AUSTRALIAN NATIONALS HELD CAPTIVE

EXCERPTED FROM SENIOR DIG (RETD) MERRIL GUNARATNE’S “COP IN THE CROSSFIRE”

Ansell Lanka was a Board of Investment (BOI) approved company established around 1989 in the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in Biyagama. The factory had been set up within a 25 acre site to manufacture surgical gloves. Approximately 3,000 Sri Lankans had been employed there. The managerial staff in 1994 comprised five Australians and 35 Sri Lankans.

In the second quarter of 1994, the management of the factory had been restructured to ensure greater output and better supervision of the workers. This triggered considerable worker unrest and a 30% wage increase sought. The hostage drama which began on July 30, 1994 was over this issue. The authorities refused to yield considering the demands totally unreasonable. Incensed, the workers led by about 12 ring leaders had decided to take the law into their own hands.

On July 30, 1994 the work on the second shift was scheduled to commence at 1.30 pm. This was the time for the first shift comprising of about 1,000 workers to cease work and leave the factory premises. When the second shift began, 12 ring leaders from the first shift had coerced several workers on the second shift to take members of the managerial staff including five Australians captive and confine them to the administration block within the factory premises. They had thereafter surrounded the administration block with drums of Isopropyl Alcohol, an extremely combustible and lethal spirit capable of causing instant death and destruction. Ten such drums had been placed in and around the administration block where the hostages were held captive. Large numbers from the concluded first shift had been forced to remain within the premises as well, the object being to demonstrate that the acts of the captors had overwhelming support among workers.

The hostage takers had laid down conditions for the release of the hostages; that their demand for a salary increase be met, and that police should not enter the factory premises. They had in fact informed the police through members of the private security agency hired by the company for the security of the premises that drums of lethal alcohol would be employed to kill the hostages, and that the factory would be set on fire, if any attempt was made by the police to enter the premises. The captors had mounted sentries at vantage points including the water tank, to watch vehicles advancing towards the factory. From subsequent accounts given by the hostages, the situation had been extremely tense, with most captives believing that the captors were determined to execute their threats if their demands were not met.

At about 3.00 pm. on the following day, I received a telephone call from Rohitha Bogollagama, Director General of the Board of Investment (BOI), when I was in my office in police headquarters. I was then Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ranges), and therefore had jurisdiction over all territorial police ranges of DIGs in the country, including the Kelaniya Police Division where Ansell Lanka was located. Bogollagama said that the President and the Prime Minister had directed me to visit Biyagama and explore whether it would be possible to take appropriate steps to overcome the impasse and secure the release of the hostages.

I immediately telephoned Edmund Karunanayake, DIG (Western Province, North) who had authority over Biyagama. I also spoke to Ananda Jayasekera, Senior Superintendent of Police Kelaniya (SSP) to ascertain facts connected with developments. Having been associated for a long time with work connected with intelligence and terrorism, I was convinced that only terrorists with political motives who had undergone training could be that fanatical. The narration of developments by the DIG and SSP Kelaniya gave me the impression that in this instance, the hostage situation had been triggered by novices masquerading as terrorists. Nonetheless the Kelaniya police officers had taken the threats of the hostage takers seriously.

Before leaving for Biyagama to take command of the situation, I informed DIG (Western Province, North) to establish a Command Post within Biyagama Free Trade Zone (FTZ) with radio and telephone facilities. I directed the DIG and the SSP to await me at the post. I thereafter telephoned the office of DIG of the Special Task Force (STF) in order to communicate with Lionel Karunasena, the commandant, to see whether it was possible for them to despatch an elite unit capable of mounting a rescue operation if necessary. Lionel Karunasena (who unfortunately died later) was not at his desk, having flown to Batticaloa – Ampara for operations against the militants. I thereupon spoke to his deputy, Upali Sahabandu, and requested his assistance.

He was most enthusiastic to participate in what would be a novel challenge, but said that he would first speak to his DIG for permission and telephone me. Within five minutes he telephoned and said that he had obtained the required approval. I directed him to arrive at Biyagama as early as possible. When I reached the Command Post at about 4.30 pm, Upali had already arrived there. He had brought with him an array of sophisticated weapons, body armour, stun grenades, the best sharp shooters and equipment to cut through physical barriers.

I sat down to a discussion with DIG Karunanayake, SSP Ananda Jayasekera, Deputy Commandant of the STF Upali Sahabandu and other senior officers of Kelaniya Police Division and the STF. After listening to them, I was surprised that the captors had been allowed to enjoy certain vital facilities without restriction.

HOSTAGE…

They had been permitted the use of telephone facilities with the outside world. They had also enjoyed the luxury of obtaining crucial information through officers of the private security agency (attached to the Company) who had been allowed to move to and from the factory premises. As a result, the “hostage takers” were able to gauge the state of mind of the police and the FTZ authorities, and also to gain psychological dominance over the latter. The general view of those at the conference was that the hostage takers were serious in their threat to execute the hostages if their demands were not met. The point that the suspects had threatened death to the hostages if police were seen outside the factory was repeatedly emphasized by senior police officers of Kelaniya.

Having assessed the overall situation, I came to the conclusion that the hostage takers had gained ascendancy over the management of the FTZ in Biyagama and the police through deception and bluff. The police had been demoralized to a point where they had thought it appropriate to compromise rather than adopt decisive steps. What raced through my mind at the time was that I was encountering a dilemma of unusual proportions. On the one hand, there was no room for negotiations since the hostage takers were not only irrational, but were also some distance away from the gate of the factory, thus denying scope for discussion and negotiation. They had also assumed a state of dominance over the police. I realized that the strongest option available was to storm the factory in order to rescue the hostages. Before making such a choice fraught with the possibility of death and injury to hostages, and accompanying consequences to the government and myself, I considered it appropriate to address and drive sense into them, by speaking to them over a loud hailer from the factory gate.

Before exercising the chosen option, I ordered Upali Sahabandu to conduct a survey and indicate whether the STF could penetrate the perimeter fence, reach the administration block quickly, confront the miscreants and rescue the hostages. I felt that the captors may be confused and demoralized on seeing the STF troops doing a recce, a development they would not have expected.

At about 6.00 p.m, Upali Sahabandu, Deputy Commandant of the STF, returned after the recce and informed me that his men could successfully storm the administration block within the factory and rescue the hostages. Having received a brief report about his plan of action, I asked him how long it would take to complete the entire operation and also the possibility of casualties. He said that there were risks involved, but that casualties could be minimized, and that the entire operation including the successful rescue of the hostages would not exceed more than about 10 minutes. He further stated that the STF may have no option but to shoot at the captors at time of entry. I then took the decision that if my addressing the captors did not yield results, I would storm the premises. I still remember the surprise and consternation on the faces of Director General of the BOI, Rohitha Bogollagama and the Australian High Commissioner who had by now arrived at the Command Post and were privy to our discussions.

I decided as a first step to address the hostage takers from the entrance gate of the factory. DIG (W.P North) and SSP Kelaniya were vehemently opposed to my decision. Before speaking to them, steps were taken to disrupt telephone facilities and electricity within the factory premises. This unexpected step caused panic amongst the captors. Thereafter, officers of the private security agency who so far had unfettered movement to and from the factory, were barred further entry. The captors were thus denied a valuable source of information. At 7.30 pm, I addressed the hostage takers and told them through a loud hailer from the entrance gate that they should walk out with the hostages unharmed within half an hour or I would not be able to guarantee their safety. A misleading assurance was also communicated to them that their demand for a salary increase would be met if they obliged. This conciliatory step was adopted as bait as well as a face saving formula to enable them to comply with the ultimatum.

The captors, rather than confront the STF troops, decided to surrender. At about 8.00 pm. they walked out of the factory premises with the hostages unharmed. The 12 ring leaders were taken into custody. Rohitha Bogollagama and the Australian envoy were profuse in their thanks. After the successful conclusion of the mission, General Hamilton Wanasinghe, Secretary of Defence at the time, whilst extending congratulations, cautioned against summoning the STF without his sanction (the STF at that time was administered by the Ministry of Defence).