoneration, but in mitigating sentences. In Chile, prosecutions were feasible only after a prolonged interval since the dismantling of Augusta Pinochet’s dictatorship ….” (Ibid).
The mechanisms adopted by the countries cited above reflect their own social and cultural values. Therefore, Sri Lanka too has to craft mechanisms in keeping with its own civilisational values of restorative and not retributive justice for true reconciliation, as declared by President J. R, Jayewardene in San Francisco as to what the global attitude should be towards Japan at the conclusion of World War II. Since the several Presidential Commissions appointed under governments already embody records of alleged violations committed, the information in these commission reports should be the foundation of the archival records on which the edifice of reconciliation should be built.
ESTABLISHING DUE CONTEXT
The suggestion that an independent and credible inquiry be conducted into allegations of war crimes reflects a skewed understanding of the actual context in which the armed conflict in Sri Lanka occurred. Even the UNHRC has acknowledged that the provisions of “Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions relating to conflicts not of an international character is applicable to the situation in Sri Lanka, as stated in para. 182 of the OISL Report by the UNHRC Office. Therefore, the correct context is International Humanitarian Law with appropriate derogations of Human Rights law during an officially declared Emergency as per the ICCPR.; a fact acknowledged in the OISL report.
Consequently, the armed conflict has to conform to provisions of Additional Protocol II of 1977, because “This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions is the due context. There is no provision for “alleged war crimes” in the Additional Protocol. Although Sri Lanka has not formally ratified Additional Protocol II, the Protocol is today accepted by the Community of Nations as Customary Law. On the other hand, “war crimes” are listed in the Rome Statute; a Statute that Sri Lanka has NOT ratified and not recognized as part of Customary Law.
Therefore, any “investigative mechanism” has to be conducted within the context cited above, which is Additional Protocol II of 1977.
SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
On the other hand, why would there be a need for Sri Lanka to engage in an independent and credible inquiry into allegations, considering the following comment in Paragraph 9.4 and other Paragraphs of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)?
“In evaluating the Sri Lankan experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL (International Humanitarian Law), the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority”
9.7 “Having reached the above conclusion, it is also incumbent on the Commission to consider the question, while there is no deliberate targeting of civilians by the Security Forces, whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the NFZs was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality…” (Ibid)
The single most significant factor that contributed to violations was the taking of Civilians in the N Fire Zone hostage (NFZ) by the LTTE. This deliberate act where distinction between civilian and combatant was deliberately abandoned, exposed and compromised the security of the Civilians. The consequences of this single act prevent addressing whether military responses were proportionate or excessive, or whether the impact of firing at make-shift hospitals were deliberate or not, and whether limiting humanitarian aid was intentional or not. These issues are recorded and addressed in the Presidential Commission Reports such as LLRC and Paranagama. This material should be treated as archival material on which to build an effective framework to foster reconciliation.
UK SANCTIONS
Sanctions imposed by the UK government as part of an election pledge for Human Rights violations during the armed conflict is a direct act of intervention according to Article 3 of the Additional Protocol of 1977 that is the acknowledged context in which actions should be judged.
Article 3 Non-intervention states:
1 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government by all legislative means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State”.
2 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory on which the conflict occurs”.
Targeting specific individuals associated with the armed conflict in Sri Lanka is a direct assault of intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. The UK government should be ashamed for resorting to violating International Law for the sake of fulfilling an election pledge. If Sri Lanka had issued strictures on the UK government for not taking action against any military officers responsible for the Bloody Sunday massacre where 26 unarmed civilians participating in a protest march were shot in broad daylight, Sri Lanka would, in fact be intervening in UK’s internal affairs.
CONCLUSION
The UK’s action reflects the common practice of making election pledges to garner targeted votes of ethnic diasporas. The influence of ethnic diasporas affecting the conduct of mainstream politics is becoming increasingly visible, the most recent being the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act of Ontario that was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada on grounds the Provincial Legislations have no jurisdiction over Federal and International Laws.
However, what should not be overlooked is that the armed conflict occurred under provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This Article is developed and supplemented by Additional Protocol II of 1977. Therefore, since all Geneva Conventions are recognised as Customary Law, so should the Additional Protocol II be, because it is a development of common Article 3.
Imposing sanctions under provisions of Additional Protocol II amounts to Intervention in internal affairs of a State as stated in Article 3 of the Protocol; II cited above. Such interventions are prohibited under provisions of international law.
The need to revive independent and credible inquiries after the lapse of 16 years is unrealistic because those who were perpetrators and victims alike cannot be identified and/or located. Furthermore, the cost of disclosure because of the possibility of retribution would compromise their security. A realistic approach is to use the material recorded in the Presidential Commission Reports and treat them as archival records and use the lessons learnt from them to forge a workable framework that would foster unity and reconciliation with the survivors in all communities This is not to live in the past but to live in the here and now – the present, which incidentally, is the bedrock of Sri Lanka’s civilisational values.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
The Silent Invasion: Unchecked spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s agricultural landscape is witnessing a silent yet profound transformation with the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations. Once introduced as a commercial crop, the oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is now at the center of a heated debate, with environmentalists and scientists warning of its devastating ecological consequences.
Speaking to The Island research scientist Rajika Gamage, said: “The spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka is not just a concern for biodiversity, but also for water resources, soil stability, and even local economies that rely on traditional crops.”
A Brief History of Oil Palm Cultivation
Oil palm, originally from West and Central Africa, was first cultivated for commercial purposes in Java in 1948 by Dutch colonists. It reached Malaysia and Indonesia by 1910, where its lucrative potential drove large-scale plantations.
According to Gamage, in Sri Lanka, the first significant oil palm plantation was established in 1968 at Nakiyadeniya Estate by European planters, initially covering a mere 0.5 hectares. Today, oil palm cultivation is predominantly concentrated in Galle, Matara, and Kalutara districts, with smaller plantations in Colombo, Rathnapura, and Kegalle.
Over the decades, he says the commercial viability of oil palm has prompted its expansion, often at the cost of native forests and traditional agricultural lands. Government incentives and private investments have further accelerated the spread of plantations, despite growing concerns over their environmental and social impacts.
Economic Boon or Environmental Curse?
Supporters of oil palm industry argue that it is the most efficient crop for vegetable oil production, yielding more oil per hectare than any other alternative. Sri Lanka currently imports a significant amount of palm oil, and expanding local production is seen as a way to reduce dependence on imports and boost local industries. However, Gamage highlights the hidden costs: “Oil palm plantations deplete water sources, contribute to soil erosion, and threaten native flora and fauna. These are long-term damages that far outweigh the short-term economic benefits.”
One of the primary environmental concerns is the aggressive water consumption of oil palm, which leads to the depletion of underground aquifers. This is particularly evident in areas such as Kalu River and Kelani River wetlands, where native ecosystems are being severely affected. Additionally, soil degradation caused by extensive monoculture farming results in loss of fertility and increased vulnerability to landslides in hilly regions.
Furthermore, studies show that oil palm plantations disrupt the natural habitats of endemic species. “Unlike rubber and coconut, oil palm does not support Sri Lanka’s rich biodiversity. It alters the soil composition and prevents the regeneration of native plant species,” Gamage explains. The loss of forest cover also exacerbates human-wildlife conflicts, as displaced animals venture into human settlements in search of food and shelter.
A Threat to Indigenous Agriculture and Culture
Beyond environmental concerns, oil palm is also threatening traditional crops like kitul (Caryota urens) and palmyrah (Borassus flabellifer), both of which hold economic and cultural significance. “These native palms have sustained rural livelihoods for centuries,” says Gamage. “Their gradual replacement by oil palm could lead to economic instability for small-scale farmers.”
Kitul tapping, an age-old tradition in Sri Lanka, provides a source of income for thousands of families, particularly in rural areas. The syrup extracted from kitul is used in local cuisine and traditional medicine. Similarly, palmyrah has deep roots in Sri Lankan culture, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where its products contribute to food security and local industries.
The rise of oil palm plantations has led to the clearing of lands that once supported the traditional crops. With large-scale commercial investments driving oil palm expansion, small-scale farmers are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their livelihoods. Gamage warns, “If we allow oil palm to replace our native palms, we risk losing not just biodiversity, but also a vital part of our cultural heritage.”
The Global Perspective: Lessons from Other Nations
Sri Lanka is not the first country to grapple with the consequences of oil palm expansion. Malaysia and Indonesia, the world’s leading producers of palm oil, have faced severe deforestation, biodiversity loss, and socio-economic conflicts due to unchecked plantation growth.
In Indonesia, for example, vast tracts of rainforest have been cleared for palm oil production, leading to habitat destruction for endangered species such as orangutans and Sumatran tigers. Additionally, indigenous communities have been displaced, sparking legal battles over land rights.
Malaysia has attempted to address some of these issues by introducing sustainability certifications, such as the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard. However, implementation challenges remain, and deforestation continues at an alarming rate.
Sri Lanka can learn valuable lessons from these experiences. Implementing strict land-use policies, promoting agroforestry practices, and ensuring transparency in plantation expansion are crucial steps in mitigating environmental damage while supporting economic development.
The Urgent Need for Action
Despite these concerns, Sri Lanka has yet to enforce strict regulations on oil palm expansion. Gamage urges authorities to intervene: “It is imperative that we implement policies to control its spread before it is too late. The unchecked expansion of oil palm will lead to irreversible environmental damage.”
To address this issue, experts suggest a multi-pronged approach:
Stronger Land-Use Policies
– The government must enforce restrictions on oil palm cultivation in ecologically sensitive areas, such as wetlands and forest reserves.
Reforestation and Rehabilitation
– Efforts should be made to restore degraded lands by reintroducing native tree species and promoting sustainable agroforestry.
Supporting Traditional Agriculture
– Incentives should be provided to farmers growing traditional crops like kitul and palmyrah, ensuring that these industries remain viable.
Public Awareness and Education
– Raising awareness among local communities about the environmental and social impacts of oil palm can empower them to make informed decisions about land use.
Sustainable Alternatives
– Encouraging research into alternative vegetable oil sources, such as coconut oil, which has long been a staple in Sri Lankan agriculture, could reduce reliance on palm oil.
As Sri Lanka stands at a crossroads, the decisions made today will determine the country’s ecological and agricultural future. While the economic benefits of oil palm are undeniable, its long-term environmental and social costs cannot be ignored. The challenge now is to strike a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability before the damage becomes irreversible.
In conclusion Gamage said, “We must act now. If we allow oil palm to spread unchecked, future generations will bear the cost of our inaction.”
Sri Lanka has the opportunity to take a different path—one that prioritises biodiversity conservation, sustainable agriculture, and the well-being of local communities. The time for decisive action is now.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
A plea for establishing a transboundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay

Blue-green land and waterscapes act as ecological corridors across land and water in creating an ecological continuity in order to protect and restore the habitats of native and naturalised species.
In addition, these ecological corridors also help to conserve and improve the habitats of migratory species, as well. One of the main objectives of establishing blue-green land-waterscapes is to reconcile increasing local/regional development and human livelihood challenges in a sustainable manner while, at the same time, safeguard biodiversity and their habitats/ecosystems, as far as possible.
While green landscapes are natural and semi-natural terrestrial vegetation types like natural forests and grasslands, blue waterscapes are aquatic or semi-aquatic vegetation types such as seagrass meadows, mangroves and coastal and other wetlands. These vegetated coastal ecosystems known as ‘blue carbon’ ecosystems are some of the most productive on Earth and located at the interfaces among terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments. They provide us with essential ecosystem services, such as serving as a buffer in coastal protection from storms and erosion, spawning grounds for fish, filtering pollutants and contaminants from coastal waters thus improving coastal water quality and contributing to all important food security.
In addition, they capture and store “blue” carbon from the atmosphere and oceans at significantly higher rates per unit area than tropical forests (Figure 1) and hence act as effective carbon sinks. By storing carbon, these ecosystems help to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, thus contributing significantly to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Figure 1: Carbon storage in different vegetation types (Source – What Is Blue Carbon and Why Does It Matter? – Sustainable Travel International)
.Blue-green Carbon Markets
The recognition of blue carbon (BC) ecosystems (primarily mangroves, seagrasses and tidal marshes) as an effective natural climate solution paved the way for their inclusion within carbon markets. Blue carbon is the marine analog of green carbon, which refers to carbon captured by terrestrial (i.e., land-based) plants. The blue-green carbon market involves buying and selling carbon credits from projects that protect and restore coastal and marine ecosystems (blue carbon) and terrestrial ecosystems (green carbon). Since Blue Carbon ecosystems have higher carbon sequestration (capture and store) potential compared to their terrestrial counterparts, blue Carbon credits are worth over two times more than green carbon credits. They offer opportunities for commercial enterprises to offset carbon emissions and in turn support climate action.
Blue Carbon projects are expected to grow twofold in the near future. With the recent surge in international partnerships and funding, there is immense growth potential for the blue carbon market. However, it is critically important to look beyond the value of the carbon sequestered to ensure the rights and needs of local communities that are central to any attempt to mitigate climate change using a blue and green carbon project.
Blue Carbon projects can serve as grassroot hubs for sustainable development by developing nature-based solutions in these ecosystems thus contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Globally, numerous policies, coastal management strategies, and tools designed for conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems have been developed and implemented. Policies and finance mechanisms being developed for climate change mitigation may offer an additional route for effective coastal management. The International Blue Carbon Initiative, for example, is a coordinated, global program focused on conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems for the climate, biodiversity and human wellbeing.
Until recently, most of these opportunities focus on carbon found in the above ground vegetative biomass and do not account for the carbon in the soil. On the other hand, blue carbon, in particular has the potential for immense growth in carbon capture economics in the near future and can provide significant socioeconomic and environmental benefits. Consequently, blue -green carbon habitats in the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay region represent invaluable assets in climate change mitigation and coastal ecosystem conservation and sustainable development.
Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Trans-boundary Region
The Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region form a transboundary area within the waters of southeastern India and northwestern Sri Lanka. This region supports dense seagrass meadows having a high level of marine biodiversity including marine mammals such as dugong. Sea turtles are frequent visitors to the gulf while sharks, dolphins, sperm and baleen whales too, have been reported from this area. The Mannar region is recognized as an Important Marine Mammal Area (IMMA) of the world by IUCN (Figure 2) and also an Important Bird Area by Birdlife International. This region as a whole is a store house of unique biological wealth of global significance and as such is considered as one of the world’s richest regions from a marine biodiversity perspective.

Figure 2. Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay IMMA (Source – IUCN Joint SSC/WCPA Marine Mammal Protected Areas Task Force, 2022 IUCN-MMPATF (2022)
Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve – India
India has already declared a part of this region as the UNESCO Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve covering an area of 10,500 km2 of ocean with 21 islands and the adjoining coastline. The islets and coastal buffer zone include beaches, estuaries, and tropical dry broadleaf forests, while the surrounding seascape of the Marine National Park (established in 1986) and a 10 km strip of the coastal landscape that include seaweed communities, seagrass communities, coral reefs, salt marshes and mangrove forests form the coastal and marine component of the biosphere reserve on the Indian side of the Gulf of Mannar.
Sri Lankan ‘Proposed’ Biosphere Reserve
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay there is a semi-enclosed shallow water body between the southeast coast of India and Sri Lanka, with a water depth maximum of 13 m. To the south, a chain of low islands and reefs known as Adam’s Bridge or Rama Setu (Rama’s Bridge), separates Palk Bay from the Gulf of Mannar. The Palk Bay leads to Palk Strait (Figure 3). Palk Bay is one of the major sinks for sediments along with the Gulf of Mannar. Sediments discharged by rivers and transported by the surf currents as littoral drift settle in this sink.
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay, studies are being conducted by the Dugong and Seagrass Conservation Project to establish an additional 10,000 hectares of Marine Protected Area to support the conservation of dugongs and their seagrass habitat in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay. This project will involve the preparation of a multiple-community-based management plan in conjunction with government, fishing communities and the tourism industry.
With this valuable information emerging from projects of this nature, Sri Lanka has real opportunities to create a large marine protected area in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region and eventually merging them together with the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve of India to form a trans-boundary biosphere Reserve.
Terrestrial cum Marine Spatial Plan for the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Region
Therefore, an excellent opportunity awaits both the Governments of Sri Lanka and India to collaborate in preparing of a terrestrial and marine spatial plan for this region, a prerequisite before going further on designing and implementing large scale development plans in establishing wind energy farms, mineral sand extraction, fishing industry, oil exploration and tourism development.
Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) is an integrated, place-based approach for allocating coastal and marine resources and space, while protecting the ecosystems that provide these vital resources.
On the Indian side, the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere reserve is well established and functional. On the Sri Lankan side, already there are three DWLC managed protected areas i) Adam’s Bridge Marine National Park (# 29 in the map – 18,990 ha declared in 2015), ii) Vedithalathiv Nature Reserve (# 35 -29,180 ha declared in 2016) and iii) Vankalai Sanctuary ( # 97 -4839 ha declared in 2008) (Figure 4) which can serve as the core zone of the Sri Lankan counterpart of a trans-boundary biosphere reserve. Due to the integrated nature of shallow wetland and terrestrial coastal habitats, Vankalai Sanctuary, in particular is highly productive, supporting high ecosystem and species diversity.

Figure 4: Protected Areas in Norther Sri Lanka Managed by the Department of Wildlife Conservation Source: DWLC
This site provides excellent feeding and living habitats for a large number of water bird species, including annual migrants, which also use this area on arrival and during their exit from Sri Lanka.
Having several coastal and marine protected areas already within the Sri Lankan territory provide an excellent opportunity to establish the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay blue-green Biosphere Reserve (Sri Lanka) initially and eventually to join up seamlessly with the already established Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve on the Indian side to create a trans-boundary blue-green biosphere reserve.
This makes perfect sense because unlike sedentary plant species, mobile animal and plant groups (phytoplankton, in particular) do not respect human demarcated territorial boundaries. The provision of a common and unhindered protected coastal and marine passage for their customary movement for food and raising young is therefore of crucial importance in conservation management. Scientific evidence-based selection of additional areas, if necessary and their respective boundaries are best be determined in consultation with expert groups on marine mammals and reptiles, birds, fish, coastal vegetation conservation, sociology and industrial development from both sides of the divide.
Proper spatial planning needs to be done before large-scale development plans are designed and implemented in order to avoid conflicts of interest leading to inordinate delays and teething problems in project initiation. As a priority, the protected blue-green core and buffer regions need to be demarcated for their conservation. This could best be done in this narrow passage of land and water between Sri Lanka and India
( Palk Strait & Gulf of Mannar) by preparing a marine and terrestrial spatial plan along the UNESCO Man and Biosphere conceptual guidelines differentiating core, buffer and transition zones. While the protected areas in the core and buffer zone provide all important ecosystem services that would also serve as breeding ground for fish, crustaceans, marine reptiles, birds and mammals thereby provisioning sustainable industries to be developed in the surrounding transition areas demarcated in the joint spatial plan.
In addition, the Satoyama Global Initiative established by the Japanese at UNESCO as a global effort in 2009 to realise ‘societies in harmony with nature’ in which – Satoumi – specifically referring to the management of socio-ecological production landscapes in marine and coastal regions, is also a good model to be considered for conservation of biodiversity and co-existence between humans and nature.
Final Plea
In order to take this proposal forward from the Sri Lankan side, a number of useful baseline reports are already available including, but not limited to, the following: i. Biodiversity Profile of the Mannar District (CEJ & USAID 2022), ii. The Gulf of Mannar and its surroundings (IUCN 2012), iii) Atlas of Mangroves, Salt Marshes and Sand Dunes of the Coastal Area from Malwathu Oya to Pooneryn in the Northwestern Coastal Region, Sri Lanka (Ecological Association of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, 2020). iv. Integrated Strategic Environment Assessment of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (CEA 2014).
If this proposal to establish a Trans-boundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay is acceptable in principle to the Governments of Sri Lanka and India, it would be ideal if the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program UNESCO which is an intergovernmental scientific program whose mission is to establish a scientific basis for enhancing the relationship between people and their environments to partner with the relevant Government and non-governmental agencies in both countries in making it a reality. This proposed concept has all the necessary elements for developing a unique sustainable conservation cum industrial development strategy via nature-based solutions while at the same time contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation.
by Emeritus Professor Nimal Gunatilleke,
University of Peradeniya
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