It was with shock that I realized that the article in the Sunday Island of April 5 about the winsome graduate gazing serenely at her surroundings was, in fact, an obituary about Nilanthi Jayasinghe, a former colleague who I had held in high esteem. I had lost touch with Nilanthi since my retirement and this news that she had passed away, saddened me deeply

I knew and had worked with Nilanthi – Mrs Jayasinghe as we used to call her – at the Open University of Sri Lanka in the 1990s. As Director, Operations, she was a figure that we as heads of academic departments, relied on; a central bastion of the complex structure that underpinned academic activities at Sri Lanka’s major distance education provider. Few people realize what it takes to provide distance education in an environment not geared to this form of teaching/learning – the volume of Information that has to be created, printed and delivered; the variety of timetables that have to be scheduled; the massive amount of continuous assessment assignments and tests that have to be prepared and sent out; the organization of a multitude of face-to face teaching sessions; the complex scheduling of examinations and tests – all this needed to be attended to for a student population of more than 20,000 and for 23 centres of study dotted across Sri Lanka.

It was an unenviable task but Nilanthi Jayasinghe with her flair for organization, handled it all with aplomb and a deep sense of commitment. If there were delays and inconclusive action on our part, she never reprimanded but would work with us to sort things out. Her work as Director, Operations brought her into contact with staff across the spectrum-from the Vice-Chancellor to the apprentice in the Open University’s Printing Press. Nilanthi treated everyone with dignity and as a result, was respected by all at the university. She was sensitive, kind-hearted, a good friend who would readily share problems and help to solve them. The year NIlanthi retired, I was out of the island. When I came back to the Open University, I felt bereft without the steadfast support of her stalwart presence .

The article in the ‘Sunday Island’ describes her life after retirement, looking after family members and enjoying the presence of a granddaughter.

After a lifetime of commitment to others, Nilanthi Jayasinghe truly deserved this happiness.

May she be blessed with peace.

Ryhana Raheem

Professor Emeritus
Open University of Sri Lanka.

James Mather (Selvan to all of us) who passed away recently at the age of 95 was one of the leading Chartered Accountants in the country. He was the senior partner of Ernst and Young for long years, and the mentor for a generation of chartered accountants. He was confidante and adviser to many of the leading businessmen of his time. His career spanned over six decades. A man who never sought the limelight, he was very influential in Ceylon/Sri Lanka’s business world.

Selvan Mather was born in 1930 to a well-known Christian family in Jaffna. His father, Rev. James Mather was Head of the Methodist Church in Ceylon. Selvan was educated at Trinity College Kandy, and he had a life-long connection with the school. He entered the University of Ceylon in the late 1940s, at a time when Ivor Jennings was Vice-Chancellor.

He read economics and passed out with an honours degree. For short periods he was in the Department of Income Tax and with the newly established Central Bank of Ceylon. The Central Bank facilitated him to go to England to qualify as a chartered accountant. His two referees, when seeking admission to an accountancy firm in the U.K. were M.D.H. Jayawardena, then Minister of Finance and the Auditor General of Ceylon, L.A. Weerasinghe. Being a chartered accountant was a rare event those days.

On his return from England, his career was with Ernst and Young where he became senior partner. He was close advisor and confidante to many of the leading businessmen. He was admitted to its Hall of Fame by the Institute of Chartered Accountants.

To strike a personal note, I got to know him 50 years ago when he applied for a fellowship given by the Asian Productivity Organisation (APO) in Tokyo. I was in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs at the time, and the Ministry was handling APO affairs in Colombo. He told me later that he enjoyed his time in Tokyo. From that time, we kept up a friendship with him and Nelun, which lasted 50 years.

My wife, Rukmal, and I lived in Windsor England, for about 25 years. During that time, Nelun and Selvan were regular visitors to England. I remember taking him for long walks in Windsor Great Park, and on the grounds of Eton College which were nearby. We went on long car tours in England covering the Cotswolds, the Peak districts and the Potteries. I remember celebrating Selvan’s 70th birthday in London at a Greek restaurant, along with his great friends, Nihal and Doreen Vitarana. Memories remain, although Selvan is no more.

In the last decades of his life we saw Nelun and him often. A few of us, Manik de Silva, Nihal and Srima Seneviratne and a few others met regulsrly for lunch. We will all miss Selvan who was mine of his life and times very much.

Selvan leaves his wife Nelun and three children and their husbands – Rohan, Shyamala and Indi, and Rehana and Akram. It was a close-knit family and they will miss him.

Leelananda De Silva.

Broader Strategic Consequences

One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.

Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.

The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.

A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system

The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.

The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.

The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.

Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.

Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.

However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.

Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon

History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.

European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.

by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)