Opinion
Import substitution in Covid-infested Neoliberal World
Covid-19, which has taught many a lesson to the rich and the mighty, is causing unparalleled turmoil in the neoliberal economies of the world. It has made governments and economists think of alternatives to the market driven dependent economies that most poor countries practice or are forced to practice. Sri Lanka too is trying its hand with options like export control, import substitution, taxation, protective tariffs, etc. Most countries are forced into it due to the disruption of several aspects of the system, such as foreign exchange earning capacity, international transport, and local export oriented industry. Sri Lanka is faced with considerable decline in its main sources of foreign exchange, such as foreign employment, tourism and garments. The foreign exchange thus earned are, in the main, spent to import food items, textile, medicines, fertilizer, etc., that could be locally produced. Is there any logic in advocating the continuation of this policy – Covid or no Covid?
Yet there are people including parliamentary bigwigs, who criticize the present government policy of controlling imports and attempting import substitution. They say such policy would antagonize Western countries who buy our products, like tea and rubber. Yes, it would make them angry but then that is how they pursue and perpetuate the practice of neoliberalism and exploitation of our resources. They say Western countries would stop extending preferential treatment and favourable terms to us in trade. Yes, they may do that but we must know that these are only tools they use to trap us into their system of neocolonialist exploitation. These people who talk like this in parliament must be tools of the neocolonialists.
It may be worthwhile to look at other countries which had adopted import substitution, in the past as well as recently and see how they have fared in their effort. This concept and policy could be traced back to the 18th Century German economist Friedrich List who proposed a “National System” of political economy where tariffs were to be imposed on imported goods while free trade would operate for local products. Later in the 1950s and 60s the Global South, particularly Latin America, adopted this policy and came to be known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). ISI is based on the premise that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through local production. It envisaged industrialization of production for greater efficiency and mass production. Most of the Latin American countries, like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras employed this system, the larger countries with big populations were benefited to a greater degree than smaller countries.
African Socialism, which started about the same time with leaders like Kwome Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania giving it leadership, took up ISI as its economic policy. These movements were socialist and nationalist and naturally anti-west and the Western powers did not view these developments kindly. In the 1980s with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the IMF and the World Bank gaining immense ground, the Global South abandoned ISI policy and turned to the West and again became the servant of neoliberalism.
However, there is a country which recently adopted these ISI measures with great success. Russia has managed to save several billions of Dollars by vigorously following ISI policies in the industrial sector, mostly in the areas of agriculture, automotive, chemical, pharmaceutical, aviation, etc. In 1914, their cost of food imports was 60 billion dollars, it was brought down to 20 Bn by 2018, in 2012 the pharmaceutical industry was negligible and by 2017 it has developed into a 50 Bn industry. These achievements were mainly due to subsidization of vital industries, import restriction by heavy taxation and other protective trade policies.
There may be lessons for Sri Lanka from what has taken place in the above mentioned countries. First and foremost the essential food items that could be produced here should not be imported and everything required for this endevour such as land, water, seeds, fertilizer, machinery should be made available. Every effort should be made to manufacture locally these things necessary to achieve self-sufficiency in food. If we are self sufficient in food, medicine, clothes and housing we need not be afraid of economic warfare that imperialists resort to when they want us to do their bidding. We must get assistance from friendly countries like China and Russia to achieve self-sufficiency in essential items and not for mammoth projects that politicians think would enhance their image.
As mentioned above, ISI policies employed for heavy industrial development had succeeded in large countries like Brazil, Mexico and Argentina but in smaller countries like Ecuador and Honduras such attempts at industrialization had failed. This was the experience in Africa too. Development of one industry at the expense of others or one crop like tea for instance could also lead to failure.
Therefore Sri Lanka must not go for heavy industries. First it must achieve self sufficiency in food and other essentials. Later it could start small machinery like power looms, electrical and electronic items. Industrialization should be at the manageable level of agriculture, clothes and such items and perhaps not heavy industries like automobiles, etc. The threat posed by Covid-19 must be converted into an opportunity and made full use of to make the country’s economy and politics independent of external factors.
N. A. de S. Amaratunga
Opinion
The pointer who showed the moon: Professor Y. Karunadasa (1934–2026)
On 27 April 2026, Sri Lanka lost a quiet giant. Professor Y. Karunadasa, one of the world’s foremost scholars of Abhidhamma and Buddhist philosophy, passed away in Colombo. He was 92.
For those who never sat in his classroom, the name might sound distant. But for anyone who has ever wondered what the Buddha really meant by anatta (no‑self) or sabhāva (intrinsic nature), Karunadasa’s work was a lantern in the dark. He did not write to impress other academics. He wrote to make the Dhamma clear.
Born in 1934, he graduated with First Class Honours in Pali from the University of Ceylon in 1958. A decade later, his PhD thesis from the University of London became his landmark book, The Buddhist Analysis of Matter. One reviewer called it “the final word on the subject for many years to come.” He later served as Dean of Arts at the University of Kelaniya and founded its Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies. The nation honoured him with Sri Lanka Sikhamani in 2005.
Yet his true gift was teaching. He once said he loved students who knew nothing about Buddhism. “It’s more adventurous,” he explained. “For those already exposed, it’s not so fascinating. In a way, it’s easier because they carry no prejudices.” He taught at SOAS, Toronto, Calgary, and Hong Kong, but he always returned to Sri Lanka – because, he said, “the Dhamma lives best where the language of the texts is still spoken.”
What exactly made his scholarship so special? Before Karunadasa, Western, and even some Asian scholars, often dismissed Abhidhamma as dry scholasticism – a medieval invention far from the Buddha’s original words. Karunadasa spent four decades proving otherwise. He showed that Abhidhamma is not a later corruption but a natural extension of the early suttas. His analysis of sabhāva (intrinsic nature) was revolutionary: he demonstrated that the Abhidhamma schools never posited eternal substances, only conditioned, momentary realities. In doing so, he rescued the entire Abhidhamma tradition from the charge of being “proto‑Hindu” or essentialist. Philosophers in London and Chicago began citing him alongside Western phenomenologists. Yet he never lost his Sri Lankan accent or his habit of drinking plain black tea while discussing citta and cetasika.
His most profound contribution was to Abhidhamma, the analytical heart of the Buddha’s teaching. Western scholars often dismissed Abhidhamma as dry scholasticism. Karunadasa showed it was a living philosophy of mind and matter, free from eternalism and nihilism. He argued that the Buddha’s refusal to posit a permanent self was not a mere negation but an invitation to see reality as a process – a stream of conditioned moments, luminous and awake.
What made him rare was his humility. He never claimed to be a meditation master or a saint. He was a reader of texts, a lover of words, a man who believed that truth shines brightest when pointed at, not possessed. “I present what I find,” he said. “Whether one decides to accept it is an individual matter.”
I recall a small story that students often told. Once, a young monk asked him after a lecture, “Venerable Professor, after all this analysis, does the self exist or not?” Karunadasa smiled. “That question,” he said, “is like asking whether the flame in this oil lamp is the same as the flame a moment ago. The Buddha’s answer is neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ but ‘it is not proper to say so.’ Learn to live with the question, and you will be freer than any philosopher who claims to have an answer.”
Students remember him not for grand speeches but for small kindnesses – a patient explanation of a Pali compound, a gentle nod when a young scholar stammered through a seminar. He never raised his voice. He never needed to.
The Buddha once said that the Dhamma is like a finger pointing to the moon. Do not stare at the finger, he warned. Professor Karunadasa spent a lifetime perfecting that finger – polishing it, straightening it, making sure it pointed true. We may now look at the moon and remember the hand that showed us where to turn.
May his passing be his final lesson: that even the greatest scholar must one day let go. And in that letting go, become the silence from which all teaching first arose.
May he attain the supreme bliss of Nibbana!
Dedicated to the memory of a teacher who never stopped learning.
K.L. Senarath Dayathilake
Opinion
Fiscal discipline, institutional accountability, and contemporary governance challenges
Sri Lanka is currently facing a complex set of interrelated economic, social, and governance challenges that cannot be attributed to a single policy failure or institutional weakness. Rather, these challenges reflect deeper structural issues that have evolved over time and now manifest as systemic constraints on economic stability and effective governance.
The key issues at the centre the current debate include fiscal discipline, the role of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, governance challenges, the experience of public administration, and the capacity for effective policy implementation.
This short paper aims to lay the foundation for this discussion by initiating a focused and structured dialogue on these critical issues.
Fiscal Discipline: Current Status and Core Challenges
Fiscal discipline refers to the government’s ability to maintain a balance between its revenue and expenditure. It is a fundamental requirement for macroeconomic stability. However, an assessment of Sri Lanka’s current situation indicates that this balance remains significantly weakened.
Over the past three decades, government revenue as a share of GDP has steadily declined. From approximately 18–20 percent in the 1990s, it fell to nearly 9 percent in the early 2020s. While recent tax reforms have contributed to a gradual recovery, government expenditure has remained persistently high at around 20–25 percent of GDP. This imbalance has resulted in sustained budget deficits and a significant accumulation of public debt.
Within this context, constrained revenue growth and structural weaknesses in expenditure management have emerged as key factors shaping the country’s long-term fiscal outlook.
In 2024, tax revenue increased to 12.4 percent of GDP, up from 9.9 percent in 2023, and is projected to reach 14.8 percent in 2025. While this reflects a positive trend, it remains insufficient to ensure fiscal sustainability.
Expanding the tax base, strengthening tax compliance, and rationalising tax exemptions remain critical priorities. However, these efforts are constrained by structural factors, including the large size of the informal economy, weak income reporting mechanisms, and low levels of formalsation among small and medium-sized enterprises.
In addition, the heavy reliance on indirect taxation represents a structural imbalance. Currently, around 70–75 percent of total tax revenue is derived from indirect taxes, while direct taxes account for only about 25–30 percent. Among these, Value Added Tax (VAT) contributes a disproportionately large share, whereas income and corporate taxes remain relatively limited. Such a structure has implications not only for revenue stability but also for income distribution.
Tax administration continues to face operational challenges, including limited administrative capacity, technological constraints, weak enforcement, and persistent issues of tax evasion and avoidance.
Therefore, despite recent improvements in revenue performance, deeper structural reforms in the tax system are essential—particularly increasing the share of direct taxation and broadening the overall tax base.
The expenditure side presents equally significant challenges. According to the 2025 budget, government expenditure is estimated at around 21.8 percent of GDP, while revenue stands at approximately 15.1 percent. This reflects a substantial and persistent fiscal gap, the closure of which requires difficult and often politically sensitive policy choices, including borrowing, revenue enhancement, or expenditure rationalisation.
A particularly pressing concern is debt servicing. According to the World Bank, nearly half of government revenue between 2024 and 2027 may be absorbed by interest payments. This represents a significant fiscal risk. If a large share of public revenue is allocated to debt servicing, the fiscal space available for education, healthcare, social protection, and productive investment becomes severely constrained.
Public debt management therefore remains highly vulnerable. Although debt restructuring efforts have been undertaken, their long-term success depends critically on sustained fiscal discipline. Without this, debt sustainability risks re-emerging as a major macroeconomic concern.
The financial performance of state-owned enterprises further compounds these challenges. In 2024, 52 major state institutions reported combined losses exceeding LKR 150 billion. Key entities such as the Ceylon Electricity Board, Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, SriLankan Airlines, and the Sri Lanka Transport Board continue to exert pressure on public finances. Notably, in the first half of 2025 alone, the Ceylon Electricity Board recorded a loss of LKR 13.2 billion.
Taken together, the challenge of fiscal discipline is not isolated. It reflects a broader structural imbalance arising from weak revenue performance, ineffective expenditure control, high debt burdens, rising debt servicing obligations, and persistent losses in state-owned enterprises.
Accordingly, addressing these challenges requires more than incremental adjustments. It calls for a comprehensive and sustained restructuring of public financial management to restore long-term fiscal stability.
The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance: Roles and Performance
Against this fiscal backdrop, the role and effectiveness of key economic institutions become critically important. The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are the two principal institutions responsible for macroeconomic management in Sri Lanka. The Central Bank is tasked with maintaining price stability and financial system stability through monetary policy, while the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the design and implementation of fiscal policy.
In recent years, the Central Bank has adopted a tight monetary policy stance to contain inflation. This represents a necessary and positive adjustment. However, a key concern lies in the clarity, consistency, and credibility of policy communication. When markets, investors, and the public do not receive clear and predictable signals regarding the future direction of policy, an uncertain environment emerges. Under such conditions, investment decisions are often delayed, market volatility increases, and overall economic confidence weakens.
With regard to the Ministry of Finance, the central issue is the gap between policy intent and effective implementation. While targets have been set to increase tax revenue, progress in broadening the tax base and strengthening compliance remains limited. This reflects not only technical challenges but also deeper institutional constraints.
Another critical area is the reform of state-owned enterprises. Although policy intentions and reform frameworks have been articulated, implementation has been slow and uneven. This delay imposes an additional burden on fiscal discipline, as continued losses in these institutions ultimately translate into increased public expenditure and fiscal pressure.
At the same time, the International Monetary Fund has emphasised, particularly in the context of the 2026 budget, the need for stronger revenue mobilization, disciplined expenditure management, improved tax compliance, and enhanced public financial management. These recommendations reinforce the urgency of institutional strengthening.
It would be overly simplistic to conclude that these institutions have entirely failed in their mandates. However, it is evident that they have not yet achieved the expected levels of efficiency, coordination, and transparency required under current economic conditions.
A key structural weakness lies in the limited coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. When these two policy domains are not aligned, their outcomes can be mutually undermining. For example, while the Central Bank may pursue tight monetary policy to control inflation, expansionary fiscal policies or excessive government spending can offset these efforts.
Going forward, strengthening institutional effectiveness requires more than clarifying mandates. It demands improved policy coordination, stronger implementation capacity, and more transparent and credible communication. These elements are essential to restoring confidence among markets, investors, and the public.
Governance Challenges and the Experience Gap: Reality and Limits
Beyond institutional performance, governance capacity itself remains a central concern. One of the most prominent criticisms directed at the current administration is the perceived lack of experience in public governance. This concern cannot be entirely dismissed. A governing team with limited experience may face significant challenges in managing the complexity of the state apparatus, fiscal risks, international commitments, and institutional processes.
However, it is insufficient to interpret this issue solely as an individual limitation. It must also be understood as a systemic challenge. In the presence of a strong advisory framework, data-driven decision-making processes, and effective coordination within a professional public service, the impact of limited experience can be mitigated to a considerable extent.
Conversely, when such institutional mechanisms are weak, the absence of experience can have more pronounced consequences. These may include delays in decision-making, misalignment of policy priorities, and increased policy instability. In such an environment, governance becomes more uncertain, and institutional trust tends to erode.
Therefore, the issue cannot be adequately captured by simply referring to a “lack of experience.” The more fundamental challenge lies in the interaction between limited experience, institutional weaknesses, and deficiencies in decision-making frameworks.
This perspective is reinforced by an observation shared in response to this discussion:
“The appointment of underqualified individuals and political appointees to senior positions in the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance can significantly contribute to such challenges. In the past, many of these roles were held by experienced senior public servants and capable economists, who possessed a deep understanding of public financial policy and governance.
It is not sufficient to characterise such issues merely as a ‘cyber incident.’ They should also be understood as manifestations of deeper systemic gaps. Accordingly, the government must identify and decisively address these gaps. However, there is limited evidence of such preparedness at present.”
This view underscores the need to assess governance challenges not only at the level of individuals, but also at the institutional and systemic levels.
Accordingly, a sustainable long-term response requires strengthening professionalism within the public sector, ensuring greater transparency and meritocracy in appointments, and institutionalizing more structured and evidence-based decision-making processes.
Priority Reforms for Immediate Action
Addressing the challenges outlined above requires a set of coordinated and decisive reforms. These actions are not optional; they are essential to restoring fiscal stability and rebuilding public confidence.
First, public expenditure must be realigned based on clear strategic priorities. Resources should be redirected away from politically popular but low-impact spending toward areas that support economic growth, strengthen human capital, and enhance social protection.
Second, the tax system must be simplified, made more equitable, and significantly broadened. Rather than increasing the burden on a narrow base of existing taxpayers, policy efforts should focus on expanding the tax base, strengthening compliance, and improving the efficiency of tax administration.
Third, reforms of state-owned enterprises must be accelerated without delay. The continued reliance on public funds to sustain loss-making institutions is fiscally unsustainable. Comprehensive restructuring is required, including improvements in governance, pricing mechanisms, operational efficiency, and accountability frameworks.
Fourth, transparency must be strengthened as a core principle of public financial management. Timely and credible disclosure of fiscal data—including debt positions, the financial performance of state-owned enterprises, and progress on reform implementation—is essential to building trust and ensuring accountability.
Finally, accountability mechanisms must be reinforced. Clear responsibility must be assigned for policy decisions, and outcomes must be systematically monitored and evaluated. Sustainable improvements in governance depend on the consistent application of accountability.
In conclusion, Sri Lanka’s current economic and governance challenges cannot be attributed to a single cause. They reflect a broader systemic imbalance arising from weak fiscal discipline, institutional limitations, communication gaps, shortcomings in policy implementation, and constraints in governance capacity.
An economy is not merely a collection of numbers; it is fundamentally a system built on trust. Rebuilding that trust is not optional—it is essential. It requires immediate and credible action to strengthen fiscal discipline, institutional accountability, transparency, and policy consistency.
This remains the defining challenge facing the current administration.
by Prof. Ranjith Bandara
Opinion
Drug crisis: A national security threat warranting a concerted response
What has happened to our beloved nation, its loving people, and our once high-esteemed culture? At a time when the country has become the cynosure of many through the peace walk led by the Buddhist clergy together with Aloka, with people from all walks of life gathering in support, it clearly shows how deeply our people are yearning for peace, unity, and harmony.
Yet, while this noble message unfolds, an incident of the opposite nature at the very gateway of our nation has brought shame and concern. Allegations involving clergy linked to narcotics raise painful questions about morality, manipulation, and the misuse of trust. If they were trapped knowingly or unknowingly by interested parties, it is even more tragic.
Sri Lanka deserves better. Our people deserve better. Let truth prevail, justice be done, and may our nation return to dignity, wisdom, and peace.
These painful contradictions reveal a deeper truth: Sri Lanka today is confronting not merely isolated scandals, but a growing national crisis. The drug menace has become a direct threat to the nation’s social harmony, economic stability, political order, and long-term security. What was once seen as only a law-enforcement matter must now be understood as a strategic national challenge.
National security is not limited to borders, weapons, or military preparedness. True national security rests on three pillars: social stability, economic resilience, and political confidence. When drugs infiltrate communities, corrupt institutions, destroy youth potential, and empower organised crime, all three pillars begin to weaken. That is the danger Sri Lanka faces today.
Recent large-scale detections by the Sri Lanka Navy, law-enforcement agencies, and intelligence services indicate the seriousness of the threat. If reported seizure figures have sharply increased, it may reflect stronger enforcement as well as the scale of trafficking attempts. Either way, it sends a clear warning: criminal syndicates see Sri Lanka as fertile ground for their operations.
A central question many citizens ask is whether Sri Lanka has become only a transit point, or whether domestic demand itself is driving these operations. Increasingly, observers note that local consumption cannot be ignored. Drug traffickers do not repeatedly risk sophisticated smuggling methods unless profits justify the danger. Where there is sustained demand, supply networks become more determined, more creative, and more ruthless.
This means Sri Lanka is not only confronting traffickers at sea or airports it is confronting an internal market. That market is built through addiction, peer pressure, targeted recruitment, nightlife culture, workplace social circles, and the normalisation of substance use among sections of society. Dealers identify vulnerable youth, socially isolated individuals, thrill-seekers, and stressed professionals. Dependency becomes their business model because dependency guarantees recurring revenue.
The criminal economy behind narcotics has no religion, ethnicity, caste, or political loyalty. These syndicates recognise only profit. They exploit any route, corrupt any system, intimidate any rival, and manipulate any weakness. They may finance violence, use debt bondage, recruit couriers, infiltrate businesses, or exploit social divisions if it protects revenue streams. This is why the drug menace must never be communalised or politicised. Crime has no creed.
Equally dangerous is the corruption ecosystem that narcotics can generate. Where drug money grows, bribery follows. Where bribery spreads, public trust declines. Where trust declines, institutions weaken. Thus, the narcotics problem becomes not only a criminal issue but a governance issue. If left unchecked, it can distort markets, compromise officials, and create parallel power structures.
Sri Lanka therefore stands at a defining moment. The government’s recent emphasis on confronting organised crime and narcotics can become meaningful, but only if it evolves into a sustained national mission rather than a temporary campaign. Raids and arrests are necessary, but seizures alone do not win this war. Every intercepted shipment is a tactical success; it is not yet a strategic victory.
To prevail, Sri Lanka requires three simultaneous lines of effort:
1. Cut Supply
Border security must remain relentless. Agencies such as the Sri Lanka Navy, Sri Lanka Customs, police narcotics units, and intelligence services need modern surveillance, financial investigation tools, and stronger coordination. Maritime interdiction, container screening, asset seizure, and anti-money-laundering action are essential.
2. Reduce Demand
Supply exists because demand exists. This is where schools, families, mosques, temples, churches, kovils, youth clubs, and employers become national security stakeholders. Prevention must begin early. Children need resilience education. Parents need awareness tools. Communities need courage to report suspicious activity. Religious institutions can restore moral clarity and social accountability. Sports, arts, skills training, and employment pathways can redirect vulnerable youth toward dignity and purpose.
3. Rehabilitate Victims
Addiction should not be treated only as crime; it is also a health and social challenge. Many users are trapped, manipulated, or psychologically dependent. Rehabilitation must include counseling, medical support, vocational reintegration, and family healing. A person recovered from addiction is one less customer for traffickers and one more citizen restored to society.
The most successful anti-drug societies combine enforcement with community ownership. Sri Lanka must do the same. Villages, neighborhoods, apartment communities, and workplaces should become protective ecosystems where dealers cannot hide and vulnerable people are not abandoned. When faith leaders, teachers, parents, and police cooperate, traffickers lose anonymity.
There is also an urgent communication battle. Drug culture is often marketed through glamour, rebellion, or status. That false narrative must be defeated. Society must expose the truth: drugs destroy ambition, fracture families, damage mental health, fuel crime, and enrich predators. Prevention messaging must be modern, digital, youth-oriented, and continuous.
Political Will Must Replace Political Theater
Political leadership is equally important. This issue cannot be seasonal, symbolic, or used for partisan point-scoring. A national consensus is needed. Governments may change, but anti-narcotics strategy must remain professional, consistent, and insulated from political interference.
Sri Lanka has overcome terrorism, disaster, and economic hardship through resilience. It can overcome this menace too, obut only through unity, discipline, and moral seriousness. Every parent, teacher, religious leader, police officer, sailor, customs officer, doctor, journalist, and young citizen has a role.
This Is Not Just a Drug War, It Is a Fight for the Soul of the Nation
This is not merely a campaign against drugs. It is a campaign for the soul of the nation. It is about protecting our children, preserving our communities, defending our institutions, and securing our future.
Sri Lanka has awakened to the danger. The moment must not be wasted. If faith, family, and state walk together, drugs will have no place to hide.
Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.
By Mahil Dole
-
News7 days agoWhistleblowers ask Treasury Chief to resign over theft of USD 2.5 mn
-
News7 days agoNo cyber hack: Fintech expert exposes shocking legacy flaws that led to $2.5 million theft
-
News4 days agoBIA drug bust: 25 monks including three masterminds arrested
-
Business5 days agoNestlé Lanka Announces Change in Leadership
-
News2 days agoTreasury chief’s citizenship details sought from Australia
-
News4 days agoBanks alert customers to phishing attacks
-
News5 days agoHackers steal $3.2 Mn from Finance Ministry
-
Business7 days agoDialog Enterprise partners Star Garments: Pioneering 5G innovation in Sri Lanka’s apparel industry
