Features
Evaluating trends in the JVP-NPP
by Kumar David
The government is in retreat analysts say. Strategists in the opposition, smelling blood, are hopeful of replacing President and Parliamentary majority in 2024 and 2025, if not earlier in the event of a debacle. It is a sign of the times that Namal and his wife were jeered and compelled to flee Monarch Imperial, a posh restaurant, on December 23 said the Daily Mirror of the next day. In this context there are four national groups of importance – JVP-NPP, SJB-Sajith, TNA and the scattered Muslim parties. The first two have national ambitions and the latter two sub-national (not lead a government). The SLPP has not yet given up the ghost and under Mahinda’s leadership hallucinates recovery. Sajith hankers after the presidency. The JVP-NPP is motivated to get enough parliamentary seats to be one step away from power. I discount Ranil’s UNP, the SLFP and every other faction of the government as a centrepiece of any future government. Presidential ambitions: Sajith, Champika, Karu, and from the (Raja) Paksa-clan Gota second term or Namal, all crave the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.
It is premature to make predictions but strategies are ripening; the NPP has issued a draft programme and JVP Secretary Tilvin Silva a strategy letter in the December 20 issue of Mawilma (Compass) the NPP’s monthly magazine-newsletter. I will discuss the programmes of the aforementioned four and the government side as they become available, but right now only the JVP-NPP version is to hand. I will not confine myself to the document but also comment on broad strategy in the context of the unfolding scenario. For example, I will spell out my views on the JVP-NPP’s orientation to military intimidation.
The NPP’s “Rapid Response” Manifesto
The platform entitled “Rapid Response to Overcome Current Challenges” opens with a preface outlying Sri Lanka’s manifest debacle followed by a section entitled ‘A Thriving Economy Instead of a Dependent Economy’ which declares “As National People’s Power we present initial ideas for the socio-economic transformation that society needs”. https://www.npp.lk/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/NPP-Booklet-English.pdf
The document is heavy on economic aspects, less so on state-structure, constitutional reform and the national question. It gives prominence to comprehensive short, medium and economic goals and includes a section on preparing the human resources required for plan implementation. It critiques JR’s Open Economy as the origin of the current malaise and for initiating a culture of greed which bred a select group which benefited from profit, fraud and corrupt business practices, and vested power in a few hands. Features of JR’s policy were ‘financialisation’, austerity, subsidy cuts, nurturing monopolies, excessive borrowing, and the sale of state assets to a favoured coterie; neoliberalism Sri Lanka style. Emphasis on financial markets undermined commodity production says the manifesto and accuses post-independence policy makers of not managing the economy for eco-friendly and people oriented outcomes and failing to even protect the place the country previously occupied in foreign trade. Instead there has been borrowing for narrow political and personal gain of rulers (Hambantota Harbour, Mattala Airport, Mr 10% etc.) but not borrowing for development. The document should have emphasised that a Tourism and Remittance based economy is not production oriented.
The end result, the NPP says is near bankruptcy leaving the country enmeshed in a vicious cycle of debt and foreign currency shortages. The nexus of Manufacturing-Technology-Education-Exports-Foreign Investment targeted at production are all mentioned, but the presentation could have been better integrated. The role of the private sector is noted but employing the state as vehicle to enable entrepreneurship as in China could have been emphasised. Interestingly the document also warns that “The people responsible for creating the debt trap will not be allowed to escape from liabilities”. Hope this is not another empty threat!
In respect of state-structure the NPP urges a strong parliament with a cabinet accountable to parliament and elimination of the executive presidency where power is “arbitrarily concentrated in one person”. The president is to be elected by parliament as the ceremonial head of state and the armed forces. Governance is to be led by the prime minister and the cabinet with checks and balances. The right to recall representatives will be introduced – an important new provision. The separation of power between the executive, legislature and judiciary is to be ensured. What more could any blue-blooded liberal ask for?
The National Question is the Achilles’ heel of all Sinhalese politics because even anti-racist parties know that a bold position regarding minorities will spell their doom. This perception is correct; the core of the problem lies with the Sinhalese people. (It’s well and good for me, not warming a seat in parliament to say this, but which Sinhalese party can say this and hope to win even a few seats?) The LSSP story is a frightening reminder of the truth that eventually it is the people, not the leaders, who make history. NM was prepared to demand ‘Parity of Status’, Colvin raged against Sinhala Only, Reggie Mendis lost a hand at the Town Hall grounds deflecting a bomb thrown by a racist bomb. But then in a decade plus, pressure wore down the Party. Every Sinhalese party has been frightened by such lessons. That my dear countrymen is Lanka!
The programme promises a system of governance that decentralises political and administrative power based on democracy, equal representation, and participation, “affirming the Sri Lankan identity” of all nationalities (sic!). It resolves to make the Provincial Councils efficient institutions – note, not to abolish them. It promises a commission (dear God another god forsaken commission!) with powers to prevent discrimination against any individual or social group based on nationality, religion, caste, language, gender, or sexual orientation – why not the laws of the land do this, I ask? The NPP-JVP promises to take steps to acknowledge cultural differences between different communities and to promote coexistence within this matrix.
The drafters seem to have been in difficult terrain bridging three concepts; liberal democracy, radical rejection of ethnic exclusivity and any notion that Lanka is the land of the Sinhala Buddhists. As a political realist I find the NPP’s phrasing adequate though I will tease it about the missing elephant ‘devolution of power’. The difference from Sajith-SJB is that from personal knowledge of JVPers I know that the Sinhala-JVP of the 1960-70s and the anti-13A Somawansa Amerasinghe JVP of the 1980s, are both gone for good. If you detect any slippage on the national question in this programme blame not the NPP, hold the Sinhalese people to account.
JVP Secretary Tilvin Silva’s Approach
The Party Secretary is the official spokesman and his emphases are significant. What I detect is that Tilvin is, perhaps, concerned not to make too many concessions to liberalism in the economic programme. He emphasises “paradigm shift”. But I am not sure what he means when he critiques “the old State-monopolistic capitalistic system”. Is he referring to the Stalinist centralised universally-planned state economy or the Sirima-NM model of 1970-75? Perhaps both. I agree that a fresh approach to economic problem solving, including an understanding of why the liberal-capitalist model, the Sirima-NM guided model and Stalinist regimented economy all failed is needed. He does not comment on the avatar of the Deng Xiao Ping model as transferred to Vietnam and Mongolia. There is much to learn from these two since there has been substantial manufacturing, economic and export growth, while benefits have percolated down to the people and hence the regimes have sustained public approval.
Here is an extract from Tilvin’s Malima article. “This crisis is now a challenge to the people. Its real cause is not merely factors such as Gotabaya’s personal failure. The real reason for this is the bankrupt and wrong socio-economic system still being followed in the country. Therefore, there is an inescapable challenge to everyone who expects a real and sustainable solution to the crisis. It is defeating the system of roll-over politics and handing over the country to people trusting in various political personalities. Further, reverting back to the old State-monopolistic capitalistic system as a solution to the neo-liberal economic model is also not feasible. What the country is honestly requesting for is a deep and vast paradigm-shift in the socio-economic system. There is no other real solution to this problem.” Tilvin Silva, Malima, 20 Dec 2021; (Available from JVP, 464/20, Pannipitiya Road, Battaramulla. Phones: 0112 785612, 0777 199524, 0714458399, 0718449424).
An ex-LSSP, ex-Vaama comrade
Readers of my column are familiar with the two themes I have been emphasising in recent months: (a) The regime is buckling in a huge crisis; (b) nevertheless it is very dangerous – it cannot be trusted and is prone to military adventurism. This is Comrade Puwakpitiya’s response to my importuning that he pushes both these ideas in the NPP; he is quite close to NPP policymakers. I quote from a recent email.
“I think it is premature. We should consolidate our base at working class and village level so that we can intervene as a powerful force. We do not see a threat of militaristic intervention. The government is too weak at the moment and I do not see any way it can come out of this. If the situation changes, we can reconsider. At the moment there is space for us to work towards an alternative political movement” – Puwakpitiya.
Though he is agreement with my assessment of the mess in government, at the same time he shows naïve underestimation of potential dangers. To wait till the “situation changes” to make defensive alignments is like a man who waits till after his death to take an insurance policy! The costs of an adventure by a regime which cannot “come out” of a disastrous meltdown are too catastrophic to wait till it happens. There are two Christmas season examples on the world’s TV screens right now. The Burmese military is on a rampage of brutal bloody crackdown, rape and murder including indiscriminate airstrikes on Karen and Kachin minorities precisely because the junta is in a social and economic crisis. In Sudan on Christmas Day the military mobilised thousands of troops to spray gunfire on protests against a “government too weak to come out of” its crisis except by such methods. The Sri Lanka military has tasted blood in 1989 and against Tamils in the 30-year civil war. Thus waiting “for the situation to change” is complacent. The costs of complacency will be very high if there if a military venture is attempted (anarchy plus economic, ethnic and civil conflict). What’s the objection to establishing a minimal defensive covenant of the whole opposition right now? How will this obstruct “consolidation of a base at working class and village level”? Why is it an either-or formulation?
Features
Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart
For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.
To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.
Transformation
The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.
Scandal
It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.
Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.
The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.
Failure that is not unique
This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.
The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.
The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.
Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.
If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.
Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.
Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.
The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.
Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.
To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.
The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.
The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.
The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.
Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.
If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.
by Professor Amarasiri de Silva
Features
Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary
The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.
The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.
Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.
“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.
The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.
Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.
“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.
According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.
The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.
“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.
The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.
The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.
The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.
“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.
Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey
Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka
Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.
In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.
The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.
With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.
The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.
Following are excerpts of the interview:
Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.
Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.
Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.
Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.
Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.
Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.
Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.
Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.
Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.
Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.
Q: Are there any future expansion projects?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.
Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.
Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.
By Ifham Nizam
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Business5 days agoSri Lankan scientist-innovator Milinda Edirisinghe introduces AI-integrated gem testing system to gemological world
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Features6 days agoAre threats to Buddha Sasana external or from within?
