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Funding of higher education in Sri Lanka

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(A response to Prof. Shamala Kumar’s article, “Public funding of higher education: Seeking private funds to fill the gap?” in The Island of 10 June 2025)

*  Acknowledging the Funding Crisis and Equity Gap

Prof. Kumar rightly draws attention to the precipitous decline in state funding for higher education in Sri Lanka from 4.25% of GDP in the 1960s to a mere 1.5% in 2022, and the consequential disparities in revenue-raising capacities, with the University of Colombo generating approximately 20% of its budget independently, while regional universities such as the University of Jaffna and Wayamba University operate with less than 2% (Kumar, 2025). This fiscal contraction worsens structural inequities and hampers the mission of regional institutions. Ashraf et al. (2012) state that the system resource approach to organisational effectiveness highlights that an institution’s ability to secure and use resources is crucial for its success. Without strategic investment and resource redistribution, less-resourced universities will continue to lag behind, perpetuating systemic inequities.

However, in this context, it is important to recognise that looking for alternative revenue sources, like increasing the number of foreign students and forming public-private partnerships, is not just a concession to the market; it is a strategic necessity.

These methods can help universities diversify their funding sources, improve their resilience, and lessen their dependence on decreasing public funds. Also, attracting international students and private investment can provide essential resources for infrastructure, faculty development, and research, which supports the broader mission of higher education (British Council, 2024).

Institutional Constraints Over Full Marketisation: The Imperative of Governance Reform

The expectation that public universities transition to full self-funding is neither feasible nor equitable in the absence of substantive governance reforms. Sri Lankan universities remain entangled in rigid administrative frameworks, including protracted approvals for signing MOUs with foreign universities, foreign-funded research and Treasury-mandated procurement protocols, which severely restrict strategic autonomy (Kumar, 2025). The process approach to organisational effectiveness highlights the need for efficient internal operations, trust, and communication as key factors for institutional success (Ashraf et al., 2012). Too much bureaucracy weakens these elements, limiting innovation and responsiveness.

To fully realise the benefits of recruiting foreign students and forming public-private partnerships, governance reforms must give universities the power to negotiate, carry out, and manage these initiatives effectively. Without these reforms, even the best strategies might be slowed down by bureaucracy and inefficiency. This would limit their potential impact on institutional growth and equity.

Moreover, governance in higher education is complex. It involves coordination between government agencies, institutional leadership, and internal governance bodies (De Boer et al., 2015). Effective reform must strike a balance between institutional autonomy and transparent accountability mechanisms. Empirical research from Ethiopian public universities indicates that governance principles, including academic freedom, accountability, and transparency, are positively correlated with educational quality (Gebremariam et al., 2020). These findings suggest that enhancing autonomy and leadership capacity is critical to improving institutional performance in Sri Lanka.

Reforming Quality Assurance in Sri Lankan Higher Education: A Unified Total Quality Management Framework for Public and Private Institutions

The prevailing quality assurance (QA) framework in Sri Lanka’s higher education sector, overseen predominantly by the University Grants Commission (UGC), has been critiqued for its compliance-driven, top-down approach. As Prof. Kumar insightfully notes, this system marginalises internal democratic bodies such as Faculty Boards and Senates, reducing QA to bureaucratic box-ticking exercises that stifle institutional creativity and contextual responsiveness. This model fails to foster a culture of continuous improvement and innovation, which is essential for elevating educational quality in a diverse and evolving landscape.

To overcome these limitations, it is necessary to adopt a Total Quality Management (TQM) approach tailored specifically for higher education (Yusuf, 2023). Unlike traditional compliance models, TQM emphasises continuous improvement, stakeholder engagement, and process optimisation. Frameworks like ISO 21001, which has been designed for educational organisations, highlight learner-centered practices, visionary leadership, and social responsibility, aligning quality management with the dynamic needs of institutions and their communities which also incorporates both Total Quality Management (TQM) principles and compliance requirements.

Institutional Autonomy with Collaborative National Oversight

A reimagined QA system would grant universities, both public and private, the autonomy to implement TQM practices suited to their unique contexts. This autonomy fosters a culture of self- reflection and ongoing quality enhancement, empowering institutions to innovate while remaining accountable. Simultaneously, a national apex body would be established to collaboratively develop quality benchmarks with key stakeholders, including faculty, students, employers, and policymakers. This participatory governance model ensures that quality standards are relevant, transparent, and socially accountable, consistent with the strategic constituency model of organisational effectiveness.

To balance autonomy and accountability, a tiered accreditation system is proposed:

Under such a system, institutions that meet or exceed quality benchmarks would enjoy full autonomy to innovate and refine their quality management without excessive external interference whereas institutions that fall short would remain under a compliance-driven regime, receiving targeted support and oversight until they achieve the required standards (Russell Group, 2014). This, while motivating underperforming institutions to elevate their standards, will free high- performing institutions from being bound by the limitations of low-performing institutions in setting quality benchmarks. Therefore, the proposed graded approach would incentivise excellence while safeguarding minimum quality standards, recognising the diversity of institutional missions and capacities across Sri Lanka’s higher education sector.

Ensuring a Level Playing Field: Integrating Private Providers

Market distortions often attributed to private-sector education largely stem from the absence of a unified, developmental QA framework. Incorporating private providers into the same TQM-based QA system as public universities ensures equitable quality assurance across the sector. Private institutions adopting TQM principles would align with ISO 21001 standards, embracing learner- centeredness, ethical conduct, and social responsibility.

As indicated before, a national apex body would oversee this unified QA framework, setting transparent benchmarks and monitoring performance across all institutions. The tiered accreditation system applies equally to private providers, fostering a competitive environment driven by quality and innovation rather than price or minimal compliance. This approach addresses concerns regarding misuse of autonomy in the private sector and guarantees equitable access, academic standards, and ethical fundraising practices.

Empirical Evidence and International Best Practices Empirical studies support the effectiveness of Total Quality Management (TQM) in higher education, particularly in improving institutional processes and stakeholder satisfaction. For instance, Gorontalo State University’s adoption of TQM practices has been linked to notable gains in accreditation, governance, research collaboration, and community outreach (Rahman et al., 2018). Globally, organisations such as the OECD encourage coherent national quality assurance systems, where both public and private institutions are subject to clear, development-oriented standards monitored by appropriate national authorities.

Capacity Building and Facilitative Governance

Effective TQM adoption requires capacity building in leadership, quality culture, and data management. The national apex body’s role should be facilitative, providing guidance, disseminating best practices, and supporting professional development, rather than functioning as a rigid regulator. This enables a sector-wide cultural shift from compliance to continuous improvement.

Beyond Blaming “Neoliberalism”: Emphasising Implementation and Governance Culture

While Prof. Kumar warns that unchecked marketisation can weaken free undergraduate education and increase social inequalities (Kumar, 2025), it is important to understand that how well an organisation performs depends on the design and management of governance and policy, not just on economic ideology (Cameron, 1978; Ashraf et al., 2012).

The focus on internationalisation and industry collaboration should not be dismissed as purely ‘neoliberal.’ Rather, these strategies should be evaluated based on how they can promote the public good. When appropriately regulated, such efforts can enhance graduate employability, foster applied research aligned with national priorities, and enable Sri Lankan universities to participate more actively in global knowledge and technology production (British Council, 2024; Ashraf et al., 2012).

Governance reform must address not only structural autonomy but also the culture of governance. Research in Europe, including the UK, highlights that inclusive and participatory governance cultures, characterised by transparency, engagement, and proactive leadership, are essential for effective institutional management (Bergan and Pinheiro, 2021). These cultural aspects complement formal reforms in promoting institutional agility and innovation. Although operating within a state- controlled system, Tsinghua University has undertaken governance reforms that demonstrate evolving models of internal collaboration among faculty, administrators, and students (Wang and Liu, 2019). This underscores the potential benefits of empowering internal democratic bodies such as Councils, Senates, and Faculty Boards in the Sri Lankan university system.

Governance as a Catalyst for Collaboration, Research Quality, and Innovation

Effective governance frameworks support collaboration across different fields and promote research excellence. These elements are vital for improving the quality of higher education (Lee et al., 2020). Public-private partnerships can create opportunities for joint research, technology sharing, and ecosystems that lead to innovation, benefiting both schools and businesses.

Universities with solid governance systems create environments that encourage academic freedom and independence. This approach promotes innovation and valuable research results. Therefore, reforming governance is crucial not only for fairness and quality control but also for Sri Lanka’s overall research and innovation goals.

A Balanced, Action-Oriented Policy Framework.

Conclusions

Prof. Kumar’s critique of growing inequality due to unchecked market forces is relevant and significant. However, completely rejecting private involvement could result in continued resource shortages and hinder innovation. We need a complex and thoughtful approach. This approach should acknowledge the role of internationalisation and cooperation between public and private sectors. These aspects are vital for building institutional strength, generating knowledge, and supporting national progress. By using established models of organisational effectiveness (Cameron, 1978; Ashraf et al., 2012) and research on governance, this approach should combine governance reform, balanced revenue strategies, fair taxation, and a cohesive framework for quality assurance in development. Transitioning to a TQM-based, unified quality assurance system that encompasses both public and private higher education providers, supported by institutional autonomy and a stakeholder-driven national framework, presents a promising path forward for Sri Lanka. This model aligns with international best practices and addresses the current regime’s limitations by fostering innovation, contextual adaptation, and equitable quality enhancement. Ultimately, it creates a level playing field that elevates quality, equity, and innovation across the entire higher education sector. Only through such thorough reforms can Sri Lanka maintain its commitment to free education, promote innovation, and provide equitable, high-quality higher education for all.

References

*  Ashraf, G., Abd Kadir, S., & others. (2012). A Review on the Models of Organizational Effectiveness: A Look at Cameron’s Model in Higher Education. International Education Studies, 5(2), 80-87.

*  Bergan, S., & Pinheiro, R. (2021). Governance and Institutional Autonomy in Higher Education: The Role of Culture. European Journal of Higher Education, 11(3), 255-270.

*  British Council. (2024). Growth of Sri Lanka’s private higher education sector.

*  Cameron, K. S. (1978). Measuring Organizational Effectiveness in Institutions of Higher Education. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(4), 604-632.

*  De Boer, H., Enders, J., & Schimank, U. (2015). Higher Education Governance and Institutional Autonomy: A Multi-Level Perspective. Higher Education Policy, 28(3), 293-311.

*  Gebremariam, M., et al. (2020). The Impact of Governance Principles on Quality of Education in Ethiopian Public Universities. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 42(3), 234-250.

*  Kumar, S. (2025). Public funding of higher education: Seeking private funds to fill the gap? The Island, June 10, 2025.

*  Lee, S., et al. (2020). Governance and Research Collaboration in Higher Education. Studies in Higher Education, 45(5), 1021-1037.

*  OECD. (2020). Quality Assurance in Higher Education: Trends and Challenges. OECD Publishing.

*  Perera, H., & Fernando, R. (2021). Challenges in Quality Assurance Implementation in Sri Lankan Universities. Sri Lankan Journal of Educational Research, 13(1), 45-62.

*  Rahman, A., et al. (2018). Implementation of Total Quality Management (TQM) in Efforts to Improve the Quality of Higher Education: Case Study at Gorontalo State University. Journal of Indonesian Community and Public Health, 1(2).

*  Russell Group. (2014). Quality Assurance in UK Higher Education: A Tiered System Approach. Russell Group Paper.

*  assurance.pdf

*  Wang, H., & Liu, J. (2019). Multi-Model Governance Reform at Tsinghua University. Higher Education Policy, 32(4), 567-584.

*  Yusuf, F. A. (2023). Total Quality Management (TQM) and Quality of Higher Education: A Meta-Analysis Study. International Journal of Instruction, 16(2), 161-178.



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Opinion

What BNP should keep in mind as it assumes power

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PM Tarique Rahman

BNP rightly deserves our congratulations for winning a decisive victory in the 13th parliamentary election. This outcome reflects an unequivocal mandate that is both politically and historically significant. Coming as it does at a critical point in Bangladesh’s democratic journey, this moment marks more than a change of government; it signals a renewed public resolve to restore democratic norms, accountability, and institutional integrity.

The election came after years of severe distrust in the electoral process, questions over legitimacy, and institutional strain, so the poll’s successful conduct has reinforced trust in the process as well as the principle that governments derive authority from the consent of the governed. For quite some time now, Bangladesh has faced deep polarisation, intolerance, and threats to its democratic foundations. Regressive and anti-democratic tendencies—whether institutional, ideological, or political—risked steering the country away from its foundational goals. BNP’s decisive victory can therefore be interpreted as a call to reverse this trajectory, and a public desire for accountable, forward-looking governance rooted in liberal democratic principles.

However, the road ahead is going to be bumpy, to put it mildly. A broad mandate alone cannot resolve deep-rooted structural problems. The BNP government will likely continue to face economic challenges and institutional constraints for the foreseeable future. This will test its capacity and sincerity not only to govern but also to transform the culture of governance in the country.

Economic reform imperatives

A key challenge will be stabilising the economy, which continues to face mounting pressures: growth has decelerated, inflation has eroded people’s purchasing power, foreign exchange reserves remain low, and public finances are tight. External debt has increased significantly in recent years, while the tax-to-GDP ratio has fallen to historically low levels. State-owned enterprises and the banking sector face persistent structural weaknesses, and confidence among both domestic and international investors remains fragile.

The new government should begin by restoring macroeconomic discipline. Containing inflation will need close coordination across ministries and agencies. Monetary policy must remain cautious and credible, free from political interference, while fiscal policy should prioritise stability rather than expand populist spending.

Tax reform is also unavoidable. The National Board of Revenue requires comprehensive modernisation, digitalisation, and total compliance. Broadening the tax base, especially by bringing all high-income groups and segments of the informal economy into the formal system, is crucial. Over time, reliance on indirect taxes such as value-added tax and import duties should be reduced, paving the way for a more progressive direct tax regime.

Banking sector reform is equally crucial. Proper asset quality reviews and regulatory oversight are necessary to rebuild confidence in the sector. Political patronage within the financial institutions must end. Without a resilient financial system, private investment cannot recover. As regards growth, the government should focus on diversifying exports beyond ready-made garments and deepening integration into regional value chains. Attracting foreign direct investment will depend on regulatory predictability and improvements in logistics and energy reliability. Ambitious growth targets must be matched by realistic implementation capacity.

Political Challenges

Distrust among political actors, partly fuelled by fears of retribution and violence, is a reality that may persist. BNP will face pressure from its supporters to act quickly in addressing perceived injustices, but good governance demands restraint. If the new government resorts to or tolerates exclusion or retaliation, it will risk perpetuating the very cycle it has condemned.

Managing internal party discipline will also be crucial, as a large parliamentary majority can sometimes lead to complacency or factional rivalry. Strong leadership will be required to maintain unity while allowing constructive internal debate. BNP must also rebuild trust with minority communities and vulnerable groups. Elections often heighten anxieties among minorities, so a credible commitment to equal citizenship is crucial. BNP’s political maturity will also be judged by how it treats or engages with its opponents. In this regard, Chairman Tarique Rahman’s visits to the residences of top opposition leaders on Sunday marked a positive gesture, one that many hope will withstand the inevitable pressures or conflicts over governance in the coming days.

Strengthening democratic institutions

A central promise of this election was to restore democracy, which must now translate into concrete institutional reforms. Judicial independence needs constant safeguarding. Which means that appointment, promotion, and case management processes should be insulated from political influence. Parliamentary oversight committees must also function effectively, and the opposition’s voice in parliament must be protected.

Electoral institutions also need reform, particularly along the lines of the July Charter. Continued credibility of the Election Commission will depend on transparency, professional management, and impartiality. Meanwhile, the civil service must be depoliticised. Appointments based on loyalty rather than merit have long undermined governance in the country. So the new administration must work on curtailing the influence of political networks to ensure a professional, impartial civil service. Media reform and digital rights also deserve careful attention. We must remember that democratic consolidation is built through institutional habits, and these habits must be established early.

Beyond winner-takes-all

Bangladesh’s politics has long been characterised by a winner-takes-all mentality. Electoral victories have often resulted in monopolisation of power, marginalising opposition voices and weakening checks and balances. If BNP is serious about democratic renewal, it must consciously break with this tradition. Inclusive policy consultations will be a good starting point. Major economic and constitutional reforms should be based on cross-party dialogue and consensus. Appointments to constitutional bodies should be transparent and consultative, and parliamentary debates should be done with the letter and spirit of the July Charter in mind.

Meeting public expectations

The scale of public expectations now is naturally immense. Citizens want economic relief, employment opportunities, necessary institutional reforms, and improved governance. Managing these expectations will be quite difficult. Many reforms will not yield immediate results, and some may impose short-term costs. So, it is imperative to ensure transparent communication about the associated timelines, trade-offs, and fiscal constraints.

Anti-corruption efforts must be credible and monitored at all times. Measures are needed to strengthen oversight institutions, improve transparency in public procurement, and expand digital service delivery to reduce opportunities for rent-seeking. Governance reform should be systematic, not selective or politically driven. Tangible improvements are urgently needed in public service delivery, particularly in health, education, social protection, and local government.

Finally, a word of caution: BNP’s decisive victory presents both opportunities and risks. It can enable bold reforms but it also carries the danger of overreach. The key deciding factor here is political judgment. The question is, can our leaders deliver based on the mandate voters have given them? (The Daily Star)

Dr Fahmida Khatun is an economist and executive director at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Views expressed in the article are the author’s own.

Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

by Fahmida Khatun

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Opinion

Why religion should remain separate from state power in Sri Lanka: Lessons from political history

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Religion has been an essential part of Sri Lankan society for more than two millennia, shaping culture, moral values, and social traditions. Buddhism in particular has played a foundational role in guiding ethical behaviour, promoting compassion, and encouraging social harmony. Yet Sri Lanka’s modern political history clearly shows that when religion becomes closely entangled with state power, both democracy and religion suffer. The politicisation of religion especially Buddhism has repeatedly contributed to ethnic division, weakened governance, and the erosion of moral authority. For these reasons, the separation of religion and the state is not only desirable but necessary for Sri Lanka’s long-term stability and democratic progress.

Sri Lanka’s post-independence political history provides early evidence of how religion became a political tool. The 1956 election, which brought S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to power, is often remembered as a turning point where Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was actively mobilised for political expedience. Buddhist monks played a visible role in political campaigning, framing political change as a religious and cultural revival. While this movement empowered the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, it also laid the foundation for ethnic exclusion, particularly through policies such as the “Sinhala Only Act.” Though framed as protecting national identity, these policies marginalised Tamil-speaking communities and contributed significantly to ethnic tensions that later escalated into civil conflict. This period demonstrates how religious symbolism, when fused with state power, can undermine social cohesion rather than strengthen it.

The increasing political involvement of Buddhist monks in later decades further illustrates the risks of this entanglement. In the early 2000s, the emergence of monk-led political parties such as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) marked a new phase in Sri Lankan politics. For the first time, monks entered Parliament as elected lawmakers, directly participating in legislation and governance. While their presence was justified as a moral corrective to corrupt politics, in practice it blurred the boundary between spiritual leadership and political power. Once monks became part of parliamentary debates, policy compromises, and political rivalries, they were no longer perceived as neutral moral guides. Instead, they became political actors subject to criticism, controversy, and public mistrust. This shift significantly weakened the traditional reverence associated with the Sangha.

Sri Lankan political history also shows how religion has been repeatedly used by political leaders to legitimise authority during times of crisis. Successive governments have sought the public endorsement of influential monks to strengthen their political image, particularly during elections or moments of instability. During the war, religious rhetoric was often used to frame the conflict in moral or civilisational terms, leaving little room for nuanced political solutions or reconciliation. This approach may have strengthened short-term political support, but it also deepened ethnic polarisation and made post-war reconciliation more difficult. The long-term consequences of this strategy are still visible in unresolved ethnic grievances and fragile national unity.

Another important historical example is the post-war period after 2009. Despite the conclusion of the war, Sri Lanka failed to achieve meaningful reconciliation or strong democratic reform. Instead, religious nationalism gained renewed political influence, often used to silence dissent and justify authoritarian governance. Smaller population groups such as Muslims and Christians in particular experienced growing insecurity as extremist groups operated with perceived political protection. The state’s failure to maintain religious neutrality during this period weakened public trust and damaged Sri Lanka’s international reputation. These developments show that privileging one religion in state power does not lead to stability or moral governance; rather, it creates fear, exclusion, and institutional decay.

The moral authority of religion itself has also suffered as a result of political entanglement. Traditionally, Buddhist monks were respected for their distance from worldly power, allowing them to speak truth to rulers without fear or favour. However, when monks publicly defend controversial political decisions, support corrupt leaders, or engage in aggressive nationalist rhetoric, they risk losing this moral independence. Sri Lankan political history demonstrates that once religious figures are seen as aligned with political power, public criticism of politicians easily extends to religion itself. This has contributed to growing disillusionment among younger generations, many of whom now view religious institutions as extensions of political authority rather than sources of ethical guidance.

The teachings of the Buddha offer a clear contrast to this historical trend. The Buddha advised rulers on ethical governance but never sought political authority or state power. His independence allowed him to critique injustice and moral failure without compromise. Sri Lanka’s political experience shows that abandoning this principle has harmed both religion and governance. When monks act as political agents, they lose the freedom to challenge power, and religion becomes vulnerable to political failure and public resentment.

Sri Lanka’s multi-religious social structure nurtures divisive, if not separatist, sentiments. While Buddhism holds a special historical place, the modern state governs citizens of many faiths. Political history shows that when the state appears aligned with one religion, minority communities feel excluded, regardless of constitutional guarantees. This sense of exclusion has repeatedly weakened national unity and contributed to long-term conflict. A secular state does not reject religion; rather, it protects all religions by maintaining neutrality and ensuring equal citizenship.

Sri Lankan political history clearly demonstrates that the fusion of religion and state power has not produced good governance, social harmony, or moral leadership. Instead, it has intensified ethnic divisions, weakened democratic institutions, and damaged the spiritual credibility of religion itself. Separating religion from the state is not an attack on Buddhism or Sri Lankan tradition. On the contrary, it is a necessary step to preserve the dignity of religion and strengthen democratic governance. By maintaining a clear boundary between spiritual authority and political power, Sri Lanka can move toward a more inclusive, stable, and just society one where religion remains a source of moral wisdom rather than a tool of political control.

In present-day Sri Lanka, the dangers of mixing religion with state power are more visible than ever. Despite decades of experience showing the negative consequences of politicised religion, religious authority continues to be invoked to justify political decisions, silence criticism, and legitimise those in power. During recent economic and political crises, political leaders have frequently appeared alongside prominent religious figures to project moral legitimacy, even when governance failures, corruption, and mismanagement were evident. This pattern reflects a continued reliance on religious symbolism to mask political weakness rather than a genuine commitment to ethical governance.

The 2022 economic collapse offers a powerful contemporary example. As ordinary citizens faced shortages of fuel, food, and medicine, public anger was directed toward political leadership and state institutions. However, instead of allowing religion to act as an independent moral force that could hold power accountable, sections of the religious establishment appeared closely aligned with political elites. This alignment weakened religion’s ability to speak truthfully on behalf of the suffering population. When religion stands too close to power, it loses its capacity to challenge injustice, corruption, and abuse precisely when society needs moral leadership the most.

At the same time, younger generations in Sri Lanka are increasingly questioning both political authority and religious institutions. Many young people perceive religious leaders as participants in political power structures rather than as independent ethical voices. This growing scepticism is not a rejection of spirituality, but a response to the visible politicisation of religion. If this trend continues, Sri Lanka risks long-term damage not only to democratic trust but also to religious life itself.

The present moment therefore demands a critical reassessment. A clear separation between religion and the state would allow religious institutions to reclaim moral independence and restore public confidence. It would also strengthen democracy by ensuring that policy decisions are guided by evidence, accountability, and inclusive dialogue rather than religious pressure or nationalist rhetoric. Sri Lanka’s recent history shows that political legitimacy cannot be built on religious symbolism alone. Only transparent governance, social justice, and equal citizenship can restore stability and public trust.

Ultimately, the future of Sri Lanka depends on learning from both its past and present. Protecting religion from political misuse is not a threat to national identity; it is a necessary condition for ethical leadership, democratic renewal, and social harmony in a deeply diverse society.

by Milinda Mayadunna

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Opinion

NPP’s misguided policy

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Balangoda Kassapa Thera

Judging by some recent events, starting with the injudicious pronouncement in Jaffna by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and subsequent statements by some senior ministers, the government tends to appease minorities at the expense of the majority. Ill-treatment of some Buddhist monks by the police continues to arouse controversy, and it looks as if the government used the police to handle matters that are best left to the judiciary. Sangadasa Akurugoda concludes his well-reasoned opinion piece “Appeasement of separatists” (The island, 13 February) as follows:

“It is unfortunate that the President of a country considers ‘national pride and patriotism’, a trait that every citizen should have, as ‘racism’. Although the President is repeating it like a mantra that he will not tolerate ‘racism’ or ‘extremism’ we have never heard him saying that he will not tolerate ‘separatism or terrorism’.”

It is hard to disagree with Akurugoda. Perhaps, the President may be excused for his reluctance to refer to terrorism as he leads a movement that unleashed terror twice, but his reluctance to condemn separatism is puzzling. Although most political commentators consider the President’s comment that ‘Buddhist go to Jaffna to spread hate’ to be callous, the head of an NGO heaped praise on the President for saying so!

As I pointed out in a previous article, puppet-masters outside seem to be pulling the strings (A puppet show? The Island, 23 January) and the President’s reluctance to condemn separatism whilst accusing Buddhists of spreading hatred by going to Jaffna makes one wonder who these puppeteers are.

Another incident that raises serious concern was reported from a Buddhist Temple in Trincomalee. The police removed a Buddha statue and allegedly assaulted Buddhist priests. Mysteriously, the police brought back the statue the following day, giving an absurd excuse; they claimed they had removed it to ensure its safety. No inquiry into police action was instituted but several Bhikkhus and dayakayas were remanded for a long period.

Having seen a front-page banner headline “Sivuru gelawenakam pahara dunna” (“We were beaten till the robes fell”) in the January 13th edition of the Sunday Divaina, I watched on YouTube the press briefing at the headquarters of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Association. I can well imagine the agony those who were remanded went through.

Ven. Balangoda Kassapa’s description of the way he and the others, held on remand, were treated raises many issues. Whether they committed a transgression should be decided by the judiciary. Given the well-known judicial dictum, ‘innocent until proven guilty’, the harassment they faced cannot be justified under any circumstances.

Ven. Kassapa exposed the high-handed actions of the police. This has come as no surprise as it is increasingly becoming apparent as they are no longer ‘Sri Lanka Police’; they have become the ‘NPP police’. This is an issue often editorially highlighted by The Island. How can one expect the police to be impartial when two key posts are held by officers brought out of retirement as a reward for canvassing for the NPP. It was surprising to learn that the suspects could not be granted bail due to objections raised by the police.

Ven. Kassapa said the head of the remand prison where he and others were held had threatened him.

However, there was a ray of hope. Those who cry out for reconciliation fail to recognise that reconciliation is a much-misused term, as some separatists masquerading as peacemakers campaign for reconciliation! They overlook the fact that it is already there as demonstrated by the behaviour of Tamil and Muslim inmates in the remand prison, where Ven. Kassapa and others were kept.

Non-Buddhist prisoners looked after the needs of the Bhikkhus though the prison chief refused even to provide meals according to Vinaya rules! In sharp contrast, during a case against a Sri Lankan Bhikkhu accused of child molestation in the UK, the presiding judge made sure the proceedings were paused for lunch at the proper time.

I have written against Bhikkhus taking to politics, but some of the issues raised by Ven. Kassapa must not be ignored. He alleges that the real reason behind the conflict was that the government was planning to allocate the land belonging to the Vihara to an Indian businessman for the construction of a hotel. This can be easily clarified by the government, provided there is no hidden agenda.

It is no secret that this government is controlled by India. Even ‘Tilvin Ayya’, who studied the module on ‘Indian Expansionism’ under Rohana Wijeweera, has mended fences with India. He led a JVP delegation to India recently. Several MoUs or pacts signed with India are kept under wraps.

Unfortunately, the government’s mishandling of this issue is being exploited by other interested parties, and this may turn out to be a far bigger problem.

It is high time the government stopped harassing the majority in the name of reconciliation, a term exploited by separatists to achieve their goals!

By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana

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