Foreign policy quandaries for IOR’s Small States intensifying

As should be expected, the calling over at the Port of Colombo recently by an Indian warship quickly followed by similar dockings in Colombo by three Chinese warships is posing the question among observers as to whether a further escalation is being witnessed in the tussle for regional supremacy between India and China. This is added proof, it seems, that Sri Lanka is the coveted trophy, so to speak, in the “geo-political” contest between the regional giants.

On the face of it, such port visits by the warships of the countries in question should not prove controversial since the visits are purportedly of a routine nature and by virtue of that fact are legitimate. On the other hand, Sri Lanka has no choice but to permit these visits since it cannot afford to offend either of the states, given its high dependence on India and China for economic and other forms of assistance. In other words, circumstances are compelling Sri Lanka to be ‘Non-aligned’ in this situation, irrespective of whether such a policy posture is earnestly sought by it or not.

Sri Lanka’s foreign policy challenge occasioned by the Indian and Chinese warships ought to be further compounded by its reliance on the powers in question to straighten out its current debt restructuring exercise. That is, Sri Lanka’s economic survival is crucially dependent on India and China. The former has no choice but to tamely accommodate the warships.

Accordingly, Sri Lanka could be considered as epitomizing the pitiable condition of most Small States which are dependent for their survival on major powers. Like Sri Lanka, however, the majority of Small States could use ‘Non-alignment’ to legitimize their docile compliance with the requirements of the big powers of the region.

As these Small States ponder their foreign policy options, they would do well not to leverage their cordial ties with one major power to extract concessions from another or ‘play’ one major power against the other, as is sometimes the case. A foreign policy strategy of this kind may not benefit the Small State in question in the long run, particularly if the major power against which such countervailing power is being used is a close neighbour.

There is the case of the Maldives, which has gone the ‘extra mile’ as it were to foster closer relations with China, with the aim of apparently counterbalancing India but it is yet to be seen as to what extent this foreign policy initiative would benefit the Maldives. It’s a matter that needs to be left to time.

Moreover, other Small States in South Asia in particular cannot model themselves on the Maldives on account of the fact that the latter is more economically vibrant than most Small States of the India Ocean Region (IOR). That is, the Maldives is in a better position than its counterparts of the region to be independent in the area of foreign policy. This is a luxury most Small States cannot afford.

Not all major powers relate to Small States or for that matter any other kind of state on the basis of purely altruism or ‘fellow feeling’. It should not be overlooked that such affinity is usually based on the major power’s economic, strategic and political interests.

In the case of China, some resources sought eagerly by it and seen as central to its economic interests are energy and minerals. Besides, strategically located Small States are also seen as having a bearing on its best interests by China.

Therefore, if China is seeking to perpetuate and upgrade its relations with Sri Lanka and Pakistan, for example, it is principally on account of coveted resources, such as energy. There is also, of course, the need to counterbalance the regional dominance of India.

Accordingly, Small States of the IOR would need to manage their relations with major powers with utmost judiciousness. For example, Sri Lanka should guard against falling inextricably into ‘debt traps’ that would bring it into a relationship of subservience with such powers.

States such as Sri Lanka would need to stringently follow a strategy of maintaining equitable relations with all the powers that matter. In fact, a policy of Non-alignment may need to be pursued to the degree possible.

Another problem area that Small States of the IOR would need to resolve on an urgent basis is what seems to be an ingrained ‘Anti-India phobia’ among considerable sections of their publics. This is particularly true of Sri Lanka. Utterances that smack of an irrational and baseless fear of India, are being made, for instance, by some current contenders for the position of president of Sri Lanka.

Such instinctual dislike of India is an issue of longstanding in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, this curious antagonism towards India is stirred by sections of Sri Lanka’s political establishment for the purpose of ‘capturing the majority vote’. But, needless to say, the harm the relevant phobia does to better India-Sri Lanka ties is incalculable.

However, common sense ought to dictate to India’s smaller neighbours that swift progress, in an economic sense in particular, is not possible without factoring in flourishing bilateral relations with India. The mere geographical closeness and predominance of India ought to convince the political and policy elites of South Asia that it would be utterly foolhardy to be estranged from India.

It does not follow from the foregoing that India’s smaller neighbours should get into a subservient relationship with it. The sovereign equality of states is, after all, non-negotiable. However, regional realities cannot be allowed to be glossed over in the crafting of their foreign policies by India’s smaller neighbours. That is, such policies ought to have a realistic basis.

From a long term viewpoint, however, Small States would find that a Non-aligned foreign policy is best for them. This is in view of the fact that they would need the cooperation of the rest of the world to survive materially.

There exist numerous regional organizations that profess to further the interests of Southern states. However, it is imperative that the foremost interests of Small States are concertedly and consistently advocated by these groupings as well. It would be found that the foremost interests of Small States are best addressed from a Non-aligned point of view. This endeavor would need to be premised on a creative re-interpretation of Non-alignment.